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SUMMARY
The purpose of this research was to investigate the implications of networked
public management on the design, implementation, and utilization of federal performance
measurement systems. A multiple, instrumental case study of four public health programs
funded by CDC and implemented nationally through vertical and horizontal network
structures was conducted. Cross-case findings suggest that the networked implementation
structures for the four federal-level, public health programs have important implications
for the design of the performance measurement systems. Specifically, the performance
measurement systems were affected by four consequences of the implementation
networks: the political influence of collaborative stakeholders; network variability;
dependencies on voluntary, horizontal network partners to achieve outputs and outcomes;
and jointly produced outcomes that compromise assigning agency-specific attribution and
accountability. While these four factors did not deter the use of performance
measurement by any of the programs, all had important consequences for the
development and subsequent design of the performance measurement systems, including
limiting the choice and types of measures, level of measurement, potential uses of the
measures, and resources needed to implement and support the systems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this research was to investigate the implications of networked
public management on the design, implementation, and utilization of federal performance
measurement systems through a multiple, instrumental case study of four national public
health programs at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Performance
measurement has gained prominence at CDC over the past 15 years, advanced by the
influence of the New Public Management (NPM) and its accompanying reforms on
national-level public health programs. One emphasis of NPM, which advocates the
integration of corporate values in government, is increased accountability; that is, holding
government programs responsible for achieving program outcomes and demonstrating
their “value added” (Frederickson 2003). Performance measurement, a management tool
involving the ongoing monitoring of indicators of organizational and program
performance (Poister 2003), has been widely promoted and adopted as a tool to enhance
accountability while also contributing to program improvement (Kelly 2002).
Additionally, the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) designated
performance measurement a statutory requirement, mandating that federal agencies
develop annual performance plans and submit annual performance reports inclusive of
performance data.
Because of my responsibilities at CDC related to GPRA and, more recently, the
Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) program assessment and rating tool (PART)
process, I felt compelled to question the implications of the complex public management
context in which public health programs are implemented on the design and
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implementation of federal-level, performance measurement systems. This situation
involves extensive decentralization among vertically-integrated, intergovernmental
partners at the state and local level, as well as private and non-profit agencies that operate
on more horizontal levels. In contrast to the traditional hierarchical approach to
governing, this environment is better described as involving “networks.” Fundamentally,
public health problems reflect the complex intersection of social, environmental,
behavioral, and biological factors (Institute of Medicine 2003), so achieving effective
outcomes necessitates collaboration and coordination among networked partners across a
variety of sectors. In fact, CDC readily acknowledges that no one agency or program can
effectively achieve desired health outcomes and strongly endorses a collaborative
approach in public health practice 1 .
This approach to the delivery of public health services by CDC, a federal
government agency, demonstrates organizations operating in a governance framework.
Governance involves the processes of administration and management in an environment
characterized by multiple societal forces, that is, in a context where broad relationships
exist between government and its political, administrative, and social environment (Kettl
2002; Stoker 1998). A central characteristic of governance involves networks, in which
more traditional, vertical, intergovernmental arrangements exist alongside horizontal,
voluntary associations (Hill and Lynn 2005). Kettl (2002) suggests that networked
governance has emerged, in part, to facilitate more integrated and coordinated service
delivery in response to complex social problems like those in public health. In a report for
the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) Center for The Business of

1

http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/mission.htm. (accessed 02/01/09).
2

Government, Kettl (2005) even highlights CDC as an example of an agency shifting to a
more flexible, networked approach. Empirical studies describing public management in
networked governance structures are just beginning to appear in the literature.
The practice of federal-level performance measurement has primarily been
described based on the traditional view of bureaucratic hierarchy, where established lines
of formal authority and, therefore, accountability, are relatively straightforward
(Frederickson 2003; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Perrin 1998). The implications
of networked governance are noteworthy, especially the severe compromising of
hierarchical authority, which impose new and greater challenges on the design and
implementation of performance measurement, especially at the national level. Frankly,
little research has focused on what Frederickson and Frederickson (2006) suggested is
“the most critical factor accounting for the effectiveness of performance measurement –
third-party government” (p. 10). By better understanding the influence of networked
governance on the design and implementation of federal performance measurement
systems, its use as a management tool may be improved in the future. Subsequently, this
research contributes to a fledgling theory building in the area of performance
measurement (Jennings and Haist 2004), an undertaking encouraged by some key leaders
in the field (Wholey 1999).
In this first chapter, relevant background supporting the dissertation study is
provided. An important research gap is identified and the research purpose is stated. In
addition, background is provided on CDC, where the research was conducted, the
theoretical basis for the research is provided, and the research questions are detailed.
Finally, a brief summary of the methodology is included.
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1.1 Background
1.1.1 The Emergence of Networked Governance
Since the early 1990s, “governance” has emerged as a new organizing concept for
public administration and management in response to various social and political
influences (Agranoff and McGuire 2001a; Frederickson and Smith 2003). The term
governance has been part of common parlance for decades, but more recently, the term
has been used to describe a meaningful shift in how we are governing (Frederickson and
Smith 2003). Indeed, governance has emerged as an organizing framework intended to
capture an important turn in the practice of public administration and management, that
is, the processes of governing (Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004). In particular, the more
recent focus on governance signals a change in the relationship between the state and
society and reflects the broader relationships that exist between government and its
political, administrative, and social environment (Kettl 2002). This view of governance
recognizes that government operates within a vast environment of multiple societal forces
rather than viewing it as a ‘stand alone’ institution (Stoker 1998).
Governance provides the overall context for this study for two reasons. First, a
dominant feature of governance involves third parties and networks (Lynn, Heinrich, and
Hill 2000). Within the governance framework, the government’s work is carried out, in
part, through interdependent networks rather than traditional hierarchy alone. In
governance, it is networks, rather than the formal institutions of government, that
dominate public policy and are increasingly responsible for delivering public services
(Frederickson and Smith 2003; Milward and Provan 2006; Peters and Pierre 1998).
Second, using governance as the context for this study reflects the larger backdrop within
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which NPM, with its emphasis on results and its promotion of performance measurement,
is practiced. Governance, then, provides the overall political and organizational context
for this study and, as such, becomes relevant in our understanding about how networked
management affects the practice of performance measurement.
Scholars have suggested that the move to networked governance is associated, in
part, with the devolution of government as a direct provider of public programs to the
“hollow state,” a situation in which policy implementation is dominated by third parties
(Boyt 2005; Milward and Provan 2000). As noted earlier, networks may also have
emerged as potentially more effective organizational structures to support the
collaborative relationships necessary to address complex social problems (Agranoff and
McGuire 2001b; Keast et al. 2004; O’Toole 1997). Harmon and Mayer (1986) dubbed
these “wicked” problems, those complex problems influenced by a variety of often
interrelated factors. Such problems demand coordinated responses across sectors and
levels of government in order to assure integration and efficiency in the delivery of varied
programs and services (Agranoff and McGuire 2001a).
Consequently, a networked model of governance has emerged and public policy
implementation now occurs in the context of actors who are mutually dependent and who
are linked by a web of relationships between various organizations, sectors, and levels of
government (Salamon 2002). In this environment, government represents just one of
many actors and institutions involved in addressing issues and concerns of the polity
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001a). This shift has led to what Kettl (2002) has termed the
“fuzzy boundaries” problem wherein new challenges are posed by the loss of hierarchy’s
clear lines of responsibility and the state’s loss of sole authority. In a network model,
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interdependent relationships exist between the state and other third-party actors from the
private and non-profit sectors resulting in power dependencies (Stoker 1998). These
interdependencies imply that in a networked context, government loses its capacity for
direct control and must rely on strategies of influence and leverage (Peters 2001).
However, as Milward and Provan (2006) suggest, “networks have proven to be a very
valuable public management tool . . . because they are the only organizational forms that
can operate horizontally, across a range of organizations, and integrate the strengths and
talents of a variety of organizations in the public, nonprofit, and for-profit sectors to
effectively address critical public problems” (p. 7).
Additionally, the collaborative approach inherent in networked governance
reflects the recognition that outcomes, both individual and organizational, result from the
actions of varied actors addressing a multitude of factors that are contributing to the
problem. For results to be achieved in this context, leaders must effectively collaborate
across public, private, and non-profit sectors as well as across levels of government
(Abramson, Breul, Kamensky 2006). This structure presents what has been called the
“joint production problem,” the challenge of coordinating program implementation across
a potentially broad and decentralized service implementation network, each with its own
goals and priorities (Milward and Provan 2004). As noted above, it is well recognized
that a complex interplay of factors contribute to public health problems and that
representatives from various sectors and levels of government must be engaged to
effectively address them.
But both the fuzzy boundary and joint production problems lead to a central
challenge or dilemma of governance, that of accountability (Kettl 2002; Peters and Pierre
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1998; Stoker 1998). In fact, challenges to accountability abound in networks as program
implementation is decentralized, traditional hierarchical authority is compromised,
political resources are shared, and monitoring channels are diffused and become
unreliable (Goldsmith and Eggers 2005; O’Toole 1997; Peters 2001; Posner 2002).
Melissa Stone expressed valid concerns about accountability in these contexts asking,
“How must we conceptualize accountability when the actual implementers of public
policy are removed from government agencies and have their own notions of to whom
and for what they are accountable?” (Cited in Boyt 2005, 537).
1.1.2 NPM and the Rise of Performance Measurement
At the same time that networked governance has achieved higher levels of
prominence, performance measurement, with an emphasis on outcomes, also has gained
attention given the results-based management reforms of recent years associated with
NPM (Behn 2003; Jennings and Haist 2004). NPM emerged in the late 1980s and early
1990s; Osborne and Gaebler’s 1992 best seller, Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, is seen as a leading text for the
movement. NPM advocates that government adopt market-based approaches perceived as
more efficient and effective (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Peters and Pierre (1998)
suggested that in contrast to governance, which is process-oriented and based in
democratic theory, NPM is more appropriately viewed as an ideological movement
emphasizing responsibility and accountability through a focus on outcomes and results.
They argue that NPM and governance are distinct approaches with a number of
fundamental differences (Peters and Pierre 1998). The principles of NPM have been
widely adopted in practice and translated into government reform that emphasizes
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decentralized government, increased contracting through third parties, and an expanded
use of policy tools 2 to increase competition (Frederickson and Smith 2003). In fact, these
three aspects of NPM are likely to support a networked governance structure.
In contrast to governance, where accountability is seen as problematic, NPM
claims it as a particular strength (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Peters and Pierre 1998).
Outcome-based performance is so central to NPM that it is often recognized as “resultsoriented government.” Because of its emphasis on outcomes over processes or outputs as
a means to assess policy implementation, NPM shifts the focus of accountability from the
elected official to the administrator, holding public managers responsible for results
(Dubnick 2005). NPM’s emphasis on results and accountability led to a defining moment
for the movement, the passing of the 1993 GPRA (Light 1997). GPRA was intended to
primarily addresses perceived weaknesses in government management and introduce
greater accountability for results (Frederickson 2003; GAO 2004).
The influence of NPM and GPRA has spurred what some have viewed as an
“accountability movement” characterized by the widespread implementation of
performance measurement systems (Behn 2003; Blalock and Barnow 2001; Coplin,
Merget, and Bourdeaux 2002; Grizzle 2002; Radin 2006; Schick 2001). Through the
influence of NPM, performance measurement is now recognized as a fundamental public
administrative reform (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Kelly 2002; Radin 2006).
While evidence of the effectiveness of performance measurement is still mixed, it has
been widely adopted and supported in practice (Barry 2000; Hatry 1997; Kelly 2002;
Turnock 2000; Wholey 2002). In addition, there has been substantial political and policy
2

Policy tools or instruments reflect the activities performed by a federal agency to
address public problems or achieve objectives (Frederickson 2001; Salamon 2002).
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impetus for performance measurement, such as GPRA and its inclusion in former
President Bush’s Presidential Management Agenda (PMA) PART (GAO 2005). The
overriding benefit and promise of performance measurement is its contribution toward
more sound public management, including increased accountability and transparency.
“What gets measured gets done,” and, “You can’t manage what you don’t measure,” are
common adages reflecting the potential of performance measurement to support
improved management and leadership (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Poister (2003)
suggests that the inherent logic of performance measurement engenders support for it: “
… performance measurement systems provide incentives for organizations and programs
to perform at higher levels, and this is the core of the logic underlying the use of
monitoring systems as performance management tools” (p. 99).

1.2 Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study
In a report from the IBM Center for the Business of Government (Abramson,
Breul, and Kamensky 2006), performance management and network governance are
identified as two of six trends transforming government. Both represent central features
of contemporary public management. Researchers have suggested, however, that
performance measurement is based on assumptions rooted in a hierarchical model of
bureaucracy (Frederickson 2003; Perrin 1998; Radin 2006), implying that its practice has
largely been described based on a context where accountability structures are
considerably more fixed than in a networked model. As previously noted, the NPM
reforms emphasize results-based performance measurement as a means for assuring
accountability (Jennings and Haist 2004). Unfortunately, the performance measurement
literature has only begun to address the design and implementation of performance
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measurement systems in networked environments (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006;
Goddard and Mannion 2004; Mandell and Keast 2006; Voets, De Rynck, and Wouter
2006). And, as noted above, accountability has been identified as one of the greatest
challenges facing networked governance. Radin (2006) has suggested that advocates of
performance measurement make a number of assumptions that goals can be clearly
defined and are the responsibility of specific actors, outcomes can be quantified and
measured, data are available and accurate, and an actor will have authority to act on the
results. These assumptions and their implications for the practice of performance
measurement are compromised in the networked context. As reflected in the title of this
dissertation, a potential conflict emerges when accountability for results meets a
networked context (Milward and Provan 2006; Radin 2006).
Given such challenges, the design and implementation of federal performance
measurement systems is likely more difficult in networked than hierarchical settings.
And, while much has been written about the NPM reforms and the centrality of
performance measurement to improved public management and accountability, the
literature does not address the tensions and/or opportunities created based on its use in a
framework of networked governance. Because of this gap in the literature, the purpose
of this research was to investigate the implications of networked public management
on the design, implementation, and utilization of federal performance measurement
systems through a multiple, instrumental case study of four national public health
programs at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
The proposed research builds on earlier work by David Frederickson (2003), a
qualitative grounded theory study of GPRA’s implementation in five U.S. Health and
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Human Services (HHS) agencies Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA),
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), National Institutes for Health
(NIH), Indian Health Services (IHS), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Although Frederickson started the study intending to explore how these five agencies
measure their performance under GPRA, the research evolved in focus to trying to better
understand how well these agencies measure third party performance (Frederickson and
Frederickson 2006). His findings were important because he identified a number of
factors influencing the implementation of federal performance measurement suggesting
that third-party governance and “network articulation 3 ,” were the most influential factors
(Frederickson and Frederickson 2006).
This dissertation research extends and builds on Frederickson’s work. It is
intended to provide a better understanding of how federal public health programs are
grappling with the challenges posed by networked governance in developing programspecific, performance measurement systems. Based on the research, recommendations are
made to enhance the future use of performance measurement in federal public health
programs implemented in networked environments. In addition, this research contributes
to early theory building in the area of performance measurement initiated by Jennings
and Haist (2004).

1.3 Study Context: CDC’s National Public Health Programs
CDC, an agency of HHS, is the nation’s leading public health institution. Several
of CDC’s national public health programs provide rich examples of initiatives committed
3

Frederickson and Frederickson (2006) define articulated as “extent to which separate
organizations or institutions in a network are coupled, fit together, linked, or combined
and the nature and quality of those connections,” (p. 8).
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to strengthening their use of performance measurement while being implemented through
a networked governance model. Like other federal agencies, CDC has been influenced by
NPM through both GPRA and PART and has worked to develop strategic plans and
related performance measurement systems. Staff at CDC have developed and reported
GPRA measures, programs have been reviewed by OMB’s PART process, and evaluators
have developed program-specific performance measurement systems for varied purposes.
Goal-based strategic planning efforts are also underway at the agency level, an effort seen
as generally reinforcing performance management efforts at CDC.
In addition, CDC increasingly relies on networks and partnerships to solve
multifaceted public health problems. Such problems involve social, medical, economic,
political, and moral dimensions which require multiple-level responses addressing
individuals, communities, and populations. CDC’s “Future’s Initiative” is a recent
leadership effort to both increase CDC’s capacity to effectively collaborate with and
leverage its partners while also improving accountability. Under this initiative, CDC has
defined six key strategies to guide its work including two that align with the prominent
issues of this study: (1) emphasizing leadership through leveraging partnerships and
networks and (2) stressing accountability to sustain public trust and confidence 4 .
Accountability is further emphasized as one of CDC’s three core values in conjunction
with respect and integrity 5 . Other federal organizations support CDC’s priorities
including a 2003 report from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) (IOM 2003). In that report,
IOM calls for constructing an intersectoral public health system based on collaborative

4

http://www.cdc.gov/osi/goals/strategicimperatives.html (accessed 02/02/09).
5 http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/mission.htm (accessed 02/02/09).
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arrangements that emphasize partnerships and networks (IOM 2003). This
recommendation is not intended to disregard the importance of the traditional,
intergovernmental pubic health structure that is comprised of federal, state, and local
health agencies. From a constitutional and historical perspective, state and local agencies
have a central responsibility in assuring the public’s health (IOM 2003). In fact, many of
CDC’s federal public health programs are structured around the decentralized,
intergovernmental relationships that exist between CDC and its state partners, who in
turn, frequently fund public health agencies at more local levels.
There is, however, an increasing emphasis at CDC to employ mechanisms, often
informal, that engage other sectors in addressing public health concerns. The premise
underlying this broader networked approach is two-fold. First, it is expected that strategic
collaboration will ensure that greater resources of all kinds (e.g., monetary, expertise, inkind contributions) are brought to bear on the problem. And second, due to the potential
of partner-generated synergy, networked approaches are more likely to have greater
influence on health outcomes than what government could accomplish alone. It is
noteworthy that the public health literature acknowledges the importance of partnerships
and coalitions in achieving public health goals that require resources and capabilities
beyond any single agency or sector (Lasker, Weiss, Miller 2001; Shortell 2002;
Wandersman, Goodman, and Butterfoss 1997). While the move to a broader, networked
public management approach is considered advancement for the field of public health, it
also underscores the complexity of applying performance measurement to federal-level,
public health programs.
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As noted above, CDC typically implements national public health programs
through decentralized, intergovernmental relationships. Some CDC programs support
upwards of sixty or more grantees (e.g., CDC’s National Breast and Cervical Cancer
Early Detection Program and National Diabetes Prevention and Control Program). Most
often, cooperative funding agreements, a type of grant, are used as a policy tool, a choice
that provides grantees some discretion in program implementation. The “cooperative”
nature of the policy tool provides program-level managers greater flexibility to structure
programs in ways best suited to the needs and culture of their communities while
preserving some level of control for CDC. This reinforces a long standing tradition in
public health of more localized, public health service delivery.
In addition, based on CDC’s institutional priorities for increased collaboration,
many CDC funding announcements encourage or even mandate broad partnerships at the
state and local level aimed at increasing coordinated efforts across networks. For
instance, as part of CDC’s National Comprehensive Cancer Control Program (NCCCP),
health departments facilitate comprehensive, state-, tribe-, or territorial-wide planning for
cancer prevention and control. Planning efforts typically engage state and local public
health agencies, representatives of the health care and pharmaceutical industries, leading
non-profit organizations such as the American Cancer Society (ACS) and Lance
Armstrong Association, universities and other research institutions, cancer treatment
centers, and so forth. Goals established by these planning groups often reflect the need
for diverse implementation approaches on the part of coalition members. Although these
networks are more informal in nature than some described in the network management
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literature (e.g., Milward and Provan 1998; Milward and Provan 2006), they provide an
example of public health programs implemented in a networked context.
In summary, CDC’s public health programs provide the opportunity to explore the
confluence of networked governance and performance measurement. As described above,
in order to more effectively address the “wicked” public health problems facing our
country and the globe more broadly, CDC is increasingly adopting networked public
management approaches. At the same time, federal programs are struggling to develop
and implement effective and useful performance measurement systems to answer calls
for accountability in this more complex context.

1.4 Theoretical Framework
Although the literature related to performance measurement is vast, little effort
has been undertaken to develop related theory (Frederickson 2003; Jennings and Haist
2002, 2004). More recently, however, Edward Jennings and Meg Haist (2004) have made
an effort intended to encourage systematic empirical research. In a chapter of The Art of
Governance: Analyzing Management and Administration, edited by Patricia Ingraham
and Laurence Lynn (2004), Jennings and Haist propose twenty-five hypotheses
predicting the impact of performance measurement. Their work is positioned in a larger
logic or framework of governance that is proposed by Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill in the
book’s first chapter.
The logic of governance offered by Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn (2004) suggests that
outcomes or outputs (i.e., performance) are a function of five general classes of variables
environment, consumer characteristics, treatments, structures, and managerial roles or
actions. That is, P = E + C + T + S + M. The authors clarify that they are not offering a
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theory per se, “but rather an organizing device for conceptualizing and interpreting
empirical research,” (Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004, p. 7). Given this model, Jennings
and Haist recognize that performance management falls under the managerial efforts (i.e.,
“M”) as a mediator of performance. The authors noted, “The broad features of the
governance model suggest that performance measurement or management is only one of
many factors that shape the impacts of a policy. As such, the effects are likely to be at the
margin” (Jennings and Haist 2004, p. 175).
In offering their hypotheses for performance measurement, Jennings and Haist
build on earlier work by both Gormley and Weimer (1999) and Dixit (2002). Gormley
and Weimer draw their theoretical ideas about performance measurement from literature
related to accountability, incentives, and competition. Dixit’s work (2002) is primarily
drawn from literature exploring the role of incentives, that is, how a focus on results via
performance measures serves as an incentive to influence and direct performance.
Jennings and Haist’s twenty-five hypotheses for future empirical study consider
incentives and accountability (nine hypotheses), organizational characteristics (eight
hypotheses), political context (three hypotheses), agency type (three hypotheses), and
leadership (two hypotheses). See appendix A for a full listing of the twenty-five proposed
hypotheses.
Given my particular research interests and the intended study context, I have used
two of three hypotheses offered by Jennings and Haist related to agency type as a
theoretical basis for this study. These two hypotheses were developed based on James Q.
Wilson’s (1989) typology of four agency types: production, procedural, craft, and coping
agencies. This well-known typology incorporates two dimensions, one related to whether
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outputs are observable and another to whether outcomes are observable. Feller (2002)
also cites Wilson in pointing to the relevance of organizational production characteristics
on performance measurement systems.
Production agencies have observable outputs and outcomes (e.g., postal service)
while craft agencies have outputs that are difficult to discern but observable outcomes
(e.g., Army Corp of Engineers). Outputs and outcomes are both difficult to observe in
coping agencies (e.g., police departments). And in procedural agencies, outputs are
evident, but agencies are challenged to attribute outcomes to their efforts. CDC is an
example of a procedural agency, in that outputs can be observed but outcomes are
typically difficult to observe and/or not easily attributable to the agency. For instance,
one can easily count the number of cooperative agreements, contracts, or grants (i.e.,
outputs) that CDC awards to partner agencies. However, observing outcomes based on
those outputs is more difficult. First, as noted above, it is a more complicated proposition
to suggest that eventual changes in longer-term outcomes, such as morbidity or mortality,
are attributable solely to CDC, especially given the nature of public health problems and
the networked contexts of interest here. In reality, health outcomes are influenced by
multiple factors; therefore, they are more likely the result of many different interventions
and environmental factors. Next, several of CDC’s prevention programs, which count
incidents of disease, accidents, or suicides that are avoided, are typically problematic if
not impossible to measure. Finally, many public health outcomes, such as changes in
morbidity and mortality, take years to achieve, another factor moderating the ability to
observe agency outcomes.
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In table 1 below, Jennings and Haist revise Wilson’s typology to offer the
expected impact of performance measurement for each agency type (Jennings & Haist
2004, p. 185). Jennings and Haist define “observability” in two ways – the ability to
measure outputs and outcomes and the ability to attribute outcomes to a particular
agency.

Table 1. Expected Impact of Performance Measures by Type of Agency 6
Outputs Observed
Outcomes
Observed

Outputs Unobserved

Production Agency:
Substantive impact is clear;
performance measures likely to
be used and to have impact.

Outcomes
Procedural Agency: Substantive
Unobserved impact on procedures or
outputs, but may be difficult to
assess whether outcomes are
impacted by performance
measurement-driven changes in
outputs being measured.
Attention will focus on
efficiency, and the relationship
of inputs to outputs.

6

Craft Agency: Because outputs are
difficult to observe (and therefore to
control), expectation is for symbolic
impact or the adoption of outcomefocused performance incentive systems
as a means of improving agency
effectiveness.
Coping Agency: Because neither outputs
nor outcomes can be observed, indirect
measures may be used; however,
impacts will be unclear or measures will
be at the activity level.

Copyright 2004 by Georgetown University Press. Edward T. Jennings and Meg Patrick
Haist, "Putting Performance Measurement in Context". From The Art of Governance:
Analyzing Management and Administration, Patricia W. Ingraham and Laurence E. Lynn
Jr., Editors, p. 185. Figure 8.2: Expected Impact of Performance Measures, by Type of
Agency. Reprinted with permission. www.press.georgetown.edu.
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Jennings and Haist’s first two hypotheses organized around agency type are
derived directly from the table above and are based on the premise that the use and
impact of performance measurement is affected by the extent to which (1) outputs and
outcomes can be observed and attributable to the agency and (2) the extent to which
outcomes are controlled by the agency. However, the authors also recognize that political
influences may override the actual ability of agencies to control outcomes. For instance,
although strong political rhetoric demands schools’ accountability for results, student
outcomes are extremely difficult to attribute to a particular educational institution or
program (Jennings and Haist 2004).
The first two hypotheses are as follows:
H1: “The extent to which performance measures are used and the types of
measures used will depend on the degree to which outputs and outcomes can be
observed” (Jennings and Haist 2004, 185).
H2: “Measurement will be more common and will have greater impact when
agencies have greater control over outcomes” (Jennings and Haist 2004, 185).
The third hypothesis relates to the extent to which measures are consistent with
the agency’s task and goals. There are different types of performance measures, some
that focus on processes and others on program outputs and outcomes. Jennings and Haist
(2004) suggest that the choice of what types of measures to include in any given
performance measurement system will depend, in part, on which types best reflect
whether the agency is achieving its mission. Their third hypothesis is as follows:
H3: “The impact of performance measurement depends on the design of a set of
measures appropriate to agency tasks and goals” (Jennings and Haist 2004, 185).
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These three hypotheses provide a constructive, theoretical focus and offer
valuable direction for this research. Together, the hypotheses emphasize the potential
influence of organizational context and function on the design and impact of performance
measurement. This seems a useful point of departure to explore the implications of
networked public management on the design and implementation of federal performance
measurement systems in public health. In particular, one observed limitation of Jennings
and Haist’s work is their lack of explicit attention to either the decentralized nature of
social programs in the public sector or to the increasing emergence of networked
governance. This shortcoming has been noted by others (Frederickson and Frederickson
2006). None of the twenty-five hypotheses, or in fact any of their chapter’s text,
explicitly addresses the reality of decentralized implementation structures characteristic
of many public programs, including those at CDC. The three hypotheses highlighted
above account for agency type or function, but are not particularly attendant to varied
implementation structures. This weakness is not limited to the work of Jennings and
Haist; neither GPRA nor much of the vast literature on performance measurement
addresses the complexities imposed on performance measurement by more complex
implementation structures. This limitation in the theory development work of Jennings
and Haist, however, invites an opportunity for this research to contribute to their theory
building by extending on their theoretical propositions.
On a more pragmatic level, the research contributes to a better understanding of
the development and implementation of performance measurement in highly
decentralized environments. For instance, the first hypothesis is based on the assertion
that performance measurement is more likely to be used and to have a greater impact in
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agencies where outputs and outcomes can be observed (and are attributable to the
program or agency). Based on this proposition, Jennings and Haist (2004) suggest that
production agencies (e.g., sanitation) will more frequently and effectively use
performance measurement than, say, coping agencies (e.g., police department) or
procedural agencies (e.g., public health) where outputs and outcomes are not easily
attributable to the agency. How then, do network contexts, in which outcomes are more
often the result of cooperative efforts and accountability is highly fragmented, affect the
use of performance measurement, the types of measures employed, and its perceived
impact?
The second hypothesis suggests that performance measures are less likely to be
applied and to have less effect in organizations where control over outcomes is weak
(Jennings and Haist 2004). In networked environments, the role of public management
shifts from a focus on command and control to one based on negotiation and bargaining
(Agranoff and McGuire 2001a; Milward and Provan 2006). Cooperative strategies
become necessary to facilitate coordinated responses that are needed to more effectively
address social problems. Consequently, and as noted earlier, networks involve
interdependencies among agencies and partners, and these interdependencies further
compromise government’s authority over agencies and programs (Peters 2001). What
then are the effects on performance measurement of these interdependencies and the
decreased level of control over program outcomes?
Finally, the third hypothesis relates to the idea that performance measures will
reflect the agency’s function. Therefore, even in today’s political climate where outcomes
are emphasized, an agency focused on service delivery may value indicators of process
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over outcome measures (Jennings and Haist 2004). How, then, are performance
measurement systems structured to reflect the agency tasks and goals in a networked
context?

1.5 Research Questions
Given the purpose of the research and the theoretical framework described above,
three research questions were developed to guide the study. The research questions
reflect the dominant feature driving the research, helping to maintain attention to the
major concerns of the study and attending to the complexity and contextuality of the case
(Stake 1995). The three research questions are directly derived from the first two
hypotheses above. These research questions, along with the theoretical hypotheses above,
guided all aspects of the research, focusing both data collection and analysis.
•

How does networked public management affect the observability of CDC
program outputs and outcomes?

•

How does networked public management influence CDC’s use of performance
measurement and the types of performance measures used?

•

How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement?

1.6 Overview of Methodology and Scope of Study
Two key characteristics of qualitative research include its aim at understanding
and description as well as its focus on context and process (Denzin and Lincoln 2000;
Peshkin 1993). For this study, qualitative research methods are particularly suitable given
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the interest to better understand and describe the implications of network public
management environments (context) for the development and implementation of
performance measurement systems (process). Qualitative methods allow an in-depth
exploration of the relevant processes and contextual influences reflected in Jennings and
Haist’s three hypotheses (Miles and Huberman 1994). These methods are also
appropriate given the limited understanding of the role of networked contexts on
performance measurement evident in the extant literature. The field currently lacks the
depth of understanding needed to support a quantitative study exploring the influence of
specific variables that could be used to make broader generalizations through statistical
analysis.
Case study is most appropriate when the nature of the research addresses
questions of “how” and “what” and is consistent with the research questions posed above
(Creswell 2007). Recognizing the importance of context to the practice of performance
measurement, Joseph Wholey (1999), a long-time leader in the field of policy evaluation,
has encouraged the conduct of case study research, particularly cross-case analysis, to
develop related theory and improve practice. Within the traditions of qualitative research,
case study has been increasingly utilized in public administration and public health
research (Brower, Abolafia, and Carr 2000; Ulin, Robinson, and Tolley 2005). Case
study research is especially valuable to capture individual differences from one program
setting to another or from one program experience to another (Patton 2002; Stake 2006).
Although several approaches to case study have been described (Merriam 1998;
Stake 1995, 2006; Yin 2009), Stake’s methodology was used given its wide use, his
attention to the inclusion of multiple cases, and his specification of unique case study
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approaches. Stake (1995, 2006) differentiates between intrinsic and instrumental case
studies. While intrinsic case study aims to understand a particular case, instrumental case
study is used to gain broader insight; that is, the case becomes “instrumental” in
understanding something broader than the individual case. Multiple case study attempts
to broaden instrumental understanding by including more than one case (Stake 2000).
The aim of this research was to better understand the development and implementation of
performance measurement in networked contexts rather than to understand aspects of a
particular “case” per se. Therefore, a multiple, instrumental case study design was used.
A detailed description of the methodology is included in chapter 3.

1.7 Summary
A growing number of programs including those in STD, preparedness, tobacco,
and cancer, have shifted to emphasizing collaboration within networks as a means to
achieve public health goals. This model of networked governance reflects the realities
imposed by complex public health problems that require coordinated responses across
agencies and sectors in order to effectively address them. Not only does CDC’s
leadership endorse this approach, it recognizes the importance of accountability and
transparency in government. Toward that end, performance measurement has been
increasingly adopted across CDC and the wider government as a performance
management tool supporting accountability.
This research explored the implications of networked public management on the
design and implementation of federal-level performance measurement systems. As noted
earlier, performance measurement and networks have been identified as two of the six
leading trends transforming government today. Given that performance measurement has
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been principally described based on a hierarchical view of public management and that
accountability has been cited as the greatest challenge within networked governance, a
need emerged to explore the potential difficulties this intersection of context and practice
presents. The literature has only begun to explore this issue. Initial theory building
proposed by Jennings and Haist (2002, 2004) provides a valuable framework to help
guide this investigation. Of Jennings and Haist’s twenty-five proposed hypotheses, three
based on agency type shaped the development of this study’s research questions.
Given the fledgling state of research in the area of performance measurement as
applied in networked public management environments, a multiple, instrumental case
study was used to gain valuable understanding. Four “cases” of federal-funded public
health programs administered by CDC were included and traditional qualitative methods
were applied for data collection and analysis. By better understanding the influence of
networked governance on the design and implementation of federal performance
measurement systems for four public health programs administered by CDC,
recommendations for future practice were developed. In addition, the research
contributed to expanding the theoretical development that has been initiated by Jennings
and Haist.

25

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This study is informed by relevant literature in performance measurement, public
health, and networked management. Broader concepts, most prominently, governance
and New Public Management (NPM) offer important contextual understanding helping to
frame the proposed study. In the first part of this chapter, literatures related to
governance, NPM, and the performance movement are all introduced. In the second part
of the chapter, empirical and other literature related to performance measurement, public
health, and networked management are presented.

2.1 Governance
The term governance has been part of common parlance for decades, but more
recently, the term has been used to describe a meaningful shift in how we are governing
(Frederickson and Smith 2003). Indeed, governance has emerged as an organizing
framework intended to capture an important turn in the practice of public administration
and management, that is, the processes of governing (Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004). In
particular, the more recent focus on governance signals a change in the relationship
between the state and society and reflects the broader relationships that exist between
government and its political, administrative, and social environment (Kettl 2002). This
particular view of governance recognizes that government operates within an
environment of multiple societal forces rather than viewing it as a ‘stand alone’
institution (Stoker 1998). This perspective also suggests that society is departing from the
more traditional view of government with its “assumptions of a collective public interest,
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hierarchical authority that compels compliance with mandates, and separation between
politics and public administration” (Stone and Ostrower 2006, 5).
Although definitional consensus for the term governance is lacking, Heinrich and
Lynn (2000) in their 2000 text, Governance and Performance, defined governance as
“regimes of laws, administrative rules, judicial rulings, and practices that constrain,
prescribe, and enable government activities, where such activity is broadly defined as the
production and delivery of publicly supported goods and services” (p. 3). Given that any
particular governance regime involves compromise and bargaining across the competing
interests, priorities, and values of varied stakeholders, the Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill
(2000) suggest that governance is an inherently political concept, a view purported earlier
by Peters and Pierre (1998) and Stoker (1998). More simply, Kettl (2002) suggested,
“Government refers to the structure and function of public institutions. Governance is the
way government gets its job done” (p. xi).
As noted in chapter one, governance provides the overall context for this study for
two reasons. First, a dominant feature of governance involves third parties and networks
(Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000). Within the governance framework, the government’s
work is carried out, in part, through interdependent networks rather than traditional
hierarchy alone. In governance, it is collaborative networks, rather than the formal
institutions of government, that dominate public policy and are increasingly responsible
for delivering public services (Frederickson and Smith 2003; Peters and Pierre 1998).
The second reason for using governance as context for this study is that it reflects the
larger backdrop within which NPM, with its emphasis on results and its promotion of
performance measurement, is practiced. In fact, performance or accountability for results
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is often specified as the dependent variable to be explained by governance dimensions
(Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004; Stone and Ostrower 2007). Governance, then, provides
the overall political and organizational context for this study and, as such, becomes
relevant in our understanding about how networked management affects the practice of
performance measurement.
Although the field recognizes that the concept of governance currently lacks a
causal theory (Frederickson and Smith 2003), some academics have attempted to describe
it in more explicit terms. For instance, Pierre and Peters (2005) propose five distinct
modes of governance, each based on a unique model of state and society interaction, that
are currently operational in existing democratic systems. Stone and Ostrower (2007)
identify three features of governance. Stoker (1998) offers a list of five propositions that
help describe the concept of governance. Salamon (2002) emphasizes the tools of policy
implementation as he identifies five key concepts of governance. Salamon argues that the
unit of analysis in the study of governance has shifted from the public agency or program
to the tools of governance. Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn (2004) assume a multidisciplinary
approach in conceptualizing governance as an expanded view of public administration.
These various characterizations of governance are distinct, yet they have much in
common including their emphasis of the following: the actors involved; the
organizational context comprised predominantly of networks; the tools for policy
implementation; the processes of governance; accountability challenges; and the
recognition of the multitude of factors potentially influencing results. These
characteristics overlap to some extent, but are helpful nonetheless in enhancing our
understanding of governance. Each is described in greater detail below.
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2.1.1 Actors
As mentioned previously, governance involves two principal actors, the state and
society. This simple dichotomy, however, belies greater complexity, particularly for the
state. While the state is commonly divided by policy areas or “stovepipes” and levels
(i.e., multilevel governance comprised of federal, state, county, and city factions as in the
U.S.), society is differentiated by various private and non-profit sectors each with varied
goals (Pierre and Peters 2005). The important point here is that governance involves
actors and institutions that are drawn well beyond government alone (Stoker 1998).
Pierre and Peters (2005) proposed five distinct modes of governance, each based
on a unique model of state and society interaction, that are currently operational in
democratic systems. Although the authors describe each model based on a set of
characteristics, the most prominent criteria involves the balance of power between the
social and public sector actors. The models cover a continuum from intensive
government involvement and control to nearly no involvement. On one end of the
continuum sits the “Etatiste” model in which government is assumed to be the principal
actor and is able to control the involvement of other social actors, usually keeping their
participation at a minimum. At the other end of the continuum resides the model titled,
“Governance without Government;” scholars argue that this model is characterized by
“self-steering government arrangements” controlled primarily by private actors (Pierre
and Peters 2005, 12). Stoker (1998) also suggested that governance involves
“autonomous self-governing networks of actors” (p. 18). This metaphor of governance
without government is similar to that of the “hollow state,” a characterization which
implies a shift in focus from traditional public administrative practice within a
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bureaucratic state to one that recognizes the loss of state power to other social actors in
the policy process (Milward and Provan 2000).
In the governance without government model, the state is viewed as having lost
its legitimacy, is less relevant to the policy process, and has, therefore, lost its capacity to
govern (Pierre and Peters 2005). In between the etatiste and governance without
government models, Pierre and Peters (2005) described three other models (i.e., liberaldemocratic, state-centric, and the Dutch governance school models) that reflect shades of
this balance between the public and private realms participating in contemporary
governance activities.
Given the varied actors involved in governance, Stoker (1998) suggests that there
has been a blurring of responsibilities and boundaries in addressing social and economic
issues. This is similar to Kettl’s (2002) articulation of “fuzzy boundaries” inherent in
governance based on the involvement of different actors and their changing roles. The
fuzzy boundaries represent the challenges posed by the loss of traditional hierarchy’s
clear lines of responsibility and the state’s loss of sole authority. Kettl identifies a number
of “fuzzy boundaries” related to the multitude of actors that are relevant for program
management and suggests, “The fuzzy boundary problem confounds the central task of
administration building coordinated efforts to solve complex problems” (p. 59).
2.1.2 Organizational Context Comprised of Networks
As mentioned earlier, a defining feature of governance involves organizational
networks and their role in dominating public policy (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000;
Pierre and Peters 1998; Salamon 2002; Stoker 1998). Frederickson and Smith (2003)
state, “Governance is the modern theory of network management” (p. 125). Peters and
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Pierre (1998) suggest that the prominence of networks in governance has occurred, in
part, because of the de-legitimization of the state due to its perceived bureaucratic, slow,
and seemingly unresponsive nature. Salamon (2002) argues that today’s emphasis on
indirect policy tools has also contributed to the increasing role of networks in
governance. And, as noted earlier, others suggest that networks have evolved to more
effectively tackle complex public management problems that demand a collective and
coordinated response (Agranoff and McGuire 2001b; Milward and Provan 2006; O’Toole
1997).
In a governance framework, networks involve interdependent relationships
between the state and other third-party actors from the private and non-profit sectors.
Although the state acts as an important partner in the network, it is conceptualized as just
one of the interdependent actors. As noted in the section above, Pierre and Peters (2005)
describe varied models of governance differentiated, in part, by the strength (or lack
thereof) of the state’s power in this balance. Of relevance here, is that in a governance
framework, power dependencies exists within the relationships involved in the collective
action of the network (Stoker 1998).
Given the network’s composition and power differentials, the straightforward
command and control administrative mechanisms of the past are compromised by the fact
that varied organizations now control some of the traditional tasks of government
(Milward and Provan 2006). In a governance relationship, various organizations may
dominate certain processes, but no one agency can easily command given that problems
are no longer controlled within the boundaries of one agency (Milward and Provan 2006;
Stoker 1998). Subsequently, a mutual resource dependency is created among network
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partners, including those from the public sector, whereby a single organization (i.e., the
state) cannot command but is more often dependent on the compliance of the other
participating actors (Peters and Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998).
However, hierarchical relations with command and control structures are not
entirely replaced by a configuration of networks; our governance system is rooted in a
constitutional scheme that requires some amount of hierarchical relations that address
political and judicial requirements for accountability (Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004).
Heinrich, Hill and Lynn (2004) argue that less likely are the extremes of pure hierarchy
or networks (i.e., governance without government), instead, the more practical problems
of governance rest “where networks are hierarchical ‘tools of government’” (p. 10).
Obviously, this leads to consideration of how government can most effectively manage
networks (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).
To some extent, the networks of governance are related to the issue networks
described by Hugh Heclo and others in the policy literature (Heclo 1978; Parsons 1995).
However, in governance networks, the network goes beyond influencing policy formation
and adoption to actually “taking over the business of government” (Stoker 1998, p. 23).
Whereas Heclo described the role of issue networks in policy formation, governance
networks play a more significant role in long chains of policy implementation. Stoker
(1998) suggests that these networks forge their capacities by blending their resources and
expertise to form a long-term coalition or “regime” which represents the ultimate act of
power in a system of governance.
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2.1.3 Multiple Factors Affecting Outcomes
As noted, Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn (2004) propose an analytic framework to
guide the empirical study of governance. Explicit in their “logic of governance,” is the
recognition that performance (i.e., individual or organizational level outcomes) are
dependent on several classes of variables including environmental factors, client or
consumer characteristics, treatments or interventions, structures (administrative or
organizational), and aspects of management. This characteristic of governance and its
implications for performance measurement is revisited later in this section.
2.1.4 Tools of Policy Implementation
Salamon (2002) is the strongest proponent of the expanded use of policy tools as a
defining characteristic of governance. Salamon defined a policy tool or instrument of
public action as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to
address a public problem” (p.19). Stoker (1998) also recognizes that, within this new
framework of governance, government can apply new tools and techniques to “steer and
guide” rather than relying on the “power of government to command or use its authority”
(p. 18). And Pierre and Peters (2005) acknowledge the importance of policy
implementation in governance and the expanded use of less-intrusive policy instruments
that often depend on private sector actors.
Salamon (2002) suggests that within governance the unit of analysis has shifted
from the public agency or program to the tools of governance. Salamon (2002) argued
that individual tools used in policy implementation both dictate the actors involved and
represent a critical factor in structuring the implementation process. Consequently, by
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focusing on the policy tool, one can predict the actors who will be involved, the roles
they will play in the implementation process, the structure of that process, and its
outcomes (Salamon 2002). Furthermore, as noted earlier, Salamon (2002) emphasized
that the indirect nature of many of the policy tools used today have contributed to the
increasing role of networks which, he contends, are largely shaped by the tool used as
those tools play a large role in defining the actors and their roles.
2.1.5 Processes of Governance
Pierre and Peters (2005) identified a number of processes involved in governance
including identifying and selecting the collective goals of society, makings decisions
about how to realize those goals, mobilizing resources across the public and private
sectors to reach the goals, choosing the appropriate implementation tools, and providing
feedback based on evaluation to support future decision making. In all these processes of
governance, the private sector may play a significant role. This is in contrast to
hierarchical government, which, based on its authoritative orientation, acts primarily
through mechanisms of control and regulation.
In governance, the relational interdependencies among actors involved in
networks implies that the state loses the capacity for direct control and must rely, instead,
on influence and leverage via a continual processes of bargaining, negotiation,
persuasion, and mediating (Kettl 2002; Peters and Pierre 1998; Pierre and Peters 2005;
Salamon 2002; Stoker 1998). In the context of governance, cooperation and collaboration
between horizontally arranged stakeholders in the public and private sectors replace
competition (Milward and Provan 2006; Salamon 2002). The recognition of the role for
negotiation, compromise, and bargaining among actors coming to the table with different
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agendas, goals, and priorities again emphasizes the political nature of governance
(Frederickson and Smith 2003) and points to the need for a different set of enablement
skills rather than management skills among public sector employees (Salamon 2002).
2.1.6 Accountability Challenge
The shift in administrative practice described above highlights what Stoker (1998)
and others (Kettl 2002) identify as new dilemmas related to democratic accountability
inherent in the governance framework. Peters and Pierre (1998) echo this concern
suggesting that the issue of accountability, in particular, is unresolved in contrast to the
traditional channels of answerability inherent in the bureaucratic state. Several of the
other aspects of governance noted above contribute to the accountability challenges in
governance. The increased devolution and resulting administrative fragmentation based
on the growing involvement of the private sector in policy implementation, the
challenges posed by fuzzy boundaries, the reliance on bargaining and lack of formal
chains of command, the nature of the indirect policy tools used all these contribute to
making accountability more difficult to assign within a governance structure.
2.1.7 Summary of Governance
The features outlined above help to understand how government is getting its
work done in a framework defined as governance. In governance, producing and
delivering public goods and services is increasingly dependent on non-governmental
partners whom are often arranged and organized through networks and participate with
government in processes of goal setting, decision making, resource mobilization, and
feedback. The networks involved in governance do not entirely replace the hierarchical
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organization of more traditional government structure, but augment those by imposing a
new horizontal layer of stakeholders involved in policy formation and implementation
(Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004). The value of networks may be their ability to more
effectively address outcomes that often reflect the influence of multiple factors. Networks
are addressed in more detail later in this chapter.
Governance also involves the use of an expanded array of policy tools, often
indirect in their nature. Without the strict lines of authority imposed by hierarchy, the
public sector must focus on negotiation and bargaining in the governance context, in what
is essentially a political process. Finally, given the extensive involvement of third parties,
the network structure, use of indirect policy tools, and reliance on negotiation and
bargaining, accountability becomes particularly problematic in the governance
framework, an issue that will be addressed in more detail in the sections below.

2.2 New Public Management (NPM)
While governance may best be characterized as a political concept based in
democratic theory, it relates closely to NPM, an influential reform movement in public
management that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Peters and Pierre (1988)
argue that fundamental differences exist between governance and NPM which demand
that they be viewed as separate concepts. Although some similarities between the two at
the operative level are acknowledged, the authors have identified a number of
fundamental differences on a more theoretical level. These differences include the
following: (1) governance is about process while NPM emphasizes outcomes and results;
(2) governance is inter-organizational in concept while NPM has an intra-organizational
focus; (3) governance is based in democratic theory whereas NPM is seen as ideological
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in nature calling for the adoption of market practices for the delivery of public sector
goods; (4) forms of governance maintain some public sector resources under government
control in an effort to support government’s ability to act, whereas NPM advocates a
larger transformation of the public sector; and (5) forms of governance are seen as easier
to adopt in contrast to NPM which requires more substantive cultural shifts (Frederickson
and Smith 2003; Hood and Peters 2004; Peters and Pierre 1998). Hood and Peters (2004)
also acknowledge the ideological nature of NPM, describing a number of paradoxes that
have emerged during its tenure – chastising “one size fits all” approaches while adopting
such forms in practice, promoting “evidence-based learning” while often adopting
“evidence-free” approaches, and advocating for rational techniques of budget control
despite the incremental budgeting experience of previously, like-minded reforms.
Peters (2001) suggests that advocates of NPM contend that government cannot do
anything well so it should do as little as possible. Advocates of the NPM reform
movement suggest that government is drowning in its own, overgrown bureaucracy
resulting in widespread inefficiency. From this view, government is seen as out of touch
with the public, economically complacent, preoccupied with due process, and indifferent
to the needs of its clients or “customers” (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). The thrust of NPM
is an advocacy for the adoption of market-based approaches which are believed as
operating more effectively and efficiently. Proponents of NPM argue that the
management and methods of the private sector are inherently superior to those applied in
the traditional public sector (Peters 2001). Therefore, advocates of NPM view the publicprivate dichotomy as obsolete (Peters and Pierre 1998) and suggest that government
should adopt fundamental corporate notions of competition to create internal markets.
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Through markets, government will be enabled to do more with less by increasing
efficiencies at multiple levels. Although governance models also incorporate an
introduction of competition to the public sector, it is not to the same degree and instead,
the focus is toward blending private and public resources through a more cooperative and
collaborative approach involving inter-organizational partners (Peters and Pierre 1998).
The principles of NPM or “new managerialism” have been widely accepted in the
practice of public administration although extensive empirical study supporting the
approach is lacking (Frederickson and Smith 2003). In general, NPM can be described as
a generic management philosophy as the approach assumes that, regardless of whether
working in the private or public sector, similar management challenges prevail and
should be addressed in a similar fashion (Peters and Pierre 1998). David Osborne’s and
Ted Gaebler’s1993 book, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is
Transforming the Public Sector, is viewed as a guiding text for NPM. The authors
suggest that America faces a deep crisis in how government operates and called for a new
kind of government, an “entrepreneurial government,” to represent a paradigm shift in
how government does its work (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). In their text, NPM is
represented through ten principles, each summarized in an independent chapter. Their
tenets of NPM include a government which (1) “steers” rather than rows, (2) empowers
rather than serves, (3) encourages competition, (4) endorses a mission-based organization
rather than one which is rule-driven, (5) funds outcomes rather than outputs, (6) assumes
a customer-focus, (7) earns rather than spends, (8) prevents rather than cures, (9) works
through decentralization characterized by participation and teamwork rather than
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hierarchy, and (10) applies a market-approach to government (Osborne and Gaebler
1993).
These principles translate into a government reform emphasizing decentralized
government, contracting through third parties, deregulation, increased competition,
citizen or customer choice, increased discretion among managers, and outcome
measurement as a means to assess effectiveness (Frederickson and Smith 2003).
Similarly, Kettl (2000) identifies six core issues of NPM including productivity,
marketization, service orientation, decentralization, policy, and accountability.

2.3 The Performance Movement: Policy Reforms
As noted above, performance is central to NPM with results so fundamental to the
reform that it is often referred to as “results-oriented government.” Performance, as
measured through outcomes rather than outputs, is emphasized in NPM as a means to
assess management and policy as well as a means of accountability (Peters 2001). As
mentioned earlier, where accountability is viewed as problematic in the governance
framework, it is perceived as a particular strength of NPM (Peters and Pierre 1998). In
fact, a central theme in NPM is the improvement of government performance through
accountability mechanisms that more directly connect providers and consumers of public
services. From this view, the point of accountability is substantially shifted from the
elected official to the administrator (Barberis 1998; Dubnick 2005).
Paul Light, in his respected 1997 text, Tides of Reform: Making Government
Work, 1945-1995, inventories federal reform statutes passed during the 50 year period
1945-1995 and identifies four major public management reforms, or tides, including, “(1)
scientific management with its focus on tight hierarchy, specialization, and clear chains
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of command, (2) war on waste, with its emphasis on inspectors, auditors, cross checkers,
and reviewers, (3) watchful eye, with its embrace of sunshine and openness, and (4)
liberation management, with its cry to let the managers manage, albeit with a bit of
market pressure” (p. 1).
Light (1997) suggests that the most recent reform of liberation management is not
new, but instead reflects aspects of earlier reforms, particularly, scientific management.
Light identifies competition through increased privatization of the public sector and
deregulation as the main tools of liberation management which attempts to encourage
more entrepreneurial approaches to management through public agencies emphasizing
“steering” rather than rowing. The goal of liberation management, according to Light, is
higher performance based on outcomes or results, which are seen as the reform’s key
products. Al Gore’s National Performance Review (NPR) passed in 1993 is recognized as
the defining moment for liberation management and the 1993 Government Performance
and Results Act (GPRA) as its defining statute (Light 1997). Light noted the influence of
Osborne and Gaebler on the movement as a whole, but, in particular, on Gore’s NPR
stating “Osborne in particular was so important to the NPR that the final report was
known as REGO (for reinventing government) in his honor” (p. 36). The NPR, later
called the National Partnership for Reinvention Government, was headed by Vice
President Gore and had strong political visibility throughout the Clinton Administration.
Not surprisingly, a chief tenet of NPR involves holding public managers accountable for
results (Affholter 1994).
GPRA was not necessarily a new idea. It is a statute that has roots in several
earlier reforms including the Program, Planning, and Budgeting System (PPBS) from the
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1960s, Management by Objectives (MBO) in the early 1970s under Presidents Ford and
Nixon, and President Carter’s Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) in the late 1970s (Light
1997; Nathan 2001; Radin 2006). In fact, the General Accounting Office (GAO 7 )
suggests that GPRA improves on those earlier reforms by incorporating their best
features (GAO 1997c). These reforms, including GPRA, are generally aimed at
improving federal management by introducing greater rationality into government
decision making, particularly the federal appropriations and budgeting process (GAO
1996).
GPRA was passed as part of a larger statutory framework to improve federal
management that included the Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO), other legislation
related to information technology such as the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, and the
Clinger-Cohen Act (GAO 1997c). GPRA is seen as the centerpiece of this framework
which is intended to instill a results-orientation in the federal government. It is
worthwhile to note that several features distinguished GPRA from the earlier reforms
(e.g., MBO, PPBS) noted above. Most importantly, GPRA was passed as federal statute
and, as such, mandates roles for Congress and the legislative branch that previous
reforms did not. In other words, GPRA does not go away with a changing administration
like executive reform initiatives such as the Clinton and Gore’s NPR.
As the federal fiscal environment tightened, GPRA was intended to address some
long-standing management problems that were seen as undermining government’s
efficiency and effectiveness and to introduce greater accountability for results (GAO
2004). The law specifies the following purposes: (1) to improve the confidence of the
7

The General Accounting Office has been renamed the Government Accountability
Office.
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American people in the federal government; (2) improve program effectiveness through
promoting a new focus on results, customer service, service quality, and customer
satisfaction; (3) help Federal managers improve service delivery; (4) improve
congressional decision making; and (5) improve the internal management of the federal
government (GPRA 1993). David G. Frederickson (2003), in his study of GPRA’s
implementation in five HHS programs, stated, “While measures of government
performance and the logic of strategic management have been around since the 1930s,
GPRA is certainly the most ambitious and comprehensive approach to measuring
government performance and results that has ever been attempted” (p. 13).
Specifically, GPRA’s requirements include the development of five-year strategic
plans by all federal agencies, followed by program-specific performance plans with
specific performance goals and corresponding performance indicators that allow for
comparing actual results with the established performance goals (GPRA 1993). Through
annual program performance reports, progress toward meeting goals based on
performance information is reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
The Act allowed for a seven year start-up period with the first strategic plans due to OMB
in 1997 and the first performance reports supplemented with actual data due in 2000. In
addition, a number of pilot demonstration projects were included as part of GPRA to
assess its implementation (GPRA 1993). When passed by law in 1993, the bill received
overwhelming support from Congress as well as the Clinton Administration and was
endorsed by the National Academy of Public Administration (Affholter 1994). Its
passage was accompanied by strident political support such as this from Senator William
Roth, one of GPRA’s chief authors, “For the first time, the American people will be told
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what levels of service and program results they can expect from their tax dollars,
followed by reports on what was actually achieved. It may sound like common sense for
the government to do this – and it is – but is has not been done before by the federal
government” (Cited in Light 1997, 235).
The specific focus on results or outcomes, rather than inputs or processes, is
another distinguishing feature of GPRA from earlier reforms. This move to a resultsorientation requires a shift in organizational culture that may necessitate new ways for
administrators to conduct their work (Mihm 2000). GPRA does not aim, like some earlier
reforms or executive initiatives, to reorganize government in any structural way. Rather,
as noted previously, it takes government structure as a given and emphasizes improving
management through goal setting and achieving results (D.G. Frederickson 2003). By
attempting to replace the rule-based compliance type accountability of more traditional
bureaucracy with performance and results-based accountability, GPRA’s focus on results
reflects the tenets of NPM (Light 1997).
As for any political reform, GPRA embodies the varied agendas of different
stakeholders, some not so readily reflected in its statutory language (Radin 2006). First,
some advocates of performance measurement view GPRA as a means toward better
government. These stakeholders assume that government activities are measurable and
measurement is the most objective means to inform public policy decision making (D.G.
Frederickson 2003). This view of GPRA, and the reinventing movement in general,
reflects a commitment toward a rational decision making model whereby politics are
avoided and “objective” performance data will be managerially used in the policy process
to improve decision making, and, in particular, decisions about budgeting (Broom, et al.
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2002; Kravchuck and Schack 1996; Peters, 2001; Radin 2006). However, as Broom and
her colleagues (2002) pointed out, “Virtually all systematic examinations suggest that a
focus on performance does not preclude political considerations from driving decision
making” (p. 2). This is especially true for the federal budgeting process, one that is
intrinsically pluralistic, political, and incremental in nature (Frederickson, DG, 2003;
GAO 1997c; Nathan 2001; Radin 2006; Schick 2001). There is, in fact, no evidence to
suggest that GPRA has affected the federal appropriations process (Frederickson 2001;
GAO 2005).
Other stakeholders, particularly professional government accountability experts,
see GPRA as a means for budget cutting and government reduction through the
identification of duplicative and ineffective government programs (Radin 2003). And still
others view GPRA from a more apolitical stance, to address issues related to public
relations or budget maximizing objectives (D.G. Frederickson 2003). Given the political
nature of the policy process, the promise of GPRA, and performance measurement more
generally, may lie on its potential contribution to improve decision making by policy
makers, administrators, and program managers and increase government accountability to
its citizens (Fredrickson 2001, 2003). As Wholey and Newcomer (1997) suggested, “The
theory behind the Government Performance and Results Act is that planning and
performance measurement will help agencies communicate performance expectations and
results – and that the use of performance information will improve management and
program effectiveness, improve policy decision making, and improve public confidence
in government” (p. 93).
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An evaluation of GPRA on its tenth anniversary conducted by GAO (2004) based
on a randomized survey of federal managers as well as interviews, focus groups, and
document reviews identified a number of positive findings. These include: (1) federal
managers surveyed reported having significantly more of the types of performance
measures (i.e., outcome measures) required by GPRA than at earlier times; (2)
interviewees reported GPRA having positive effects on planning and reporting; and (3)
reviews of plans suggested that GAO feedback was incorporated to improve plans, goals
became more quantifiable over time and more results-oriented, and agencies provided
increasing detail about their goals and strategies to address concerns about performance
and accountability (GAO 2004). In general, research suggests that GPRA has contributed
to improved program management but has not been used by legislators for influencing
decision making related to appropriations (Frederickson 2001; GAO 2004).
Although GPRA has strong support, it also has its share of critics. Beryl Radin
has written extensively about GPRA and the performance movement more generally
(1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003, 2006). She suggests that the GPRA legislation can best
be viewed as an example of a government-wide, one-size-fits-all reform that endorses
generic activities and requirements (2006). She argues that GPRA “does not fit easily into
the institutional structures, functions, and political realities of the American system,”
rendering GPRA, like previous reforms to, “operate largely as rhetorical positions or
arguments without the ability to influence substantive policy and budgetary processes”
(Radin 2000a, 111).
Others have identified important limitations in the legislation itself, including
GPRA’s failure to recognize a number of unique attributes of public programs including:
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(1) varied goals and contexts of different federal agencies, (2) the extensive degree of
decentralization in program implementation structures, (3) the variety of policy
instruments employed by each for implementation, and (4) the unique challenges faced
by agencies in measuring the performance of public programs (D.G. Frederickson 2003).
Studies of federal agencies’ experience with GPRA have confirmed these issues as
challenges (Frederickson 2003; GAO 1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2000; Mihm 2000). Given the
uniform nature of GPRA and its requirements (i.e., Radin’s claim that GPRA is another
one-size-fits-all, government-wide reform), these areas of variability challenge its
implementation.
Of particular note are those challenges to GPRA posed by key attributes of NPM,
specifically, its emphasis on decentralization, the increased use of third parties, and
expanded use of policy tools. Several researchers have pointed out that GPRA does not
acknowledge government’s extensive decentralization and use of third parties, including
those that are arranged in networks, nor does it recognize the characteristics or purposes
of those arrangements (Fossett, Gais, and Thompson 2001; Frederickson 2001, 2003;
Radin 2001b). Given a decentralized context, Radin (2000b) suggests that GPRA’s
requirement that federal agencies define performance goals rather than the states, reflects
the law’s “compliance” orientation which contradicts NPM’s advocacy for increased
autonomy to third parties. In his qualitative dissertation study, briefly introduced in
chapter one, David G. Frederickson explores the experience of five HHS agencies
implementing GPRA 8 . All five agencies utilize implementation structures Frederickson

8

Agencies involved in the study included Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), National Institutes for
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(2003) described as “articulated vertical networks of third parties.” His most important
findings center on the implementation challenges to GPRA posed by third party
governance and the influence of varied policy instruments used by each federal agency 9 .
The term “articulated” reflects the “extent to which separate organizations or institutions
in a network are coupled, fit together, linked, or combined and the nature and quality of
those connections,” (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006, 8).
In a book written by Frederickson along with his father, H. George Frederickson,
the authors expand on the younger Frederickson’s dissertation research to discuss how
these varied “articulated vertical networks” relate to government performance
(Frederickson and Frederickson 2006). Based on grounded theory methodology, the
authors identified the following explanatory factors or variables influencing the
implementation of GPRA in the five agencies (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006,
152):
1. level of third-party policy implementation
2. accountability to federal program purposes
3. nature and quality of network articulations
4. characteristics of goals
5. level of centralization of policy implementation

Health (NIH), Indian Health Services (IHS), and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).
9
Frederickson adopted Salamon’s (2002) view of policy tools. The FDA uses regulatory
policy tools; CMS uses grants for Medicare and contracted services for Medicaid; HRSA
uses grants; IHS uses grants to support direct service; NIH uses grants to support
intramural research
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6. precision and characteristics of performance measurement
7. level and character of client and stakeholder support
8. level of professional identity
In Frederickson and Frederickson’s text (2006), each variable is presented as a
heuristic continuum and the five cases placed appropriately. For instance, the continuum
for the level of third-party implementation extends from completely hollowed out to that
of direct government. While IHS is placed toward the latter end of the spectrum, HRSA
and Medicaid reflect the hollowed out end. Frederickson and Frederickson deduce that
variability in types of third parties, types of policy tools, implementation models, and
arrangements in federal agency-third-party articulations and vertical networks all have
significant influence on the development of useful performance measurement systems for
GPRA. So although the law itself may seem a “one size fits all” type policy, programs
seem to have developed varied approaches given the factors noted above.
Others address methodological issues related to GPRA arguing that the legislation
makes an implicit assumption that information about performance, the heart of
performance measurement, is accessible, affordable, and reliable (Perrin 1998; Radin
2006). Even more fundamentally, some point to the challenges in measuring social
phenomenon arguing that it is often quite difficult, if not impossible, to develop
indicators for social programs in the same way that economic indicators relate to profit
are used (Perrin, 1998; Barry 2000).
Although GPRA remains in place following the close of Clinton and Gore’s NPR,
it has been overshadowed to some extent by the former Bush Administration’s effort to
link the executive branch budget recommendations to performance. While GPRA had bi-
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partisan support from both Congress and the White House when it was passed as law in
1993, the Bush administration implemented its own approach to performance
measurement as part of its wider President’s Management Agenda (PMA) (Gilmour
2006). The effort on the part of the Bush administration to integrate performance
information into budget decision making is one of the PMA’s five government-wide
management priorities, the Budget and Performance Integration initiative (Brass 2004).
Called the Program Assessment Rating Tool or PART, the instrument was developed by
OMB and includes a standard series of approximately twenty-five questions. PART is
viewed as a diagnostic tool intended to make conclusions about the benefits of federal
programs based on program performance and evaluation information (GAO 2005). The
questions fall under four topic areas including: (1) program purpose and design; (2)
strategic planning; (3) program management; and (4) programs results (GAO 2005). Each
of these dimensions is weighted in the instrument’s numerical scoring and then converted
into an overall qualitative rating that can be compared across federal programs. PART
was developed to assess different types of federal executive branch programs in order to
direct funding and management decisions and brings even greater attention to outcomes
and results than GPRA (Brass 2004; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006).
PART was initiated in 2002 for use in the fiscal year 2004 budget cycle and has
been incrementally applied in a systematic assessment of executive branch programs that
have funding associated with them (Brass 2004). GAO conducted an assessment in 2004
of the first 234 programs assessed by OMB for PART for fiscal year 2004 budget cycle
(GAO 2005). Their analysis identified over 600 recommendations made by OMB as part
of those reviews. GAO found that OMB judged one-half of the programs reviewed as
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having inadequate results-based information (GAO 2005). Additionally, GAO found that
half the recommendations made by OMB related to improving program assessment, in
particular, to identify program outcome measures and collect or obtain improved
performance data or program evaluations (GAO 2005). In 2005, GAO conducted another
assessment to review whether programs had, in fact, improved their evidence base for the
PART review. They found that while the PART process stimulated agencies to build their
evaluation capacity, programs more typically designed evaluations to meet their own
needs related to program improvement rather than broader, impact level evaluations
(GAO 2005). In addition, early analysis of PART suggested that assessment results are
not effectively impacting the budget recommendations of the executive branch, despite
their claims to the contrary (Brass 2004).
The relationship between GPRA and PART has not been well described by OMB
except to note that both are central to maintaining a focus on results (Brass 2004; GAO
2004). GAO has repeatedly recommended that OMB articulate an integrated,
complimentary relationship between the two policies (GAO 2004, 2005); others have
suggested that a stronger integration of the two would strengthen the executive and
congressional management reforms (Brass 2004). In sum, while there is limited evidence
to date of GPRA or PART’s success as results-based reforms, especially in terms of their
impact on federal budgeting or improving performance, they both reflect the influence of
NPM and the prominence given organizational performance in government today
(Cavalluzzo and Ittner 2004; Schick 2001). Significant time and resources on the part of
federal agencies are spent addressing both policies (Dubnick 2005). These two “resultsbased” initiatives, grounded on the assumption that increased accountability through
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performance measurement will, in fact, lead to improved efficiency and effectiveness of
government, have been central to NPM and have held substantial sway in the
management operations of federal agencies.

2.4 Performance Measurement
In her book about performance measurement Radin (2006) suggests, “It is not an
exaggeration to characterize the concern about performance as ubiquitous” (p. 4).
Similarly, Coplin, Merget, and Bourdeaux (2002) state, “Performance, in a word,
captures the zeitgeist of the 1990s among professional researchers in public
administration” (p. 699). This view is endorsed by others (Behn 2003; Blalock and
Barnow 2001; Grizzle 2002; Schick 2001) and reflects the importance of performance
measurement in government today. Attention to performance, long standing in the private
sector, now seems infused in our culture, cutting across all levels of government and
extending to the nonprofit arena as well (Hendricks 2002).
Performance in education is given particular attention by the press, but the media
also addresses performance in health, the environment, welfare, transportation, foreign
policy, national security and other areas of the public sector (Radin 2006). An assumption
of unquestionable benefit is presumed. For instance, writing about the U.S. News &
World Reports annual college rankings, David Leonhardt stated, “Human beings do a
better job of just about anything when their performance is evaluated and they are held
accountable for it. You can’t manage what you don’t measure, as the management adage
says, and because higher education is by all accounts critical to the country’s economic
future, it sure seems to be deserving of rigorous measurement” (Leonhardt 2006, C1).
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In this section, relevant literature on performance measurement is summarized.
The literature is vast, therefore, this review is limited to publications and journal articles
about government-based performance measurement, and, in particular, addresses
empirically-based quantitative and qualitative studies (e.g., studies based on surveys as
well as case studies by GAO and others). Literature related to the principles and practice
of performance measurement is also included. Given that performance measurement is a
central feature of governance and NPM’s recent reforms (i.e., GPRA and PART), the
practice has strong champions. Consequently, Frederickson (2003) and others (Forsythe
2001; Nathan 2001) suggest that a dominant literature for the field has a distinct
normative or advocacy tone that tends to promote an idealized view of the contribution
performance measurement can make to improve government. In contrast, as noted earlier,
others have adopted a more critical stance. This literature, both positive and negative,
might be best characterized as “commentary” and some, relevant to this study, is included
here as well.
2.4.1 Principles and Practice of Performance Measurement
An extensive literature is available addressing the principles of performance
measurement and approaches for conducting it. Lead authors in this arena include Hatry
(1999), Newcomer (1997), Poister (2003), and Wholey (2002). Performance
measurement is rooted in management theory and practice, in particular, in performance
management. Performance management involves several independent processes
including: (1) the development of agency or program mission, goals, and strategies; (2)
the development of performance measurement instruments and systems; (3) the use of
analytic techniques to interpret performance measures; and (4) use of performance
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information for strengthening accountability, improving program effectiveness, and
supporting policy-related decision making (Smith and Goddard 2002; Wholey 2002). A
performance management system involves the continuous use of all four practices so that
they are integrated into the core operations of an organization (Landrum and Baker
2004). Central to performance management, then, is performance measurement which
Poister (2003) defines as “the process of defining, monitoring, and using objective
indicators of the performance of organizations and programs on a regular basis” (p. 1).
Some definitions overtly emphasize outcomes and efficiency as the object of
measurement (Hatry 1999) while others are more inclusive of program inputs, outputs,
and outcomes at various stages (e.g., intermediate outcomes, end or long-term outcomes)
(Newcomer 1997). The indicators of performance, or performance measures, are most
often quantitative, objective measures related to some aspect of agency or program
performance (Poister 2003). Although some make a distinction between performance
measures and performance indicators, the terms will be used interchangeably here.
The development and implementation of a performance measurement system
typically involves several key steps (Hatry 2002, p. 30; Poister 2003, p. 23):
1. Assure management commitment
2. Clarify purpose and system parameters
3. Identify mission, objectives, and clients of the program
4. Identify outcomes and other performance criteria
5. Define, evaluate, and select indicators
6. Identify data sources and data collection procedures, providing for quality
assurance
7. Develop an analysis plan
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8. Specify the system design (reporting frequencies and channels, analytical and
reporting formats, software applications, roles and responsibility for system
maintenance)
9. Conduct a pilot and make indicated revisions
10. Implement (full-scale)
11. Use, evaluate, and modify system as appropriate
Because of its relevance to this study, categories of performance information used
in performance measurement systems should also be defined. These categories are
summarized in table 2 (Hatry 1999, 2001; Newcomer 1997; Poister 2003).

Table 2. Categories of Performance Information Used in Performance Measurement
Inputs: Inputs reflect the resources actually used to produce or deliver program outputs
or outcomes. Inputs are typically described based on amount of funding, number of
employees, etc.
Outputs: Outputs are the products and services completed or delivered based on the
inputs. Outputs are the things that the program has done such as the number of trainings
delivered, the number of condoms distributed, or the number of breast cancer
mammograms provided.
Outcomes: Outcomes reflect the program’s consequences and can include intermediate
and long-term outcomes. Outcomes are typically influenced by external factors beyond
an individual program’s control.
• Intermediate outcomes are those expected to lead to longer-term outcomes, but
are not ends in themselves. For instance, using the mammography example above,
increasing the number of women re-screened annually for breast cancer is an
intermediate outcome.
• Long-term or end outcomes are the intended results of the program. Again,
using the example above, a reduction in the rate of late stage breast cancer
diagnosis (morbidity) reflects a long-term outcome.
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2.4.2 Assumptions and Orientation of Performance Measurement
Radin (2006, 19) describes a set of assumptions intrinsic to conducting
performance measurement which include:
1. Goals can be defined clearly and set firmly as the basis for the performance
measurement process.
2. Goals are specific and the responsibility of definable actors.
3. Outcomes can be specified independently of inputs, processes, and outputs.
4. Outcomes can be quantified and measured.
5. Outcomes are controllable and susceptible to external timing.
6. Data are available, clear, and accurate.
7. Results of the performance measurement can be delivered to an actor with
authority to respond to the results.
As mentioned previously, some suggest that much of what has been advanced
regarding performance measurement assumes a hierarchical context composed of twoparty direct government and where accountability structures are clear (Frederickson
2003; Goddard and Mannion 2004; Perrin 1998). In a hierarchical context, performance
measurement is seen as an important public management tool of command and control
between principals and agents to assess accountability by ensuring results or outcomes
are achieved.
2.4.3 Uses and Purposes of Performance Measurement
A good deal of literature advances the benefits of performance measurement
including its use: (1) as a management tool for program oversight and to link goals and
objectives to performance; (2) as an accountability mechanism to assess whether results
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are achieved, contribute to more efficient budgeting, and improve confidence in
government; (3) to support data-driven planning and decision making; (4) to increase
government transparency; (5) as a monitoring tool to identify potential implementation or
program theory problems and make revisions; (6) as a means to identify areas for indepth evaluation; (7) to compare patterns of performance over time; (8) for public
relations, including substantiating funding requests; (9) to inform policy makers and
contribute to the policy process; (10) for responding to Congressional inquiries; and (11)
for benchmarking to allow comparisons across similar programs (Barry 2000; Broom et
al. 2002; Hatry 1999; Kravchuck and Schack 1996; Mark, Henry, and Julnes 2000; Mihm
2001; Poister 2003; Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsy 1999; Wholey and Newcomer 1997).
Others recognize the political use of performance measurement (Feller 2002; Jennings
and Haist 2004; Pollitt 1986). Feller (2002) emphasizes the influence of the political
organizational context on performance measurement and stated, “Performance
measurement systems and related performance indicators are political instruments used
within organizational settings” (p. 439).
Behn (2003) identifies improved performance as the ultimate purpose of
performance measurement, but he also described seven other distinct managerial
purposes evaluate, control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, and learn. Behn (2003)
suggests different measures are needed based on the unique purpose for the system. For
example, performance indicators used to support budgeting require efficiency measures
and indicators to support motivating require real-time measures (Behn 2003). The
literature, then, suggests that the choice of measures may be influenced by the use and
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purpose of the performance measurement system (Behn 2003), agency type (Jennings and
Haist 2004), and the level of decentralization (Frederickson 2003).
2.4.4 Empirical Research
As discussed earlier, given prominence of performance measurement and its
accepted practice in the field, a relatively small amount of empirical research has been
conducted (Barry 2000; Goddard and Mannion 2004; Jennings and Haist 2002; Kelly
2002; Poister 2003; Turnock 2000; Wholey 2002). Kelly (2002) comments, “I think that
performance measurement, as a tool of accountability for outcomes, is the rare situation
where we understand the practice more than the theory. We know a lot about how to
construct and report performance measures, but we cannot say specifically why we go to
all the trouble. According to our best evidence, nothing much changes as a result of
adopting performance measurement systems” (p. 375).
Based on a comprehensive literature review of impact studies related to
performance measurement, Jennings and Haist (2002) note, “We have limited evidence
of the impact that it [performance measurement] has on the effectiveness of government
systems, the conditions under which it works or does not work, and the factors that affect
the success of performance measurement” (p. 2). It was the recognition of this deficit that
led Jennings and Haist to begin the theory development that provides the foundation for
this research study.
Empirical research on performance measurement based on survey data represents
studies at varying levels of government, but studies of public agencies at the city, county,
and state levels predominate. Much of this research focuses on the level of adoption and
use of performance measurement as part of the management for results (MFR)
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framework. For instance, Moynihan and Ingraham (2003) assessed the adoption of MFR
systems, Melkers and Willoughby (1998, 2004, 2005) conducted studies of performance
budgeting, Poister and Streib studied performance management systems and their use in
municipal government (1999a, 2005), and Berman and Wang (2000) examined
performance measurement systems.
Based on studies conducted in 1998 and 2004, Melkers and Willoughby find
widespread adoption of performance budgeting at the state-level, much of which has been
either legislated or required through administrative dictates (Melkers and Willoughby
2004). Similarly, Moynihan and Ingraham (2003) examined state-level data to assess the
implementation and use of MFR efforts. Based on data from 2000 collected as part of the
Government Performance Project (GPP), the authors found that all fifty U.S. states were
using some type of MFR system.
In a more recent study by Melkers and Willoughby (2005), the authors examine
the use of performance measurement, again, primarily for budgeting purposes, based on
year 2000 survey data from budgeters and administrators at the state and local levels. In
this study, sixty-eight percent of respondents said that either all of their departments or at
least half of their departments use performance measures. Poister and Streib found
somewhat slow adoption of formal citywide strategic planning and the use of
performance measurement. Based on a 1997 survey of managers representing cities with
populations of 25,000 and greater, the researchers found that forty percent or less of these
municipalities were using performance information in meaningful ways to support
management and decision processes (Poister and Streib 1999a). In a study conducted
with the same sample in 2004, Poister and Streib found that only twenty-two percent of
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cities used performance measures to track progress in meeting goals and objectives
detailed in strategic plans (Poister and Streib 2005). Similarly, Berman and Wang (2000)
analyzed survey data from public managers working in counties with populations of
50,000 or greater and found thirty-three percent of counties using some type of
performance measurement but only twenty percent demonstrating “high use.”
These results suggest that although programs have often adopted performance
measurements systems of various types, the meaningful use and integration of
performance information has lagged. In an interesting look at factors associated with the
adoption and implementation of performance measurement, Julnes and Holzer (2001)
used data from a national survey of state and local government officials and found that
the adoption of performance measurement is influenced by rational and technocratic
factors such as goal orientation, resources, internal requirements, and information,
whereas implementation was influenced by political and cultural factors.
Studies have found that performance information is perceived as useful for
communications and management activities such as strategic planning, but has not been
used in fiscal decision making (Melkers and Willoughby 2005). To date, little research
supports the use of performance measurement for informing fiscal decision making
(Melkers and Willoughby 2004). This is interesting given that budgeting is often seen as
the driving force behind performance measurement (Newcomer 1997). The research by
Poister and Strieb (1999a) found that cities using performance measures did so based on a
desire for improved decision making and accountability rather than for simply meeting
reporting requirements.
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Studies examining factors affecting the use of performance information provide
insights as well. Berman and Wang (2000) found that technical capacity and stakeholder
support are significantly associated with increased use of performance measurement.
Capacity was defined as jurisdictions’ ability to: (1) relate outputs to operations; (2)
collect timely data; (3) analyze data; (4) access adequate information and technology
systems; (5) garner support from department heads; and (6) garner support from elected
officials. They also found that widespread use of performance measurement increased
satisfaction with its impact (Berman and Wang 2000). A study of federal-level managers
working in the twenty-four largest executive agencies used GAO survey data to also
explore factors influencing the use of performance measurement (Cavalluzzo and Ittner
2003). These results found that organizational factors such as managerial commitment to
the use of performance measurement, decision making authority, and training in the
techniques of performance measurement have a significant influence on its development
and use.
Again at the federal level, Heinrich (1999, 2002) has conducted research based on
data from the federal Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). Findings suggest that
although the use of administrative data in performance measurement results in relatively
imperfect data, it still can provide useful information to inform program improvement. In
addition, Heinrich’s results suggest the importance of considering the effects of other
factors, including organizational structure and complexity, policy choices and constraints,
and service delivery practices in assessing program performance. This is consistent with
the framework for governance she proposes along with Hill and Lynn discussed earlier
(Heinrich, Hill, Lynn 2004).
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Other than the studies of JTPA, research at the federal level has largely involved
data collected by GAO to study various aspects of GPRA, and more recently PART’s,
implementation. Most of this research involves smaller, qualitative studies aimed at
increasing understanding of GPRA’s implementation, including challenges federal
agencies have faced. In an evaluation of GPRA’s first ten years involving both survey
data and qualitative interviews, GAO found that federal managers reported having more
outcome measures required by GPRA, identified positive effects of GPRA on
requirements for planning and reporting, and had more quantifiable, results-based goals
in place (GAO 2005).
Other GAO studies identify the many difficulties federal agencies have faced in
moving toward the results-based framework inherent in GPRA. These include challenges
at various stages of developing performance measurement systems such as identifying
goals, developing measures, collecting data, and analyzing and using data. Programs have
struggled to translate long-term goals into annual performance goals and develop related
outcome measures (GAO 1997a, 1997b, 2004, Mihm 2000). This has been complicated
by difficulties uncovered in coordinating cross-cutting federal programs (Mihm 2000)
and the mission fragmentation that challenges program’s ability to think about how their
own activities contribute or are related to common outcomes (GAO 1999). Programs
have faced challenges in data collection (GAO 2004) and, in regard to measurement, they
have struggled to obtain valid, reliable, and useful data in a timely fashion (GAO 2004;
Mihm 2000). Limited capacity (i.e., analytic and methodological expertise) and training
have also been identified as impediments, no doubt contributing to the measurement
challenges (GAO 2004; Mihm 2000).
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A major issue identified through this research has been an inability for agencies to
confidently attribute changes in outcomes to a particular program effort (GAO 1996,
1997a, 2004; Mihm 2000). By focusing on outcomes, it becomes difficult to distinguish
results produced by federal programs from results caused by other, external factors. This
is especially true for complicated social issues for which outcomes are undoubtedly
influenced by a complex interaction of factors. Much of the methodological literature on
performance measurement recognizes the important limitation of performance
measurement related to attribution (Broom, et al. 2002; Hatry 2001; Poister 2003;
Wholey and Hatry 1992). Blalock and Barnow (2001) stated that “the major
methodological problem in most [performance] management systems is the tendency to
attribute the outcomes collected in these systems to social programs or entire human
investment systems – that is, to assume that these programs or systems are responsible for
the outcomes collected” (p. 503). Indeed, many suggest that there remains an assumption
that performance measurement assumes causality (Blalock and Barnow 2001;
Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Perrin 1998; Radin 2006). In an article describing
their efforts to develop a performance management system for the Ryan White
Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act (CARE) which is funded by HRSA,
Kates, Marconi, and Mannle (2001) stated that the crux of performance measurement as
conceived by GPRA is “measuring that impact, or, the difference between having a
program and not having it” (p. 147), when, in reality, that type of scientific measurement
is not possible through performance measurement systems (Broom et al. 2002; Kates,
Marconi and Mannle 2001).
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Similarly, Hatry (2001) noted “…the outcome data likely to be obtainable from
ongoing performance measurement systems will seldom, if ever, reveal the extent to
which the program has caused the outcome. Other factors – over which the program only
has partial control – will inevitably be present” (p. 30). Given the influence of external
factors, Hatry (2002) argues that public managers cannot be held fully accountable for
results. Instead, he suggests that only limited, outcome-level accountability is present in
such situations, and shared accountability may provide the best means to reach a fuller
degree of accountability for outcomes (Hatry 2002). These same academics often
encourage more rigorous evaluation studies to assess cause and affect relationships
between the structure and processes of programs to outcomes (Blalock and Barnow 2001;
Harkreader and Henry 2000; Hatry 1997; Perrin 2006).
Given this limitation, performance measurement experts have encouraged the
inclusion of short-term and intermediate outcomes for which programs may have more
control. Such outcomes may provide a more comprehensive view of the program and
may allow for more plausible claims of attribution (Derose et al. 2002; Hatry 2001;
Poister 2003). In other words, performance measurement systems need to attend to the
“entire results chain” (Perrin 2006, 8).
Similarly, authors emphasize that although performance measures can help assess
how well an organization is performing, these measures do not typically reveal why or
how an organization achieved that level of performance (Behn 2003; Hatry 1997;
Newcomer 2001). Again, other evaluation methods are needed to answer questions
related to what exactly is happening and why. These issues related to attribution and the
kinds of questions performance measurement can and cannot effectively address
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highlight the important relationship between outcomes research and performance
measurement. Perrin (2002) stated that “outcomes research, quality improvement, and
performance measurement are closely related activities, each of which depends critically
on one factor: the ability to establish a reasonably firm relation between the structure and
processes that are within the control of the individual, institution, or system whose
performance is being judged and the outcome that is considered desirable” (p. III-91).
Other research has addressed the unique challenges to performance measurement
posed by decentralized implementation structures (Frederickson 2003; Frederickson and
Frederickson 2006; GAO 1997a, 1997c, 1998a, 1998b). An important issue addressed by
the reinvention movement is the role of the federal government. As discussed earlier, a
central tenet of NPM involves devolution of federal responsibilities to third parties
including state and local government, nonprofit organizations, and for-profit agencies. A
shift in government has involved the reduction in the direct delivery of federal programs
by federal staff and, instead, the use of varied policy tools to increase the involvement of
third parties. Salamon (2002), who writes about the proliferation of policy tools, noted,
“What is distinctive about many of the newer tools of public action is that they involve
the sharing with third-party actors of a far more basic governmental function; the exercise
of discretion over the use of public authority and the spending of public funds” (p. 2). By
giving third partners greater authority and discretion in decision making, decentralized
institutions are seen to offer a number of advantages including an ability to more flexibly
respond to local needs and changing circumstances, a desire to implement more
innovative strategies, and the ability to act more effectively than centralized institutions
(Osborne and Gaebler 1993).
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As addressed earlier, however, a central dilemma emerges in benefiting from third
parties advantages while avoiding the creation of public programs that are so complex
and unwieldy that accountability is impossible (Frederickson 2001). Some suggest that a
paradox has emerged based on incompatible strategies related to NPM. On one hand,
increased decentralization is meant to provide greater autonomy and discretion to third
parties. On the other hand, the performance movement is based on more traditional,
compliance-oriented accountability (Goddard and Mannion 2004; Hood and Peters 2004;
Radin 2001, 2006). Advocates of NPM, however, counter that performance measurement
in fact serves as bridge between these to aims. From their view, performance
measurement is a means to avoid the traditional command and control mechanisms by
substituting outcome requirements (i.e., results) for the flexibility and discretion provided
third parties in implementation (Wholey 1999). Others suggest, however, that NPM has
focused on performance at lower levels of analysis rather than addressing the more
complex situations which involve multiple organizations, cross-organizational policy
arenas, or fields involving multiple actors from varied sectors all contributing to
outcomes (Bouckaert and Peters 2002). Forsythe (2001), in his text on performance in
government noted, “No government-wide strategy for performance management will
magically solve the difficult problems of monitoring the results of federally funded
programs administered by state and local governments and by private contractors” (p.
547).
At any rate, the introduction of third party governance, including networks,
imposes greater complexity for performance measurement at the federal level than at the
state or local levels given the intergovernmental and intra-governmental relations
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involved (Frederickson 2003; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Mandell and Keast
2006; Radin 2000b). The policy implementation literature has long exposed the
convolution for program implementation imposed by decentralized structures (Bardach
1977; Derthick 1972; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). In fact, implementation studies,
many of which were conducted in the 1970’s, contend that decentralized implementation
is, in fact, the source of problems that leave public policy programs falling short of their
expectations (deleon and deleon 2002; Salamon 2002; Scheirer 1981; Lester and Goggin
1998). The NPM reforms have only further complicated the implementation process with
Lester and Goggins (1998) characterizing the 1990s as an “implementation era.”
The recent reform movements point to the complexity of the contemporary
implementation process one involving varied policy tools for multiple actors among
multiple agencies each influenced by its own set of values, goals, stakeholders, and
context. The effects of inter-agency interaction that occur during policy implementation
result in extensive evolution in the implementation process whereby policy goals and
objectives are modified by the process itself (Majone and Wildavsky 1979). As a policy
is implemented across (and down) levels of government, a mutual adaptation occurs
between the organizational setting and the program (Berman 1978). In other words,
decentralized implementation can lead to extensive variability in implementation across
sites, especially given that legislative statutes tend to fairly vague (Elmore 1978). In
addition, increasing numbers of actors are involved, each with their own goals and
organizational culture. It is not surprising then that new challenges emerge for
performance measurement in this context. As Fossett, Gais, and Thompson (2001)
contend, “Proclaiming the virtues of mission-driven federalism is, of course, one thing
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and success in implementing it quite another. Intergovernmental arrangements complicate
virtually all aspects of performance management – agreement on key goals, the
development of indicators, the timely collection of pertinent and valid performance data,
the interpretation of these data, the implementation of an incentive system (e.g., rewards
for strong performers), and more” (p. 208).
A study by GAO in 1998 assessed the challenges in measuring program results in
decentralized contexts. Not unexpectedly, goal conflicts often emerge as agencies at the
state or local level have differing sets of priorities (GAO 1998a). In addition, programs
frequently have different purposes for performance measurement (e.g., accountability,
program improvement) (GAO 1998a). Adding more complexity is the variability in
activities implemented at each site which is well documented in the implementation
literature but also by studies of performance measurement (GAO 1998a). Frederickson
(2003) suggests that GPRA makes an implicit assumption of homogeneity in regard to
agency service provision activities. In reality, however, program variation can be
extensive for a national program that works through state and local agencies and or
community based organizations. Under this scenario, it is not uncommon for each site to
modify program elements to meet the needs and fit the structure and culture of their
respective environments and target populations. However, research suggests this
variability challenges the ability of federal agencies to identify a common set of uniform
national indicators (GAO 1998a, 1998b).
In regard to measurement, research indicates that decentralized program
implementation compromises data quality and introduces variability in data collection
across sites as it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to control data collected by third
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parties (Frederickson 2003; GAO 1997a, 1998a). This has lead to documented problems
in aggregating data from numerous sites at a national level (GAO 1998a). And finally,
studies show that the training and capacity issues identified earlier are also exaggerated in
a decentralized context as limits in analytic resources and experience with measurement
exist on a wider scale (GAO 1998a).
Other studies have explored how performance information is being used. This
area of research is important because it is the use of performance measurement that must
justify its costs, and performance measurement is likely to influence behavior only if it is
used (Schick 2001; Wholey 1997). An evaluation of GPRA by GAO in 2004 found that
although managers had more performance data, results were mixed on whether they were
using it to improve performance (GAO 2004). In another study that examined the use of
performance measurement in sixteen federal programs, researchers found that
performance data was being used for four purposes: (1) to trigger corrective action; (2)
identify best practice; (3) motivate behavior; and (4) plan (Hatry et al. 2004). Based on
their study, these researchers also characterized a number of barriers to the use of
performance measurement including the lack of authority to make changes based on
performance information, limited understanding of how to use outcome data, and data
problems more generally (e.g., data may not be timely, data may be old by the time it is
available, data may not be disaggregated to a useful level) (Hatry et al. 2003, Hatry et al.
2004). And finally, the study found that some outcomes included in performance
measurement systems can take years to achieve which, again, compromised the system’s
usefulness given that performance measurement systems are based on the premise of
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providing frequent, timely information (Hatry et al. 2003, Hatry et al. 2004). The
empirical research presented above is summarized in a table format in appendix B.
2.4.5 Theory Building
Given a deficit in theory development for performance measurement, Jennings
and Haist (2002, 2004) made an effort to propose theory intended to help predict the use
and consequences of performance measurement by identifying factors that influence the
implementation and impact of systems of performance measurement. As noted in chapter
one, using the framework for governance articulated by Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn (2004),
Jennings and Haist propose twenty-five hypotheses for empirical study (Jennings and
Haist 2004) 10 . The larger governance framework developed by Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn
suggests that government performance is a function of structure, treatments, environment,
client characteristics, and management (P = S + T + E + C + M) (Heinrich, Hill, and
Lynn 2004). In this model, performance measurement is reflected in the “M” as one type
of management tool that may affect performance outcomes in the public sector. From this
perspective, the authors suggest that performance measurement is likely to have relatively
marginal effects in shaping the impacts of a policy given that there may be a myriad of
challenges related to administrative structures, the treatments (interventions) available,
the environmental factors, and client characteristics (Jennings and Haist 2004).
The twenty-five hypotheses proposed by Jennings and Haist are based on three
features of the governance system that may mediate the implementation and impact of
performance measurement. These mediating factors include: (1) incentives that support
managers’ participation in performance measurement systems; (2) politics, that is, the
10

All twenty-five hypotheses are listed in appendix A.
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degree to which political interests agree on the goals of the policy and the validity of the
measures; and (3) organizations, including their structure, features, culture, and
leadership (Jennings and Haist 2004). As discussed in the first chapter, three of these
hypotheses are proposed as a theoretical framework to guide this study.

2.5 Public Health and Performance Measurement
2.5.1 Developments in Public Health Practice
In the field of public health, attention to performance measurement has increased
over the course of the past decade or more. Although public health may have lagged
behind in the performance measurement movement in contrast to the health care sector
(Handler, Issel, and Turnock 2001; Roper and Mays 2000), CDC has been influenced by
GPRA, PART, and other aspects of NPM. The literature related to performance
measurement in public health is limited, but reflects many of the same challenges
highlighted in the section above. More importantly, the context of the public health
system and the nature of national public health programs contribute to the existing
challenges facing the effective use of performance measurement. Given that this study is
based in a public health context, some background on the field is provided in this section.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s important advancements in the practice of
public health occurred. Two notable works were published by the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) reflecting these changes. First, in 1988, the IOM published a report titled The
Future of Public Health which outlined three core functions of public health including
assessing health status and related health needs, policy development, and assuring that
needed services are provided (IOM 1988). This landmark IOM report defined public
health as “what we as a society do collectively to assure the conditions in which people
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can be healthy” (IOM 1988, 1). The report articulated a mission for public health and
communicated a common approach for the field.
Following this important work, HHS 11 convened the Public Health Functions
Working Group in 1994 to define a set of essential public health services derived from
the three core functions. This working group developed the ten essential public health
services (table 3 below) meant to provide a foundation for public health efforts in the
United States (IOM 2003).

Table 3. The 10 Essential Public Health Services
Assessment
1. Monitor health status to identify community health problems
2. Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the community
Policy Development
3. Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues
4. Mobilize community partnerships to identify and solve health problems
5. Develop policies and plans that support individual and community health efforts
Assurance
6. Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety
7. Link people to needed personal health services and assure the provision of health
care when otherwise unavailable
8. Assure a competent public health and personal health care workforce
9. Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based
health services
Serving All Functions
10. Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems

11 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is comprised of following
federal agencies: Administration for Children and Families, Administration on Aging,
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, Food and Drug Administration, Health Resources and Services
Administration, Indian Health Services, National Institutes of Health, and the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
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Other important guidance for the field of public health was provided by Healthy
People 2000 and, more recently, Healthy People 2010 both of which reflect a vision for
disease prevention and health promotion for the country. Healthy People 2010 details
public health objectives for the Nation and provides a basis for public health planning at
all levels of government 12 . The report includes twenty-eight focus areas, some of which
are disease specific (e.g., cancer, sexually transmitted diseases) and others that are
behavioral in nature (e.g., physical activity, tobacco use).
In 2003, IOM published a follow-up to its 1988 report titled The Future of the
Public’s Health in the 21st Century (IOM 2003). This report explicitly defines health as a
public good and describes government’s fundamental responsibility in promoting and
protecting the public health. The report emphasizes several important developments that
affect our approach to public health and also have direct relevance to performance
measurement as applied to federal-level, public health agencies. First, it is recognized by
scientists today that health is influenced by a multitude of interacting factors. Building
from the work of Dahlgren and Whitehead (1991), a conceptual model reflecting
determinants of population health was specified in the report providing a heuristic to
facilitate our understanding about the multiple factors that interact in complex pathways
to effect population level health (IOM 2003, 52).
The model helps to unravel the relationships between macro-level and micro-level
determinants of health. At the individual level, personal traits such as sex interact with
disease-related factors such as the virulence of a particular disease agent. These micro
level factors “interact along complex and dynamic pathways” (IOM 2003, 53) with more

12

Healthy People 2010. http://www.healthypeople.gov/About/whatis.htm (accessed 08/21/06).
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proximate determinants such as individual risk behavior and social, family, and
community networks as well as with mid-level determinants like living and working
conditions. These in-turn, interact with the larger, up-stream, determinants at the macro
level including social, economic, cultural, and environmental conditions (e.g., economic
inequality, cultural values, urbanization) and policies at all levels (e.g., local, state,
national, global) (IOM 2003). Consistent with lessons learned from community
collaboration action (Fawcett 1999), the implication is that multiple strategies (e.g.,
education, healthcare, health systems, communication, policy action) are needed to more
effectively impact health outcomes. The consequences for program evaluation more
generally, and performance measurement specifically, are increasing challenges to
disentangling individual program effects on particular health outcomes (Barry 2000;
Straw 1996)
The complexity involved in assuring and improving the public’s health reflected
in this model points to a second major development in the field of public health that is
addressed in the IOM report. More precisely, there has been a recognition that problems
are too complex and resources too limited to depend on the traditional public health
system (i.e., national, state, tribal, and local health departments) alone to assure the
public’s health. “Health is shaped by both innate factors (i.e., genes, age, and sex) and
other influences from the social economic, natural, built, and political environments,
ranging from the availability of shelter and food to questions of social connectedness and
behavior. These multiple determinants of health, among others, constitute a reality that
makes it impossible for one entity or one sector alone to bring about population health
improvement,” (IOM 2003, 41).
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Indeed, in their report, IOM (2003) clearly calls for constructing an intersectoral
public health system based on collaborative arrangements that emphasize partnerships
and networks. This system depends on the contributions of varied sectors of society
including the public health system, but also, the health care system, academia,
communities, businesses, employers, the media, and individuals (IOM 2003). By
leveraging the resources of such diverse partners, the public health system will be
strengthened through increased expertise, resources, and broadened perspectives for
public health action (IOM 2003). This shift in the view about the actors needed in a
public health system is reflected in the fourth essential public health service listed above,
“Mobilize community partnerships to identify and solve health problems.” As stated in
the report, “There is strong and growing evidence that ‘healthy’ policy must include
consideration of domains that are not traditionally associated with health but whose
influences have health consequences (e.g., the education, business, housing, and
transportation domains)” (IOM 2003, 34).
This does not discount in any way the importance of the traditional public health
structure of federal and state agencies that, from a constitutional and historical
perspective, have a central responsibility in assuring the public’s health (IOM 2003). This
is consistent with Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn’s (2004) point that hierarchical elements
remain intact within a governance framework. In fact, many of our public health
programs continue to be structured based on the decentralized relationship between the
federal, state, and local government. For instance, at CDC, more traditional lines of
authority remain intact through intra-governmental funding systems in which CDC
distributes federal dollars to both state and local health departments. CDC also funds non-
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governmental partners as well, including community-based organizations and national
organizations. Table 4 below summarizes customary program service delivery and
accountability structures for many of CDC’s national public health programs.

Table 4. CDC National Public Health Program Service Delivery and Accountability
Structures
CDC
• Distributes public funds via cooperative agreements
Federal government
(i.e., a form of a grant) to state and local government,
non-profit community based organizations, academic
institutions, etc.
• Provides technical assistance and support
• Assures appropriate fiscal stewardship
• Manages federal-level performance measurement
systems for its national programs
• Reports annually to OMB on GPRA requirements
• Reviewed by OMB PART
State, Tribal, or Territorial Health Agency
State, Tribal, Territorial
• Distributes public funds to local government and nongovernment
profit community based organizations
• Provides technical assistance and support
• Assures fiscal stewardship for funds distributed
• Delivers public health services (i.e., the 10 essential
public health services)
• Reports to CDC on program activities and fiscal
expenditures
• Reports performance measurement data to CDC
Local or Regional Government, Nongovernmental Agencies,
Local government or
Health Providers
NGO
• Delivers public health services
• Reports data as required

But while these traditional approaches to public health service delivery remain
steady, there is also increasing emphasis on mechanisms, both formal and informal, to
engage other sectors in addressing public health concerns. For instance, in efforts to
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address comprehensive cancer control and prevention 13 federal and state partners are
working to encourage the involvement of many sectors and agencies. These include
multiple departments within state public health agencies (e.g., cancer surveillance,
screening programs, nutrition and physical activity programs, tobacco prevention
programs, adolescent and school health), leading non-profit groups (e.g., ACS, Lance
Armstrong Foundation, Susan G. Koman Foundation), business (e.g., pharmaceutical
companies), and universities 14 . This approach to cancer prevention and control uses
strategic partnerships to leverage public outcomes more effectively than what
government could accomplish alone. This is clearly an important advancement for the
field, however, it again underscores the complexity of applying performance
measurement to federal public health programs when multiple partners are involved in
delivering varied implementation strategies to affect particular health outcomes.
Finally, a third development in public health reflects the increasing emphasis on
evidence-based practice and policies. Given the array of public health interventions
available, the complicated pathways from program implementation to health outcomes,
and limited public health resources, efforts are underway to encourage the use of
strategies with some evidence regarding their effectiveness (IOM 2003). One means to
increase accessibility to evidence-based public health practice has been the creation of the
Task Force on Community Preventive Services. This group parallels the U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force (USPSTF) which conducts scientific evidence reviews of clinical

13

Comprehensive Cancer Control address the continuum of care encompassing
prevention, screening (early detection), treatment, palliation, and survivorship
14
http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/ncccp Accessed 8/26/06.
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preventive services and publishes the Guide to Clinical Preventive Services 15 . The Task
Force on Community Preventive Services, an HHS initiative that is organized by CDC,
reviews scientific information in order to make evidence-based recommendations for
public health programs that promote population health. The Guide to Community
Preventive Services was published in 2005 and provides a review of evidence-based
interventions in a number of areas including tobacco, physical activity, diabetes, and
cancer (Task Force on Community Preventive Services 2005). The emphasis on
identifying evidence based strategies and encouraging their implementation is promising
for performance measurement as the causal links between structures, processes, and
outcomes will be more fully understood. At this time, however, given the limited amount
of rigorous evaluation research of public health practices, there is a significant lack of
scientific evidence (Derose, et al. 2003; Perrin and Koshel 1997; Perrin, Durch, and
Skillman 1999).
A fourth development in the field reflects the influence of NPM and relates to the
importance of improving systems of accountability to ensure health goals are met as well
as the quality and availability of public health services (IOM 2003). Of course GPRA and
PART apply to federal public health programs, but there is increasing attention on the
development of more specific standards for program and workplace performance that
extend more broadly among stakeholders (IOM 2003).

15

http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/pocketgd.htm Accessed 08/26/06.
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These four developments in the field of public health described above are
reflected in the IOM (2003, p. 33-34) report’s identified six areas for change and action.
These include:
1. Adopt a population health approach that builds on evidence of the multiple
determinants of health.
2. Strengthen the governmental public health infrastructure – the backbone of any
public health system.
3. Create a new generation of partnerships to build consensus on health priorities
and support community and individual health actions.
4. Develop appropriate systems of accountability at all levels to ensure that
population health goals are met.
5. Assure that action is based on evidence.
6. Acknowledge communication as the key to forging partnerships, assuring
accountability, and utilizing evidence for decision making and action.

2.5.2 Empirical Research on Performance Measurement in Public Health
As mentioned earlier, the literature on performance measurement in public health,
especially empirical studies, is small. Two reports published in the 1990s and
commissioned by the National Research Council (NRC) at the request of HHS address
performance measurement in the context of a proposed performance partnerships grants
program (Perrin and Koshel 1997; Perrin, Durch, and Skillman 1999). These reports
summarize some of the key challenges to performance measurement as applied in public
health and make some recommendations for improving its practice. Many of the
challenges addressed in these reports reflect those described earlier including: (1) issues
related to attribution (i.e., the lack of firm causal links between inputs, processes, and
outcomes; program resources often represent a small part of the total resources
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contributing to the outcome; public health outcomes are influenced by multiple factors);
(2) issues related to data (i.e., limits of available data sources; quality and comparability
of available data; difficulties in specifying numerators and denominators for specific
indicators; costs of data collection and reporting); and (3) issues related to achieving
outcomes in public health (e.g., the length of time needed to achieve health outcomes
such as lowering the incidence of cancer is often extensive) (Perrin and Koshel 1997;
Perrin, Durch, and Skillman 1999).
Given that this study explores issues for performance measurement imposed by
the increasing involvement of networks in our Nation’s public health infrastructure, the
final section of this chapter provides a more detailed summary of the emerging literature
in networked public management.

2.6 Networked Public Management
2.6.1 Defining Networked Public Management
As discussed earlier 16 , a defining feature of governance involves organizational
networks (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000; Pierre and Peters 1998; Salamon 2002; Stoker
1998). Milward and Provan (2000) use the term “hollow state” as a metaphor to describe
this phenomenon in which the government increasingly funds but does not directly
provide public services. As noted in the section above, given the complexity of public
health problems as well as the influence of NPM, networks are increasingly being used to
more effectively and synergistically implement public policy and achieve public health
goals.

16

Section 2.1.2 addressed networks as a characteristic of a governance framework
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O’Toole (1997) defines networks as “structures of interdependence involving
multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal
subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement. Networks exhibit some
structural stability but extend beyond formally established linkages and policylegitimated ties” (p. 45). O’Toole’s definition has been widely cited and goes on to state,
“The institutional glue congealing networked ties may include authority bonds, exchange
relations, and coalitions based on common interest, all within a single multi-unit
structure” (O’Toole 1997, 45).
Milward and Provan cite a definition by McGuire that more explicitly recognizes
the linkages that are the foundations of networks, “networks are ‘structures involving
multiple nodes – agencies and organizations – with multiple linkages. A public
management network thus includes agencies involved in a public policy making and
administrative structure through which public goods and services are planned, designed,
produced, and delivered (and any or all of the activities). Such network structures can be
formal or informal, and they are typically intersectoral, intergovernmental, and based
functionally in a specific policy or policy area” (McGuire cited in Milward and Provan
2006, 9). The networks of interest for this study are also collaborative in character.
Collaboration can be defined as “a concept that describes the process of facilitating and
operating in multi-organizational arrangements for solving problems that cannot be
achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations” (McGuire 2006, 678).
As mentioned in chapter one, networks impose horizontal relationships aimed at
improving service integration, often with nongovernmental partners, on top of vertical, or
hierarchical ones reflecting the intergovernmental relationships of traditional federalism
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(Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn 2004; Milward and Provan 2004). As noted earlier, Heinrich,
Hill, and Lynn (2004) contend that networks will continue to include the hierarchical
relations with command and control structures given that our governance system is
fundamentally rooted in a constitutional scheme that includes political and judicial
requirements for accountability. In fact, intergovernmental relationships reflect the most
typical form of network connections in carrying out public programs (O’Toole and Meier
2004).
Within a network structure, policy processes become more complex because
collective decision making and problem solving are required among mutually
independent actors, each representing various organizations, sectors, and levels of
government (Agranoff and McGuire 2001a; Salamon 2002). As mentioned previously,
these interdependent relationships are often established and maintained based on the
exchange of resources, expertise, information, and technology (Agranoff and McGuire
2001a). Salamon (2002) identifies key attributes characterizing network settings. These
include the following:
1. Pluriformity – Networks exhibit pluriformity by involving a diverse range of
agencies and organizational types which often have limited experience
collaborating as well as a limited understanding of each other’s styles of
operation.
2. Self-referential – Networks are self-referential in that each organization
participating in the network has independent interests and each approaches the
relationship with a unique set of perspectives and incentives.
3. Asymmetric interdependencies – Networks involve asymmetric interdependencies
in which all network actors are interdependent, but in asymmetric ways.
4. Dynamic – The features of networks constantly change in response to various
conditions requiring network membership to shift, leadership to change, and goals
and strategies to evolve.
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2.6.2 Increasing Role of Networks in Public Management
Networks are not necessarily a new phenomenon in government; in fact, Kettl
(2003) notes that since World War II there has been an increase in government partnering
with nongovernmental partners as a means to practically deal with the increased
complexity of public programs. However, the prominence of networks has grown in
recent years for several reasons. First, where the bureaucratic form of governance
dominated the industrial age, networks are seen as more appropriate in an information
and global age where the world is more complex and diverse (Agranoff and McGuire
2001b).
Second, NPM’s emphasis on increased decentralization and reliance on third
parties for policy implementation has contributed to the network model (Milward and
Provan 2004). Related, Salamon (2002) suggests that the rapid expansion of indirect
policy tools used in decentralized government has also played a role in contributing to
network management. Agranoff and Meier (2001b) suggest that particular policy tools
encourage the utilization of network models.
Third, the emergence of more wicked social problems which require the
involvement of many actors in order to effectively address them has also contributed to
the increase of networks in public management (O’Toole 1997; Agranoff and McGuire
2001b). As noted above, this is certainly the case in public health where many problems
reflect the collision of economic, social, physical, and environmental factors. Fourth, in a
government funding atmosphere characterized by “silo” grant-making and contracting,
network management may be the best structure to achieve goals that require more holistic
solutions.
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And finally, networks may be emerging simply based on funders’ requirements
for collaboration and other political imperatives that encourage networking (O’Toole
1997; O’Toole and Meier 2004). Again, in public health, there has been an increase in the
number of these partnerships and coalitions over the past decade as more people
recognize achieving public health goals requires the resources and capabilities of more
than any single agency or sector (Lasker and Weiss 2003). Many federal agencies include
collaboration such as state-wide coalitions as a funding requirement (Wandersman,
Goodman, and Butterfoss 1997).
2.6.3 Network Types and Structures
Networks can vary in structure, size, and complexity (O’Toole and Meier 2004)
and are referred to as “partnerships, coalitions, alliances, strategic alliances, consortiums,
and networks” (Milward and Provan 2004, 8). Based on a study of twelve networks in the
Midwest, Agranoff (2003) identified four types of networks including informal networks,
developmental networks, outreach networks, and action networks. In a more recent
report, Milward and Provan (2006) also describe four types of networks service
implementation networks, information diffusion networks, problem solving networks,
and community capacity building networks. Each is briefly summarized in table 5 below
(Milward and Provan 2006, 11).
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Table 5. Public Management Networks – Types and Characteristics
Network Type
Key Characteristics
• Government funds the service under contract but doesn’t directly
Service
provide it (frequently health and human services).
Implementation • Services are jointly produced by two or more agencies.
Networks
• Collaboration is often between programs of larger organizations.
• Horizontal management of service providers is a key task.
• A fiscal agent acts as the sole buyer of services.
• Key management tasks include encouraging cooperation,
negotiating contracts, planning network expansion, etc.
• Horizontal and vertical ties between interdependent government
Information
agencies.
Diffusion
• Primary focus is sharing information across departmental
Networks
boundaries.
• Commonly used for disaster preparedness and other “high
uncertainty” problems.
• Primary purpose is to help organizational managers set the agenda
Problem
for policy related to a critical national or regional problem.
Solving
• Focus is on solving existing complex problems rather than building
Networks
relationships for future problems.
• Often emerges from information diffusion networks.
• Relationships may be temporary, to address a specific problem, and
then become dormant after the problem is resolved.
• May be either designed or emergent.
• Primary goal is to build social capital in community-based settings.
Community
• Network purpose is both current and future oriented.
Capacity
• May be created by participants (bottom-up) or by private and
Building
government funders (top-down).
Networks
• Often involves a wide range of agencies with many emergent subnetworks to address different community needs that may arise.

2.6.4 Challenges of Managing in a Network Public Management Context
Network management is understood as different from hierarchical public
management. Some specific challenges to managing in a network context are summarized
below.
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2.6.4.1 Joint production problem
Intrinsic to networks is what has been termed the “joint production problem,” the
challenge to coordinate program implementation across a potentially broad service
implementation network (Milward and Provan 2004). In networks, leaders must
effectively collaborate with representatives from the public, private, and non-profit
sectors as well as across levels of government (Abramson, Breul, Kamensky 2006). As
previously discussed, the complex issues addressed by networks require the actions of
varied actors to address the multitude of factors contributing to them. The joint
production problem points to a central management challenge in network settings, that is,
achieving program success in an environment that often involves voluntary collaboration
with a variety of actors over whom public managers have little formal authority (O’Toole
and Meier 2004). However, a qualitative study of twelve networks in the Midwest
conducted by Agranoff (2003) found that government actors were often the conveners of
networks. And although trust was found to generally replace more formal authority in this
context, government retained status as a core actor and key partner given their legitimacy
to address social problems (Agranoff 2003).
2.6.4.2 Fuzzy Boundary Problem
As noted above, in a networked model, government represents only one of many
actors and institutions involved in addressing social problems (Agranoff and McGuire
2001a). This has led to what Kettl (2002) has termed the “fuzzy boundaries” problem,
that is, new management challenges created by the loss of hierarchy’s clear lines of
responsibility and the state’s loss of sole authority. As Kettl (2003) suggests, “Managing
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government programs effectively thus increasingly depends on bridging the fuzzy
boundaries that separate those who make policy from those in the complex
interdependent chain of those who share responsibility for implementing it” (p. 60).
These interdependent relationships that exist between government and other thirdparty actors from the private and non-profit sectors result in power dependencies
(Salamon 2002; Stoker 1998). Responsibility for management in networks is shared,
therefore, traditional hierarchical authority is compromised (O’Toole 1997). The central
authority of government hierarchy is replaced by voluntary cooperation and strategies of
influence and leverage (Frederickson and Smith 2003; Peters 2001). For public managers,
more time is spent managing the interdependencies between their organization and the
others involved in the network (Agranoff and McGuire 2001a). In part, this stems from
the multiplicity of interests and values represented in a network; the participants each
come with their own set of values, interests, and goals that must somehow be reconciled.
2.6.4.3 Management Capacity
Agranoff (2003) says of network management, “Network management is
considered to be a different type of non-hierarchical management, where information and
expertise is substituted for authority structure, through a self-organizing process, held
together by mutual obligation that develops over time, by reaching consensus-based
decisions, and by blending knowledge bases from different organizational arenas into
innovative technologies that can become the ‘DNA’ of networks” (p. 6). To effectively
manage in networks, different capacities are needed than those applied in hierarchical
arrangements (Agranoff and McGuire 2001b). But, at this time, horizontal management
across organizations is poorly understood and government has limited capacity to
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effectively manage networks (Milward and Provan 2004, 2006). Kettl (2002) suggests a
“management gap” exists, that is, government has not adapted its public management
systems to administer effectively in a network environment. Similarly, Milward and
Provan (2004) suggest that government lacks effective coordinating structures for
managing in network settings.
O’Toole (1997) identified four factors differentiating management in networks – a
lack of direct managerial supervision over those for whom their performance is judged,
diffuse monitoring channels that are often unreliable, the absence of a shared
organizational culture, and a need to integrate potentially diverse organizational needs
into action. A study of intergovernmental networks in public school districts
differentiated between a “structural network,” which the authors defined as the more
stable, intergovernmental network, and a “behavioral network,” the larger network of
partners with whom managers collaborate (O’Toole and Meier 2004). Results suggest
that public management, measured by stability in personnel within the structural network
and behavioral networking, was positively related to improved performance (O’Toole
and Meier 2004). Using the same data set and building on the idea of behavioral
networking, Goerdel (2006) found that proactive management on the part of public
managers supported organizational success. That is, public managers who initiated
contact and collaboration with network actors more frequently achieved organizational
success (Goerdel 2006).
Kettl (2002) and others (Mandell and Keast 2006; Agranoff and McGuire 2001a)
recognize managing networks as primarily a “people problem” and emphasize skill
building in the areas such as communication, negotiation, facilitation, and persuasion
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skills that will support the bridge-building and “boundary spanning” necessary to
effectively navigate this context as well as ability to effect network arrangements in way
that further coordination.
2.6.4.4 Accountability
Accountability represents another major management dilemma in network
environments. As noted earlier in the section addressing governance, accountability is
seen as particularly problematic given the network structure (Page 2004; Peters and
Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998). Both the fuzzy boundaries and joint production problems
contribute to making it more difficult to assign accountability in a network structure. In
addition, monitoring channels may be more diffuse and unreliable (O’Toole 1997).
Posner (2002) offers three reasons for accountability challenges in networks.
First, in network settings, authority and political resources are shared and third parties
have significant power. The goals and objectives of those third parties may differ
significantly from those of government (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). Stakeholders may
represent competing values and be held responsible for different outcomes (e.g., ones
related to efficiency vs. effectiveness) (Milward and Provan 2004). Second, as discussed
earlier, in networks, information asymmetries exist whereby third parties often have more
information and insider-knowledge about what is occurring in the field. Third parties can
also hide information about performance, and government often has not supported more
costly monitoring to track and assess performance, especially when decentralized
programs are involved (Posner 2002). And finally, implementation can involve several
layers of actors, including levels of government, non-profit organizations, and for-profit
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sectors (Posner 2002). The layers of agencies and actors further fragments and challenges
accountability structures.
In summary, given a network structure where program implementation is
decentralized, authority is compromised, political resources are shared, and monitoring
channels are diffuse and unreliable, demands for accountability are particularly
challenged (Goldsmith and Eggers 2005; O’Toole 1997; Peters 2001; Posner 2002). This
situation is exacerbated by the current lack of capacity and tools of governance to
effectively navigate in a network environment (Kettl 2002; Milward and Provan 2004,
2006). Accountability may need to be conceptualized differently for networks than for
single organizations, considering ideas of responsibility and responsiveness (Agranoff
and McGuire 2001b).
2.6.5 Network Public Management and Theory
Although public administrators have been working in a network environment for
many years, related empirical analysis and theory building is more recent and has been
relatively slow to develop (Kettl 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004). Kettl (2003)
acknowledges a lack of consensus in the field on whether networks reflect an approach,
theory, or loose construct; he suggests that to date, the analysis of networks best
represents a framework that may offer some early steps toward the development of tools
for better managing within a network model.
The literature clearly reflects, however, increased attention to issues related to
managing public agencies which operate in environments characterized by networks.
There seems little question that networks have emerged as an important form of
governance (Agranoff 2005; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Frederickson and Smith 2003;
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Kettl 2002; O’Toole and Meier 2004). In fact, their importance has led some to call for
the development of a paradigm for network management similar to the hierarchical,
bureaucratic model that proceeded it (Frederickson and Smith 2003; Agranoff and
McGuire 2001b).
In a forum held in 2005 and sponsored by The IBM Center for The Business of
Government, public management experts identified using networks to organize in
response to “non-routine” or wicked problems as one of the three most important
challenges facing the U.S. government (Kettl 2005). This group concluded that, although
hierarchical management structures continue to work well in addressing more routine
problems (i.e., Social Security, garbage collection), networked approaches are needed to
more effectively tackle complex problems (e.g., social service problems, terrorism) where
responsibility for solving them is more diffuse (Kettl 2005). The group also concluded
that problems such as those related to public health and homeland security must rely on
distributed organizations, that is, efforts that integrate hierarchical and networked
approaches (Kettl 2005).
The report included a case study example of how CDC Director, Dr. Julie
Gerberding, has recently reorganized CDC in order to more effectively respond to public
health emergencies (e.g., bioterror episodes, bird flu outbreaks). Central to this
reorganization was facilitating CDC’s ability to more effectively collaborate through
networks to improve information sharing within and outside the institution and to
leverage needed expertise of CDC’s partners (Kettl 2005). Kettl (2005) argues that the
twenty-first century problems facing CDC called for its transformation from a more
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traditional hierarchical organization to one that reflects new goals and an emphasis on
performance, increased collaboration, and improved service delivery.
2.6.6 Performance Measurement and Network Governance
Only a few sources were identified in the literature explicitly investigating the
relationship of performance measurement and network governance and most of it comes
from Europe and Australia. The study of GPRA implementation by Frederickson and
Frederickson (2006) previously described is relevant here as well. Based on a review of
performance systems in seven different public sectors within the United Kingdom (U.K.),
Goddard and Mannion (2004) explored whether performance measurement systems can
also support horizontal relationships more characteristic of a network approach to
governance. They differentiated vertical with horizontal performance measurement
systems based on aspects of measurement, analysis, and action (use). These
characteristics are summarized in table 6 below (Goddard and Mannion 2004, 82).
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Table 6. Characteristics of Vertical and Horizontal Performance Measurement
Systems
Vertical, Hierarchical Approach
Measurement:
Scope

•
•
•
•

Measurement:
Purpose

•
•
•

Analysis

•

•
•
•

Horizontal, Network Approach

National (center) perspective
Focus on dimensions of
performance important to
center
Quantitative orientation for
indicators
Lack of consultation on
system design

•

Accountability (financial
and political) and external
control
Focus on attaining minimum
standards/uniform standards
Use performance data to
mediate relationships
between different parts of
the system

•

Center focuses on providing
data definitions and ensuring
consistency in data
collection, analysis, and
presentation
Analysis undertaken by
center and fed back down to
organizations
Organizations collect data
only for the purpose of
meeting central priorities
Analysis highlights best and
worst performers

•
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•
•
•

•
•

•

•
•
•

Focus on issues of concern to
customers, clients, and provider
staff
Participative process of system
design
Include qualitative elements of
performance
Focus on dimensions of
performance important to local
partners
Emphasize use by organizations
for their own purposes
Focus on improvement across all
organizations
Use of data to support informal
systems and channels of
communication and
dissemination
Use of peer review process
Some use of anonymized
information collected by and
shared between, participating
organizations
Organizations use the data they
collect for local purposes
Analysis focused on continuous
quality improvement across all
organizations
Use of inspection to cover
“softer” areas of performance not
captured by quantitative
indicators

Vertical, Hierarchical Approach
Action:
•
Dissemination
Incentives
•
•
•
•
•

Focus on achievement of
indiscriminate targets by all
regardless of starting point
Publication of results in
league table format
Focus on meeting needs of
external stakeholders (e.g.,
public)
Incentives targeted at poor
performers
Incentives targeted at
institutional level
Incentives directed largely at
extrinsic motivation

Horizontal, Network Approach
•

•
•

•
•

Encouragement for organizations
to access and use the data for
their own quality improvement
purposes
Focus on helping organizations to
make sense of the data and share
best practice
Incentives exist for encouraging
performance improvement
regardless of the starting point of
the organization
Incentives directed at the
individuals whose behavior
affects performance
Incentives directed at intrinsic
motivation

The authors found both vertical and horizontal features of performance
measurement systems in the seven different public sectors reviewed in the U.K. That is,
they found that vertical and horizontal approaches seem to exist on a continuum with
agencies having adopted elements of both in their performance measurement systems.
This is consistent with Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn’s (2004) contention that in the
governance framework a continuum emerges related to the horizontal and vertical
dimensions of administrative structures rather than simply one or the other alone. Like
Radin (2006), Goddard and Mannion argue against a “one-size-fits-all” approach to a
performance measurement system and suggest a more nuanced strategy to integrate topdown approaches with ones more horizontal in nature. Their findings promote more of a
contingency perspective, suggesting that vertical approaches may be more effective when
policy dictates a small number of important targets by focusing the actions of agents.
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Their review also identifies unintended consequences related to gaming and misconduct
that can emerge under these circumstances. In contrast, they find a key benefit of
horizontal approaches to performance measurement in the creation of a more open
environment that supports freer exchange of information leading to continuous learning
and program improvement (Goddard and Mannion 2004).
In a recent paper by Mandell and Keast (2006), both from Australia, the authors
suggest that newer, “non-traditional,” performance measures are needed to evaluate
performance in collaborating networks. They argue that traditional performance measures
focusing on tasks completed and clients served may be appropriate for single agency
efforts but are inadequate for network arrangements. Rather, the authors suggest that
these types of performance measures must be augmented by ones assessing the
performance of the network itself. Outputs and outcomes of importance to networks
include those related to the processes that occur throughout the development of a network
as well as relationship building, trust, and more tangible elements such as revised policies
and procedures (Mandell and Keast 2006). Mandell and Keast (2006) suggest that the
effectiveness of collaborating networks is not based on the effectiveness of any single
agency, but rather “by the ability of all organizations in the network to act as a cohesive
whole” (p. 4). Consequently, the authors argue that performance measures must be
developed with input from all network members rather than imposed by a government
agency (Mandell and Keast 2006). In addition, they acknowledge that network structures
will compromise the ability to hold individual government agencies accountable for
individual outcomes (Mandell and Keast 2006). In fact, within a network, Page (2004)
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suggests that the attempt to hold individual agencies responsible for broad outcomes may
actually risk setting them up for failure.
When operating through networks, then, the issue emerges of including common
measures of collaborative performance. That is, to better manage networks, should an
effort be made to develop measures that capture the performance of the network itself as
suggested by Mandell and Keast? In an earlier paper by Keast et al. (2004), the authors
noted, “The difficulty is that the types of results that occur through network structures do
not have to do with generating programs or numbers (although that is part of the
secondary results), but have to do more with changing relationships and perceptions,
which are much more intangible” (p. 367). The authors advocate for the recognition of
outcome measures that reflect the benefits of network operations – “systemic change,
relationship building, innovative operating procedures, and community inclusion” (Keast
et al. 2004, 370).
Similarly, Voets, De Rynck, and Van Dooren (2006), all from Belgium, consider
the challenge of measuring collaborative performance in networks given that it may offer
an important tool when managing in these contexts. They ask, “Do we need a different
conceptualization of performance, if precisely these less tangible and measurable
dimensions are at the heart of collaborative networks?” (Voets, De Rynck, and Van
Dooren 2006, 21).
In the U.S., Robert Agranoff (2005) has given this idea some attention as well,
considering how to develop measures that capture the “value-added” of the collaborative
network. Agranoff (2005) proposed developing measures relating to the individual level
(e.g., individual gains based on network participation), the organizational level (e.g.,
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access to new information or expertise, increased integration), and collaborative levels
(e.g., process related to relationship building, etc.).

2.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter summarized several literatures relevant to the proposed study
including those related to governance, NPM, policy reforms related to NPM and
performance measurement, performance measurement, public health, and networked
public management. These literatures all contribute to framing the study in the current
discourse. Governance provides an important overall context given the centrality of
networks in the framework. New Public Management, with its policy reforms (i.e.,
GPRA, PART) and emphasis on performance measurement, also provides invaluable
context for the study.
As the dissertation title suggests, the literature recognizes potential challenges for
developing and implementing performance measurement in networked public
management contexts. Although performance measurement has been widely adopted in
practice, network contexts pose unique challenges given their characteristics outlined
above. Studies by GAO and Frederickson addressing GPRA’s implementation imposed
by third-party government and decentralized implementation structures provide an
important foundation from which to build the proposed study. Theoretical work by
Jennings and Haist also provide an essential basis for the research.
The literature suggests that government is struggling to adapt and transform its
public management practices to fit new structures that support more agile and
coordinated responses to the complex policy problems facing the country today.
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Performance management is one strategy that has been advocated as a means to improve
the results of public programs in these contexts (Kettl 2005). However, a better
understanding of how programs are addressing the challenges posed by network
governance in developing and implementing performance measurement is needed in
order to enhance its practice. Therefore, more research is needed. The next chapter
describes the methodology used for this study that addresses this gap in the research.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Fundamentally, the selection of research methods is dictated by the researcher’s
philosophical view, as well as the study’s purpose, the nature of the research questions,
and the available resources (Creswell 1998; Patton 2002). Qualitative methods are most
suitable when a subject is simply insufficiently understood and researchers are exploring
the “how” and “what” (Creswell 2007; Ulin, Robinson, and Tolley 2005). Both are
relevant here. First, as already noted, the extant literature addressing the convergence of
performance measurement and networked governance is scarce. Second, as reflected in
the research questions, the proposed study is exploratory in nature, aimed at better
understanding the implications of networked public management on the design and
implementation of federal-level performance measurement. Consequently, a qualitative
methodology is applied because it enables a more detailed description and explanation of
federal performance measurement applied in these contexts.
The field of qualitative research has grown substantially over the past two decades
with its methods increasingly utilized by researchers in the applied social sciences,
including among others, those in public policy, public management, public health, and
evaluation (Brower, Abolafia, and Carr 2000; Miles and Huberman 1994; Rossman and
Rallis 2003; Ulin, Robinson, and Tolley 2005). Notably, some classic texts in the field of
public policy have been based on qualitative research including Pressman and
Wildavsky’s (1973) account of policy implementation and Allison’s (1971) analysis of
the Cuban missile crisis. Agranoff and Radin (1991) argue the importance of systematic
and rigorous case study approaches to explore complex issues in public administration
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that cannot be effectively addressed using other research methods. Furthermore,
qualitative research can make an important contribution toward building a bridge
between theory and practice that will benefit public managers (Agranoff and Radin 1991;
Brower, Abolafia, and Carr 2000).
This chapter summarizes the study’s research methods. First, some key
characteristics of qualitative research are described to introduce the broad research
approach adopted for this study. This is followed by a justification of the qualitative
approach chosen for the study, case study methodology. In particular, features of a
multiple, instrumental case study, the specific type of case study applied here, are
detailed. The chapter then presents a thorough overview of the sampling, data collection
processes, data analysis procedures, and the presentation of findings. Next, the chapter
addresses issues related to the study’s rigor, particularly those of reliability and validity.
The chapter closes by attending to ethical considerations, study limitations, and
researcher assumptions.
As introduced in chapter one, the three research questions guiding the study are as
follows:
1. How does networked public management affect the observability of program
outputs and outcomes?
2. How does networked public management influence the use of performance
measurement and the types of performance measures used?
3. How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance
measurement?
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3.1 Characteristics and Strengths of Qualitative Research
The characteristics of qualitative research reflect many of its strengths and
contributions as a broad research method. Qualitative research can be characterized by its
1) naturalistic approach, 2) aim toward understanding, 3) focus on interpretation, 4)
inductive strategy, 5) use of multiple methods, 6) emergent and flexible design, 7)
simultaneous conduct of data collection and analysis, and 8) the researcher’s role as the
primary instrument of data collection. First, qualitative research involves data collection
and methods that are applied in real-world settings that unfold “naturally” (Lincoln and
Guba 1985; Rossman and Rallis 2003). The naturalistic approach emphasizes the
importance of understanding the context in which the phenomenon or person operates
based on the belief that the setting significantly influences human behavior (Bogdan and
Biklen 2007).
Second, in contrast to quantitative research, with its aim at explanation,
prediction, and broader generalization, qualitative research is intent on generating deeper
understanding of the whole as well as of the specific and particular (Miles and Huberman
1994; Patton 2002; Stake 1995). By simultaneously applying data collection and analytic
methods that are open-ended yet rigorous, qualitative research uncovers nuance and
complexity related to the object of study (Janesick 2000). This allows researchers to
uncover a richness that is often conveyed in “thick” or “rich” description a narrative
providing a deep level of understanding intended to facilitate theory building, explicate
relationships, or provide important contextual details not possible through quantitative
methods (Denzin and Lincoln 2000).
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Third, in qualitative study, the researcher strives to understand the multiple
perspectives of those closest to the phenomenon of interest and achieve an “emic” or
insider perspective of the view of those studied (Stake 2000). In other words, qualitative
research aims to make meaning of phenomena based on individuals’ perceptions of them
(Creswell 2007; Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Stake (1995) suggests that interpretation is
the single most distinctive characteristic of qualitative research.
Next, interpretations are largely drawn inductively in qualitative research rather
than deductively, as in the quantitative arena. Categories, themes, and patterns are
derived directly from the data (Janesick 2000). It would be misleading to suggest,
however, that qualitative work is solely inductive; theoretical frameworks and research
questions provide essential structure for research (Miles and Huberman 1994). That is,
qualitative research often begins deductively with a conceptual framework and a set of
analytic categories, and then it proceeds inductively to derive meaning from the research
experience and collected data (Miles and Huberman 1994). But fundamentally,
qualitative research involves an effort to inductively derive meaning from the multiple
perspectives of those included in the study (Ezzy 2002).
Fifth, qualitative research utilizes multiple methods to collect varied empirical
data. Most frequently, data collection involves interviews, observations, and document
review (Patton 2002). The use of these varied approaches facilitates a more holistic view
of the phenomenon under study and allows for the triangulation of data sources,
improving the study’s reliability and validity.
Sixth, the methods selected in qualitative research are used in a flexible manner,
that is, the approach involves emergent research design (Rossman and Rallis 2003). Miles
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and Huberman (1994) recognize the need to “bend the methodology to the peculiarities of
the setting” (p.5). This requires that investigators understand the theoretical or policy
issues under study as they must make analytic judgments throughout data collection (Yin
2009). This suggests a seventh, closely related characteristic – that “analysis begins in the
field” as researchers are attentive to emerging themes and patterns, consistently reflecting
on data to help shape the study design (Glesne and Peshkin 1992). Consequently, data
collection and analysis occur concurrently in qualitative research necessitating the
flexibility noted above (Creswell 2007). For instance, an interviewee may identify
another important person to interview; an observation may reveal new issues for study;
and a specific document examined may suggest another for analysis (Janesick 2000).
Lastly, in qualitative work, the researcher becomes the instrument for data
collection (Creswell 2007; Miles and Huberman 1994). There is a purposeful researchersubject interaction intended to facilitate deeper understanding. Within this relationship,
the researcher assumes a neutral or nonjudgmental approach emphasizing empathy,
respect, sensitivity, and responsiveness (Patton 2002). This is in contrast to quantitative
research where the researcher assumes the role of objective observer (Stake 1995). Given
the role of the researcher in qualitative researcher, attention to voice and reflexivity is
essential. Patton noted, “The qualitative researcher owns and is reflective about her or his
own voice and perspective; … the researcher’s focus becomes balance understanding and
depicting the world authentically in all its complexity while being self-analytical,
politically aware, and reflexive in consciousness,” (Patton 2002, 41).
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3.2 Methodological Approach: Multiple, Instrumental Case Study
Case study, one tradition of qualitative research, is an empirical method most
appropriate when the nature of the research addresses “how” and “what” (Creswell
2007). Case study research aims to deepen understanding by closely studying the
complexities of an individual case in order to produce rich description (Rossman and
Rallis 2003). The case can focus on individuals, programs, communities, or states, but
regardless of the unit of analysis used, a qualitative case study “seeks to describe that unit
in depth and detail, in context, and holistically” (Patton 2002, 54).
Case study has been identified as a valuable method for the study of public policy
and public administration. Stake suggested, “The utility of case research to practitioners
and policy makers is in its extension of experience,” (Stake 2000, 449). For this study,
case study serves as a useful qualitative approach given the research questions and the
unit of analysis (i.e., public health programs nationally administered by CDC). The
“case” is defined more precisely in section 3.3 below.
Stake (1995, 2006), Yin (2009), and Merriam (2009) are all widely cited for their
approaches to case study research. For this study, Robert Stake’s methodology has been
adopted because of its wide use, his attention to the inclusion of multiple cases, and his
specification of unique case study approaches. Stake (1995, 2006) differentiated between
intrinsic and instrumental case studies. While intrinsic case study aims to understand a
particular case, instrumental case study is used to gain broader insight; that is, the case
becomes “instrumental” in understanding something broader than the individual case.
Instrumental case study may involve a single case or multiple cases. Multiple case study
attempts to broaden instrumental understanding by including more than one case (Stake
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2000). Consequently, multiple case study research starts with the phenomenon of interest
and studies individual cases for what they can tell us about that phenomenon (Stake
2006).
This study incorporates a multiple, instrumental case study design. Multiple,
instrumental case study allows the researcher to study the phenomenon of interest,
performance measurement, in different networked management contexts. The researcher
examines the individual cases’ similarities and differences in order to better understand
the object of study (Stake 2006). Although each case is explored in depth, it is always
with a view toward better understanding the phenomenon of interest (Stake 2006). Stake
(2006) noted, “It is supposed that the complex meanings of the Quintain 17 are understood
differently and better because of the particular activity and contexts of each Case” (p. 40).
Therefore, by studying the development and implementation of federal-level performance
measurement in different contexts, each involving networked public management, a more
nuanced understanding of the phenomenon may be unveiled. Both the unique situational
analysis of each case and the similarities and differences across cases contribute to a
greater understanding of performance measurement designed and implemented in
networked environments.
Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (2009) recognized that the inclusion of
multiple cases can enhance the confidence of findings. By examining multiple cases that
may be both similar and contrasting, the validity and stability of findings are strengthened
(Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2009). Finally, while multiple, instrumental case studies
often involve a research “team,” Stake (2006) emphasized that the approach is also
17

Stake introduces the term “Quintain” in his most recent text on multiple case study to
represent the broader phenomenon under study in multiple, instrumental case study.
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appropriate for dissertation research although the student occupies all roles (e.g., director,
data gatherer, and analyst). This issue will be revisited later in the chapter.

3.3 Defining the Case
In conducting a case study, the first obligation is to define the “case” (Yin 2009).
Stake (2006) defined the case as a “bounded system,” reflecting the fact that the case is
an object rather than a process. A case is purposive, an integrated system; the case
represents a context and experience (Stake 2006). In sum, the case reflects the unit of
analysis and defines the scope for which findings and conclusions can be made (Patton
2002) 18 .
For this study, the “case” is defined as “a federally-funded, public health program
nationally administered by CDC and implemented through a decentralized network that
has developed or is in the process of developing a national-level performance
measurement system.” This definition provides a “boundedness, context, and experience”
that usefully defines the case (Stake 2006). The case is bounded at the federal level,
specifically at CDC. While the national program involves a decentralized, network
implementation structure, the primary interest is to describe the federal-level experience
in developing and implementing performance measurement systems. This choice is
largely driven by pragmatic considerations related to both scale and regulations imposed
by OMB 19 .

18

Case study has come to mean more than the unit of analysis, however. The term also
reflects a methodological approach as well as the product of analysis (Stake 1995; Patton
2002).
19
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires Health and Human Services
(HHS) approval for research involving nine or more persons as part of the Paperwork
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The multiple, instrumental case study provides an in-depth study and analysis of
each of four selected public health programs administered by CDC and allows for
valuable cross-site analysis. Stake (2006) suggested that the inclusion of at least four
programs provides more useful variation and is preferable to two or three. At the same
time, Stake (2006) emphasized that the first objective is always to understand the
individual case and, in particular, its functioning and activities. For this study, the
researcher aimed to interpret patterns across each case, examining it in terms of its own
situation, prior to conducting any cross-case analysis (Stake 2006).

3.4 Sample Selection: The Cases
Well chosen cases are essential to assuring that the phenomenon of interest is
understood (Stake 2006). In contrast to quantitative research, which often uses random
sampling techniques derived from statistical probability theory in order to assure
generalizability, qualitative research involves purposeful or judgment sampling, with the
principle aim of selecting information-rich cases leading to the greatest understanding
(Patton 2002; Stake 1995; Yin 2003). Purposeful sampling allows researchers to “tailor”
the sample to the study (Stake 2006). Cases are selected based on conceptual rather than a
representative basis (Miles and Huberman 1994).
Stake (2006) suggested broad criteria for sample selection in a multiple,
instrumental case study that included assuring that the cases: (1) are relevant to the
phenomenon of interest; (2) provide diversity across contexts; and (3) provide
opportunities to learn about both complexity and contexts. However, the most important

Reduction Act of 1995. At CDC, this approval process takes approximately 12-15
months. OMB approval is not required for research involving federal employees.
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factor for case selection is that the case provides a meaningful opportunity to learn (Stake
2006). Of course, case selection is also influenced by more practical issues. For instance,
issues of access and willingness to participate must be addressed (Rossman and Rallis
2003). For this study, the researcher’s association at CDC facilitated entrée with relevant
stakeholders in the proposed program areas. Based on preliminary discussions with CDC
staff from each national program, a willingness to participate was assured prior to the
dissertation proposal defense; formal introduction, approvals (i.e., Division Directors
support to participate), and permissions (e.g., CDC human subjects review) were secured
prior to initiating field work.
As noted above, for this study, a case is defined as a federally-funded, public
health program nationally administered by CDC and implemented through a
decentralized network that has developed or is in the process of developing a nationallevel performance measurement system. Consideration was given to whether cases could
be included that would be differentiated based on a relevant variable. For instance, in his
dissertation research addressing GPRA, Frederickson (2003) included five cases from
HHS 20 , each of which used different policy tools (e.g., regulation, grants, contracts, direct
service). This was consistent with his research questions to explore the influence of
policy tools on programs’ choice of GPRA measures.
For this research, a differentiating variable relevant to the proposed research
purpose and questions involves the network structure itself. It is presumed that while all
of the potential cases (i.e., federally-funded, public health program nationally
20

Frederickson included the following five federal agencies in his study of GPRA
implementation: National Institutes of Health (NIH), Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), Indian Health Services (HIS), Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), and Heath Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).
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administered by CDC) are vertically integrated in their implementation structure (e.g.,
funding may move from CDC to a state health department to a county health
department), some have more extensive horizontal network characteristics than others.
By including cases that represented both types, there is an opportunity to make some
comparisons in addressing the research questions. Consequently, a stratified, purposeful
sampling strategy is used. Stratified sampling is one of a number of approaches to
purposeful sampling described by Patton (2002) in qualitative research and involves
breaking the sample into categories. For this study, the sample is stratified based on
characteristics of the network structure.
Four cases, each unique in context, were selected based on a set of broad criteria
that were derived from the study’s purpose and research questions. The criteria assured
that the individual cases would share important key characteristics and are “categorically
bound” (Stake 2006, p. 6) in their representation of the study’s focus. The overall criteria
were as follows:
1. The cases should reflect programs with widely decentralized implementation
networks.
2. The cases should be domestic (e.g., within the U.S. and its territories) and include
programs that fund thirty grantees or more 21 . The large number of grantees
funded by a single program poses unique challenges in identifying a common set
of national indicators.
3. The cases should involve cooperative agreements 22 or grants as the policy tool.

21

Many of CDC’s national programs are funded across all 50 U.S. states. Tribal
organizations and U.S. territories are sometimes funded as well.
22
Cooperative agreements are typically used by CDC as the policy tool to provide
funding to grantees. Cooperative agreements are a type of grant and require that grantees
“cooperate” with CDC for various programmatic decision-making. The funding
announcement for each program specifies the roles and expectations for both the grantee
and CDC.
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4. The cases should reflect programs with a program-specific, performance
measurement system either in development or fully implemented. The
performance measurement system does not necessarily need to include GPRA
measures.
5. The cases should provide ample and rich opportunities for studying performance
measurement systems in contexts of networked public management environments.
This implies that the maturity of the performance measurement system should be
considered.
The cases were stratified as follows: two cases represent programs with primarily
vertical, integrated networks and two others represent programs with more extensive
horizontal, network composition. Unfortunately, CDC does not maintain an inventory of
its national programs with performance measurement systems. Therefore, the researcher
sought advice from several CDC colleagues about case selection. All those who were
consulted work at senior levels and are well versed with programs across the agency.
Through this first set of discussions, a group of ten potential CDC programs were
identified meeting the criteria above. Next, individual meetings were held with staff from
most of those programs to further explore their program structure, performance
measurement system, and interest in participation.
Based on the information collected, four cases were proposed for inclusion: (1)
the National Diabetes Prevention and Control Program (NDPCP); (2) the Comprehensive
STD Prevention Systems (CSPS); (3) the National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early
Detection Program (NBCCEDP), and (4) the National Tobacco Control Program
(NTCP). Upon initiating field work, the NDPCP was dropped and replaced with the
Public Health and Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program. This change was made
based on advice from representatives in NDPCP. The evaluation team in the Division of
Diabetes Translation was revisiting their performance measurement development process
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and suggested that the researcher identify a more fully developed system. The
replacement of cases is appropriate in qualitative research, especially when the change
will enhance the utility of the study (Stake 1995).
In regard to stratification, the CSPS and the NBCCEDP represent vertically
integrated networks while the NTCP and PHEP include vertical along with more
extensive horizontal network dimensions. Each program included in the study is briefly
introduced below.
3.4.1 Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR), Public Health Emergency
Preparedness (PHEP) Program
DSLR is located in CDC’s Coordinating Office on Terrorism and Preparedness
for Emergency Response (COTPER). Through DSLR, over $700 million is awarded to
62 state, local, and territorial health grantees in the Public Health Emergency
Preparedness (PHEP) Program. The program aims to build public preparedness for a
range of hazards including natural disasters as well as terrorist, chemical, biologic,
radiologic, and nuclear emergencies. The PHEP program was initiated in 1999 and has
changed substantially from year to year. The program is generally viewed as ‘new’ and
the discipline of public health preparedness is still evolving. Working in a complex
political environment, grantees collaborate with both vertical and horizontal partners. Six
national-level performance measures are currently place and an effort is underway to
further develop the indicator set.
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3.4.2 Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Prevention (DSTDP),
Comprehensive STD Prevention Systems
CDC’s DSTDP is located in the National Center for HIV, STD, and TB
Prevention (NCHSTP). The primary grantee program of the DSTDP is called the
Comprehensive STD Prevention Systems (CSPS). The purpose of the program is to
support STD programs in designing, implementing, and evaluating comprehensive STD
prevention systems. Some grantees receive additional funding to address STD-related
infertility, syphilis elimination, and specific surveillance activities. Just over $104 million
dollars is distributed to all fifty U.S. states, the District of Columbia, six U.S. cities, and
seven U.S. territories. Program activities vary by grantee, but include the implementation
of community and individual behavior change programs, medical and laboratory services,
partner notification and counseling services, surveillance activities, and planning to
address STD outbreaks.
The program has a strong vertical dimension in its implementation structure with
funding often moving from CDC to state health departments to county or other local
health jurisdictions. However, horizontal features are also present as programs are
encouraged to collaborate closely with other public health programs including those
addressing HIV and hepatitis, the correction and detention systems, drug treatment
facilities, family planning clinics, and private medical providers. CDC began requiring
grantees to report on a set of twelve core indicators in 2004.
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3.4.3 Division of Cancer Prevention and Control (DCPC), National Breast and
Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program
CDC’s DCPC is located in the National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention
and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP). DCPC funds the National Breast and Cervical
Cancer Early Detection Program (NBCCECP) which was established by Congress in
1990 with the passage of the Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Prevention Act. The law
requires that CDC provide funds to state, territorial, and tribal health agencies to carry out
the program. The law specifies six activities for implementation: (1) breast and cervical
cancer screening; (2) referrals for medical treatment and other support services; (3) public
information and education; (4) professional education; (5) quality assurance; and (6)
monitoring and evaluation, including surveillance. Although NBCCEDP funds can be
used for some diagnostic procedures, funds may not be used for cancer treatment. The
NBCCEDP serves low-income, uninsured, or under-insured women 23 .
Currently, the program provides approximately $160 million dollars in funding to
68 state, tribal, and territorial grantees. Since the program’s inception, over 3.2 million
women have been screened and nearly 8 million screening tests provided. State, tribal,
and territorial agencies manage the NBCCEDP through varied implementation structures,
but these typically involve a fee-for-service model whereby providers of breast and
cervical screening services are reimbursed by the state, region, or county for services
rendered.
Although the service delivery structure is primarily vertically integrated,
programs collaborate at more horizontal levels with organizations such as the American

23

HHS, CDC, Request for Application DP07-703
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Cancer Society (e.g., local chapter), the Komen Foundation, the state comprehensive
cancer control programs, and local level community based organizations. In addition,
given shared risk factors, NBCCEDP programs typically collaborate with other chronic
disease programs such as those addressing diabetes, heart disease, physical activity,
nutrition, and tobacco prevention. These collaborations often facilitate coordinated efforts
for public and provider education and client outreach. Extensive patient-level screening
and diagnostic data are collected and reported semi-annually to CDC. A performance
measurement system has been in place since 2005 and is used by CDC for program
monitoring and as part of a performance-based budgeting formula.
3.4.4 Office on Smoking and Health, National Tobacco Control Program
CDC’s Office of Smoking and Health (OSH) supports the National Tobacco
Control Program (NTCP) providing a total of $63 million in funding to all fifty U.S.
States, the District of Columbia, and seven U.S. territories. Program goals include
preventing the initiation of tobacco use among young people, eliminating exposure to
second hand smoke, promoting tobacco cessation among adults, and addressing tobaccorelated disparities among certain population groups. Funding supports implementation of
community interventions and mobilization, counter-marketing efforts, policy
development, and surveillance/evaluation24 .
The implementation structure for the NTCP is fairly networked at the state and
local levels often involving extensive collaboration with partners representing a broad
spectrum of sectors and levels of government (e.g., school system, non-profit
24

http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco_control_programs/stateandcommunity/index.htm#a
bout. (accessed March 7, 2007). In addition, HHS, CDC, Program Announcement 03022.
113

organizations such as American Cancer Society and the American Heart Association,
health maintenance organizations, business associations, and other chronic disease
programs). In many states, the CDC awards are augmented by other funding sources
(e.g., state legislature allocations) often derived from tobacco excise taxes and/or the
1998 Master Tobacco Settlement Agreement.
In 2005, OSH published Key Outcome Indicators for Evaluating Comprehensive
Tobacco Control Programs (CDC 2005) which identifies120 evidence-based, outcomelevel, performance measures. Given the variability in implementation activities among
grantees, programs have flexibility in selecting measures for which to report to CDC.
More recently, OSH identified a subset of twenty-five of these key measures (i.e., core
indicators) for which all grantees will be required to track and report to CDC.

3.5 Sample Selection: The Individuals
Persons involved in developing, implementing, and or managing the performance
measurement system for each of the four programs were recruited for study participation.
These persons included CDC staff, contract employees, and external stakeholders,
including directors for state-based programs. It is common for CDC to contract with
agencies for a variety of evaluation and research activities, including developing
performance measurement systems. Likewise, CDC often involves external stakeholders
(e.g., representatives of state or national organizations) in an advisory capacity for such
efforts as these. Miles and Huberman (1994) recognize the value of including those
“peripheral” to the case as well as those closer to the phenomenon being studied, and
suggest that those on the periphery of the case offer a unique perspective and contribute
to a stronger contextual understanding.
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Purposeful sampling was used to select interviewees for each case. Interviewees
represented a group with experience in the development, implementation, or management
of the performance measurement system. Again, these individuals represented persons
who had the most extensive experience with the performance measurement system or
who otherwise offered an important perspective. To increase the comparability of data, an
attempt was made to interview persons in similar positions or roles across the four cases.
These roles and the number of people interviewed for each 25 included:
1. The person(s) involved in the development and/or implementation of the
performance measurement system (n=19)
2. The person(s) responsible for the CDC data management system used to
manage performance data reported by grantees (n=7)
3. The Branch Chief or Section Chief for the program services branch (i.e., the
branch that oversees the cooperative agreements or grants for the national
program) (n=7)
4. Program consultants from the program services branch who work directly
with funded grantees to oversee the cooperative agreements or grants (n=11)
5. Policy staff responsible for managing GPRA and PART reporting (n=5)
6. Program Directors who manage the state-based programs 26 or CDC field staff
that work in the grantee program (n=7)
The researcher identified persons who directed the development of the
performance measurement systems for all four programs. These people served as
“gatekeepers” to the larger program staff and stakeholders. Once human subjects’
approvals were obtained in the fall 2007, the researcher met individually with each
gatekeeper and formally requested their participation in the study. The researcher
25

Some participants fit two roles (e.g., a program consultant who was on a performance
measurement workgroup to help develop the measures).
26
The researcher was limited by the number of non-federal employees that could be
included in the study given the absence of OMB Paper Reduction Act approvals.
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provided the gatekeeper an invitation to participate by email with information about the
study. The gatekeeper assisted the researcher in securing Division approval for
participation and identifying others important to the development, implementation, and/or
management process. Potential interviewees were contacted by email and invited to
participate in the study. The email explicitly stated that the research was being conducted
to fulfill dissertation requirements and that human subjects’ review had been obtained
from both CDC and Georgia State University (GSU). Individual emails to participants
were modified slightly to personalize them as appropriate.

3.6 Data Collection Methods
The research protocol was approved by the institutional review boards for both
CDC and Georgia State University (GSU). As noted in the section addressing the
strengths of qualitative research, the approach allows for a variety of methods. Rossman
and Rallis (2003) suggested that case studies in particular are “methodologically
eclectic.” In fact, case study requires that multiple methods or sources of evidence be
used (Yin 2009). The most common data collection methods used in case study are
interviews, document review, and observation, although quantitative methods are also
often incorporated (Patton 2002; Stake 2006; Yin 2009). These three methodologies were
adopted here as a means to facilitate a holistic understanding of each case while also
allowing for methodological triangulation of data, which supports the reliability and
validity of findings (Yin 2009). Most importantly, a systematic, objective approach to
data collection was practiced so that generalizations could be made about the case(s) as
patterns and themes were identified (Stake 1995).
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3.6.1 Interviews
In case study, interviews are an extremely important data source (Yin 2009), in
part because they can provide such rich data. Interviewing aims to “discover the
informant’s experience of a particular topic or situation” (Lofland and Lofland 1995, p.
18). While various approaches to interviewing are described (Patton 2002), a semistructured interview guide approach was adopted here. This approach involved
combining topic-initiating questions that were derived from the research questions with
follow-up questions or probes aimed at gathering more detailed information (Rapley
2001). The interview guide is included as appendix C. The guide assured that relevant
subject areas were addressed consistently across interviews, while allowing flexibility for
the researcher to probe in order to further clarify particular topics (Miles and Huberman
1994; Patton 2002). For multiple cases, Miles and Huberman advocate for a structured
data collection instrument to improve internal validity and assure that comparisons can be
made across cases.
Interviews were conducted in person, in a private office, typically at CDC.
Written, informed, voluntary consent was secured from all interviewees. The consent
form is included as appendix D. For individuals physically located in another city;
telephone interviews were performed. Incentives were not provided for participation. All
interviews were audio recorded with the permission of participants. Email was used to
facilitate interview scheduling and to remind participants of interview dates and times. In
all 55 people were invited to participate and, of those, 52 (95%) agreed to participate. Of
the three who did not participate, two never responded to repeated emails and one
recommended another individual as more appropriate for inclusion.
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In sum, a total of 50 interviews were conducted with 52 individuals (table 7). Two
people were interviewed together in two different interviews (i.e., a total of four people
interviewed); the participants explicitly requested that they be interviewed together and
represented similar roles (i.e., two policy staff persons; two data management staff).
Interviews were conducted from January 22 through June 4, 2008. For the most part,
interviews were conducted by “case”; that is, all 13 interviews with participants
representing the CSPS were conducted before moving to the second case (PHEP), and so
forth. The order in which cases were addressed in the study was established based on the
availability of staff. The average interview length across the four cases was 67 minutes
(range: 33-133 minutes). All interviews were transcribed verbatim by a professional
transcriptionist.
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Table 7. Interviews Conducted by Case
Case

Number of
Participants

Total
Interviewees

Average
Interview
Length
(minutes)

Dates of
interview data
collection

Male

Female

Public Health
Emergency
Preparedness
Program

2

11

13

67 minutes March 13, 2008 –
April 4, 2008

Comprehensive
STD Prevention
System

8

5

13

69 minutes January 22, 2008
– March 24, 2008

National Breast
and Cervical
Cancer Early
Detection Program

5

8

13

70 minutes March 31, 2008 –
May 14, 2008

(12
interviews)

National Tobacco
Control Program

5

8

13

April 23, 2008 –
57 minutes June 4, 2008

(12
interviews)

Totals

20

32

52

January 22, 2008
67 minutes – June 4, 2008

(50
interviews)

3.6.2 Document Review
In case study, documents provide valuable information that can corroborate data
collected from other sources, provide additional evidence, and spawn new paths of
inquiry (Patton 2002; Yin 2009). Documents may also, however, contradict data gathered
through interviews and observation, encouraging the researcher to explore these
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discrepancies in greater detail (Rossman and Rallis 2003). For this study, relevant
documents were systematically collected and reviewed. Program-specific web sites were
reviewed to identify potential documents for review, and participants in individual
interviews were queried about relevant documents. 27 Government websites were also
accessed and reviewed (e.g., Office of Management and Budget’s ExpectMore.gov). A
document review or summary form (appendix E) was completed for each document
selected for study inclusion. Documents included the funding announcement for the
specific program, reports on the development of the performance measurement system,
summaries of stakeholder input on the performance measures, minutes from relevant
meetings, presentations about the performance measures, relevant policy documents,
guidance documents summarizing the selected performance measures, and monitoring
reports used to provide feedback to grantees among others. Appendix F lists the 57
documents and websites collected and reviewed for each case. Some cases provided a
greater number of documents than others. Given the researcher’s role as a CDCemployee, participants were generous in providing varied documents, including drafts of
documents and internal reports for which an external researcher may not have had access.
3.6.3 Direct Observation
Observation allows the investigator to enter the research context or setting and
explore its complexities (Rossman and Rallis 2003). For this study, data collected
through observation provided additional information about the performance measurement
systems, the stakeholders involved in their development, and the context in which they

27

As a CDC employee, the researcher has access to both internal (CDC Intranet) and
external (CDC Internet) web sites for CDC programs.
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have been developed. Key stakeholders for each program were queried about
opportunities for observation during the data collection phase of the study. Observational
opportunities included internal CDC meetings of performance measurement workgroups,
external stakeholder meetings to assist in developing performance measures, conference
presentations, other presentations, and a Congressional hearing. A total of 12 formal
observations were conducted across the four cases with at least two conducted for each
case. Table 8 summarizes the observations conducted for each case.
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Table 8. Formal Observations Conducted by Case
Case
Public Health
Emergency
Preparedness

Date of
Observation

Length of
Observation

November
2007

1.5 hour

December
2008

1.5 hours

February
2008

1.5 hours

February
2008

1.5 hours

Meeting of Evaluation Workgroup
Sub-committee– Incident
Management workgroup

April 2008

Two days

American Evaluation Association
Conference presentation, “How Do
You Keep It Going: Steps that One
CDC Program Takes to Keep
Performance Measures Relevant”

November
2007

1.5 hour

Observation
American Evaluation Association
Conference presentation, “Getting
from War Stories to Science:
Developing Performance Measures in
Public Health Emergency
Preparedness”
CDC Evaluation Forum Presentation,
“Strategies for Ensuring Data
Integrity in Performance
Measurement: Lessons Learned from
the Public Health Emergency
Preparedness Cooperative
Agreement”
National Association of County and
City Health Officials (NACCHO)
Public Health Preparedness Summit
presentation, "Are We Prepared?"
National Association of County and
City Health Officials (NACCHO)
Public Health Preparedness Summit
presentation, "Developing and
Implementing a National PHEP
Measurement System to Support
Accountability and Program
Improvement"

Comprehensive
STD
Prevention
Program
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Case

Date of
Observation

Length of
Observation

March 2008

2 hours

January 29,
2008

3 hours

Meeting of CDC Minimum Data
Element (MDE) Committee

April 2008

1.5 hours

Montana Statewide Comprehensive
Cancer Meeting – Presentation “The
Montana Breast and Cervical Health
Program)

May 2008

45 minutes

Meeting of the Core Indicator
Workgroup

May 16, 2008

1 hour

Meeting of the Core Indicator
Workgroup

May 28, 2008

1 hour

Observation
STD Performance Measurement
Workgroup meeting

National
Breast and
Cervical
Cancer Early
Detection
Program

National
Tobacco
Control
Program

U.S. Congressional Hearing –
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives: The National Breast
and Cervical Cancer Early Detection
Program

Observation length varied depending on the context. A meeting of the STD
performance measurement workgroup lasted approximately two hours, while an external
stakeholder meeting convened by COTPER lasted two full days. The researcher took an
unobtrusive approach to conducting observations rather than a participatory one (Patton
2002). An observation guide (appendix G) was used to collect field notes, including
descriptive data about the physical environment, interactions among those observed, and
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investigator’s impressions and analytic insights (Rossman and Rallis 2003). The
researcher took extensive field notes for each observation. These notes represent the
observation as data or evidence, comparable to an interview transcript (Schwandt 2001).
Raw notes compiled during the observation were further refined into more detailed
summaries recorded on the observation guide following each observation.
3.6.4 Summary of Data Collection Methods
The majority of data collection was conducted between November 2007 and June
2008, although some document and website review continued through December 2008.
Table 9 summarizes data collection for the entire study, which included a total of 50
interviews with 52 individuals, 57 document or web-site reviews, and 12 formal
observations.
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Table 9. Summary of Data Collection

Public Health
Emergency
Preparedness

Comprehensive
STD
Prevention
Program

National
Breast and
Cervical
Cancer
Early
Detection
Program

Number of
Interview
Participants

13

13

13

13

52

Number of
Interviews
Conducted

13

13

12

12

50

Number of
Documents
Review

15

15

14

13

57

Number of
Observations
with Field
Notes

5

2

3

2

11

National
Tobacco
Control
Program

Total

3.7 Data Management
Given the extensive data that were collected through the methods detailed above,
attention to effective data management was essential. A well-organized database supports
the study’s reliability by assuring that other investigators can directly review the case
study evidence (Yin 2009). In addition, effective data management is critical to
supporting analysis. A number of strategies were used to ensure an efficient approach to
data management.
1. Microsoft Excel – Detailed Excel spreadsheets were maintained to track all data
collection and analysis efforts according to the individual case. The spreadsheets
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included details about the data collection method (e.g., observation, interview,
document review); relevant dates and times (e.g., dates of correspondents with
participants, interview date/time/place, observation date); participant names,
pseudonyms, and contact information; data file names for audio recordings and
transcriptions; document names with corresponding electronic document file
names; etc. Excel was also used to develop the analytic codebook and facilitate
case and cross-case analysis.
2. Atlas.ti Scientific Software Atlas.ti was used to facilitate data analysis. Atlas.ti
allows for the efficient coding and retrieval of data, along with other analytic
functions (e.g., content analysis, memoing, mapping relationships). All text-based
data was stored in Atlas.ti, including interview transcripts, document review
summaries, and observation summaries.
3. Microsoft Word Microsoft Word was used to maintain all electronic documents
including interview transcripts, document review summaries, observation
summaries, a researcher’s journal, the analytic codebook, and the written chapters
developed for inclusion in the final dissertation.
4. Digital audio recordings – Sony digital audio recorders were used to record all
interviews. The digital audio files were maintained on a personal computer and
deleted once a written transcript was completed.
5. Electronic data – All electronic data were maintained on a personal computer,
password protected, and backed up daily to a FireLite Smartdisc.
6. Hard copies Hard copies of some documents were maintained separately (e.g.,
reports, power point presentations received at observations events, signed
informed consent forms) in a locked storage cabinet.
3.8 Data Analysis Procedures
Although analysis is, to some extent, intuitive and an “art,” there are systematic,
analytic methods that can be applied to all evidence gathered that assure a “scientific”
approach (Creswell 2007; Merriam 2009; Miles and Huberman 1994; Schwandt 2001;
Stake 2006; Yin 2009). As noted earlier, in qualitative research, analysis is conducted
simultaneously with the data collection effort. Emerging themes generated from one
interview are explored in future ones; something observed leads to reviewing another
document; analytic insights are recorded; and potential themes are explored with other
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participants. This is possible given both the researcher’s role as the primary instrument
for data collection and the flexible nature of qualitative research. The researcher
terminated data collection based on practical considerations related to resources (i.e.,
time) and also influenced by the number of available sources, research limitations (i.e.,
inability to interview more than nine non-federal stakeholders), and data saturation.
Rossman and Rallis (2003) identified seven analytic procedures to guide analysis
that were followed for the study. These include: (1) organizing the data; (2) becoming
familiar with the data; (3) generating categories and themes; (4) coding the data; (5)
interpreting the data; (6) searching for alternative explanations; and (7) writing the
dissertation. As described below, these procedures are not necessarily conducted in a
linear manner, but rather, iteratively.
3.8.1 Organizing the Data
A central challenge in qualitative research is making sense of such vast amounts
of data (Miles and Huberman 1994; Patton 2002). This challenge was relevant for the
current study given the vast amount of data collected and the involvement of a single
researcher. Several approaches, described above in section 3.7, were used to organize the
data, making it more manageable. In particular, the data were organized by each case and
Atlas.ti allowed the researcher to filter data in various ways (e.g., by creating “families”
of data by case). Therefore, data were easily grouped and sifted to facilitate analysis (e.g.,
by case, participant role, related codes).
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3.8.2 Familiarizing Yourself with the Data
Knowing the data intimately requires immersion in the data itself. For this study,
the investigator conducted all research activities including data collection and the
development of analytic memos maintained in a journal. In addition, once the written
interview transcript was received back from the transcriptionist (typically within 2-3
days), the researcher vetted it against the original audio recording, allowing a second
“listen” of the interview and assuring accuracy of the transcription..
Further immersion occurred as part of codebook development and data coding.
For instance, to construct the codebook (see 3.8.3), the researcher “open coded” over half
of the interview transcripts (n=29), again offering an opportunity to closely review the
data. Next, the researcher coded all interview transcripts, document review forms, and
observation field notes – this work continued to facilitate a deeper understanding of the
data. Finally, one other strategy supported the researcher’s constant reflection on the data.
The investigator maintained an analytic journal throughout the study where ideas were
recorded about emerging insights, potential themes, and methodological issues (Glesne
and Peshkin 1992; Stake 2006). An example of an entry in the journal is noted below:
March 29, 2008: Lack of direct line control over local level implementers
(and network partners) diminishes perceived influence on the part of CDC
on grantees’ performance, data collection and reporting for the
performance measures, and resulting performance. CDC managers and
grantees seem very cognizant of what is and isn’t within the grantees’
control -- issues of “fairness” are frequently cited by grantees.
As part of the journal, the researcher tracked key decision points made by the
researcher and important reflections on the researcher’s role in data collection and
analysis (Janesick 2000).
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April 20, 2008: I initiated NBCCEDP interviews in mid March – Feona
invited me to present on the study at one of their all-staff branch meetings.
Everyone has been very supportive of the study. As with the other cases, I
interviewed two program directors (PDs) who were well versed in the
topic; they were two long-serving PDs, one of which is the current
NBCCEDP Program Director Council chairperson.
All of these efforts – data collection, vetting the transcripts, open coding to
develop the codebook, final coding of all data, and maintaining an analytic journal –
contributed to the researcher’s effort to maintain an intimate understanding of the data.
3.8.3 Generating Categories and Themes
As data were collected, potential categories and themes were identified and noted
in the researcher’s analytic journal. For instance, while interviewing participants in the
first case, a potential theme emerged around the notion that, given the network context,
performance measurement systems evolve over time – that is, the systems may develop in
an incremental fashion, gaining in complexity and sophistication. As themes like this
were identified, the researcher documented them in the analytic journal and began to
explore them further in other interviews, document review, and observations. Similarly,
categories emerged during data collection. For instance, the researcher observed varied
descriptions of the use of performance measurement data in networked contexts as well
as different aspects of the process of developing performance measures in networks.
The process used by the researcher to develop the codebook also facilitated the
identification of categories and themes. Although there are different approaches to
building codes, two methods were used here. First, a priori codes were identified
deductively based on the theoretical framework, research questions, and interview
questions (Miles and Huberman 1994). For example, the descriptive codes “horizontal
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networks” and “vertical networks” were drafted given their significance to the research
questions themselves.
Next, codes were developed inductively from the text using open coding, a
technique first described by Strauss and Corbin (1990), but also by Charmaz (2006).
Open coding involves creating codes tied to the data itself by reading the text and
identifying codes directly related to that text, thus preserving elements of the study
context (Miles and Huberman 1994). The approach helps ensure that the analysis is
“grounded” in the data. This two-level strategy to coding, a priori coding and open
coding, results in both “etic” codes that are more conceptual and broad in nature, as well
as “emic” codes, those closer to the data and participants’ perspectives (Miles and
Huberman 1994). The open coding technique was especially valuable in deriving
categories and themes from the data itself.
While some (Charmaz 2006) advocate the use of gerunds and a rigorous line-byline coding for the first step of open coding, a less painstaking approach of deriving codes
or categories was used here (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Patton 2002). More specifically,
an initial round of open coding was conducted on a subset of just over half the transcripts
for each case using Atlas.ti (n=29 total transcripts). In this exercise, initial codes were
developed based on the actual text although every line of text was not coded. Based on
the open coding of 29 interview transcripts, over 1400 initial codes were developed and
were entered into an Excel spreadsheet. At this first stage, the “codes” were fairly raw in
form including some that were in-vivo text (e.g. “at CDC this program is so
decentralized,” “networks challenge ability to see who has responsibility for
performance”) and others that were more descriptive (e.g. challenge in measuring a less
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direct service, no consensus on what to do). This inductive approach to coding resulted in
codes that were emergent and, as noted earlier, directly tied and “grounded” to the data.
Using the constant comparative method, originally described by Glaser and
Strauss (1967) as part of their grounded theory approach, the researcher reviewed and
compared the initial 1400 open codes. Atlas.ti allowed the researcher to move easily from
a code back to the original text in order to maintain a contextual perspective. By
comparing codes with codes, data with data, and codes with data, the researcher was able
to begin sorting and grouping codes into broader themes and categories. This step
allowed the researcher to move toward developing codes that were more conceptual in
nature. Charmaz (2006) describes this phase as “focused coding”; Miles and Huberman
(1994) describe it as “pattern coding” and suggest it is especially valuable for multiple
case studies as it helps begin to identify common themes.
This second phase of reviewing, sorting, and organizing reduced the 1400 initial
codes to 147 codes that were grouped around topics or categories. For instance, under the
broad category of “networks,” the researcher identified the following codes: building
networks; conflicts in networks; policy tools to support networks; managing networks;
value of networks; challenges of networks; unintended consequences of networks;
compromise in networks; and competition in networks.
Microsoft Excel® was used to help sort and organize the codes. The 1400 original
open codes were maintained in the Excel spreadsheet as data were grouped allowing for
detailed examples to be maintained. For instance, as illustrated in table 10, the researcher
identified an emerging theme during this phase of analysis and codebook which she titled

131

“conflicts in networks.” The individual cells in the table are filled with some of the
original open codes that the researcher grouped under this theme.

Table 10. Codebook Development: Conflicts in Networks
Can be
competing
priorities to
PM at
grantee
level*

Can be
different
agendas
between
states and
locals

I don't even
know if
CDC is on
the same
page

Network
partners can
impede
public
health
performance
FBI
wouldn't let
CDC in
during
Katrina

Some
doctors view
toward the
health
department
is I don't
Problems of have to talk
turf
to them
Who pays
for testing
in the jails?

Differences in
Local -federal priorities for
tensions
feds vs. states

Different
missions
for jails

Do we have
any
agreement
on what
we're trying
to do?

Public
health’s voice
can be lost in
preparedness
network/arena

Philosophical
battle between
control and
influence

Political
demands to
bend to
grantees'
demands
too often

Politically
it would be
hard to
raise the
targets

Strongly
influenced by
Dept of
Homeland
Security and
Dept of
Defense

Varied
disciplines in
preparedness
result in
different
interpretations,
reflect
different
cultures that
effect PM

We disrupt
the routine
of jails
when we
come in

How does
public
health
contribute
in the larger
network
response?

Whose
performance
are you
measuring?

*Each cell is filled with an “open code” which has been organized under the broader code
“Conflicts in Networks”
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Next, this smaller set of 147 codes was again closely reviewed by the researcher
and new categories or themes were identified by collapsing, condensing, or expanding
certain codes (Creswell 2007). During this third wave of comparisons, the 147 codes
were reduced to a group of 60 codes. Again, the original open codes were maintained in
the Excel spreadsheet, providing detailed examples for each of these 60 codes. During
this phase, conceptual categories emerged for the codebook; Miles and Huberman (1994)
suggest such a structure is essential. Groups of codes began to naturally fit together under
these larger categories. For instance, there were a number of codes which reflected the
process of developing performance measures; other codes congealed around the issue of
measurement while still others reflected notions of cultural shifts and network
characteristics. Particular attention was given to developing codes not only at the
descriptive level, but also at deeper, more analytic levels reflected in the categories and
themes (Charmaz 2006; Schwandt 2001).
After this round of sorting and grouping, the code “conflicts in networks” that was
developed in the second stage (see table 10) was abandoned. Instead, a new code of
“value and goal conflicts” was created under a broader category of “network
characteristics.” Several dimensions of networks were included under this category,
including the a priori descriptive codes such as “network characteristics: vertical
relationships” and “network characteristics: horizontal relationships,” but also inductive
codes related to process such as “network characteristics: bargaining, consensus building,
and relationship building.” Table 11 below reflects the original open codes maintained
for the new code, “Network Characteristics: Value and Goal Conflicts.”
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Table 11. Codebook Development: “Network Characteristics: Value and Goal
Conflicts”

There are so
many fingers in
the pot
Trying to
understand the
critical linkages
between public
health and
hospitals

Differences in
priorities for
feds vs. states

Jail partners
need to see a
benefit

Networks can
be complicated
by things like
mixed areas of
responsibility

Different
missions for
jails

FEMA region
vs. public
health regions
are different
and have
different focus

Program
crosses so
many
disciplines big
challenge

Can be
competing
priorities to
performance
measurement at
grantee level

Can be
different
agendas
between states
and locals

I don't even
know if CDC is
on the same
page

Making
arguments with
jails that public
health is
important

Their mission is
public safety,
ours is public
health
COTPER
influenced by
homeland
security value
system vs.
public health
has a different
value system

Syphilis
elimination is
HIV prevention

The final phase in this step of analysis to form the codebook involved the
development of operational definitions for all 60 codes. These definitions are essential to
ensure that the researcher applies the codes consistently over time (Miles and Huberman
1994). The researcher adopted an approach to codebook development described by
McQueen and colleagues (2008), public health researchers. Definitions included seven
components – a code name, brief description, long description, when to use, when not to
use, coding rules, and examples. The Excel spreadsheet, with its elaborate detail of sorted
open codes, proved invaluable to the development of the operational definitions. Table 12
illustrates the codebook definition for “network characteristics: value and goal conflicts.”
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Table 12. Example of Codebook Definition
Code Name:

Network Characteristics: Value and Goal Conflicts

Brief Description:

Conflicts/issues between network partners around values, goals,
mission, priorities, etc.

Long Description:

Given the network structure, conflicts or issues may arise in
developing performance measurement related to differing
agency values, goals, mission, priorities, areas of responsibility
/ turf, culture, etc. These conflicts may impede the development
of a common set of measures or the collaboration needed to
collect/report performance related data.

When to Use:

Apply this code when text refers to or describes tension
between network partners that is related to fundamental
differences in values, goals, etc.

When NOT to Use: N/A
Coding Rules:

N/A

Example:

“Human nature, again, I could be part of this myself if I was out
there, I have been out there in the past, but you’ve got your own
little kingdoms and queendoms and fiefdoms and all that and
the HIV STD programs are a great example of that. They’re still
not really working together out there and it’s now 2008.”
“You know, I think each State determines who their screening
population is going to be, and in [state name] it’s not just the
Department of Health at the site, we have stakeholders, and we
have a really strong Komen presence in our State” [referring to
partners who want women aged 40-50 screened vs. CDC policy
of screening women 50-64].

Once the draft codebook was completed, the researcher coded a subset of eight
interviews (i.e., two from each case), in order to further refine the codebook. During this
time, definitions were revised and four new codes were added. The final codebook, then,
included 64 codes (see appendix H).

135

3.8.4 Coding the Data
The final codebook was entered into Atlas.ti so that the full definition (i.e., all
seven components) was easily visible as the researcher coded the textual data. Coding
data involves chunking the text into more manageable segments and attaching a code to it
(Bogdan and Biklen 2007; Miles and Huberman 1994; Patton 2002). Charmaz (2006)
suggested that coding represents the “analytic frame from which you build the analysis”
(p. 45). The researcher coded all data for each case in sequence; that is, all interviews,
document review forms, and observation field notes were coded for one case before
moving on to the next. This approach supported the tenet of immersion in qualitative data
the researcher was able to focus entirely on the data collected for each case. Throughout
the coding process, the researcher developed “comments,” a feature supported by Atlas.ti.
The software allowed the researcher to attach comments to particular segments of text,
offering the opportunity to record insights during the coding process. Those comments
were saved in the database and could be easily retrieved. Data coding proved a critical
analytic process allowing the researcher to both examine the whole as she reviewed each
transcript, document review form, and observation field notes, but also to extrapolate data
and attach codes to build empirical evidence for categories and themes observed in the
data.
3.8.5 Interpreting the Data
Rossman and Rallis (2003) differentiate analysis from interpretation. They
suggest that while analysis involves coding to organize the data, interpretation involves
the more complicated process of making meaning from the data (Rossman and Rallis
2003). As a process of meaning-making, interpretation is shaped by the research
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questions, conceptual framework, and ideas that were the starting point of the inquiry
(Peskin 2000). The efforts to develop comments during the coding process (described
above) and maintain an analytic journal throughout the study represent strategies that
support interpretation.
An important analytic strategy involved “memoing” throughout the coding
process. Atlas.ti includes a memo feature that allowed the researcher to develop and
maintain numerous memos. A method adopted from grounded theory, the writing of
memos promotes continual reflection on the data. For this study, memo writing helped
maintain a focus on the data, capture analytic insights, note relationships between and
among codes, make personal reflections on the researcher’s analytic process, and
continually document new ideas and impressions. Given that the research was conducted
by a single investigator, memoing proved invaluable in increasing the level of abstraction
in analysis. Although memos are maintained as part of the Atlas.ti database, memos were
viewed as an extension of the analytic journal maintained by the researcher.
Specific “memos” were developed for each case (e.g., NBCCEDP, PHEP) as well
as for some key topics (e.g., “control within networks,” “accountability”). The writing
process itself, including efforts to memo, was fundamental in elucidating a more nuanced
analysis. The researcher used the memo function of Atlas.ti to record free flowing
thoughts as the coding proceeded rather than fully developed analytic deductions. An
example of a memo is provided below:
Coding Memo: June 2008 “The data here seems to suggest that with
"wicked problems" and in a networked context, it takes time to develop
more sophisticated performance measures -- the measures evolve over
time from more simple, "low hanging fruit" to more complex measures
that stakeholders at different levels can accept and deal with. Over time
(i.e., it’s a process!), data collection and management systems are
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developed, the field integrates the practice of data collection and reporting
at various levels (with PHEP they're starting just at the state level, but
want to move to measures at the local level), developmental measures are
piloted and tested, analytic methods develop that improve measures, the
science base evolves, capacities develop in the field to collect and report
data in ways that support data validity, and stakeholders build an
appreciation for the utility of the data.”
Again, the constant comparative method was used extensively to aid
interpretation. Comparisons of data were made at various levels. At first, data were
compared with data within an individual interview to identify similarities and differences
and to assess its relevance (Charmaz 2006). Using Atlas.ti, coded data were easily sorted
in multiple ways to help make comparisons across interviews, cases, and data collection
methods. Atlas.ti also provides a function to calculate code frequencies which helped
assess the potential strength or importance of specific categories and themes. Similarly,
co-occurrences of specific codes could be assessed; for instance, the researcher could
examine all text that was coded as both “network characteristics: horizontal dimension”
and “design: control over performance on measures.”
In multiple case study, data analysis must attend to both the individual case and
the aggregate of cases. Stake (2006) addresses the tension that exists in balancing these
two imperatives. Given that performance measurement will be better understood through
its examination in unique contexts, analysis of each individual case is essential (Stake
2006). Yin (2009), Merriam (2009), and Stake (2006) all emphasize the importance of
first conducting “with-in case analysis” that includes individual case descriptions that
convey a holistic understanding. Each case provides an opportunity to study how the
phenomenon operates under specific conditions (Stake 2006).
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Consequently, attention to within case analysis preceded cross-case analysis.
Once coding was complete for a particular case, the researcher developed an individual
case description and summary before moving forward to code the next case. This
approach allowed the researcher to maintain a concentrated focus on each case. The case
description and summary were organized in a report format so that it could be returned to
representatives from each program for review. With that audience in mind, the format
used included a brief introduction to the study and its purpose; a review of the methods
and data collection; three main sections organized around 1) the program, 2) the
networks, and 3) the performance measurement system; and an overall summary of the
case. In writing the case reports, the researcher reviewed data associated with specific
codes to develop the individual report sections (e.g., the networks); that is, data for the
same set of specific codes associated with a report section were reviewed and analyzed
for each case. This approach was meant to ensure a consistent approach to analysis across
the four cases.
As the case description reports were completed, they were sent electronically to
the person who had helped coordinate the case study for his or her review and member
checking. The investigator encouraged that individual to share the report with others for
review and comment. Member checking involves engaging the research participants in a
review of tentative findings or interpretations in order to assess their plausibility
(Merriam 2009; Creswell and Miller 2000). Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that
member checking is the most important technique to establish credibility and support
internal validity. Following the review of the report, the researcher met individually with
the key program or evaluation staff to discuss the accuracy of the report. A minimum of
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two people from each case reviewed their report and provided comment. Appropriate
revisions were made based on the meeting and the final report was provided to the
individual program.
Once the individual reports were verified through the member-checking process,
the researcher developed more in-depth findings for each case based on the research
questions. Using Excel spreadsheets, the researcher first developed extensive and detailed
matrices for each of the three major areas used to describe the case – the program, the
networks, and the performance measurement system. The matrices summarize descriptive
data for each of these three areas and are included as appendices (program characteristics
are summarized in appendix I; network characteristics in appendix J; and the performance
measurement systems in appendix K).
Next, the researcher developed a list of potential findings for each case according
to each of the three research questions – this process was aided by the matrices described
above. The potential findings for each case were organized in an Excel spreadsheet
(appendix L) and then sorted and combined into more formal statements that comprise
the findings for each case. “Cross-case analysis” was principally guided by the research
purpose, theoretical framework, research questions, and findings from the individual
cases (Stake 2006). More specifically, the cross-case analysis considered the findings
across the four cases in order to make assertions that fit across the four cases while also
preserving the “situationality” of the individual case findings (Merriam 2009; Stake
2006; Yin 2009). A process described by Stake (2006) to facilitate the cross-case analysis
was used.
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In the cross-case analysis, the researcher applied findings from the individual
cases to the study’s topic of interest – that of performance measurement applied in
networked contexts. Working from the individual case findings, the researcher assessed
the potential prominence of one case or another in addressing the research questions.
Given the unique aspects of each case (e.g., the extent of its network, the sophistication
of its performance measurement system) some cases were more relevant to a specific
research question than another. As before, Excel spreadsheets helped to organize this
process – individual sheets were used to develop a matrix for each hypothesis (Jennings
and Haist 2006) and related research question. Matrix columns included those for case
findings (tagged by case name), the effect of the specific finding on the performance
measurement system, potential broader implication of the finding for performance
measurement, specific evidence for the finding, relevant information about the case
context (i.e., case situationality), other cases that support the finding, and other cases that
counter the finding (see appendix M).
By using this systematic approach, the researcher was able to move from the
individual case reports to develop the cross-case findings and related assertions
addressing the study’s research questions. Also, by tagging the individual findings by the
case from which they were derived, the researcher could take into consideration the
importance of particular cases in addressing specific research questions and how typical
or atypical that particular case was to the study. Developing the assertions related to the
research questions was not only a matter of assessing what was common across the four
cases, but also considering the unique findings of each case (Stake 2006) – both advanced
understanding. The intention was to develop assertions that had a single focus, provided
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an orientation for understanding the research topic, and were supported by evidence
(Stake 2006). In summary, the multiple sources of data represented in the four cases were
used to help clarify meaning and build more complex explanations reflected in the key
assertions. The data displays (i.e., matrices developed as excel spreadsheets) described
above helped to draw conclusions at this stage.
3.8.6 Searching for Alternative Explanations
During analysis, rival explanations were identified and considered (Yin 2009).
For example, as data were collected for the NBCCEDP, the researcher formed an
explanation about the use of the performance measures for budgeting purposes. In
subsequent interviews, rival explanations were explored to further understanding of the
issue. In addition, negative instances those situations that are not consistent with the
emerging explanation were explored and used to refine understanding (Merriam 2009).
For instance, the researcher explored why one participant had a different perception about
potential gaming of performance measures than the others interviewed. The constant
comparative method described above helped to identify negative or discrepant cases. By
consciously exploring competing explanations and negative cases, a stronger, more
logical explanation that is well grounded in the data was developed (Rossman and Rallis
2003).
3.8.7 Writing the Dissertation, Report, or Manuscript
The analytic process continues through writing and reflects the interpretive act of
bringing meaning to the data through narrative (Rossman and Rallis 2003). Good writing
is critical in qualitative research as understanding, explanation, and findings are
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interpreted through text (Richardson 2000). In particular, the researcher must represent
the findings in rich detail in order to communicate meaning to the reader (Brower,
Abolafia, and Carr 2000). Qualitative writing should reflect three qualities according to
Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993) – authenticity, plausibility, and criticality. First, the
account must be authentic, providing a rich description to assure the reader that the
investigator has done sound research. Second, the account should provide a plausible
explanation to the reader, that is, have face validity. And third, the writing should
encourage and challenge the reader to think critically and deeply. For this study, the
researcher attempted to attend to these qualities as guiding tenets for the writing.
As noted above, individual case reports were developed for representatives of the
participating cases. The researcher, in consultation with her dissertation chairman, chose
to present findings of the four cases in individual chapters (chapters 4-7). This approach
seemed most appropriate given the unique characteristics of each case, their importance
to the study, and the length of the initial reports. Others (Yin 2009; Stake 2006) have
supported this approach. Like the initial reports developed for each site, a common
structure was adopted for these four chapters to facilitate both readability and cross-case
analysis – such an approach is consistent with a linear-analytic structure described by Yin
(2009).
The findings for each of the four programs are presented in chapters 4 through 7.
A summary of the findings for all four cases is provided in appendix N. Each chapter
begins with a case description followed by a detailed presentation of the findings and
then a chapter summary. The case description includes a synopsis of the overall program,
its implementation network, and its performance measurement system. The typology used
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is organized based on the literature review as well as inductive analysis of the data
collected (table 13).

Table 13. Typology Used for Case Description
The Program

CDC organizational context
Program goals
Stage of program development
Budget stability
Stakeholders
Political context

The Implementation
Network

Network structure: vertical relationships
Network structure: horizontal relationships
Network function: authority and control within the network
Network function: shared organizational goals and priorities
within the network
Network function: variability in context, resources, capacity

Performance
Measurement System

Process to develop the performance measurement system
Performance measurement system design including:
• Purpose
• Level of measurement
• Types of measures
• Use of targets or standards
• Quality assurance efforts
Use of performance measurement system and data

The literature review suggests that network public management has emerged, in
part, based on the complexity of the social and health problems faced today.
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Consequently, the description of each case begins with a narrative about the program.
Inductive analysis identified six common characteristics of each program: CDC
organizational context, program goals, stage of program development, budget stability,
stakeholders, and political context.
Next, the implementation network is described based on five characteristics, two
related to the structure of the network and three related to the network’s function. These
characteristics were identified both through the literature review and inductive data
analysis. For network structure, both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the
network are addressed. For network function, three aspects are considered – issues of
authority and control within the network; shared goals and priorities between network
members; and topics of context, resources, and capacity.
Finally, the performance measurement system is described including the process
for developing the system used by each program, its overall design, and use of the
performance measurement system and data. Five aspects of the performance
measurement design are described including its purpose, level of measurement, types of
measures, use of targets or standards, and quality assurance efforts.
Following the case description, each chapter concludes with a summary of case
findings, including evidence for each. As noted above, development of individual case
findings were directed by the study’s research questions. Chapter 8 includes a descriptive
summary of the four cases and presents findings from the cross case analysis organized
by the three research questions.
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3.9 Data Validity and Reliability
Trustworthiness is proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as an appropriate
criterion to assess qualitative inquiry that differs from traditional positivist criteria for
assessing research quality. The trustworthiness construct replaces traditional views of
validity and reliability with credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability
(Lincoln and Guba 1985). Others offer varied typologies of validity (Maxwell 1992;
Schwandt 2001). Merriam (1995) states, “Unlike experimental designs in which validity
and reliability are accounted for before the investigation, rigor in qualitative research
derives from the researcher’s presence, the nature of the interaction between researcher
and participants, the triangulation of data, the interpretation of perceptions, and rich, thick
description” (p.151).
3.9.1 Internal Validity
Internal validity is conventionally defined as the congruence between one’s
findings and the reality of what is studied (Merriam 2009). Validity refers to the
interpretations drawn from the data, not the data themselves (Creswell and Miller 2000).
For this study, internal validity is based on how well the investigator represents the
various perceptions and interpretations of those included in the study (Lincoln and Guba
1985; Merriam 2009; Creswell and Miller 2000). Several strategies were used to improve
the internal validity of the proposed study, including emersion in the field, triangulation,
member checking, searching for disconfirming evidence, and colleague examination.
As discussed earlier, emersion in the field refers to the researcher’s engagement in
the research context in order to understand the phenomenon of interest holistically and in
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all its complexity. For this study, the investigator gathered primary data over a sevenmonth period and used varied data collection methods to facilitate a deep understanding
of the research topic. In addition, the researcher conducted all aspects of analysis, many
of which supported a continued “closeness” to the data that benefits internal validity.
Triangulation verifies the repeatability of an interpretation or observation to
confirm findings (Merriam 2009; Stake 2006). Different types of triangulation have been
described in the literature (Mathison 1998; Patton 1999), and two approaches were
applied here. First, methodological triangulation, considered the strongest form of
triangulation, was applied. Methodological triangulation involves assessing data from the
multiple data collection methods (e.g., interviews, document review, and observation)
(Lincoln and Guba 1985; Patton 2002). Another form of triangulation, data source
triangulation, was also used; this form uses several data sources (e.g., data from more
than one person or data collected from more than one point in time) to strengthen
findings (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Patton 2002). Both approaches increase validity by
ensuring a systematic process of searching through the data to identify common themes
and by relying on more than a single source of evidence (Creswell and Miller 2000).
Atlas.ti was helpful in assessing triangulation given its capability to sort text in varied
ways and produce reports that identify the unique data sources.
Aside from concerns for validity, triangulation is also useful during data analysis
to clarify meaning by considering multiple perspectives (Stake 2006). Mathison (1988)
suggested that triangulation can result in three possibilities including convergence,
inconsistency, or contradiction. As triangulation identified inconsistencies or
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contradictions in results, the investigator considered plausible explanations to account for
them. This approach actually helped to extend and enrich meaning and understanding.
Member checking, discussed earlier, was also used to strengthen internal validity
(Merriam 2009; Creswell and Miller 2000). Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that
member checking is the most important technique to establish credibility. As noted
above, individual case reports were developed and disseminated to each program. The
researcher then met individually with key representatives to discuss the accuracy of
descriptions, the plausibility of case summaries, and whether adequate evidence was
provided in support of the findings. As noted, a minimum of two participants from each
case reviewed the reports. Participants provided detailed feedback in the face-to-face
meetings, typically providing written edits on the report or an electronic copy of the
report with tracked changes.
Identifying negative or disconfirming evidence involves searching through the
data to either confirm or disconfirm preliminary themes or categories (Miles and
Huberman 1994). Patton (1999) describes both inductive and logical approaches to
searching for rival explanations and negative cases. This approach strengthens validity by
further supporting the credibility of findings (Creswell and Miller 2000). For this study,
the identification of negative evidence served to facilitate deeper exploration of the data
and generate more insightful and nuanced understanding.
Finally, the researcher enlisted a colleague at CDC to examine findings and
comment on their perceived credibility (Merriam 2009; Patton 2002). The colleague
reviewed all case-specific chapters and the cross-case analysis chapter, offering
suggestions and identifying areas of clarification. In addition, presentations of
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preliminary results were made at the American Evaluation Association annual conference
(November 2008) and at an evaluation forum at CDC (December 2008). Colleagues were
especially helpful by raising important issues that encouraged thoughtful consideration
about the analysis, the researcher’s role in the study, and about how findings are
conveyed in the writing.
3.9.2 External Validity
In research involving quantitative methods, external validity refers to the
generalizability of the findings. As discussed earlier, qualitative findings are not intended
to be generalized but to expose a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of interest at a
particular time and in its unique context. Although efforts have been described to
strengthen generalizability in qualitative research (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2009),
an alternative conceptualization was applied for this study. “User or reader
generalizability” is a way to conceptualize external validity. Lincoln and Guba referred to
this as “transferability” (Lincoln and Guba 1985). This concept is based on the idea that
the reader or user of the findings has responsibility for determining how well the results
transfer to his or her own situation (Merriam 2009). Given this view, two techniques were
applied to strengthen the external validity of this study. First, the dissertation findings
reflect rich, thick description that enable readers to determine how well the findings
might fit their own situations (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Merriam 2009). Second, the
multiple case study design contributes to extending variation in the study of performance
measurement and allows readers to assess a greater range of experiences and contexts
(Merriam 2009).
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3.9.3 Reliability
In quantitative research, reliability refers to whether results would be the same if
the study were replicated. Given the nature of qualitative research and the fact that human
behavior is dynamic and fluid, this view of reliability is inconsistent with the approach
(Merriam 2009). The idea of reliability has been recast by some as “dependability” and
“consistency” (Lincoln and Guba 1985). That is, reliability involves assessing whether
the findings are consistent with the data collected (Merriam 2009). To strengthen the
reliability in this study, the researcher: (1) maintained a detailed audit trail as part of the
researcher’s analytic journal to assure transparency in research methods; (2) used data
source triangulation; (3) used methodological triangulation; and (4) involved peer review
(Merriam 2009). All of these have been described previously except the use of an audit
trail. An audit trail was maintained as part of the researcher’s analytic journal to
document the research and included the following: (1) listing of all data collection
efforts; (2) summary of data reduction and analysis products (e.g., codebook, field notes);
and (3) process notes including key decision points made throughout the research
process. Other written sources supporting reliability include the study proposal, data
collection instruments, and final reports and written analysis (Lincoln and Guba 1985).

3.10 Ethics
As noted earlier, the study protocol was approved by institutional review boards
at both GSU and CDC. High ethical standards were maintained throughout the research
process. The written, verbatim transcripts were returned to the interview participants
whom were offered the opportunity to review the transcript and remove any statement(s)
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he or she was not comfortable including. Pseudonyms were used to help protect
confidentiality – all names were replaced with pseudonyms in transcripts, document
review forms, and observation field notes.
The thick description inherent in qualitative research presents an important
challenge to “inferred” identification (Anastas 2004). Even without identifying
information, there is the possibility that certain readers may infer a specific participant.
Participants were made aware, in the informed consent form and verbally at the time of
the interview, that their name would not be used in any written reports, but that only the
overall program (e.g., NBCCEDP) would be associated with specific statements. And, as
described earlier, several steps were taken to assure proper data storage (e.g., password
protected laptop for electronic data, locked file cabinet for hard copies of data).

3.11 Researcher Assumptions and Biases
While limitations refer to issues related to methodology, qualitative research must
also address the researcher’s personal assumptions and biases that he or she brings to the
research process (Peshkin 1998). Addressing researcher reflexivity is another strategy
viewed as strengthening the credibility and validity of the research (Creswell 2000;
Mauthner and Doucet 2003). Mauthner and Doucet (2003) advocate for researchers to
practice greater reflection and accountability in their work, suggesting that a higher level
of self-consciousness will lead to improved confidence in the findings. The need for self
reflection is essential given that the researcher represents the primary instrument of data
collection in qualitative research. For this section, then, first person is used to describe
my own subjectivities that may potentially have influenced the conduct of this research
and my interpretations of findings.
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Although I am a doctoral student at GSU and GT, I am also an employee at CDC.
Therefore, while I conducted this research as an affiliate and representative of GSU, I
also was conducting it as a CDC employee, which raised a potential conflict. One result
of this dilemma was to disclose these relationships to participants which I did in the
introductory e-mail to all participants and within the informed consent form. Given my
working relationship at CDC, there were also concerns about the willingness of
participants to be open about their experiences. However, I found participants to be
incredibly transparent, openly sharing their perspectives and providing me internal
documents and materials unlikely to have been made available to an “outsider.”
Another issue related to my fifteen years of work experience at CDC. This
experience contributes to underlying generalizations, assumptions, and perspectives I
hold about CDC’s national public health programs. For instance, I served as a program
consultant for 7 years, working closely with state and city health department officials.
While this experience provides me a deeper understanding of the program context, I also
had to recognize my own preconceived judgments about those programs and remain
vigilant in my awareness of when these assumptions affected my perceptions. For
instance, I have developed strong views about the importance of providing state and local
partners scientific guidance while also allowing for local tailoring of community-based
public health programs in order to fit their unique context. While my experiences at CDC
certainly enhanced my ability to relate to participants and more quickly assess and
understand certain situations or dynamics, I tried to stay aware and avoid making
inappropriate conclusions based on preconceived notions.
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In my proposal, I wrote that I had concerns about the current emphasis on
indicator development at CDC, which I often saw at the expense of other evaluation
approaches. While I stayed attuned to this perception, my conversations with participants
led me to overcome this particular bias and recognize the importance this strategy offers
public health programs. Although I believe that there are unique challenges to
implementing performance measurement systems at the federal level and am concerned
that advocates lack an understanding of the complexity of its application in these setting,
I realized a new appreciation for performance measurement for program management and
evaluation.
Finally, my theoretical framework introduced a necessary bias that framed both
what I explored and how I interpreted the data collected. While this is appropriate and
necessary, it is important to remember that I explored this issue from a particular and
specific lens.

3.12 Study Limitations
Several limitations must be acknowledged. First, the results of this study are
applicable only to the four cases studied. The small sample of cases that were included in
the study, as well as the limited number of participants, precludes broader generalization
in the statistical sense. As addressed above, generalizability in case study research is
better conceptualized as “user generalizability.” Second, there are limits given that one
investigator conducted all aspects of the study. My experience on team-based qualitative
research efforts has demonstrated the value additional researchers bring to interpretation.
The team approach allows for critical thinking and dialogue across team members that is
largely absent here.
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Third, given that the researcher did not pursue OMB approvals, she could only
include up to eight non-federal participants in the study. OMB approval was not pursued
given the lengthy review process involved (i.e., twelve to eighteen months or more
following IRB approvals). The inability to include more representation from the grantee
programs, in particular, is an important limitation to the study. The researcher attempted
to address this limitation by including CDC program consultants who work closely with
the grantees (two from each case), CDC field staff assigned to specific health
departments (this was limited to the CSPS), and a small number of program directors
working for state health departments. In addition, several program consultants who were
interviewed for the study had, in the past, worked for state programs.
Next, the investigator conducted the research in her workplace. Although the
researcher’s role at CDC was perceived to facilitate access, her role as a colleague may
have inhibited some respondents. However, as noted above, the researcher found her
position afforded greater access to people, documents, and opportunities for observation,
and also facilitated more open and frank dialogue from participants. In the end, the
researcher’s “insider” position was perceived as a valuable asset in conducting the
research.
Fifth, a majority of those interviewed were involved in the development and
implementation of the performance measurement system and may have conveyed a more
positive impression than others. However, the study included participants (in each case)
that were not directly involved and invested in the performance measurement effort (e.g.,
program consultants, grantee representatives).
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Sixth, federal performance measurement is, to some extent, politically motivated
and politically charged given policies such as GPRA and PART and the use of
performance measurement data for decision making related to individual grantee budgets.
The nature of the topic may have inhibited some respondents from speaking freely about
their perceptions about it. In particular, there was political sensitivity in writing about
some of the programs and their political contexts. After working at CDC for fifteen years,
I am acutely aware of these sensitivities and had an inherent conflict of not wanting to
“bite the hand that feeds me.” However, I have attempted to honestly reflect the political
context for these programs while also remaining sensitive to the political issues inherent
to performance measurement. I found the member checking phase an important
opportunity to assess these issues with the program staff and garner feedback and advice
about their representation. Finally, limited resources in terms of time limited the data
collection and analysis process.
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CHAPTER 4
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (PHEP) PROGRAM
4.1 PHEP Case Description
As outlined in Chapter 3, Section 3.8.7, the case description is presented for this
case and all others using a standard typology. The description includes a summary of the
program, the implementation network, and the performance measurement system.
4.1.1 The Program
4.1.1.1 CDC Organizational Context
In 1999, CDC began funding state, local, and territorial health agencies to address
terrorism-related public health emergencies. In 2002, following the September 11th and
the 2001 anthrax attacks, Congress authorized funding for the PHEP cooperative
agreement to support public health preparedness activities nationally, and funding for the
program skyrocketed from about $45 million in FY 2001 to nearly $1 billion in FY 2002.
During same time, the overall preparedness budget at CDC exploded from roughly $180
million to over $3.2 billion.
CDC’s Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR) in the Coordinating Office
for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COTPER) administers the PHEP
cooperative agreement, providing consultation and technical assistance to grantees. The
current cooperative agreement (PA #AA154) has been in place for eight years. In fiscal
year 2008, CDC awarded over $700 million in funding through the PHEP program to 62
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state, local, and territorial health agencies28 . Awards are based, in large part, on
population size and ranged from $330,743 to $50,161,370 with an average award of
$11,368,829 (median award $8,897,688).
PHEP’s organizational context can be distinguished, in part, by the fact that the
PHEP program is situated in a “coordinating office” (i.e., COTPER) rather than a CDC
center, reflecting a horizontal dimension of the program within CDC itself. As a
coordinating office, COTPER provides funding to programs across the CDC centers, and
DSLR staff draw on expertise (i.e., subject matter experts) from diverse areas such as
infectious disease, influenza, environmental health, quarantine, and laboratories to
support the PHEP program. For instance, scientists from other parts of CDC who
specialize in infectious pathogens such as E. coli assist in the development of policies,
provide technical assistance to grantees, and advise on the development of performance
measures.
The organizational context for the PHEP program can also be characterized by
constant change, high political visibility, and significant demands from federal
government levels above DSLR. In particular, the political requirements imposed on the
program from Congress, other federal agencies [e.g., Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)] as well as CDC’s Office of
the Director, are constant. PHEP staff are inundated by seemingly endless Congressional
inquiries, new policy directives, and changing priorities (see political context, section
4.1.1.6 below).

28 The 62 grantees represent public health agencies for all 50 U.S. states, Chicago, New York City, Los Angeles County, Washington
D.C., and eight U.S. territories.
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Several of those interviewed used the term “wild, wild west” to describe the
program culture of PHEP, reflecting an environment where unexpected demands from
“above” were common and staff were challenged to feel a sense of control. Some
expressed frustration over a situation in which efforts to implement a thoughtful, sciencebased approach were often derailed by demands from levels above them.
4.1.1.2 Program Goals
Since its inception, the PHEP program has morphed and expanded in its scope,
often in response to critical events (e.g., 9/11, anthrax, Hurricane Katrina) or emerging
threats (e.g., West Nile, pandemic flu). Today the program is tasked to address “allhazards” which includes natural disasters as well as terrorist, chemical, biologic,
radiologic, and nuclear emergencies. Addressing such a diverse range of hazards only
begins to hint at the complexity of public health preparedness.
And unlike many other programs at CDC, the PHEP program’s focus has been
significantly shaped by a number of federal-level policy initiatives such as the DHS’
National Response Plan, National Preparedness Guidelines, and Target Capabilities List;
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program (HSEEP); the 2007 Homeland Security Presidential Directive
(HSPD) 21; and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 (PAHPA). In
addition, staff are sensitive to the need to define the program in alignment with nine
strategic preparedness goals that have been established by CDC.
One of the most significant challenges for DSLR staff is in defining public health
preparedness, which can be described as sitting at the intersection of several disciplines
including emergency management, defense, and medical services. Given that an “all158

hazards” program encompasses such diverse events, the dimensions of public health
preparedness are expansive – surveillance, epidemiology, laboratory operations, response
and recovery, and program implementation. At the same time, preparedness reflects many
standard public health functions; consequently, differentiating it from CDC’s typical
public health work is also a challenge.
Acknowledging that the field is relatively new, DSLR staff have struggled to
build an operational definition of what it means to be “prepared” by a limited science
base and a lack of federal standards. Consensus on key aspects of what people viewed as
a somewhat nebulous concept had not been achieved, although a concerted effort to do so
is being led by DSLR’s Outcome Monitoring and Evaluation Branch (OMEB) and a
framework is emerging (see performance measurement system, section 4.1.3 below).
Unlike most other public health programs, preparedness cannot be easily described using
incidence and prevalence data or morbidity and mortality rates. Preparedness more
accurately represents a process to build infrastructure, plans, and partnerships rather than
an “end state” that could be eventually achieved and easily measured.
4.1.1.3 Stage of Program Development
As noted above, what is now called the PHEP program was initiated in 1999 and
has changed substantially from year to year. The program is generally viewed as “new”
and the discipline of public health preparedness is still evolving. In part, the program has
been challenged to define itself given the lack of a solid science base and the inherent
complexities reflected in the issue itself. The characterization of the program as the
“wild, wild west” reflects participants’ feelings that they were often “blazing new paths”
as they helped to define the field of public health preparedness.
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Overall, PHEP is a program still in development with more learning needed by
CDC in collaboration with its grantees to better define the program’s parameters.
Accordingly, CDC expectations of grantees consider the program’s developmental stage,
recognizing the need for flexibility in regard to expectations. At the same time, however,
PHEP faces significant accountability demands and policy requirements from HHS,
many of which are viewed as unrealistic and insensitive to program realities (see political
context, section 4.1.1.6 below).
4.1.1.4 Budget Stability
As noted earlier, the PHEP program experienced a phenomenal increase in
funding in FY 2002, reaching $999 million. Effectively managing the influx of funding
was challenging at all program levels, including CDC. At the state level, programs
receive funds from multiple sources to support public health and medical preparedness
(e.g., CDC, DHS, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response) and are stretched
to manage the reporting requirements for multiple federal agencies while also distributing
funds to local levels needed to implement the program. Since its peak in 2002, annual
funding allocations for the PHEP program have been consistently reduced, and staff
recognize the importance of demonstrating accountability in order to defend current
funding levels.
PAHPA, which was passed as law in 2006, requires that performance-based
budgeting be instituted for the PHEP program in 2009 and mandates that funds be
withheld for programs who “fail” to meet established targets or submit a pandemic flu
plan meeting required criteria. Recently, HHS requested that CDC provide draft
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performance measures that will be used to meet PAHPA requirements so that the
measures could be published in the Federal Register for public comment.
DSLR staff expressed concerns about a shift to performance-based budgeting,
especially given the stage of program development, lack of a strong programmatic
science base, and on-going data quality concerns with the program-level performance
measures currently in place. Many are afraid that the performance measures required by
PAHPA will be used as “sticks” to reduce funds for “failing” programs. Philosophically,
participants have concerns that reducing funds from a public health program may only
worsen a grantee’s capacity to protect the public. Others fear that PAHPA’s approach to
performance-based budgeting will damage relationships with grantees, lead to a “high
stakes” testing environment where programs will simply “teach to the test,” or result in
gaming of the measures.
4.1.1.5 Stakeholders
A significant group of stakeholders at both the federal and state level exert
influence on the PHEP program through their relationships with CDC. Within CDC,
members of the Office of the Director represent a major stakeholder internal to the
organization. PHEP is the single largest cooperative agreement administered by the
agency, and, subsequently, the CDC Director works closely with the Director of
COTPER.
Executive agencies at the federal level, including DHS, HHS, ASPR, and FEMA
all represent important stakeholder groups for the program. In addition, Congress has a
stake in the program given all 50 states are funded and that U.S. constituents across the
country and U.S. territories are affected. Data suggest a top-down, hierarchical approach
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to the PHEP program from those in Washington DC, with more extensive stakeholder
involvement than typically experienced by CDC programs. For instance, program
funding announcements for PHEP are closely reviewed by HHS. Some participants
described a “cultural clash” between the federal agencies involved in preparedness and
those in public health; in particular, they felt the preparedness field, in general, was more
closely aligned with the military and its characteristic command and control approach. In
contrast, public health typically assumes a collaborative stance with its partners and
stakeholders to accomplish its goals.
The PHEP grantees represent another group of key stakeholders for the program.
And national groups representing the grantees such as the National Association of City
and County Health Officials (NACCHO), the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials (ASTHO), the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), and the
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) are all important groups with a stake
in the PHEP program. ASTHO has an active subgroup – the Directors of Public Health
Preparedness – comprised of state and territorial public health preparedness directors that
advocates on behalf of its representatives. Both the individual grantee programs and the
national organizations attempt to exert political influence on the PHEP program through
regular consultation and interaction.
4.1.1.6 Political Context
The political context represents a dominant theme for the PHEP program. In fact,
analytic codes related to the topic were the most frequently applied of any in the dataset.
The sections above already hint at the political environment for the program. In part, the
political context for PHEP reflects the public visibility and perceived importance of
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preparedness in today’s culture. But the program’s political context may be impacted to
an even greater extent by the substantial and complex intergovernmental arrangements at
federal, state, and local levels that comprise the homeland security system in general.
That system requires the integration of efforts from a myriad of federal agencies and
offices including DHS, Department of Defense (DoD), FEMA, HHS, ASPR, CDC,
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), and others. Congress and the
former President (George W. Bush) also instituted policy initiatives, legislation, and
executive measures that directed or influenced preparedness efforts.
DSLR faces a difficult political climate that seems to regularly shift the program
from one focus to another. As noted, political actions from those “above” CDC in the
institutional hierarchy are frequent and limit CDC’s control over the program’s
implementation. At the time of data collection for this study, DSLR staff were dealing
with two initiatives that had direct effects on the program – PAHPA and HSPD-21.
Under PAHPA (PL 109-417), the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
(ASPR) was established within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
PAHPA directs CDC to require grantees to contribute non-federal matching funds
beginning in FY 2008 and, as noted earlier, to institute a performance-based budgeting
formula for the PHEP program beginning in FY 2009. PAHPA also requires that PHEP
grantees develop pandemic flu plans that meet criteria established by HHS and requires
“evidence-based benchmarks and objective standards” to measure levels of preparedness
(to include outcome goals). The law dictates standardized funding cuts (i.e., 5% cut for
first year of failed performance, 10% for second consecutive year of failed performance)
for grantees that fail to meet established targets.
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HSPD-21, drafted by the Homeland Security Council and issued by the White
House in October 2007, establishes the National Strategy for Public Health and Medical
Preparedness. The national strategy is built on key principles set forth in the Biodefense
for the 21st Century (April 2004) and its intent is to articulate an approach to protect the
health of all Americans against all disasters. Among other requirements, the presidential
directive commands that the PHEP program assure state and local capacity to distribute
countermeasures (e.g., drug treatment for anthrax exposure, prophylactic treatment for
pandemic flu) within 48 hours after a decision to do so. Furthermore, HSPD-21 requires
that standards and performance measures be developed within 270 days of the date of the
directive “for state and local government countermeasure distribution systems, including
demonstration of specific capabilities in tactical exercises in accordance with the
National Exercise Program, and establish a process to gather performance data from state
and local participants on a regular basis to assess readiness.” The requirement related to
the National Exercise Program reflects a DHS initiative called the Homeland Security
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) that sets out guidelines for planning and
conducting security exercises at all levels of government. Finally, as part of HSPD-21,
CDC is directed to begin collecting performance data within 180 days after the
development of the measures and to use the data for determining future grant funding.
In summary, PHEP is situated in a complex political context with a strong topdown, compliance orientation. Some of the political directives have been difficult to
translate into the public health realm given their orientation in emergency management or
defense. And finally, COTPER faces frequent inquiries from Congress, the Inspector
General, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as well as on-going reporting

164

requirements for the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and OMB’s
Performance Assessment and Rating Tool (PART). In the end, the constant political
demands have been wearing for both DSLR and for PHEP program grantees. More
importantly, those demands have compromised a planned, science-based approach to
public health preparedness and a collaborative implementation process with state, local,
and territorial partners.
4.1.2 Implementation Network
4.1.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships
The vertical relationships that comprise the PHEP program begin at the federal
level with Congress, the President, and executive agencies including HHS, DHS, and
others. From a hierarchical perspective, three primary levels cascade below represented
by 1) CDC and DSLR, 2) the 62 state, city, and territorial health agencies, and 3)
thousands of local level jurisdictions across the U.S. These vertical relationships are
primarily intergovernmental and formalized by legal and fiscal arrangements: Congress
authorized funding for PHEP in 2002; CDC, in turn, receives an annual budget allocation
for the PHEP program from HHS; the 62 grantees, in turn, receive annual cooperative
agreement funding awards from CDC; and those grantees use contracts or other
mechanisms to distribute funds to regional or local levels. Over 50% of CDC funds are
distributed by grantees to more local levels.
Many participants used the catchphrase, “all preparedness is local,” reflecting the
idea that public health responses will typically be initiated at the local level. A more
accurate description, however, is that “initial response is local” and that all levels are
needed in response to large scale events. For instance, an individual at the local level will
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be the first to encounter a person with anthrax infection, but network members at other
levels (state, federal) will be needed to implement activities (distribution of prophylaxis
treatment) to reduce morbidity and mortality.
4.1.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships
While vertical relationships ensure financial and other technical support
from the federal government down to the local level, horizontal relationships are
equally as important at all levels of government in preparing for and responding
to public health emergencies. In nearly any scenario imaginable, multiple
disciplines and sectors will be required to work collaboratively in order to
effectively respond to an emergency for which public health may be only one
relevant component. Using the anthrax example from above, participation of
partners in the education, transportation, senior services, postal services, police
and security, health care, and business may all be needed to manage the
distribution of prophylactic treatment on a large scale. Consequently, PHEP has a
significant horizontal dimension at every level in the vertical implementation
chain.
The importance of collaboration with horizontal partners is evident in federal
policies that affect many parts of the emergency management framework, including
public health. HSPD-21 cites key principles derived from other federal strategy
documents (e.g., Biodefense for the 21st Century, April 2004, National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction) which include “vertical and horizontal
coordination across levels of government, jurisdictions, and disciplines” as well as
“engagement of the private sector, academia, and other nongovernmental entities in
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preparedness and response effort.” In support of collaboration at the federal level, HSPD21 required the establishment of the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Task Force
to include broad representation from relevant agencies. The Task Force is chaired by the
Secretary of HHS and include in its membership the Secretaries of State, Defense,
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Transportation, Veteran’s Association, and Homeland
Security as well as the Director of OMB, Director of National Intelligence, and the U.S.
Attorney General.
At CDC, COPTER works horizontally across the broader agency to coordinate
efforts in support of preparedness activities. As noted earlier, PHEP draws on subject
matter experts from many parts of CDC to make technical and scientific contributions. At
the state-level, coordination is needed across government departments and with other
sectors to carry out activities including planning and preparedness exercises. Such
coordination may involve working with departments of education, transportation,
emergency management, and environment, but also with hospital systems, commerce,
and others. And at the local level, public health must collaborate with many of these same
partners as well as the first responder agencies (e.g., fire, police).
4.1.2.3 Network Function: Authority and Control Within the Network
Control within the vertical network is exerted, in part, based on the institutional
relationships – for instance, as a federal agency, CDC is directed by Congress, HHS, and
others in the Executive Branch. And, as noted earlier, DHS, ASPR, and others also have
influence over CDC’s PHEP, primarily through the imposition of policy initiatives that
dictate programmatic requirements. Cooperative agreements are used by CDC to fund the
62 PHEP grantees. This particular funding mechanism defines explicit responsibilities for
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both the grantee and the CDC, allowing for substantial federal involvement in program
implementation, including on-going programmatic monitoring and the provision of
technical assistance. States have discretion to use the policy tools of their choosing in
awarding CDC funds to local jurisdictions.
A primary challenge of the vertical structure is CDC’s diminishing level of
influence on actual program implementation with each step down the intergovernmental
chain. While CDC has some formal authority over the grantee by virtue of the
cooperative agreement, CDC’s control over local level partners in the PHEP network is
weak to nonexistent. CDC and grantees have even less control over the horizontal
network dimension, but are nonetheless reliant on their participation to provide a
seamless emergency response. Most of these horizontal relationships tend to be informal
and unfunded. Developing effective relationships with these horizontal partners,
therefore, becomes a critical part of public health managers’ jobs and involves working
across disciplinary cultures.
4.1.2.4 Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities Within the
Network
As noted above, preparedness demands the involvement of multiple disciplines
and sectors working collaboratively across both vertical and horizontal networks. But
differences or conflicts between agencies about priorities and goals can make
collaboration difficult. For PHEP, there was more evidence of goal conflicts between
vertical partners than across horizontal ones – probably because participants spoke more
directly about those vertical relationships and few state-level representatives were
included in the study. Given the top-down nature of the program itself, goals and
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priorities of those upstream (e.g., HHS, ASPR, DHS) were privileged, but were often
viewed as “out of touch” with programmatic realities and lacking sensitivity to variability
in grantee context.
In addition, as in any vertically decentralized structure, implementation “drift”
occurs – that is, at each level (e.g., state, regional, local) the priorities and goals of a
particular grantee influence how activities are, in fact, carried out. In terms of the
horizontal dimension, participants spoke more about the challenges of earning a “place at
the table” and engaging partners than of specific conflicts across agencies in defining
common goals and objectives. Public health is a relative newcomer to the emergency
management arena and has struggled to define its role and earn recognition from the
others who have a longer history in the preparedness or emergency response arena. The
lack of available time on the part of horizontal partners to engage in planning efforts or
preparedness exercises led by public health is another barrier to their engagement. Even
at CDC, content experts in other parts of the agency have other priorities in terms of their
work responsibilities that conflict with their participation in the PHEP program efforts.
Similar challenges were faced at the state and local levels.
4.1.2.5 Network Function: Context, Resources, and Capacity
The 62 PHEP grantees vary considerably in terms of context, agency capacity,
and resources, all of which influence network functioning within each grantee’s
jurisdiction. In terms of context, grantees differ in both geography and in their risk for
specific “hazards” (e.g., bioterrorist attack, natural disaster, radiation disaster) – just
consider the gulf of differences between New York State and South Dakota.
Consequently, the relevance of specific hazards influences the agencies that participate in
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the network – a state prone to natural disasters may have a network comprised of
uniquely different agency participants than a state seen at higher risk for a bioterrorist
attack. In overseeing the PHEP program, CDC must remain sensitive to these contextual
distinctions that require unique program models and program activities.
Resources and capacity also vary across grantees and, to some degree, influence
grantees’ ability to effectively work within the network structure. Resource levels are, in
part, a consequence of the CDC funding award size, but also influenced by whether the
individual grantee receives support from its own state or territory. Participants suggested
that the current funding cuts in PHEP were negatively affecting grantees’ capacity to
carry out the requirements of the cooperative agreement, including collaborating with
network partners.
4.1.3 Performance Measurement System
4.1.3.1 Process to Develop the Performance Measurement System
The PHEP program has had some form of a performance measurement system in
place for several years. The measures have evolved extensively over that time; currently,
six performance measures are in place for the national program and a dedicated effort is
underway to refine and expand them. The current measures are summarized in table 14;
the measures relate to three of CDC’s nine Preparedness Goals that are also detailed in
the same table.
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Table 14. PHEP Performance Measures (2008)
Performance Measure

Public Health
Capability

CDC Preparedness Goal 2: DETECTION AND REPORTING
Decrease the time needed to classify health events as terrorism or naturally
occurring in partnership with other agencies.
2A: Percentage of Pulsed Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE) subtyping
data results submitted to the PulseNet national database within 4
working days of receiving isolate at the PFGE laboratory.
Target: 4 days or less

Laboratory

CDC Preparedness Goal 6: CONTROL
Decrease the time needed to provide countermeasures and health guidance to those
affected by threats to the public’s health.
6A: Percentage of key response partners that the public health agency
successfully contacts without using electric grid power and primary
Communication
land-line telephone service.
Target: Not established
6B: Time to notify all primary staff (secondary or tertiary staff as
needed) with public health agency Incident Command System
functional responsibilities that the public health agency’s
Emergency Operations Center is being activated.
Target: 60 minutes or less

Communication

6C: Time for primary staff (secondary or tertiary staff as needed) with
public health agency Incident Command System functional
responsibilities to report for duty at the public health agency’s
Emergency Operations Center.
Target: 2 ½ hours or less

Response

CDC Preparedness Goal 9: IMPROVE
Decrease the time needed to implement recommendations from after-action reports
following threats to the public’s health.
9A: Time to complete a draft of an After-Action Report/Improvement
Plan.
Target: 60 days or less

Program
Implementation

9B: Time to re-evaluate response following approval and completion of
corrective action(s) identified in an After-Action
Report/Improvement Plan.
Target: Not established

Program
Implementation
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Staff in DSLR’s Outcome Monitoring and Evaluation Branch (OMEB) oversee
development of the performance measurement system. OMEB is led by a PhD-level
evaluator and comprised of staff with expertise in evaluation, epidemiology, data
management, systems development, and public health. Most staff in the branch are
relatively new to the Division (although not to CDC) having worked in OMEB for two
years or less. The effort to develop performance measures is a high priority and a critical
Division activity, and the branch receives strong support from management in both
DSLR and COTPER’s Office of the Director.
The history of the development of performance measures for PHEP reflects an
evolution of measures over time, shaped largely by the expanding scope of the program
and its political context. Table 15 below summarizes the various iterations of
performance measures for the program by fiscal year. In general, previous performance
measure sets were developed under difficult timelines and in response to political
pressure or policy requirements.

Table 15. PHEP Performance Measure System Development, 2003-2008
Fiscal Year

Number of Performance Measures

2003

120+ measures

2004

47 measures

2005

35 measures

2006

23 measures

2006 – 2008

6 measures
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The most recent development process was initiated in 2007 and is called the
PHEP Measurement Project. Led by staff in OMEB and supported by two government
contractors, the purpose of the project is to “develop, test, and implement measures of
public health capabilities for program accountability and improvement.” A primary task
of the Measurement Project is to develop a conceptual framework for PHEP based on
priority program areas from which to identify performance measures and establish
program standards. OMEB estimates the development of revised and new measures will
be at least a two year process, although they recognize that performance measurement is
a dynamic, “self-correcting,” and on-going process. The project is operating parallel to
other related, but separate, measurement efforts – the requirement to annually report
GPRA/PART measures, the new PAHPA requirement to institute performance-based
budgeting in 2009, and another OMEB initiative to develop a larger monitoring system
comprised of measures of capacity.
The involvement of stakeholders is viewed as critical to the success of the new
development process. In December 2007, OMEB invited representatives from ASTHO’s
Directors of Public Health Preparedness to Atlanta to discuss the project, and in January
2008, OMEB assembled and convened a PHEP Evaluation Workgroup to provide
technical support and guidance to the measurement development process. The workgroup
includes 24 external stakeholders representing state and local health departments, tribal
communities, and national (e.g., APHL, ASTHO, CSTE, Centers for Public Health
Preparedness, NACCHO) and federal (e.g., DHS, ASPR, HHS’ Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation) partners. During the January 2008 meeting, the Evaluation
Workgroup prioritized five PHEP capability areas for measurement development and
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offered advice on a measurement approach. The capability areas were derived from DHS’
Target Capability List, and these five capabilities represent the foundation of the
conceptual framework that is intended to better define the PHEP program: (1) incident
management; (2) risk communications; (3) biosurveillance; (4) countermeasure delivery;
and (5) isolation and quarantine/community containment.
Once the five areas were defined, a nomination process was instituted to select
scientific and program experts to serve on topic-specific (capability areas) subgroups.
Subgroup members were not limited to the Evaluation Workgroup members. At the time
of data collection for this study, two of the five subgroups were formed and had convened
for two-day meetings to conduct process mapping exercises and begin revising existing
performance measures or developing new ones. Given the difficulty in defining
“preparedness” described earlier, the expertise of these subgroups was seen as critical to
the development of a conceptual framework and new or revised measures.
OMEB has applied a measurement framework focused on capacities, capabilities,
and performance to design their measurement system. PHEP defined these three
measurement categories as follows:
•

Capacity Measures The acquisition, development, and maintenance of public
health infrastructure and assets to support emergency preparedness and response.
Measures of capacity include equipment, medications, supplies, staff, training,
and preparedness plans.

•

Capability Measures The ability to demonstrate public health emergency
preparedness operations or actions. Measures of capability include documentation
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of discussion-based and operational-based exercises and/or responses to real
incidents. Capability = Capacity + Practice/Expertise
•

Performance Measures Characteristics of public health emergency preparedness
capability associated with the quality of operations or actions. Provides
quantitative information on how well a process or outcome is performed.
Measures of performance are often time-based but can also include measures of
quality, completeness, and accuracy.
The intention of this latest measurement effort is to develop new performance

measures by April 2010 along with related data collection guidance, training, and
technical assistance materials. PHEP estimates that 6-8 new capability-based measures
will be piloted and implemented annually. While the conceptual framework is perceived
as a fundamental step in the development process, OMEB must also ensure that any new
measures and measurement system align with various federal goals (e.g., CDC’s nine
preparedness goals, DHS target capabilities list) and are in compliance with federal
reporting requirements (e.g., OMB, HHS, DHS, ASPR). In addition, OMEB must wrestle
with other top-down political pressures, including the imposition of specific measures
required by policies such as HSPD-21, which are often viewed as both nonscientific and
unrealistic.
PHEP staff referred to the development of performance measures as a “scientific,
social, and political process” in recognition of the complex array of factors affecting the
effort. Collaboration with state and local partners, representatives of key national
organizations (e.g., ASTHO, CSTE), and content experts was viewed as central to the
performance measurement development process. But collaboration in the networked
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environment of preparedness involves a multitude of stakeholders, including those
working along both vertical and horizontal dimensions and that represent funded and
voluntary partners. All these groups wield some level of political power and influence on
the development process. There have been previous missteps in working with grantees,
including poor communications, which have damaged trust and resulted in grantee
frustration. At the same time, everyone seems acutely aware of the need to demonstrate
accountability in a climate of declining funds, and data suggested a sincere commitment
from both CDC and grantees to work together in order to “get this right.” CDC also
recognizes the experience and expertise grantees bring to the development process that
will help ensure that measures are feasible, valid, and relevant.
4.1.3.2 Performance Measurement System Design
In this section, the design of the performance measurement system is described
highlighting the following: purpose of system; level of measurement; types of measures;
use of targets or standards; and quality assurance efforts. Table 16 summarizes these
design features.

Table 16. Design Features of PHEP Performance Measurement System
Design Feature

PHEP Performance Measurement System

Purpose of system

Accountability

Level of measurement

Grantee level

Type(s) of performance measures

Process measures that reflect program capabilities

Use of targets or standards

Yes – time-based targets for some measures

Quality assurance efforts

Yes
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4.1.3.2.1 Purpose
The primary purpose for the six existing performance measures is accountability.
The PHEP program faces political pressure to demonstrate accountability “up” (e.g., to
Congress, HHS, OMB) in order to justify and defend the resources allocated for the
program. DSLR staff and grantees felt strongly that they should be held accountable,
describing accountability in both fiscal and program performance terms. From a fiscal
perspective, CDC’s responsibility is as a steward of federal funds, assuring appropriate
use of funds and budgetary practices. Programmatically, PHEP faces the difficult
challenge of demonstrating accountability for “preparing” the nation, that is, to provide
evidence that PHEP has improved our country’s preparation for the varied disasters and
attacks. Given the challenge in defining preparedness described earlier, this is no easy
task. For now, the existing six performance measures are viewed as a means for CDC to
satisfy demands for accountability and provide a “snapshot” of program performance to
vertical network partners “above.” These six measures are not thought to necessarily
represent the most important priorities for the PHEP program nor are the measures
perceived as particularly meaningful by grantees.
In contrast to the demands for “accountability up,” CDC faces pressures from the
grantees “below” for performance measures that reflect program priorities and that will
support program improvement. There was a tension between the dual purposes of
accountability and program improvement, with disparate views held about the ability of
one set of measures to meet both purposes. PHEP staff view the two purposes as
requiring very different approaches to performance measurement. From staff’s
perspective, satisfying accountability necessitates a small set of measures that can be
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used to broadly reflect performance to those above CDC. Consequently, the six existing
performance measures along with three PHEP-related GPRA measures are seen to
address accountability.
For purposes of program monitoring and improvement, PHEP staff suggested a
more comprehensive set of measures would be needed. While measures for program
improvement would be correlated to the smaller set of accountability measures, the larger
set of monitoring data would reflect a much deeper and broader view of program
implementation that provides CDC and grantees more in-depth information to support
system improvement. Consequently, staff believe that moving to a performance
measurement system aimed at program improvement will require implementation of a
more comprehensive performance management system inclusive of a larger set of
monitoring data and the development of a culture around data use at all levels (e.g., CDC,
grantee, local), neither of which currently exists.
Although there is an interest to have performance measures that also support
program improvement, most recognize that the developmental stage of the program,
including the absence of a strong program framework, means that such a system will not
be in place in the short term. A more fully developed program model is needed to identify
measures supporting program improvement, and time and resources are needed to build a
multi-level performance management system and related staff capacity to support
effective data use. In the meantime, PHEP is committed to the six existing measures that
will continue to be used through 2008 for program accountability purposes,
complimented by the three GPRA measures.
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4.1.3.2.2 Level of Measurement
As it stands, the current set of measures reflect grantee-level performance rather
than local level performance. The measures represent a set of programmatic capabilities
viewed as important in public health preparedness and perceived as adequately
responsive to calls for accountability. While PHEP recognizes the need to identify
measures at the local level, the lack of a conceptual framework and concerns about
inadequate capacity at the local level to collect and report data precludes the inclusion of
this level of measurement.
4.2.3.2.3 Types of Measures
Because outcomes for PHEP had simply not yet been identified, the six
performance measures are focused on process monitoring. Since multiple factors
contribute to distal outcomes (mortality) and make it difficult to assess attribution, longer
term outcomes will not be included in a revised set of measures. Instead, the program
hopes to design future measures around proximal outcomes that more closely reflect an
individual grantee’s performance.
Given the rare occurrence of events within the preparedness arena, PHEP
primarily relies on measures tied to preparedness “exercises” rather than real events. Five
of the six measures are based on drills or exercises — CDC requires that exercises be
conducted at least twice annually. Only measure 2A relates to laboratory testing in
response to the receipt of actual isolates (e.g., E. coli, listeria).
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4.1.3.2.4 Use of Targets or Standards
Measurement challenges led to the use of “time” as a proxy for quality in
measures. For instance, measure 9A requires that an after-action report is completed
within 60 days of an exercise or real event. Many of the time-based targets are
developmental given the lack of science-based evidence supporting a standard and little
trend data collected from programs. And although there was pressure from above to use
time-based measures, many participants spoke to the limits of time as a proxy for quality.
For instance, measure 6B relates to the time taken to notify key staff that the Emergency
Operations Center is being activated. OMEB staff are not necessarily confident that
“time” is the appropriate emphasis. For example, what may be more important, in this
instance, is that the “right people” are available to address the problem.
4.1.3.2.5 Quality Assurance Efforts
PHEP has developed a guidance document for the six performance measures that
details the following: the intent or rationale for each measure; the public health capability
the measure reflects; the jurisdiction (e.g., state); the target for performance; specific
definitions of terms; measurement specifications (e.g., numerator and denominator); data
collection and submission methods (e.g., self-report semi-annually); and other comments
or clarifications. Grantees are required as a condition of their funding award to report
data for these six measures twice annually for distinct reporting cycles – three data
submissions for the existing six measures have been received by CDC to date. Data are
reported by grantees via the Preparedness Emergency Response System for Oversight
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Reporting and Management Services (PERFORMS) – a web-based reporting effort that
was originally designed as a grants management system in 2002.
OMEB has given significant attention to issues of data quality and validity. In
part, the shear number of grantees along with variability in their capacity and resource
levels, raises concerns about the quality and validity of the performance measurement
data. PHEP contractors conducted a validation assessment in 2007 revealing a number of
challenges to data quality including wide misunderstanding across grantees about the
intent of the measures, uncertainty about how the measures were calculated and how
measures should be reported, problems adhering to measurement protocols,
misunderstanding of what data could be used to report on the measures, and others. The
challenges to data quality and validity in such a decentralized system led PHEP to
incorporate extensive guidance materials and technical assistance into the performance
measurement system design. For instance, as part of the first two data submission cycles
for the six performance measures, OMEB staff made individual phone calls with each
grantee to review and verify that the data submitted were consistent with the
requirements for each measure. This was a time-intensive exercise and OMEB does not
have the capacity to continue the practice for every submission.
4.1.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data
At this time, data from the six PHEP performance measures are used in a limited
fashion given the recognition that the measures are still developmental and concerns
about data validity. For the most part, data are used to address the demands for
accountability and the frequent inquiries from CDC’s federal partners, OMB, Congress,
and others about whether or not “we are prepared.” In February 2008, the first
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Preparedness Report was issued by COTPER that incorporates a variety of data,
including performance measurement data presented for each grantee. The report was
released at a national preparedness conference during a plenary led by the CDC Director
at that time, Dr. Julie Gerberding, and DSLR Director, Dr. Richard Besser. Within CDC,
the compilation and release of the report was viewed as a significant accomplishment.
At this stage, PHEP is focused on the development of new measures and a data
system to support their collection and analysis at CDC. There was little mention of
specific efforts planned to build a broader system to ensure data use, although staff
recognize a broader performance management system will be needed to facilitate data use
in the future. To support data use, an effort will be needed to bring science and evaluation
closer to program. However, as it stands, staff in other branches of DSLR have limited
involvement and understanding of the performance measurement efforts. Most
participants suggested it would be beneficial to have greater participation from program
consultant staff in the Program Services Branch (PSB) – these staff oversee the PHEP
cooperative agreements and have close working relationships with staff in the states,
cities, and territories. Program consultants could be important change agents in the
adoption and use of performance measurement. However, participants also acknowledged
that the “brutal” pace and demands of the PHEP program limited program consultants’
time to contribute to the effort.
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4.2 Findings
4.2.1 Dependency on the PHEP program’s network partners diminishes CDC and
grantee control over performance.
As described in section 4.1.2, public health preparedness demands extensive
collaboration with network partners at both vertical and horizontal levels. Ensuring an
effective response to a natural disaster, bioterrorist attack, or nuclear event requires an
integrated and seamless reaction across levels of government and across multiple sectors.
The PHEP program’s public health preparedness activities, such as developing plans for
various scenarios (e.g., pandemic flu) and conducting exercises (e.g., bioterrorist attack),
are dependent on the participation of others in state departments of health, education, and
transportation as well as those in local departments of health, schools, first responder
agencies, health care, and commerce among others.
The significance of intergovernmental relationships in a preparedness response
presents a major challenge for CDC, given DSLR’s limited control over the state and,
especially, the local level, although that is where a significant proportion of the
cooperative agreement funds end up. While the cooperative agreement provides CDC
some authority over their grantees (e.g., defining allowable activities, including a
requirement to report on performance measures), grantees’ control over the local level
may be limited by their state’s model of decentralization and/or their choice of funding
tool, both of which vary considerably across the country.
And while CDC and grantees may be able to exercise some authority through
policy tools like cooperative agreements and contracts, formal command and control
structures are virtually nonexistent across the horizontal domain, especially given the
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informal nature of these relationships. So while CDC and its grantees are dependent upon
these partners to participate in public health preparedness efforts for which they lead and
for which they are accountable, both lack mechanisms of formal control to ensure their
participation or performance. One participant, speaking about the requirement for states
to develop a pandemic flu plan, said
The [state] Health Department has the responsibility for coordinating the
statewide plan, so the Health Department has to work with the Department
of Transportation, the Department of Education, the Department of State,
the Department of Highways, whatever they have in their state. And each
of them [these partners] has to contribute to this overall plan. Well, you
know, if they don’t want to, or they don’t get it, or they don’t understand
how, then it becomes the Health Department’s job also to orient them, and
educate them, and train them, and nag them to get the documents.
Participants described the challenges associated with previous performance measures that
required data from sources over which grantees had no formal authority or control.
A number of the measures that we have collected historically were not
really under the control of the grantee, which compromised the data. It
was very difficult for them to get the data because it wasn’t really under
their purview. We would ask them, let’s say, ‘how fast are you in doing
this lab test?’ Well, not a lot of the states did those tests – they would have
triaged those tests out to other labs. So their structure did not support the
collection of that data or they were reporting on something that they were
not responsible for.
Grantees contend that performance for some of the existing six measures is
dependent on the cooperation of informal, unfunded, horizontal partners. For instance,
grantees’ ability to meet the target on measure 2A is dependent, in part, on receiving
viable samples from local laboratories that can, in fact, be tested. The team in OMEB
recognizes the difficulties this issue of compromised control poses for the development of
performance measures As part of the process to develop a revised set of performance
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measures for the PHEP program, the Evaluation Workgroup, a team comprised primarily
of external stakeholders, established criteria for measure selection. One criterion is that
selected measures be “under the control” of public health – a recognition of the challenge
grantees face in affecting performance on measures that may be largely outside their
direct control. Grantees have pressured CDC to account for this dilemma, casting it as an
issue of “fairness.” As example, in developing a future measure related to the PAHPA
requirement that all grantees develop comprehensive pandemic influenza plans, one
participant representing a grantee said,
Like for Pan flu –a big piece of it is the school closure issue, and so we’ve
brought Department of Education to the table. And I think it’s been going
okay, but I mean obviously it doesn’t go as fast as if it’s requiring the
involvement of people who aren’t within your purview. But I guess I
would strongly argue for just holding us [grantees] responsible for health
and medical indicators. You know, not that it’s not important how other
agencies do, but there has been a trend to hold us responsible for work that
is being done by other agencies [that we don’t control], and especially
with this movement to tie funding to performance—it’s really not fair.
4.2.2 Network public management fragments the PHEP program’s accountability
for results, creating challenges for performance measurement.
As reflected in the case description, the PHEP program is under extraordinary
pressure to demonstrate accountability for results. The size of the program budget (over
$700 million annually), the political climate, and the importance of the issue all
contribute to demands on DSLR staff to demonstrate that “we’re prepared.” However,
the challenge of defining preparedness complicates the identification of outcomes for
which grantees can be held accountable as reflected in this statement: “Since there are no
shared-upon standards for things [preparedness], it’s difficult for me to say, ‘they
[grantees] have been accountable for what they’re doing’, you know, and really mean
something.” In addition, as discussed above, important outcomes for PHEP, and
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preparedness more generally, will likely result from the work of PHEP in coordination
with many other network partners. So while it is understood that an effective response is
contingent upon collaboration across sectors and levels of government, both the vertical
and horizontal relationships muddy efforts aimed at assigning accountability.
This fragmentation of accountability has consequences for the design of PHEP’s
performance measurement system. For instance, measurement becomes more complex –
one participant described the challenges presented by the inclusion of performance
measures that capture collaborative performance:
It’s looking at those junctures between the systems [public health,
transportation, emergency management] as indicators for performance.
And that’s where it gets tricky because those junctures are a shared goal
[shared goal across agencies]…Let’s just take it down to the local level—
the emergency management, the fire, the police, the health department.
How do we work together collectively? Who’s responsible for that
measurement? I mean, I’m going to boil this down to just the data itself,
who’s going to collect it?
This statement illustrates one problem for PHEP’s performance measurement
system generated by the joint production of outcomes inherent in the field of
preparedness. That is, beyond working collaboratively to achieve outcomes, network
partners must contend with pragmatic issues related to the complexities and costs of
measurement. In the networked context, it is unclear who has responsibility for
developing and managing the performance measurement system, including the data
management systems, data collection, reporting, and analysis.
As already mentioned, the issue of control described in 4.2.1 inevitably converges
with demands for accountability in the PHEP network. As you move along the results
chain, accountability for outcomes further “out” will be difficult to assign. And as the
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achievement of important performance outcomes becomes the providence of multiple
organizations, issues of fairness again arise when a single organization (the grantee) is
held accountable for them. Indications from this case study suggest that grantees will
continue to challenge proposed performance measures for which they will be held
accountable but that they cannot influence directly. Consequently, OMEB staff will be
pressured to select measures for which accountability is more straightforward (and for
which grantees can control performance). More often, such measures will be process and
output indicators that are more closely aligned with the work of the grantee.
4.2.3 In the case of the PHEP program, performance measurement is a “political,
social, and scientific” process.
OMEB leadership referred to performance measurement as a “political, social,
and scientific” process – for the PHEP program, these three contextual factors interact to
shape the development effort and ultimate performance measurement design. The social
aspect reflects the need to continually interact with stakeholders at multiple levels in
building a performance measurement system. In the PHEP program’s network context,
this translates into engaging an extensive group comprised of CDC leadership, the 62
grantees, federal partners (e.g., APHL, ASPR, DoD), and policy makers within both the
vertical and horizontal dimensions. One person commented,
The socialization of the measures, it’s really working with our partners,
socializing them up [to federal levels above CDC], socializing them out
[to horizontal partners], and socializing them down [to grantees], you
know. It’s about change management, buy-in, acceptability…It’s the
softer side of the work we do, but it’s the most important…It’s looking to
the people who actually do the work, to say, ‘does this make sense?’ We
want these measures to be relevant, we want them to be feasible, we want
them to be reliable, and we want them to be valid. We can definitely look
at the science-based side of things, the literature, as a guiding principle,

187

that’s the other bucket. But that only takes you so far because you really
need to know, in the real world, how does this play out?
At the same time, OMEB staff face political demands and influence from these
network partners who shape the purpose and selection of performance measures. As
reflected in section 4.1, the PHEP program resides in a dynamic political context. The
program has swung from one focus to another as it has expanded in scope in response to
critical events including 9/11, the anthrax attacks, and hurricane Katrina. One person
described the increased attention given pandemic influenza,
The same thing happened two years ago with pan flu. All of a sudden it
was a ‘presidential emergency.’ So now we’ve infused another $600
million into the [PHEP] cooperative agreement to say, ‘while we are on an
all-hazards approach, trajectory, we really need you [grantees] to
concentrate on pan flu’ which has redirected all of these resources to doing
something that is against what we said we wanted to do.
This shifting political landscape has made it difficult for OMEB staff to build a
conceptual framework from which to identify potential performance measures – five
different sets of measures have been produced over the past six years. Most recently, an
evaluation workgroup comprised of external stakeholders identified five capability areas
and assigned individual subgroups of content experts to develop a new program
framework that can encompass priority areas as diverse as risk communications,
biosurveillance, and isolation and quarantine.
Participants spoke extensively about the implications of policy initiatives from
“above” including PAHPA and HSPD-21, federal level guidelines such as DHS’ Target
Capabilities List and the HSEEP, and federal guidelines such as the National
Preparedness Guidelines for the PHEP program’s performance measurement system.

188

Some of these policies impose specific measures, others set priorities and timelines – and
most are viewed by participants as both unrealistic and reflecting little understanding of
public health. One person said,
The challenge is around the political agendas and the fact that
Washington, ASPR, HHS, are completely unreasonable in what they
expect from a measurement perspective. If you look at HSPD-21 that was
just released in December [2007]. It gave us six months to develop
measures for countermeasure distribution. The data, the first report has to
be [submitted] within a year. I mean, it’s just totally unreasonable.
Consequently, OMEB struggles to manage the incongruity between top-down,
political imperatives and their feasibility for implementation in a network of 62 grantees
representing varied contexts in regard to risk of hazard (e.g., hurricane, bioterrorist
attack), geography (e.g., rural, urban), resources, and capacity.
One way OMEB staff manage the political demands is to apprise network partners
in Washington D.C. of their work in regard to the performance measures as reflected in
the following statement.
The political element is How do we keep the powers that be satisfied with
the information that we can provide them? And there is a social
component to that—it means going up to Washington quite frequently,
talking with them about the measurement strategy that we’re proposing,
recognizing we have these two tracks. ‘You’re going to get kind of the
snapshot, quick and dirty data [six existing measures] and then we’re also
working this track to develop these performance-based measures [new
measures under development]. I alluded to the idea that quality is harder to
capture. That’s going to take us some time to get there.
Finally, OMEB staff described performance measurement as a scientific process.
For now, OMEB staff are faced with developing a performance measurement system for
a relatively new and complex field with a minimal evidence-base. The complexity of
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preparedness and the current vacuum in regard to science challenge OMEB staff to know
what to measure. One person said,
You know, for preparedness it’s hard because it’s not concrete, you’re not
delivering services to patients. It’s not like a healthcare facility where
you’re measuring outcome in terms of morbidity or mortality -it’s much
more complex than that. I think that’s why everyone’s grappling with it -because what does it actually mean to be prepared? There’s no actual end
point.
Some suggested that the lack of a strong science base for the preparedness
program left DSLR more vulnerable to political influence. In speaking to the
development of performance measures, one participant said, “I mean, it [the lack of a
science base] compromises the ability to do it [develop performance measures] plus it
leaves us wide open for political sway which is typically what’s happened.” OMEB staff
are left to balance a science-based approach with political imperatives that seem
indifferent to both the scientific complexities and intergovernmental implementation
network within which CDC must operate.
In summary, performance measurement for the PHEP program reflects the
intersection of political, social, and scientific processes. In developing performance
measures for the PHEP program, OMEB staff must contend with a significant political
context, including policy that directly affects the selection of performance measures and
imposes demands on the development process. At the same time, staff must grapple with
a complex program and a limited science-base while facilitating an inclusive and
collaborative process with a large and varied network of partners, all of whom are
important to ensuring a set of meaningful performance measures that can serve a program
comprised of 62 diverse programs.
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4.2.4 The variability across the PHEP program’s vertical network significantly
shapes the design of its performance measurement system.
Given that 62 grantees and thousands of local health agencies comprise the
vertical network of the PHEP program, extensive variability exists in the risk for and
potential scale of any given event; program priorities and activities; capacity and
resources; availability of data sources and sophistication of data collection systems; and
program context. This variability within the network introduces significant challenges for
performance measurement and requires CDC to develop a system that is sensitive and
responsive to the diversity among grantees. In many respects, the network demands that
the development process be a negotiated process. One participant, representing a grantee,
acknowledged the difficulty in defining a common set of performance measures
appropriate for such a diverse set of grantees.
We just have such dramatically different populations. We function very
different as agencies. I just think there’s great variation in a lot of our
challenges, in a lot of our structures, so it just doesn’t always work to use
the same measure for everybody [all grantees].
Another design challenge imposed by the network structure involves developing
measures that can be operationalized at the local level. Participants emphasized that
preparedness starts at the local level. One person said,
What’s interesting to me is that the whole point [of the PHEP program] is
to get that local response prepared. I mean, look at the county health
department if somebody walks in with a potentially flu-like illness
[pandemic flu], can they put everything in place, from that local health
department to adjacent ones, all the way up, literally all the way up [to the
Federal level], to make sure that the effect of an outbreak is minimized?
The extensive decentralization and subsequent variability across local level partners has
proved a barrier to the identification of local-level performance measures. Consequently,
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the six measures currently in place are state rather than local-level indicators. One
participant described the challenge as follows,
I’ll bet you’ve heard that all emergencies are local and so all response is
local. If something happens in a county, it’s not the state that comes in and
responds, the county immediately responds…And so something about our
measures needs to reflect how ready the locals are. And in any one state
there may be 40, 60, 120 different local units. So trying to figure out what
things they should all be able to do and how to measure those things and
how to get them all to measure it in a way that rolls up [to the state level]
is huge. That might be the biggest challenge for [performance
measurement] in preparedness.
Concerns about capacity at both the state and local level, particularly related to
data collection and reporting, influences the choice of performance measures. The
implementation of performance measurement for the PHEP program requires that all 62
grantees have access to needed data, effective data collection and reporting systems, and
the capacity for data analysis. One participant said,
There were other measures that we wanted to include but that, frankly,
once we looked at how they [grantees and locals] would actually report the
measures and the systems out there and the assumptions that would have
to be in place…we couldn’t come up with a way for the grantees to report
them to us—that was a real eye opening experience for me.
OMEB has already experienced serious data quality problems – grantees have struggled
to understand the measures and to collect and report data. Consequently, OMEB has
conducted extensive quality assurance checks for data submissions and will have to build
in quality assurance mechanisms as they continue to develop the system. The variability
in capacity, resources, and context also limits CDC’s ability to compare performance
across the PHEP program grantees. Most participants thought that such comparisons
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would be looking at “apples and oranges” and saw little benefit in making such
comparisons.
And finally, given the obstacles imposed by network variability along with other
challenges related to program complexity and political pressure, the current set of six
performance measures were often referred to by participants as “low hanging fruit” –
common measures that all grantees could feasibly collect and report and are reasonably
responsive to accountability demands. Despite the challenges posed by the network, staff
in OMEB continue their efforts to collaborate with their partners to develop a conceptual
framework for the PHEP program that will lead to more meaningful and useful
performance measures for CDC and its grantees.

4.3 Summary
In summary, program results for the PHEP program ultimately depend on the
coordinated and seamless response of network partners representing diverse sectors and
disciplines. Without full control over the production of outcomes, grantees argue that it is
unfair to hold them fully accountable for their achievement. In the case of the PHEP
program, establishing a criterion for performance measurement selection related to
“control” is one way to address dependencies on vertical and, particularly, horizontal
network partners. But the decision to apply this criterion comes at the cost of limiting the
choice of performance measures for the PHEP program. Specifically, important outcomes
related to preparedness but reliant on the performance of the larger network are excluded.
The choice may result in the inclusion of more measures reflecting outputs and shorter
term outcomes directly tied to the work of the grantees.
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The PHEP case also highlights performance measurement as an intersection of
political, social, and scientific processes. Network stakeholders exert significant political
influence throughout the development process, and OMEB staff must also contend with
policy initiatives imposed from other federal agencies that directly affects the selection of
performance measures and prescribes demands on the development process. Given the
broad implementation network, OMEB must also negotiate an inclusive and collaborative
(social) process to ensure the identification of measures that are meaningful and valid to
62 diverse grantees and their local level partners. The variability across these grantees
represents a significant challenge to measurement development – in particular, to develop
a common set of national measures reflecting local-level preparedness efforts that are
sensitive to differentials in risk and scope of potential hazards, capacity, and resources.
And finally, staff must grapple with an extremely complex program which, at this
time, is supported by a limited science-base. OMEB’s most recent effort to engage
experts from across the country to participate in constructing a programmatic framework
around five central program capability areas (e.g., risk communications, biosurveillance)
reflects a foundational step in furthering the development of their performance
measurement system.
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CHAPTER 5
COMPREHENSIVE STD PREVENTION SYSTEMS (CSPS)
5.1 CSPS Case Description
5.1.1 The Program
5.1.1.1 CDC Organizational Context
Alongside malaria and polio, CDC’s STD program is one of its oldest, dating
back to 1957. Today, the program resides within CDC’s National Center for HIV/AIDS,
Viral Hepatitis, STD and TB Prevention (NCHHSTP), and is managed by the Division of
STD Prevention (DSTDP). The mission of DSTDP is to provide national leadership,
research, policy development, and scientific information to help people live safer,
healthier lives by the prevention of STDs and their complications.
DSTDP has recently developed a five year strategic plan that identifies seven
goals related to the prevention of STD-related infertility and HIV prevention, building
STD prevention capacity and infrastructure, reducing STD-related health disparities, and
addressing the costs of STDs and their associated sequelae. Specific objectives contained
in the plan were developed in alignment with several other planning and priority setting
efforts including the overall CDC goals, CDC’s Coordinating Center for Infectious
Diseases (CCID) performance goals, and the NCHHSTP’s program imperatives.
The largest program within DSTDP is its CSPS program which funds 66 grantees
– public health agencies in all 50 U.S. states, 7 cities (Baltimore, Chicago, District of
Columbia, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco), and 9 U.S.
territories. The CSPS was funded through a grant up until the end of 2008. The program
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now operates under a cooperative agreement which also includes funding components for
the prevention of STD-related infertility (i.e., the Infertility Prevention Project or IPP)
and syphilis elimination in high morbidity areas (i.e., the Syphilis Elimination Program or
SE). At the time interviews were conducted for this study, the program was nearing the
end of a five-year grant funding cycle initiated in 2004 and preparing to issue a new fiveyear beginning in January 2009.
In fiscal year 2008, DSTDP provided $104,263,809 in total funding for all three
program components (CSPS, IPP, SE). Heretofore the overall program will simply be
referred to as CSPS. Individual grant awards ranged from $43,609 – 6,711,083 with an
average award of $1,585,575 (median award $1,137,423). CSPS is managed by the
Program and Training Branch within DSTDP. A unique feature of the CSPS grant is its
inclusion of “direct assistance,” that is, the assignment of federal employees to some
grantees to provide on-site managerial and technical support. While the placement of
CDC “public health advisors” has been dramatically reduced over the past 15 years, CDC
still supports over 175 federal positions assigned to state and city grantee programs.
The organizational context for CSPS can be characterized, in part, by the
program’s maturity and long-term tenure of its staff. Many of those interviewed for this
study have worked in the STD program for over 15, 20, or 30 years. Staff in the program
often initiate their careers as federal public health advisors (field assignees) conducting
the fundamental “gum-shoe” detective work of STD case finding – interviewing patients
diagnosed with STDs to identify others who were potentially infected and then contacting
those persons to ensure appropriate testing or prophylactic treatment. Over time, these
staff are often promoted into state-based management positions and eventually promoted
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to CDC headquarters in Atlanta to serve as program consultants providing technical
assistance to grantees or as managers supporting CSPS and other program efforts.
Consequently, many staff, particularly those in the Program and Training Branch, bring
extensive front-line experience to their positions.
5.1.1.2 Program Goals
The purpose of the CSPS grant is to support state and local STD prevention
programs in designing, implementing, and evaluating their programs. The complexity of
the program is reflected, in part, by the existence of over 25 STDs. DSTDP is responsible
for all STDs other than HIV/AIDS which falls under the purview of the Division of
HIV/AIDS Prevention. DSTDP places particular emphasis on preventing and controlling
syphilis, gonorrhea, and chlamydia. The prevalence of these three STDs varies across the
U.S. and its territories, and, given their infectious nature, related STD epidemics can shift
over time both geographically and among sub-populations. For instance, the prevalence
of syphilis was greatest among southern, heterosexual rural African Americans in the late
1990s, but a more recent epidemic has emerged among men who have sex with men,
often those co-infected with HIV.
The activities supported by CDC’s CSPS grant include providing community and
individual behavior change interventions; providing medical and laboratory services;
ensuring partner services; promoting leadership and program management; conducting
surveillance and data management; providing or ensuring training and professional
development, and ensuring a documented STD outbreak response plan. Grantees
receiving funds for the IPP project component are responsible for ensuring the testing and
treatment of young, sexually active women and their sex partners for chlamydia and
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gonorrhea; supporting laboratory testing; developing surveillance systems; and ensuring
provider training. As a requirement of the award, grantees receiving IPP funds must
direct 50% of the award to Title X family planning programs for chlamydia and
gonorrhea screening of women and their partners 29 . Grantees receiving SE funds are
responsible for enhancing surveillance efforts, strengthening community partnerships;
providing rapid outbreak responses; expanding clinical and laboratory services; and
enhancing health promotion. Grantees eligible for SE funds are those with high syphilis
morbidity areas as defined by CDC. Similar to the IPP funds, grantees receiving SE funds
must award 15 percent of the funds to community based organizations (CBOs) that serve
affected populations.
Overall, the vast majority of CSPS funds support non-clinical prevention services
such as education, outreach testing, field investigation efforts, and surveillance activities.
These activities are largely carried out at the local level with grantees typically providing
a significant portion of their CDC funds to county health departments, but also Title X
clinics (IPP funds) and CBOs (SE funds). CDC grantees and their sub-awardees (e.g.,
county-level departments of health) are encouraged to collaborate with public and private
health care providers (including family planning clinics), community-based
organizations, and others who serve persons at risk for STDs. Jails and juvenile detention
facilities are also identified by CDC as important agencies with whom to partner, given a
higher prevalence of STDs among incarcerated populations than the general public.
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Title X was funded in 1970 as part of the Public Health Service Act. Title X funds are
administered by the Department of Health and Human Service’s (HHS) Office of Family
Planning in the Office of Population Affairs and support low cost, confidential family
planning services for young and low income women.
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Participants described a relationship with grantees that has changed over time. For
many years – in the 50’s, 60s, and 70s – the program was tightly managed by CDC. The
placement of hundreds of public health advisors in grantee programs allowed CDC to
exert more direct control and forcefully manage the STD program. During this time,
extensive data were collected and reported to CDC about case surveillance and program
activities (e.g., number of persons suspected to be infected with STDs that were
interviewed within a certain number of days). But by the end of the 1980s, data
requirements lessened and CDC required little other than surveillance case reports.
Overall, grantees were given much greater latitude. Some participants suggested that, as a
result, CDC has allowed each grantee to map their own course rather than provide the
leadership to guide the national program in a clear direction.
One program strategy promoted by CDC over the past several years, however, is
partner relationships. While STD programs have long collaborated with local partners,
programs are being encouraged to engage public and private agencies, private health
providers, health maintenance organizations, and others in order to address STDs from a
broader, state-wide (or territorial-wide, city-wide) perspective. In some respects, the
approach reflects a philosophical shift – rather than simply focusing on the clinics that the
grantees fund, they are being asked to develop and leverage partner relationships in order
to have broader state-wide effects.
Several factors contribute to the emphasis on what has been termed a “community
approach.” First, CDC’s budget allocation has remained relatively stagnant for several
years, and staff recognize the need to leverage partner resources in order to effectively
address program goals. Second, patterns of health care access and delivery have changed.
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Today, some patient populations are more likely to seek STD treatment services from
private, primary care providers rather than public STD clinics. And third, there is the
recognition that if CDC aims to have a population effect, they need other partners
engaged in the effort. Consequently, grantees must involve and influence others who
either interact with persons at high risk or provide health care services to affected
populations in order to reduce and control STD infections in the broader community. As
noted above, moving to an approach centered on community engagement and partnering
does, to some extent, reflect a paradigm shift for grantees. And the changes require that
programs recast their perspective to assume broader responsibility and accountability for
STD prevention and control in their communities or state rather than for only in the
publicly funded STD clinics.
One aspect of the community approach is to engage unfunded, informal partners
(e.g., private medical providers, health maintenance organizations, corrections facilities)
in the STD prevention and control effort along with those who receive program funding
(e.g., community based organizations who receive SE dollars). There is an expectation
that even without funding, STD programs should be able to leverage their status as “STD
experts” in order to influence others to help address STD prevention and control.
5.1.1.3 Stage of Program Development
As noted above, the STD program is one of CDC’s longest standing public health
programs. But while the program is mature, changes in health care delivery and access,
shifts in populations affected by STDs, differences in disease burden across grantees, and
the stagnant funding context require that DSTDP and the CSPS program remain flexible
in their ability to respond to fluctuations in the public health environment. Participants
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suggested this was not necessarily easy. For while the longevity of the program and the
experience of its staff reflects a well-instituted effort, its history also contributes to a
culture where change and the adoption of new practices can be difficult. In addition,
programs have experienced significant autonomy and relatively little oversight over the
past 15 years.
5.1.1.4 Budget Stability
In general, the budget for the CSPS program has stayed relatively steady over the
past several years. And given annual inflation and small salary increases for staff, flat
funding results in fewer service delivery dollars. While some grantees receive support
from their state or local coffers, many others rely solely on federal CDC dollars to fund
their programs. Staff suggested that STDs are not particularly high profile or a big
priority for federal support, especially in comparison to HIV/AIDS which receives
greater attention and significantly more funding. As noted above, funding challenges
have led, in part, to DSTDP encouraging grantees to leverage partner resources and
assess how best to spend limited program dollars. In particular, rather than simply
funding the same local agencies year after year, grantees are encouraged to assess where
resources are most needed and move dollars if indicated.
5.1.1.5 Stakeholders
Data suggest that the grantees and the National Coalition of STD Directors
(NCSD) represent two key stakeholder groups for the CSPS program. The NCSD is a
national organization comprised of state, local, and territorial STD directors established
to promote national awareness of policies that govern STDs. CDC consults regularly with
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NCSD on a range of program concerns, and NCSD representatives are often invited to
participate on DSTDP workgroups convened to address policy and other issues.
5.1.1.6 Political Context
At the federal level, participants viewed CSPS as having a relatively stable
political environment. Among sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS gets the lion’s
share of political attention and federal resources. Individual grantees and NCSD are
viewed as having a degree of political influence and power that can be exercised in their
relationships with CDC. And at the grantee level, there are politics that come into play
between the grantee and its subcontractors. For instance, grantees may face political
opposition to move funds from one long-standing subcontractor to another.
5.1.2 The Implementation Network
5.1.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships
The vertical relationships involved in the CSPS program begin at the federal level
with a budget appropriation from Congress and the President to HHS. Funds then come
to CDC and, as described earlier, are distributed to 66 state, city, and territorial grantees
through cooperative agreements. Given that CSPS program services are primarily
delivered at the local level, grantees then use contracts, grants, or other funding
mechanisms to support hundreds of local level implementers in the vertical chain, most of
which are local public health agencies. The vertical structure within a state, city, and
territory also varies. For instance, the California state program funds approximately 60
different local health agencies. Some states may fund at a county level, others at a city or
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regional level. In frontier states, services may be provided directly by the state with a
small staff addressing multiple public health areas (e.g., HIV/AIDS, STDs, tuberculosis).
As described in section 5.2.1.2 above, at least 50% of IPP project funds must be
awarded to Title X family planning settings to support chlamydia and gonorrhea
screening and the treatment of young, sexually active women and their sex partners.
Recipients of Title X funds include both private and public agencies (e.g., nonprofit
family planning clinics, hospitals, public health departments, university health centers,
Planned Parenthood affiliates). Grantees must also award 15% of SE funds to CBOs that
serve affected populations. Consequently, the vertical chain involves a network of
funding relationships, primarily through intergovernmental channels (e.g., federal, state,
local health agencies), but also with private and non-profit groups (e.g., non-profit Title
X clinics, CBOs).
Most obvious from the program’s vertical decentralization is that the CSPS
program achieves its goals through service delivery that occurs several steps removed
from CDC. As mentioned earlier, up until the late 1980s, the STD program was managed
from a more strident command and control structure, aided by the extensive placement of
field staff (public health advisors). Since that time, however, CDC has imposed less
direct oversight over the grantees, and the grantees have grown accustomed to a greater
level of autonomy in managing their programs.
More recently, CDC has attempted to restore some balance between providing
grantees a degree of latitude that allows them to tailor programs appropriately to the
disease burden, needs, and contexts of their communities while also imposing some
expectations and means of accountability to ensure a strong national effort, especially in
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regard to data collection and reporting. In theory, everyone is aiming for the same broad
goals – but the operationalization of a national program through multiple levels (i.e.,
national, state, local) introduces challenges related to the fidelity of implementation and
accountability.
5.1.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships
Collaborative, horizontal relationships exist at the federal, state, and local level.
These relationships are primarily informal, voluntary, and intended to support either
program integration or improved access to populations at risk for STD infection. At the
federal level, DSTDP interacts with the other divisions in NCHHSTP (i.e., the Divisions
of HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, Tuberculosis) as well as with other Centers (i.e., Division
of Cancer Prevention and Control, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and
Health Promotion) largely to provide more integrated service delivery. For instance, at
the time interviews were conducted for this study, DSTDP was collaborating with the
Division of HIV/AIDS to develop programmatic guidelines for partner counseling. This
type of collaboration, aimed to provide more comprehensive and integrated services to
the public, is viewed as essential to achieving DSTDP’s mission. As noted earlier,
DSTDP also collaborates regularly with the NCSD. While DSTDP works with other
federal partners such as the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and
the SAMHSA – both a part of HHS – collaboration could be improved.
At the state level, similar horizontal partnerships exist, especially in grantee
agencies that have stand-alone programs for STD, HIV/AIDS, and TB. Grantees with
smaller departments of health may have a more integrated program for these disease
areas. The 2009 funding announcement for grantees explicitly encouraged STD programs
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to “engage in meaningful collaborations with appropriate public and private health care
and other non-medical partners, particularly organizations serving at-risk populations.”
State-to-state collaboration is also occurring as state representatives convene, often on a
regional basis (e.g., western states, northeastern states), to review surveillance data,
discuss program activities, and provide peer-based technical assistance.
The “community perspective” described earlier is largely actualized at the local
service delivery level where horizontal relationships between STD programs and private
providers, laboratories, adult corrections, juvenile detention, family planning clinics, and
CBOs are recognized as central to achieving program goals. Some of these relationships
are formalized through funding arrangements while others are more informal.
5.1.2.3 Network Function: Authority and Control within the Network
The CSPS network structure diminishes CDC and grantees’ formal authority and
control over other network partners. Some control over network partners is facilitated by
formal, funding relationships which provide a level of authority and subsequent
accountability. But even with a funding relationship, CDC is struggling to impose
authority and expectations, particularly around data collection and reporting. Several
challenges contribute to the problem. As noted above, programs had been left to their
own for a long time and are relatively resistant to the imposition of new requirements.
Next, the strength of control is influenced, to some extent, by the funding mechanism
used. In this case, the grant mechanism 30 used by CDC affords grantees extensive latitude
in program implementation. And even with funding relationships, CDC’s formal control
is weakened with every step down the vertical implementation chain. For instance, while
30 DSTDP used grants as the funding tool for its CSPS awardees up until January 2009.
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CDC may have some authority over the state level grantees, its power over the local level
is limited and primarily exercised through the state-local funding relationship. Most
grantees, which use a variety of funding mechanisms, also have limited authority over the
local level implementers.
More challenging than the vertical funding relationships, however, are the
voluntary, horizontal partnerships that are frequently informal in nature and unfunded.
Participants spoke of the challenges in enlisting correction facilities to conduct STD
screening among inmates and in engaging private physicians. Without mechanisms of
formal control, DSTDP encourages a model of “influence” as part of the community
approach – programs using their STD expertise as leverage to influence network partners
to participate in STD prevention and control activities. But influencing and persuading
the informal, horizontal partners is complex, challenging, and requires different
proficiencies than those traditionally held by front-line STD staff.
5.1.2.4 Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities within the
Network
The decentralized nature of CSPS inherently results in differences around
organizational goals and priorities. While CDC and the grantees share some common,
broad public health goals related to STD prevention, grantees also hold other priorities
that may be shaped by their own context and political imperatives. The most significant
conflicts in mission and goals exist between STD programs and their horizontal network
partners that represent other sectors or disciplines. These differences challenge the ability
to forge alliances and engage partners in support of STD prevention activities. For
instance, while STD programs are encouraged to enlist adult corrections and juvenile
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detention facilities in STD screening efforts, those institutions have very different
missions. Consequently, engaging their involvement is difficult. Similarly, gaining the
trust and respect of private physicians in a given community can be challenging.
Participants emphasized the importance of developing personal relationships to overcome
these differences. Good communication and negotiation skills among staff were cited as
essential to working with partners, along with strong skills in STD prevention and control
to secure their status as experts in the STD arena.
5.1.2.5 Network Function: Context, Resources, and Capacity
Grantees vary in regard to their context, resources, and capacity. In terms of
context, grantees differ in their STD epidemiology and in the populations affected. Some
grantees have a much greater incidence of syphilis, for instance, than others. The
differences in epidemiology result in variability across grantees in regard to the program
activities and partnerships emphasized. Even areas with similar disease burden may be
dealing with very different populations. Context also varies in terms of institutional
arrangements within a state or territory and has implications for both vertical and
horizontal collaboration. For instance, some states may support collaboration with school
districts and others restrict it.
Grantees also vary significantly in regard to their level of resources and capacity.
The CDC award size varies across grantees; some have CDC direct assistance while
others do not; and some receive state sources while others have none. Capacity also
varies, affected to some extent by resource levels. As noted earlier, a small program may
be dependent on two or three staff to manage several programs for an entire state (HIV,
STD, TB) while another may be many disease specialists working all across the state.
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5.1.3 Performance Measurement System
5.1.3.1 Process to Develop the Performance Measurement System
DSTDP staff in the Office of the Director initiated efforts to develop a
performance measurement system in 1999 enlisting a consultant from Georgia State
University. The measures have evolved over time – most recently, a revised set of 17
measures were included in a new five-year cooperative agreement awarded in January
2009. Table 17 summarizes the 2009 measures according to program area and notes the
year each measure was originally introduced.
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Table 17. CSPS Performance Measures (2009)
Program Area
Medical and
laboratory
services (MLS)

Performance Measure

Year
Introduced

MLS 1a. Proportion of female admittees to large
juvenile detention facilities tested for chlamydia

2004

MLS 1b. Proportion of female admittees to large
juvenile detention facilities diagnosed with
Chlamydia

2009

MLS 2a. Among clients of IPP family planning
clinics, the proportion of women with positive
Chlamydia tests that are treated within 14 and 30
days of the date of specimen collection

2004

MLS 2b. Among clients of IPP family planning
clinics, the proportion of women with positive
gonorrhea tests that are treated within 14 and 30
days of the date of specimen collection

2004

MLS 3a. Among clients of STD clinics, the
proportion of women with positive Chlamydia
tests that are treated within 14 and 30 days of the
date of specimen collection

2007

MLS 3b. Among clients of STD clinics, the
proportion of women with positive gonorrhea
tests that are treated within 14 and 30 days of the
date of specimen collection

2007

MLS 4. Proportion of primary and secondary
syphilis treated within 14 and 30 days of the date
of specimen collection

2009

MLS 5a. Proportion of female admittees entering
selected project area adult city and county jails
that were tested for syphilis

2004

MLS 5b. Proportion of female admittees entering
selected project area adult city and county jails
tested newly diagnosed with syphilis (any stage).

2009

209

Program Area

Partner services
(PS)

Surveillance and
data management
(SDM)

Performance Measure

Year
Introduced

MLS 5c. Proportion of female admittees entering
selected project area adult city and county jails
diagnosed with syphilis (any stage) treated within
14 and 30 days of the date of specimen collection

2009

PS 1. Proportion of primary and secondary
syphilis cases interviewed within 7, 14, and 30
calendar days from the date of specimen
collection, per primary and secondary syphilis
case

2007

PS 2a. Number of contacts prophylactically
treated (disposition A) within 7, 14, and 30
calendar days from day of interview of index
case, per case of primary and secondary syphilis

2009

PS 2b. Number of contacts brought to treatment
as new syphilis cases (disposition C) within 7, 14,
and 30 calendar days from day of interview of
index case, per case of primary and secondary
syphilis

2009

PS 3. Proportion of ALL gonorrhea cases
interviewed within 7, 14, and 30 days from the
date of specimen collection. [for non-HMAs
only]

2009

SDM 1. Proportion of reported cases of
gonorrhea, Chlamydia, primary and secondary
syphilis, early latent syphilis, and congenital
syphilis sent to CDC via the National Electronic
Telecommunications System for Surveillance
(NETSS) that have complete data for age, race,
sex, county, and date of specimen collection

2004

SDM 2. Proportion of reported cases of
gonorrhea, Chlamydia, primary and secondary
syphilis, early latent syphilis, and congenital
syphilis sent to CDC via NETSS within 30 and 60
days from the date of specimen collection

2004
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Program Area

Performance Measure

Year
Introduced

SDM 3. Proportion of reported cases of primary
and secondary syphilis and early latent syphilis
sent to CDC via NETSS where sex of the sex
partners is known

2009

The process of developing measures for CSPS has been an evolving and
incremental one. From 1999 -2001 a multidisciplinary workgroup, including
representatives from NCSD, developed a program logic model depicting CSPS activities,
outputs, and outcomes (immediate, intermediate, and longer-term) to help guide
measurement development. Criteria were defined to aid measure selection (e.g., measures
should be meaningful, valid, reliable, timely, actionable). The workgroup identified
roughly 60 candidate performance measures that were piloted by a group of seven
grantees over a two year period (2001-2003). Based on the pilot and continued efforts of
the workgroup, the first set of 12 CSPS performance measures was implemented in 2004
as part of a new five-year funding announcement and made a reporting requirement for
the grant. Since that time, some measures have been dropped, others revised, and new
ones added. In 2007, a revised set of 14 measures was introduced, and as data collection
for this study ended, a revised set of 17 measures was finalized for inclusion in the new
cooperative agreement awarded January 1, 2009. Grantees are required to report on the
new 2009 measures twice annually. Table 18 summarizes some of the developmental
milestones by fiscal year.
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Table 18. CSPS Performance Measure System Development, 1999-2008
Fiscal Year

System Development

1999

Performance measurement effort initiated by DSTDP’s Office of the
Director; Interdisciplinary performance measurement workgroup
convened

2000

Program logic model finalized specifying inputs, outputs, and outcomes

2001

Two year pilot project launched with 7 grantee sites and roughly 60
potential measures

2003

Pilot project ends and participating sites recommend measures to CDC

2004

12 performance measures introduced for CSPS as part of 2004 fiveyear funding announcement

2004-2007

New division-wide performance measurement workgroup established,
workgroup charter written, performance measurement guidance
document developed, annual performance measurement consultations
convened, performance measures revised, first performance measures
data report issued, quality assurance learning tours initiated

2008

New performance measures proposed for fiscal year 2009 funding
announcement, grantee feedback obtained, 17 measures finalized for
introduction with new 2009 cooperative agreement in January 2009

The performance measurement development process can be characterized by
extensive stakeholder involvement, increasing sophistication in the development process
itself over time, and an intention to move toward population-based, short- or
intermediate-level outcome measures reflecting the community approach endorsed by
DSTDP. Stakeholders are an integral part of the development process helping to ensure
that multiple perspectives are represented and that a variety of people contribute to
developing and implementing the measures. Key stakeholders in the development process
include the grantees, NCSD, and the staff and management of DSTDP. Grantee and
NCSD representatives have been involved in developing and piloting the measures,
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serving on performance measurement workgroups, participating in annual in-person
consultations, and providing feedback on proposed measures. Stakeholder involvement is
critical to the measurement development process, in particular, ensuring that the
measures are meaningful, feasible in terms of data collection and reporting, and support
the intended purpose of program improvement. Stakeholder involvement is also viewed
as critical to securing the buy-in needed to effectively implement the measures and
promote data use.
The involvement of stakeholders has not been without missteps, however. Most
recently, proposed measures planned for inclusion in the 2009 CSPS funding
announcement were not vetted with the grantees and NCSD. Upon realizing the error,
grantees were given the opportunity to review the proposed measures and their feedback
led to the exclusion of several of the proposed measures in the final set. In almost all
respects, however, DSTDP conducts a thoughtful, systematic process in developing its
measures.
The performance measurement development process has gained in sophistication
over time. After the initial measurement workgroup dissipated, an interdisciplinary
performance measurement workgroup was reconstituted in 2004. The workgroup
includes representatives from DSTDP branches and management along with four
members of NCSD’s Program Operations Workgroup. A charter specifying the
workgroup’s function, membership, management, communication, authority, and
coordination was drafted in 2004. In 2006, a detailed performance measures guide was
disseminated to all grantees providing extensive information about each measure. Also in
2006, DSTDP introduced “performance measure learning tours,” site visits to the
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grantees to assess implementation of the measures and learn how the measures have
affected project areas. DSTDP issued its first report of the performance measures in
September 2007 based on data collected in 2005-2006. With NCSD and grantee
agreement, state-specific data were included in the report.
In anticipation of the forthcoming 2009 funding announcement, the performance
measurement workgroup led an effort to develop new or revised measures. Proposed
measures were discussed at the annual performance measure consultation meeting held in
Atlanta in the fall 2007. The workgroup hosts this consultation each year, inviting
representatives from the workgroup along with other grantee and NCSD partners to
provide advice on the development of the CSPS performance measures. Based on the
consultation and other workgroup meetings, a proposed list of measures was drafted and,
as noted above, was reviewed by grantees in early 2008. A final list of measures was
approved by the DSTDP Division Director in March (table 17).
The brief history of the development process highlighted above reflects the hard
work of some people in the Division who have championed the performance measure
project. The leadership of these champions has been central in moving the project
forward, implementing systems and structures to institutionalize the measures, and
encouraging its adoption both within and outside the Division. Many on the performance
measurement workgroup, including NCSD representatives, share the commitment and
enthusiasm of these champions. At the same time, however, many participants discussed
concerns that Division leadership and some of the DSTDP program consultants have not
fully embraced the performance measures or recognized their importance.

214

Finally, the process to develop performance measures has reflected an attempt to
develop more ambitious measures over time. The twelve measures originally introduced
in 2004 were perceived as manageable, feasible, and achievable for the grantees, if not
particularly challenging. The workgroup called them GRAM measures or “get right at
‘em” because the measures were the easiest to implement at the time.
In developing the 2009 measures, the performance measurement workgroup
proposed several outcome-level measures that were population-based focusing on the
proportion of diagnosed STD cases that are treated (e.g., proportion of gonorrhea cases in
men and women that were treated; proportion of diagnosed cases of chlamydia among
women in juvenile detention facilities that were treated; proportion of diagnosed cases of
chlamydia among men and women ages 15-25 that were treated). Grantees’ comments
about the proposed measures, collected through the vetting process, reflect a range of
concerns including the feasibility of performing well on measures reflecting STD cases
managed by private providers; the feasibility to perform well on population-level
measures given limited resources and a lack of control over the broader health care
system; the potential burden related to data collection and reporting; the capacity of
grantees to address and achieve performance targets given limited resources; the
consistency of the measures with program priorities; and the lack of access to data needed
for some measures. Based on over 80 comments received from about 22 grantees, several
of the proposed measures were excluded from the final set.
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5.1.3.2 Performance Measurement System Design
In this section, the design of the CSPS performance measurement system is
described based on several key aspects of its design. Table 19 summarizes these design
features.

Table 19. Design Features of the CSPS Performance Measurement System
Design Feature

CSPS Performance Measurement System

Purpose of system

Program improvement and accountability

Level of measurement

Local and grantee level

Type(s) of performance measures

Process and immediate outcome measures

Use of targets or standards

Baseline and 3-year targets set by grantees

Quality assurance efforts

Yes

5.1.3.2.1 Purpose
Program improvement and accountability are the primary purposes for the CSPS
performance measures. In addition, the measures are an important means to help focus
program efforts or, at least, highlight some aspects of a program that all grantees should
be measuring in order to improve programs. In communications with grantees, the
purpose of program improvement is largely promoted by emphasizing the value of
performance measurement for program monitoring, to facilitate comparisons of program
performance over time, and to help identify best practices. While participants emphasized
that grantees’ performance on the measures is not tied to funding, DSTDP has a clear
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expectation that programs should be held accountable. Grantees are legally required, as a
condition of funding, to report data for the measures semi-annually. Accountability was
viewed as an important incentive for improving performance, even without the
imposition of any sanctions or threat of punitive action.
Prior to the introduction of the measures, the use of performance data by grantees
to support their day-to-day program management is unclear. From a national perspective,
the introduction of the CDC performance measures in 2004 represented the first time
since 1992 that grantees were required to submit program data other than case-base
surveillance data. Allaying grantees’ fears and nurturing acceptance of the measures has
taken time. CDC’s hope, however, is that the performance measures will encourage and
help direct programs to explore underlying program issues that are behind the
performance on any given indicator.
The program-level performance measures are aligned with the Division’s program
performance measures developed for GPRA and PART, efforts aimed to improve
transparency and accountability in government. DSTDP has been PART-reviewed by
OMB twice, most recently in 2007 when a review of the entire NCHHSTP was
conducted. The STD program-level performance measures were important in securing an
overall PART rating of “excellent,” the highest qualitative score possible.
5.1.3.2.2 Level of Measurement
The 2009 performance measures relate to three program areas: medical and
laboratory services (MLS), partner services (PS), and surveillance and data management
(SDM). The measures primarily reflect data collected at the local level where program
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implementation occurs, although the SDM measures that relate to timely and complete
data are the responsibility of the grantee.
5.1.3.2.3 Types of Measures
All but one of the ten MLS measures focus on the testing, diagnosis, and
treatment of gonorrhea, chlamydia, and syphilis in specific population groups and
settings (i.e., female admittees to juvenile detention facilities, women in IPP family
planning clinics, women in STD clinics, female admittees of adult city and county jails).
One MSL measures is population-based focused on the treatment of all reported syphilis
cases. Based on the CSPS logic model, the measures can be categorized as process
(testing and diagnosis) and immediate outcome (treatment) measures.
Three of the four PS measures relate to syphilis and the fourth focuses on the
proportion of gonorrhea cases interviewed in areas that are not categorized as high
morbidity areas for syphilis. These measures are all population-based and categorized as
process and immediate outcomes measures. The three SDM measures focus on complete
and timely data submission and are process measures.
5.1.3.2.4 Use of Targets or Standards
Given the variability in disease burden across grantees, programs are encouraged
to establish their own baseline figure for each indicator and set projected, three-year
targets. Some suggested that DSTDP lacked the data to support target-setting at this point
in time.
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5.1.3.2.5 Quality Assurance Efforts
Several efforts have been instituted to support data quality. As mentioned, a
guidance document was produced in November 2006 and has been updated to reflect the
new 2009 performance measures. For each measure, the guidance document details its
rationale, specification, and data sources; reporting criteria; and information about how to
use the measure to improve performance. As example, for performance measure MLS
1a 31 , the guidance document provides a rationale for the measure, acknowledging that
while the STD programs do not have direct control over the juvenile facilities, grantees
are expected to actively work with facility managers to increase their awareness about the
importance of chlamydia screening. The guidance document also specifies the definition
of “large juvenile detention facilities as those that book 500 or more adolescent females
annually.” In addition, the document suggests possible data sources for both the
numerator and denominator. Consequently, the guidance document is an important
quality assurance tool to make certain that all 65 grantees define terms similarly (e.g.,
“C” disposition), calculate the measures in the same way (i.e., numerator and
denominator), and report the data in a consistent fashion.
Another important quality assurance initiative is the performance measures
learning tours. The objective of the learning tours is to assess the implementation of the
performance measures, and, in particular, to explore issues of data quality. A team
comprised of the DSTDP program consultant and performance measurement workgroup
members conduct the two and a half day visit with grantee staff. A detailed learning tour
31

MLS 1a. The proportion of female admittees to large juvenile detention facilities that
were tested for chlamydia.
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guide has been developed to facilitate the site visit. The CDC team meets with a group
from the grantee agency and discusses each measure, looking at overall performance on
the measure over time, data sources for the measure, and efforts to assure data validity.
The group also discusses how data are being used to inform program management and
improve performance – this provides an opportunity for CDC to identify technical
assistance needs. Following the learning tour site visit, CDC develops a report of
recommendations and actions for the grantee, for which the program consultant has
responsibility for monitoring.
Even with these efforts, however, data quality for the performance measures
remains a major concern. Internal data analysis and the learning tours have identified
quality problems the performance measurement report issued in 2007 highlights data
quality as an important problem. Data problems identified include missing or unreported
data and the reporting of inaccurate data. Variability across grantees in the data systems
each uses may be a factor affecting quality. Data quality issues were also highlighted in
several abstracts accepted for poster presentations at a national STD conference. For
example, instances have been reported of grantees fabricating data or making rough
estimates to meet reporting requirements. And nearly all of those interviewed spoke
about data quality problems including misinterpretation of the measures, the challenge to
CDC of assessing data validity across so many varied grantees, the lack of buy-in for the
performance measures that may contribute to poor data quality, and the capacity of
grantees to collect and report quality data from the local level.
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5.1.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data
In regard to data use, some applications of the data have been already noted. For
instance, the implementation of the program-level performance measures were
highlighted in the most recent PART review and the first data report was produced in
2007. While that report provided grantee-specific data for each measure, performance
comparisons across grantees were not particularly useful given the extensive variability
in epidemiology, context, and resources.
Overall, use of the measures has been limited despite the mechanisms developed
to support institutionalization of the performance measures (e.g., guide, learning tours,
technical assistance, report). Few people interviewed believed the data were being used to
support program management and many expressed disappointment and frustration about
its limited use. The lack of buy-in for the performance measures by the CDC program
consultants and grantees may be one factor affecting use at this time. First, while program
consultants are viewed as the primary change agents in promoting the adoption and use of
performance measurement, their endorsement of the measures is mixed and many are not
yet “managing” with the data in their regular interactions with grantees. Program
consultants face competing priorities (e.g., personnel issues related to field staff,
evidence-based action plans) which may interfere with promoting the performance
measures more ambitiously.
Second, buy-in on the part of the grantees has been slow to earn. Several
interviewed said the grantees see the performance measurement effort as an “unfunded
mandate,” rather than part of their evaluation activities. Many grantees are simply
collecting and reporting the data to meet the CDC reporting requirement. A few
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participants described situations where program consultants sometimes enter the data into
the web-based system for the grantees. Data revealed little, if any, engagement of the
local level in use of the performance data.
However, some grantees are beginning to use the performance data for planning
and improvement. A few states are developing state-specific measures and others are
collaborating with neighboring states to review data and discuss opportunities for
program improvement. Given that few grantee staff were included in this study, little is
understood about their specific barriers to use (e.g., measures are not perceived as
meaningful, time and resource constraints, lack of understanding, insufficient tools
supporting use).

5.2 Findings
5.2.1 Dependencies and goal conflicts with CSPS’ local-level, horizontal network
partners compromises grantees’ control over performance.
While CSPS’ decentralized, networked approach is essential to provide STD
prevention and control services at the local level, it introduces challenges in regard to
grantees’ ability to control performance on specified measures. As described in section
5.1.1.2, DSTDP encourages a “community perspective” to more effectively reach
populations at risk for STD infections and contribute to broader, population effects. The
community perspective is intended to expand grantees’ responsibility and accountability
for STD prevention beyond simply efforts within publicly-funded STD clinics. As one
person asked,
Is it ‘STD control’ or is it only dealing with the patients that come to the
STD clinic, or only dealing with the patients that are reported? What we’re
trying to move people’s thinking to is, ‘you’re responsible for controlling
STD in your community.’ Obviously there are a lot of things that you can’t
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do that go into contributing to STD control in your community, but if we
narrow it too much to only the things that you can do, you’re not really in
‘STD control’ anymore – you’re in a ‘clinic control’ model.
The approach involves extending collaborative partnerships, especially with
horizontal partners, to engage those who have access to high risk populations (e.g.,
primary care physicians, jails, juvenile detention centers). One participant said,
The community perspective is not just what you have control over, but a
good STD program should try to influence other parts that you don’t have
control over. For example, private providers, family planning clinics. Now
this is different from the syphilis requirement where they actually give
money to a CBO. This is, we don’t give them any money, we don’t do
anything, this is just a good [grantee] program should be recognized as the
STD expert in their county or in their state and therefore, should try to
influence private providers to screen more, should educate them more
about recognizing symptoms or how to conduct an interview with a
teenager about their sexual activity.
But while influencing the practice of physicians, corrections, and others to
participate in STD prevention is necessary to achieve longer term, population-level
outcomes, mission and goal conflicts and the lack of formal authority over these
horizontal partners challenge grantees’ ability to affect performance on measures aligned
with the approach. 32 Mission conflicts frustrate grantees’ efforts to engage horizontal
partners and the lack of formal authority compromises their influence – both limit
grantees’ ability to affect performance on identified measures. As one participant stated,
“The dollar bill usually influences pretty reliably, but the smile and handshake are not
quite as reliable.” Another person explained,
I think it’s pretty clear why grantees don’t like that – you’re calling it
performance, which is a reflection on them, and they’re not performing because
32

For instance, performance measure MLS 4, the proportion of female admittees entering
selected project area adult city and county jails that were tested for syphilis.
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someone in their community isn’t supporting them or there are things that are
beyond their control. And other people just have the luck of being in a place
where they have a cooperative prison system or something.
Grantees exerted their political muscle to successfully reject some of the
population-based, performance measures proposed for 2009 (e.g., proportion of
gonorrhea cases in men and women that were treated) that were viewed as too far outside
their control. DSTDP has been more successful in incorporating process-oriented, venue
specific performance measures. The Division’s dilemma around performance
measurement given the network structure is that while networks are necessary to achieve
critical outcomes, grantees’ have minimal control over affecting performance on
measures dependent on informal, horizontal partners. Consequently, DSTDP has been
limited in the choice and types of measures included in their performance measurement
set.
5.2.2 Given the CSPS network context, performance measurement is a negotiated
and incremental process.
Efforts to develop a performance measurement system for CSPS were started in
1999 and have evolved significantly over the past decade. The size of the CSPS
implementation network, its culture, and network members’ political influence have all
shaped what has been an incremental development process based on negotiation with
grantee and NCSD stakeholders.
The mere size of the network requires that performance measurement be
understood and adopted by hundreds of network partners. CSPS’ vertical network
includes 66 state, city, and territorial grantees along with hundreds of local level partners.
The horizontal network extends that vertical chain at all levels (federal, state, and local).
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Consequently, the development and implementation of the CSPS performance measures
has taken time. Piloting measures is necessary to assess their feasibility and utility across
a spectrum of grantees; vetting of measures is needed to further assess feasibility and
build a stake in the system; and technical assistance and training is required to help
grantees to understand the measures and build necessary data collection and reporting
systems.
In developing the CSPS performance measures, DSTDP has faced a stubborn
institutional culture resistant to CDC oversight and data reporting requirements. Grantees
had enjoyed extensive autonomy since the late 1980s with few stipulations from CDC.
And DSTDP’s use of a grant mechanism, a policy tool offering grantees a good deal of
independence, limited the Division’s authority. In discussing the challenges to developing
and implementing performance measurement in the CSPS network, one person said,
I would say the biggest challenge has simply been to change the culture or
the mindset [of grantees] to view these [measures] as valuable tools to
manage and run programs. I don’t think that it [performance
measurement] was part of the culture necessarily. To get people
comfortable with the idea that you can actually evaluate how your
program is doing, at least to a certain extent, by coming up with well
thought out measures that can be quantified and looked at over time – that
this [performance measurement] is a valuable tool. To me, that’s been the
number one challenge is to get people into that mindset and it’s still an
ongoing process.
Champions of the performance measures have also confronted a lack of
commitment from management and staff within DSTDP that has slowed the effort.
Leadership from Division management as well as program consultants who work most
closely with the grantees is essential to promoting performance measurement to the larger
network. A participant commented,
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The other challenge internally is just to get everybody in the Division on
the same page as far as the importance of the performance measures and
[the idea that] everybody needs to be working towards the same goal and
that there should be minimum standards and expectations around what you
do with regards to performance measures in your day-to-day job. And that
hasn’t happened yet.
Finally, given CSPS stakeholders’ political influence, the development process is,
to some extent, a negotiated one. While DSTDP is inclusive in its development process,
in both good faith and with appropriate intentions (assuring feasibility and acceptance of
the performance measures), the Division also recognizes that the network commands
political influence that affects the choice and type of measures selected and requirements
related to their reporting and use. As noted above, stakeholders rejected several
population-based measures proposed for 2009 that were excluded from the final set.
Consequently, the CSPS network has important implications for the development
process of its performance measurement system. DSTDP has long recognized the
necessity of involving network stakeholders in the development process. Indeed,
participants suggested stakeholder participation is essential to assure a feasible and
meaningful set of performance measures and to build the buy-in needed to facilitate their
adoption. However, the size of the CSPS network along with its cultural norms and
political sway all prescribe a more incremental and negotiated development process – one
that has frustrated DSTDP given what one person called its “glacial progress.”
5.2.3 Extensive variability across grantees influences the design of the CSPS’
performance measurement system.
The 66 grantees that comprise the CSPS implementation network represent states,
cities, and territories that differ substantially in regard to disease burden, populations
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affected, geographic context, resources, and capacity. The prevalence of STDs varies
across the U.S. and its territories – while some states face epidemic levels of syphilis
infection, others experience few cases in a given year. Grantees also vary in terms of
populations affected by STDs – states face differing prevalence of disease among African
Americans, Latinos, Whites, heterosexuals, and homosexual men. Some states have few
staff and are responsible for expansive geographic areas; others support hundreds of staff
across rural and urban contexts. Resources range dramatically from just over $46,500 for
a U.S. territory to over $6 million for a heavily populated state.
All of these factors affect an individual grantee’s priorities, program activities,
and ability to achieve results. In designing the CSPS performance measures, then,
DSTDP must accommodate the variability imposed by the network structure. First,
DSTDP faces challenges in identifying a common set of measures that has relevance for
all 66 grantees. One person said,
I guess that’s probably the biggest challenge [variability across grantees]
because even being able to come up with the 12 or 14 [measures],
whatever they have now, and getting everybody to agree. I mean, that was
a tremendous accomplishment in and of itself.
The syphilis measures present a good example – there are some states with low
syphilis morbidity for which the measures have little relevance. Consequently, the
performance measurement workgroup added a partner notification measure related to
gonorrhea cases for low morbidity areas, a concession that was not necessarily supported
by all workgroup members. One participant noted,
I think our challenge has been to identify a set of measures that is useful
for the majority of project areas, both small and large and that’s been an
internal debate in the performance measure work group. There are a
number of participants on the work group who will come out and say that
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small states don’t matter, because the real outcome measure is reducing
morbidity. And reducing syphilis morbidity in New England where all
together they have 90 cases of P&S [primary and secondary] syphilis a
year compared to Texas that has 90 in a month – there are advocates for
not worrying about the small states.
Network variability influenced the original selection of the “get right at ‘em” or
GRAM measures as the first set of performance measures. Given the diversity in
grantees, the set of twelve measures was seen as manageable, feasible, and achievable for
grantees, if not particularly challenging. One person said,
You know, these measures were not implemented because they were
necessarily the best measures. They were implemented based upon the
pilot results that suggested they’re ones we can get. In fact, they were
called GRAM measures, ‘get right at them’ measures because they were
the easiest, to be quite frank.
Although DSTDP has worked to introduce more challenging measures over time,
the network variability continues to pose a quandary. For instance, grantees persist in
voicing concerns around different priorities for grantees based on disease burden and
populations affected; the capacity of all programs to access, collect, and report data,
especially at the local level; and the feasibility of grantees with limited resources to affect
performance on this measure or that. One participant spoke to resource issues for some
grantees,
Some project areas see it [performance measures] more as a burden. I
would say some of the more rural project areas, the frontier states like
North and South Dakota, Wyoming, who receive such limited funding to
offer an STD program. They see an additional mandate from CDC around
performance measures as a little burdensome because they just don’t have
the manpower and the resources to focus on it – they may not have the
staff to do data entry or data collection or analysis to provide the data back
[to CDC]. So they struggle with that. Even some of the larger program
areas who have [their own] specific priorities, may not take it seriously.
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Consequently DSTPD has needed to design a performance measurement system
with enough flexibility to accommodate the variability. For instance, grantees have the
option to simply “opt-out” on reporting on a particular measure if they can provide an
adequate justification. And, as mentioned, DSTDP includes some “alternate measures”
for those grantees that are not high morbidity areas for syphilis. Grantees also have the
flexibility to set their own baseline and three-year targets for each measure. And finally,
DSTDP recognizes that comparing grantee performance on the measures is not
particularly useful given their variability.
Aside from flexibility, DSTDP has also needed to attend to data quality issues. A
participant said,
We knew from the pilot that we did back in the early 2000, we knew that
everybody’s [grantees] interpreting things in their own way. But I think
that it was a real eye opener for folks when they started going out on the
learning tours to find out that, oh my God – even though it’s written very
clearly in the guidance document, [we] thought it was clear as day. Even
with all of that, people don’t read it and still just interpret it their own way.
The vertical network alone challenges the ability of DSTDP to assure the
collection and reliable data from hundreds of local level sites – the introduction of
horizontal partners only compounds the difficulty. One person said,
Now I feel relatively good about the quality of data coming out of an STD
clinic but all of a sudden you open it up where 66% of those cases are
going to be coming from outside the STD clinic? Who knows what we’re
going to get. You know, but again, if the goal is to really prevent
infertility and measure how well a program is doing, then you’ve got to
look at the big picture from a national level.
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5.3 Summary
As DSTDP has assumed a more comprehensive, community perspective aimed at
achieving broader effects, program outcomes often reflect the efforts of local-level,
funded STD programs and informal network partners. Dependencies are created that
compromise grantees’ control over performance, introduce difficulties in acquiring or
collecting data, and diminish data quality. In this context, CSPS grantees are more
amenable to performance measures reflecting process, outputs, and short-term outcomes
than longer term or population-based measures. Next, the experience of DSTDP suggests
that the network context also shapes the development process itself. For CSPS, the
development of performance measures can be characterized as a negotiated and
incremental process where adoption of the measures is slowed by the breadth and depth
of the network as well as CSPS culture. And finally, DSTDP faces extensive variability
across the CSPS grantees in terms of epidemiology, geographic context, program
priorities and activities, data availability and sophistication of data management systems,
and capacity and resources. This variability has challenged DSTDP to identify a common
set of challenging performance measures equally meaningful and relevant to the 65 state,
city, and territorial grantees. In addition, differences have required that DSTDP shape a
flexible performance measurement system and that staff consider individual grantee
context in data interpretation.
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CHAPTER 6
NATIONAL BREAST AND CERVICAL CANCER EARLY DETECTION
PROGRAM (NBCCEDP)
6.1 NBCCEDP Case Description
6.1.1 The Program
6.1.1.1 CDC Organizational Context
The NBCCEDP was established based on the Breast and Cervical Cancer
Mortality Prevention Act of 1990 (PL 101-354). The program resides within CDC’s
National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP) and
is managed by the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control’s (DCPC) Program
Services Branch. DCPC develops, implements, and promotes effective strategies for
preventing and controlling cancer, working with partners at the national, state, and local
level.
Congress began funding the NBCCEDP in 1991 providing $30 million which
DCPC awarded to eight states. Over time, the appropriation has increased and by 1997,
all 50 states, the District of Columbia, five U.S. territories, and 12 tribes were funded.
Today the NBCCEDP represents the Division’s largest program. In fiscal year 2008,
DCPC awarded a total of $157,226,794 to 68 state, tribal, and territorial grantees through
cooperative agreement awards. The current five-year cooperative agreement (program
announcement #703) has been in place since June 2007. For the 12-month budget period
in fiscal year 2008, grantee awards ranged from $75,000 to $8,821,221 with an average
award of $2,312,159 (median award $2,064,252). In 2007, The National Breast and
Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 was signed into
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law by the President, authorizing the program for another five years. The legislation
establishing the NBCCEDP proscribes several requirements related to its implementation
including:
•

Grantees provide matching funds of $1 for every $3 of federal funds.

•

Of federal funds received by a grantee, 60% must be used to directly support
screening services and no more than 10% may be used for administrative
expenses.

•

Program dollars may not be used to support costs for the treatment of cancer or
for research.
Program consultants in the Program Services Branch of DCPC are responsible for

providing programmatic oversight and technical assistance to the grantees. Up until 2000,
the Program Services Branch provided “direct federal assistance” to grantees, that is,
CDC staff were assigned to work on-site to provide administrative and programmatic
support. While some program consultants have been with the program for many years,
staff turnover is not uncommon after three or four years. Physicians, epidemiologists,
economists, and behavioral scientists from the Division’s other three branches collaborate
to conduct evaluation and research of the NBCCEDP program.
Overall, the NBCCEDP is a high profile program for the Division and the Center
(NCCDPHP) given both the size of its budget and the political environment surrounding
breast cancer. The CDC Director is well aware of the program. As part the Director’s
quarterly performance reporting to Health and Human Services (HHS), data on a number
of indicators related to CDC programs, including a DCPC GPRA measure for
mammography, are presented.
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6.1.1.2 Program Goals
The NBCCEDP provides breast and cervical cancer screening to low-income
women (typically at or below 250% of the federal poverty guidelines) who are un- or
under-insured. Since the NBCCEDP’s inception in 1991, grantees have served more than
3.2 million women, provided more than 7.8 million screening examinations, and
diagnosed over 35,000 breast cancers and 2,100 invasive cervical cancers. Up until 2000,
grantees were challenged to identify resources (e.g., charity care) to assure treatment for
women diagnosed with cancer through the NBCCEDP given that the program serves unor under-insured populations. But in 2000, Congress passed the Breast and Cervical
Prevention and Treatment Act of 2000 (PL 106-354) after extensive advocacy on the part
of the American Cancer Society (ACS), Susan G. Komen for the Cure (heretofore
referred to as the Komen Foundation), and others. This law provides a waiver to women
screened and diagnosed with cancer through the NBCCEDP so that they may qualify for
full Medicaid benefits through the end of their cancer treatment 33 . The law has been
instrumental in assuring that women diagnosed through the NBCCEDP receive the
medical care and treatment needed.
The NBCCEDP is comprised of eight unique program components including
program management, client recruitment, screening, quality assurance, professional
development, data management, partnerships, and evaluation. The screening component
includes five different program activities: breast and cervical cancer screening, tracking,
diagnostic follow-up, case management, and re-screening. The NBCCEDP has developed
a conceptual model representing its comprehensive approach to breast and cervical
33

The extension of Medicaid coverage is limited to women served by the NBCCEDP
who are U.S. citizens.
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cancer control. There is strong scientific evidence supporting the effectiveness of breast
and cervical cancer screening in the early detection of disease and reductions in related
morbidity and mortality, however, less of a science base is in place to inform approaches
for the other supporting services such as public education and outreach, professional
education, and case management. Finally, while the focus of the NBCCEDP is on
screening for medically underserved women, its educational activities, public and private
partnerships, and quality assurance standards are intended to benefit all women.
All grantees report a subset of program data to DCPC called the minimum data
elements (MDEs) as a condition of their funding award. The MDEs are a set of
approximately 100 standardized data elements considered to be minimally necessary for
grantees and CDC to monitor client demographics and clinical outcomes of women
screened with NBCCEDP funds. The MDEs also are used to inform NBCCEDP policies
and practices, assess the national program’s screening outcomes, and respond to the
information needs of CDC stakeholders and partners. The nature of the NBCCEDP as a
clinically-based, service delivery program is relatively unusual for public health.
Contrary to many other public health programs, the NBCCEDP is more easily monitored
and evaluated given the ability to measure clinical service provision and related
outcomes.
Those involved with the NBCCEDP express a clear and consistent understanding
of the program and its goals, a program driven by its authorizing legislation and one
focused, for the most part, on reducing the morbidity and mortality related to breast and
cervical cancer among low-income, under-insured women served by the program. DCPC
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staff and grantees express a sincere appreciation for the gravity of breast and cervical
cancer and their responsibility to women in achieving NBCCEDP goals and outcomes.
6.1.1.3 Stage of Program Development
Although programs were incrementally funded over time, the program is
perceived as relatively mature. A level of capacity for program implementation has been
achieved across grantees – both the capacity for service delivery through the
establishment of a network of screening and diagnostic providers and the capacity to
collect and report the required MDE data. Program policies and procedures have long
been in place and stakeholder relationships are well established. The strength of the
national data system that has been established over time has rendered a program
perceived as data-driven; MDE data are used extensively to monitor program
implementation, service quality, and screening outcomes.
6.1.1.4 Budget Stability
Funding for the NBCCEDP has remained relatively stable for several years with
no significant increases in the federal appropriation. DCPC economists collaborated with
researchers at the U.S. Census Bureau to develop estimates of the NBCCEDP-eligible
population size by state. Based on existing federal resources, results suggest that the
NBCCEDP is currently able to screen approximately 14% of the eligible population 34 or
about 1% of the total women in the U.S. (Tangka et al. 2006). Consequently, DCPC
encourages the program to achieve efficiencies wherever possible. One repercussion of

34

Women at 250% or less of the federal poverty guidelines and who are un- or underinsured.
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level funding has been limited resources to recruit many new women to the program
given that re-screening is an important goal of the program.
6.1.1.5 Stakeholders
A strong group of stakeholders orbit the NBCCEDP including its grantees and a
formal council comprised of the grantee program directors. The council is a committee of
the National Association of Chronic Disease Directors (NACDD), which also stays
closely informed of NBCCEDP-related issues. A formal federal advisory committee 35 is
in place for the NBCCEDP and is comprised of national experts and leaders in the field
of breast and cervical cancer screening. The federal advisory group meets annually to
review program progress and discuss related policy.
Other stakeholders include the National Association of County and City Health
Officials (NACCHO) and cancer-related national organizations such as ACS and the
Komen Foundation, both of which have state, regional, and/or local affiliates. In addition,
other CDC-funded programs that have a close relationship to the NBCCEDP include
DCPC’s National Comprehensive Cancer Control program and the WISEWOMAN™
program (Well Integrated Screening and Evaluation for Women Across the Nation). And,
of course, Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also have an
important stake in the program.
6.1.1.6 Political Context
A significant political context encompasses the NBCCEDP given that it is a
legislated program, has a relatively large budget compared to other chronic disease
35

Based on the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972
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programs at CDC, and shares company with a group of strong national advocates for
breast cancer (e.g., ACS, Komen Foundation, National Breast Cancer Coalition). DCPC
frequently responds to Congressional inquiries, the CDC Director reports quarterly to
HHS on its performance, and DCPC staff are periodically required to provide
Congressional testimony about the NBCCEDP. 36
Changes in medical technology and the health care reform movement are having
direct effects on the program. For instance, while scientific evidence does not support a
significant clinical benefit to the use of digital mammography over traditional film
mammography, the technology companies are effectively promoting digital to
radiologists. Because the cost of digital is significantly higher, grantees are struggling to
identify mammography facilities willing to provide traditional film mammography or
those willing to accept the Medicaid reimbursement rate 37 for film mammography when
digital is provided. Consequently, to assure access to screening, CDC recently changed
its policy to allow reimbursement for digital mammography at the Medicare rate, a
procedure that currently has no scientifically determined increased benefit. The policy
change has implications for the program overall – fewer women will be screened with the
same dollars. The potential for universal health care – whether realized through a national
plan or state-by-state adoption (e.g., Massachusetts) – also has implications for the
NBCCEDP although these are less clear at this time.

36

Most recently, CDC provided Congressional testimony on January 29, 2008 to the
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee chaired by Representative Henry
Waxman.
37
NBCCEDP policy requires that reimbursement for screening, diagnostic, and other
clinical services provided through the program is capped at the Medicare rate.
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Advocacy groups were important supporters of the legislation that established the
NBCCEDP as well as the 2000 Treatment Act, and they continue to be important partners
to DCPC. However, CDC policies are sometimes in conflict with those of the advocate’s,
which has led to tension for both CDC and the grantees. Most notable is CDC’s policy
requiring that 75% of women receiving NBCCEDP-funded mammograms be aged 50 and
older given greater effectiveness of mammography in detecting breast cancer among
older women. In contrast, ACS and other groups have issued guidelines that promote
screening for women 40 and older. Grantees face substantial pressure from the advocates
to screen this younger age group.
6.1.2 The Implementation Network
The NBCCEDP is carried out through a network of agencies including the 68
grantees and over 22,000 local-level health care providers. The implementation network
for the NBCCEDP can be described based on five dimensions. The first two relate to the
structure of the network: 1) vertical relationships and 2) horizontal relationships. The
other three relate to the function of the network: 3) authority and control within the
network; 4) shared organizational goals and priorities within the network; and 5)
variability in context, capacity, and resources. Each of these is discussed below.
6.1.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships
The vertical chain for the NBCCEDP begins in Congress with its annual budget
appropriation for the program. Those funds come to CDC (DCPC) and are distributed
through cooperative agreements to the 68 NBCCEDP grantees. A myriad of decentralized
configurations characterize the dissemination of funds by grantees to local level providers
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conducting the breast and cervical cancer screening and diagnostic tests. Some grantees
contract directly with providers, radiological centers, and laboratories while using their
own staff to conduct client recruitment, professional education, case management, quality
assurance, and data management. Other grantees fund regional or local-level agencies to
implement the program; in fact, some states require that programs be implemented
through an existing intergovernmental network. In these cases, those regional or locallevel public health agencies will typically initiate contracts with health providers to
conduct the screening and diagnostics in their service area. The regional or local-level
coordinating agency could be a local health department, a community-based organization
(CBO), or hospital and might be responsible for carrying out some program activities
such as client recruitment, public education, case management, and data management. In
a few cases, a funded tribe or territory has its own health center and provides the
screening and diagnostic services directly.
Three points should be highlighted about the vertical dimension of the NBCCEDP
network. First, the most significant consequence of the vertical network is that service
delivery for the NBCCEDP is typically delivered several steps removed from CDC and at
least one or two steps removed from the grantee. So while DCPC is fiscally and
programmatically accountable for the NBCCEDP to Congress, OMB, and others, service
delivery is actually provided by local-level providers at the other end of the vertical
chain. In addition, the service delivery network is extremely large with over 22,000
providers involved in delivering screening and diagnostic services for the NBCCEDP.
Second, the vertical network is comprised not only of intergovernmental
relationships (e.g., CDC – state health department – county health department), but also
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relationships with private non-governmental and public agencies (e.g., CBOs, private
health care providers, public hospitals, cancer centers, laboratories). These agencies may
have more or less experience participating in public health efforts.
And third, the NBCCEDP goals (i.e., early detection of cancer among the priority
population for the program) are primarily achieved through the actions of the vertical
network with little dependency on horizontal network relationships. As discussed below,
this fact has important implications for program oversight and accountability, even when
the network is as extensive as this.
6.1.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships
Horizontal relationships are in place at all levels of the vertical structure. CDC
collaborates with other federal agencies (e.g., National Cancer Institute or NCI), national
partners (e.g., ACS, NACDD, NACCHO), and the federal advisory committee. Within
DCPC, the Program Services Branch collaborates with its sister branches including the
Cancer Surveillance Branch that oversees CDC’s National Program of Cancer Registries
and with other CDC programs within the NCCDPHP such as WISEWOMAN™.
Likewise, grantees have established horizontal relationships with local chapters of
ACS, Komen Foundation, and regional offices of NCI’s Cancer Information Services.
Grantees also collaborate with state-based cancer centers, academic institutions, and
private industry. Within the grantee institution, staff leading the NBCCEDP program
collaborate with other cancer screening programs within their institution (e.g., prostate
cancer, colorectal cancer), the cancer registries program, the CDC-funded comprehensive
cancer control program, and WISEWOMAN™ in order to maximize opportunities for
program integration. If a county or regional system is part of the vertical chain, they may
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have horizontal relationships with regional or local ACS, Komen Foundation, and CIS
programs. And at the service delivery level, horizontal partnerships may be established
between the provider sites and client referral sites (e.g., Title X family planning clinics,
CBOs, churches), local ACS chapters, and Medicaid enrollment offices.
For the most part, the horizontal partnerships (at all levels) are voluntary,
informal, and un-funded, although grantees may provide funding to some local level
agencies (e.g., churches, CBOs) to assist with public education and client recruitment. As
already noted, some of the horizontal relationships help promote service integration so
that women might receive more comprehensive screening (e.g., breast, cervical,
colorectal, cardiovascular). But in general, these partnerships expand the reach of the
NBCCEDP, extending its resources and advancing the broader goals of the NBCCEDP
such as enhanced access and quality care for all women. Some partners like Komen
Foundation, the Avon Foundation, and ACS provide additional in-kind and financial
resources to grantees.
6.1.2.3 Network Function: Authority and Control within the Network
Authority and control over service delivery within the NBCCEDP are
compromised given the decentralized program structure. And, as just discussed, the
structure varies – some grantees directly fund screening providers, others involve local or
regional-level agencies which then secure providers. In general, as the number of vertical
links in the NBCCEDP implementation chain increases, DCPC and grantee’s influence
over program implementation decreases.
For the NBCCEDP, authority and control over local-level service delivery is
strengthened with the presence of a funding relationship. The specific funding tool used
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will affect the level of authority and determine any sanctions that can be exercised. As
described, DCPC uses a cooperative agreement as the policy tool to fund the NBCCEDP
grantees. This funding mechanism supports a collaborative (i.e., “cooperative”)
relationship between DCPC and the grantees – cooperative agreements offer CDC the
opportunity to include programmatic and reporting requirements and allow for substantial
DCPC involvement in programmatic decision making. At the same time, cooperative
agreements are not as restrictive as a contract and provide NBCCEDP grantees flexibility
in managing and implementing the program.
Grantees apply varied funding mechanisms (e.g., contracts, memoranda of
understanding, grants) 38 either directly with providers or with regional or local-level
agencies. Some NBCCEDP grantees build requirements into the funding arrangements
that afford them greater control over program implementation and performance. For
instance, some grantees hold back reimbursement to providers or regional/local agencies
until those organizations submit required data and invoices. Other grantees use
performance-based contracts, incorporating screening requirements such as the DCPCestablished performance measures. Funding tools used by DCPC and the grantees may
also allow for the imposition of sanctions to influence program implementation. For
instance, in the past, when serious concerns about the quality of screening were
identified, DCPC has restricted cooperative agreement funds, 39 forcing programs to halt
screening women until problems were resolved. For their part, grantees have cancelled

38

A quantitative assessment of the types of policy tools used by grantees or local/regional
agencies is not available
39
Restricting cooperative agreement funds typically involves “freezing” a portion of
funds so that the grantee cannot draw down reimbursement until corrective action has
been taken.
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contracts with providers that do not meet quality requirements or withheld provider
reimbursement if screening projections are not met or if data submissions are delayed.
In contrast, little control is possible over unfunded, informal partners, although
these relationships are typically less significant in achieving program outcomes. For
instance, programs sometimes struggle to control how quickly family planning programs
refer women with abnormal Pap tests into the NBCCEDP for diagnostic testing.
With or without funding, participants discussed the value of building
collaborative relationships with agencies to increase DCPC’s and grantees’ influence
with important partners and, ultimately, to yield a greater impact. DCPC program
consultants who have effective relationships with their grantees may have greater
opportunity to encourage specific behavior rather than resorting to threats of punitive
action. And grantees that establish strong working and reciprocal relationships with their
providers or regional/local partners may be more successful in affecting implementation.
6.1.2.4 Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities within the
Network
Partners within the NBCCEDP network share similar goals, particularly as it
pertains to the value of breast and cervical cancer screening and its intended outcomes
(e.g., early detection and treatment). Some differences in priorities are evident, especially
related to policy issues such as DCPC’s emphasis on screening women age 50 and older
for breast cancer. As previously mentioned, ACS and others recommend screening for
women 40 and older. But overall, there is strong consensus on the program purpose and
goals.
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6.1.2.5 Network Function: Variability in Context, Resources, and Capacity
The NBCCEDP grantees are tremendously variable in regard to their context,
capacity, and resources. Grantees’ context differs in terms of priority populations,
demographics, geography, culture, and political environment. While California’s eligible
population for the NBCCEDP may be ethnically diverse, West Virginia’s is primarily
white, rural, and poor. The context of tribal and territorial programs is typically in stark
contrast to a state program. For instance, DCPC funds a tribal program in Alaska that is
responsible for small pockets of Native Americans scattered over an area 40,000 square
miles in size. Strategies used to reach women in this context are quite different from
those used to recruit women for screening in a dense urban population like Chicago.
Different cultural norms across grantees also have implications for program
implementation. For instance, women in rural Appalachia have unique barriers to
screening that likely differ from the barriers facing women in an urban minority
population. Grantees also vary in their capacity and level of resources. As noted earlier,
award sizes for the NBCCEDP grantees range from as little as $75,000 to over $8
million. Grantees funded at smaller amounts and with smaller programs overall likely
struggle more in terms of capacity, particularly in terms of data management
requirements for the program.
6.1.3 Performance Measurement System
6.1.3.1 Process to Develop the Performance Measurement System
The NBCCEDP performance measures are based on the MDE data which have
been collected on all women served through the program since its inception in 1991. The
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NBCCEDP performance measures were formalized in 2004 as a unique set of priority
indicators and are summarized in table 20 according to indicator category and include the
CDC standard or target.
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Table 20. NBCCEDP Performance Measures (2008)
Indicator
Category
Screening
Priority
Population
Measures
Cervical
Cancer
Diagnostic
Measures

Breast
Cancer
Diagnostic
Measures

Performance Measure

CDC
Standard

Percentage of initial program Pap tests that are conducted
among rarely or never screened women

> 20%

Percentage of screening mammograms provided to women >
50 years of age

> 75%

Percentage of abnormal screening results with complete
diagnostic follow-up

> 90%

Percentage of abnormal screening results with time from
screening test result to final diagnosis > 60 days

< 25%

Percentage of women diagnosed with HSIL, CIN2 , CIN3,
CIS 40 , Invasive with treatment started

> 90%

Percentage of women diagnosed with HSIL, CIN2, CIN3,
CIS with time from date of diagnosis to treatment started >
90 days

< 20%

Percentage of women diagnosed with invasive carcinoma
with time from date of diagnosis to treatment started > 60
days

< 20%

Percentage of abnormal screening results with complete
diagnostic follow-up

> 90%

Percentage of abnormal screening results with time from
screening test result to final diagnosis > 60 days

< 25%

Percentage of women diagnosed with breast cancer with
treatment started

> 90%

Percentage of women diagnosed with breast cancer with time
from date of diagnosis to treatment started > 60 days

< 20%

40

HSIL (High-grade squamous intraepithelial lesion); CIN (cervical intraepithelial
neoplasia); CIS (Carcinoma in situ)
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The NBCCEDP performance measures are fairly well institutionalized and
accepted by grantees as an important management tool for the program. Table 21
summarizes some key developmental markers related to the measures.

Table 21. NBCCEDP Performance Measure System Development, 1991-2008
Fiscal Year

System Development

1991

NBCCEDP program implemented in 8 states and the MDE data set
implemented, reporting required

1993

Data Quality Indicator Guide (DQIG) report developed; Data
contractor funded to manage MDE data and provide support to
NBCCEDP grantees

1997

All 50 states, Washington D.C., and a group of U.S. territories funded

2004

11 priority performance measures with standards formalized for
NBCCEDP
Coding algorithms for performance measures provided to grantees;
Subset of measures used as part of broader, performance-based
budgeting formula

2005
2006

Software developed and distributed to grantees to calculate their own
performance reports at any time

On-going

Revisions to measures made as needed

As noted, the current performance measures are derived from the MDE data
which have been collected since the program’s inception in 1991. The collection and
reporting of the MDE data have always been a program requirement for grantees and
significant resources support the activity. In 1993, a data contractor was secured by
DCPC to manage the MDE data for the NBCCEDP and provide grantees technical
support on data management-related issues. All grantees are required to employ a data

247

manager using CDC funds for the program and support a data management system for the
collection and reporting of the MDE data. The data contractor has developed a data
management software program for the MDE data that is available free of cost to any
NBCCEDP grantee. An MDE Data Users Manual is provided to all grantees; the manual
includes detailed definitions of all MDE variables. The data contractor employs a team of
technical consultants with data management expertise and, in particular, an in-depth
understanding of the MDEs. Each technical consultant is assigned a group of NBCCEDP
grantees to whom he or she provides technical support. The technical consultant works
closely with the DCPC program consultant, participating in regular conference calls, all
site visits, and semi-annual data calls to discuss the MDE data submissions.
An MDE committee comprised of multi-disciplinary staff from DCPC (e.g.,
program consultants, epidemiologists, medical advisors) and the data contractor meets
regularly to discuss issues related to the collection and use of the MDE data. In the early
1990s, the MDE committee developed a report based on the MDE data called the Data
Quality Indicator Guide or DQIG. The DQIG includes 27 indicators with benchmarks to
evaluate both data quality and quality of care. In 2004, the “core” performance measures,
a subset of clinical measures from the DQIG, were identified as a unique, stand-alone set
of indicators and are considered the most important indicators of NBCCEDP program
performance. Therefore, the performance measures represent part of a larger set of
monitoring data that support program improvement. So while the NBCCEDP grantees
were already familiar with these indicators, the eleven selected measures were given new
prominence as part of the core performance measurement set. Heretofore, the NBCCEDP
core indicators will be referred to as the performance measures.
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Stakeholders have had a voice in reviewing and refining the performance
measures over time. A workgroup of grantee staff has been convened in the past to
review the DQIG. The Council of NBCCEDP Program Directors (heretofore referred to
as the NBCCEDP Council), a committee of the NACDD, reviews proposed changes for
the larger MDE data set and has vetted the performance measures in the past. The
NBCCEDP Council worked closely with CDC in developing a performance-based
budgeting formula that incorporates seven of the eleven NBCCEDP performance
measures. In addition, an annual meeting of the grantee data managers provides a regular
opportunity to discuss the MDE data and performance measures.
The NBCCEDP performance measures have been adjusted slightly over time. For
instance, based on discussion with grantees, the standard for one measure related to
follow-up of abnormal Pap screening results was revised based on practice-base realities.
More recently, the calculation for the measures on follow-up of abnormal screening
results was revised given complaints from grantees that they did not have any control
over the timeliness of women who were screened elsewhere and referred to the
NBCCEDP for diagnostic services. In addition, a statistical test (z-test) is now applied to
more accurately determine whether a grantee meets the DCPC standard on a particular
measure – this has been important for performance measures reflecting relatively rare
events (e.g., diagnosis of invasive cervical cancer), especially for smaller grantees that
screen smaller numbers of women overall. Similarly, CDC invoked a policy whereby a
measure is not calculated if the denominator data is ten or less. Both adjustments account
for variability across grantees and ensure a more equitable application of the measures.
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In 2006, the data contractor developed an edit program specifically for the
performance measures that was disseminated to all grantees. The computer program
permits grantees to produce a performance indicator report at any given time using the
precise algorithms to calculate the measures. Using the edit program, grantees can
produce the performance report for individual regions within their state, tribe, or territory
and for individual providers to better monitor program performance. The edit report is
believed to be a factor contributing to improved performance on the measures during the
last two to three years.
At this time, many of the NBCCEDP grantees are meeting the established
standards for the performance measures. While the standards could be increased for the
existing measures, NBCCEDP staff suggest that stakeholders would oppose such an
adjustment. Participants suggested that performance measures will continue to evolve as
grantees meet existing standards, new priorities emerge, and improvements in
measurement develop. Currently, there are measurement challenges that limit the choice
of indicators. For instance, while there is an interest in measuring adherence to
recommended screening intervals for cervical or breast cancer, women tend to go in and
out of eligibility for the NBCCEDP complicating the ability to identify denominator data
for that particular calculation. There is also an interest to expand the measures beyond
only clinical ones and incorporate indicators reflecting measures of efficiency or other
program areas (e.g., public education) that are more difficult to measure.
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6.1.3.2 Performance Measurement System Design
In this section, the design of the NBCCEDP performance measurement system is
described highlighting the following: purpose of system; level of measurement; types of
measures; use of targets or standards; and quality assurance efforts. Table 22 summarizes
these design features.

Table 22. Design Features of the NBCCEDP Performance Measurement System
Design Feature

NBCCEDP Performance Measurement System

Purpose of system

Accountability, program improvement, budgeting

Level of measurement

Local level (patient-level clinical data)
Process measures (Priority population measures)

Type(s) of performance measures

Short-term and intermediate outcome measures
(Diagnostic measures)

Use of targets

Yes – Common standards set by CDC

Quality assurance efforts

Yes, extensive

6.1.3.2.1 Purpose
The NBCCEDP performance measures serve several purposes including
accountability, program improvement, and budgeting. The NBCCEDP is accountable to
three main groups: Congress, the public, and to the women served through the program.
DCPC staff view the performance measurement data as invaluable evidence that the
program is serving women of highest need and that timely and quality clinical screening
and diagnostic services are provided. As noted earlier, both DCPC staff and the grantees
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express a sincere responsibility to the women served through the NBCCEDP and view
the performance measures as a means to demonstrate accountability in meeting that
obligation.
The performance measures also support program improvement at all levels.
DCPC, working with its data management contractor, monitors all MDE data, working
closely with grantees to provide technical assistance when potential issues are identified.
Many of the grantees have developed the capacity to use their performance measurement
data in their own jurisdictions to help identify problems at the local level (e.g., a
particular provider who might not be conducting diagnostic follow-up in a timely
fashion). Using these data allows grantees to quickly make programmatic adjustments.
Interviewees suggested that grantees are more likely to focus strictly on the performance
measures with their local level agencies or providers rather than the broader set of MDE
data.
In 2005, DCPC began using a subset of the NBCCEDP performance measures as
part of a performance based budgeting formula. The formula also includes a measure of
fiscal responsibility (i.e., annual spending rate) and a score of the grantee’s annual
application calculated by the program consultant. Many of those interviewed believe that
the introduction of performance-based budgeting has led to improved performance by
grantees. Data comparisons (i.e., pre- versus post- the introduction of performance-based
budgeting) reflect significant increases in performance although other factors (e.g.,
providing computational tools) have likely contributed to these improvements as well.
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6.1.3.2.2 Level of Measurement
As described, the NBCCEDP performance measures are used for multiple
purposes and reflect patient-level, clinical data collected at the local level.
6.1.3.2.3 Types of Measures
The NBCCEDP performance measures include three types: process, short-term
outcome, and intermediate outcome. The measures of the priority populations (i.e.,
women over 50 for breast, rarely and never screened for cervical) are process-level
measures while the diagnostic measures reflect short- and intermediate-level outcome
measures (e.g., diagnosis and treatment). The goals of the NBCCEDP are reflected in
both the choice of measures and the level of measurement. That is, the performance
measures are aligned with the program goal of early detection and treatment for women
served by the program. Consequently, the performance measures reflect clinical
indicators of follow-up for abnormal screening results and initiation of treatment for
women diagnosed with cancer.
6.1.3.2.4 Use of Targets or Standards
DCPC has set a standard for each of the eleven performance measures – standards
are based on varied sources: available clinical evidence, DCPC policy, cumulative MDE
data, and expert opinion. The standards allow grantees some flexibility – for instance,
while DCPC policy encourages that programs screen women age 50 and older for breast
cancer, the standard allows for 25% to be under age 50. Similarly, CDC has established a
standard that 90% of women diagnosed with breast cancer should initiate treatment,
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allowing for those women who refuse treatment or who may be lost to follow-up. While
DCPC has been fairly transparent over the years in the development of its MDEs and
performance measures, participants suggested that there was less explicit rationale about
some of the standards.
6.1.3.2.5 Quality Assurance Efforts
Like the service delivery models, data systems vary across the 68 grantees. Some
use more decentralized models of data collection in which MDE data is managed at the
local or regional level and then submitted to state at required intervals. Others use paperbased systems in which forms are submitted to the state and data entry takes place in a
more centralized fashion. The development of web-based systems is on the rise, allowing
providers or local managers to enter data into a system where the grantee then has
immediate access to it. As mentioned, DCPC’s data contractor developed a data
management system for grantees in the mid-1990s – about half of the programs use it
while others rely on data bases they have developed or modified. One challenge of the
decentralized system is that so many different people in different roles conduct data entry
– and with staff turnover, training and re-training are a constant issue.
DCPC requires, as a condition of funding, that a de-identified, data file be
submitted to the data contractor by all grantees semi-annually. The data contractor then
cleans the data, conducts edit checks to assess data quality, develops a set of standardized
reports, and produces an aggregate data set for DCPC. The standardized reports produced
by the data contractor were developed in collaboration with DCPC’s MDE committee
and include detailed edit reports, frequency plots, the DQIG, and a summary report of the
11 performance measures. The full set of reports is distributed to the grantees, DCPC
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program consultants, and DCPC’s NBCCEDP data manager. For each MDE submission,
a conference call is scheduled between the grantee, their technical consultant (i.e., data
contractor), and the DCPC program consultant to review the data reports. In advance of
the call, a detailed set of “data notes” is developed and distributed by the technical
consultant to the grantee and DCPC staff – these notes reflect any issue (data quality and
clinical quality) identified by the technical consultant and are used to guide the discussion
during the call. Following the call, the technical consultant prepares a list of action items
that require a narrative response by the grantee. This data review protocol has been in
place for years and is a fundamental component of DCPC’s technical assistance and
quality assurance process. The approach is soundly geared toward program improvement.
The technical consultant and the DCPC program consultant work as a team and are both
considered important resources for on-going support for the grantees. In addition to the
semi-annual data review, grantees are responsible for data quality assurance efforts. Edit
checks are regularly conducted by grantees along with periodic chart audits to assess the
validity of the MDE data against medical records.
DCPC conducted a study from 2003-2007 to assess the validity of the MDE data.
Over 5,000 total medical records were extracted and compared against MDE data records
in six states representing the largest NBCCEDP programs (i.e., numbers of women
screened). Results reflected high quality MDE data for the national program.
6.1.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data
As already apparent, the NBCCEDP performance measures are extensively used
in ways consistent with their intended purposes of accountability, program improvement,
and budgeting. Data suggest that the collection, reporting, and use of the performance
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measures (and MDE data, overall) are deeply rooted within the NBCCEDP program
culture. Several factors contribute to their integration in NBCCEDP management
practice. First, the MDEs have been collected since the program’s inception, hence, data
collection and reporting have always been an important and valued program activity.
Second, the data component is well funded – grantees are provided resources through
their cooperative agreement award to support data collection and reporting (e.g., staff
salary for a data manager, data system support), DCPC funds a data contractor, and
NBCCEDP staff include a senior data manager and programmer to work with the data
contractor and manage the CDC MDE dataset. And third, the program is “data-driven” –
all levels of DCPC management, including the program consultants, use these data for
decision making and program improvement. In fact, there is an expectation that these
data are an integral component of program operations and management.
The performance measures are used by DCPC to hold grantees accountability.
Interviews with two DCPC program consultants and two grantee representatives suggest
that some grantees are also using the data to hold local, regional, or providers
accountable. In addition, the performance measures are used for political purposes.
DCPC and NBCCEDP grantees use the measures to support requests for increased
funding or defend against funding cuts. DCPC regularly uses performance data as part of
Congressional testimony or other reports. Next, the performance management system,
with its regular data reviews, follow-up action reports, and on-going quality assurance all
support the use of the performance measurement data for program improvement. And
finally, the use of the performance measures as part of a larger performance-based budget
formula beginning in 2005 has given the measures even greater attention. Those
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interviewed said there was not much pushback from grantees in reaction to use of the
performance measures in budgeting, perhaps because of the wide acceptability of the
measures and confidence in the data. There are, however, some unintentional problems
and “gaming” created by tying the measures to funding, including some manipulation of
performance to meet CDC standards and changes in program practice that allow grantees
to more effectively perform on the measures.

6.2 Findings
6.2.1 Although the NBCCEDP network compromises control over program
implementation, DCPC has designed its performance measurement system in ways
that support CDC’s and grantees’ control over performances.
In contrast to most public health programs, the NBCCEDP is a clinical, service
delivery program which offers DCPC benefits in terms of its evaluation. In addition,
DCPC has defined the NBCCEDP goals narrowly to focus on the women served through
the program rather than aiming for broader, population-level effects. Consequently,
grantees are accountable only for the women screened through the NBCCEDP. This is
contrast to the Division’s GPRA and PART measures that are population-based and
largely viewed as unreasonable standards for which DCPC should be held accountable.
As noted in section 6.1.1.4, a DCPC economic study conducted in collaboration with the
U.S. Census Bureau showed that, given resource levels, the NBCCEDP is able to screen
approximately 16% of the eligible population 41 or about 1% of the total women in the
U.S. for breast cancer. Consequently, achieving population-level effects in regard to
mortality are viewed as not particularly realistic. As one participant remarked,
41

Women at 250% or less of the federal poverty guidelines and who are un- or underinsured.
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The first thing I do is look at it [GPRA/PART measures] and I say, ‘this is
ridiculous’. You know, these are really bad ways to evaluate this
program…I always think it’s better to say that this can’t be done or we
can’t answer this than pretend we can. They [OMB] want to see an impact
on mortality and they just are not going to see an impact on mortality.
There are 15 other things they [OMB] could ask us to show to put some
credibility in the program and to evaluate it. It just tells me that the people
who are asking the question don’t understand mortality.
With program outcomes based on the women served through the NBCCEDP and
with the availability of patient-level clinical data (i.e., MDEs), the NBCCEDP has
selected 11 performance measures that are closely tied to the work of the health care
providers within the vertical network of the program. Because the NBCCEDP represents
a service delivery program, DCPC was able to identify a common set of performance
measures appropriate and relevant for all even though it is comprised of a vast
implementation network with considerable variability – 68 grantees, 22,000 local
providers, and horizontal partners at every level.
The types of measures include process-level measures (e.g., who is screened,
completeness of data), short-term outcome measures (e.g., timeliness of diagnostic
follow-up for women with abnormal screening results), and intermediate outcome
measures (e.g., timeliness from the date of diagnosis to the initiation of cancer treatment
for women diagnosed with cancer). In this case, the types of measures selected are those
over which health care providers have the ability to effect. In addition, grantees are able
to maintain some control over their vertical network partners based on their funding
relationships and CDC has structured its cooperative agreements to support greater
authority over grantees. Therefore, accountability within the NBCCEDP is less
fragmented than in networks heavily reliant on unfunded, horizontal partners.
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In regard to the 11 performance measures, grantee staff have complained when
specific measures are outside what they view as their direct control. Grantees are
especially sensitive to this issue given that DCPC is using seven of the 11 measures as
part of a performance-based budgeting formula. In response to grantees’ concerns, DCPC
has made revisions to its performance measures over time to strengthen grantees’ control
over them. For instance, one performance measure assesses the timeliness from an
abnormal Pap screening result to diagnostic follow-up and includes a standard of 60 days.
Grantees argued it was not “fair” to hold them accountable for the timeliness of women
referred to the NBCCEDP for diagnostic follow-up who had been screened outside the
program. That is, grantees argued that they do not have control over the efficiency in
which horizontal partners refer women to the program for diagnostics or over how long
women wait to come in for diagnostic follow-up. One person explained,
A good number of these women are referred in [to the NBCCEDP] for
diagnostic care because they were screened and identified as having an
abnormal Pap somewhere else. It might be that the Title X family planning
program screened a woman, they found an abnormal Pap, but it’s not
within their purview to provide diagnostic testing, so they refer her to us.
What the programs don’t have control over is how long it takes that
woman to show up.
Consequently, DCPC recently changed how the measure is calculated for the
purpose of performance based funding to adjust for women referred for diagnostic
follow-up. The adjustment not only addresses grantees’ issues with the measures, but
should resolve unintended consequences DCPC had documented stemming from how
the measure was traditionally calculated – most notably, at least one grantee, worried that
referral delays were affecting their performance on the measure, had stopped accepting
diagnostic referrals into their program.

259

6.2.2 Policy tools, management practice, and network partnerships enhance CDC
and grantee control over the NBCCEDP performance measures.
Given that the decentralized network structure of the NBCCEDP compromises
control within the network, DCPC and grantees apply policy tools and management
practices to help preserve a level of authority over vertical partners on whom
performance is dependent. For instance, DCPC uses a cooperative agreement as the
funding mechanism which affords CDC come control over grantees. One person said,
The concept [of a cooperative agreement] is that it’s a collaborative
process. We [DCPC and grantees] set goals together, we monitor progress,
we work together for improvement, and we make changes as we go
forward, as needed. So, the whole idea is that the Federal government is
playing a substantial role in the activities, and that’s what the name of it
means. A lot of people don’t understand it that way. Most people in the
health departments in the higher up levels understand it, but it takes some
reminding sometimes because they’d like to just receive the money and
check back with you when it’s time to ask for more.
While grantees choose mechanisms to fund local level partners at their discretion,
this study suggests that some are using performance-based contracting, reimbursement
policies, or other means to help preserve control over performance that is otherwise
dependent on local level partners. A participant representing a grantee explained,
“They’ve [providers] got case load requirements, so if they contract [with us] for a
thousand women [to screen for the year], they’ve got to serve at least 97% of them in
order to get paid for their administrative part.” Another grantee representative suggested
that, over the years, poor performers had simply been replaced. Other grantees withhold
reimbursement until providers or local level agencies submit required MDE data or tie
reimbursement to providers’ performance on the NBCCEDP measures.
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DCPC also has a powerful monitoring tool in the MDE data set – all grantees are
required, as a condition of their award, to submit MDE data to DCPC semi-annually.
Grantees have developed extensive data management systems that allow them to collect
data from the local level. Consequently, DCPC is able to carefully monitor local-level
service delivery by continually assessing patient-level screening data and intervene as
necessary if and when implementation problems are identified. The same is true for
grantees – for instance, the MDE data can be used to identify specific providers who are
performing poorly facilitating quick intervention. Therefore, the availability of the
comprehensive MDE data enhances control within the vertical network even when
implementation may be several steps removed.
Finally, developing effective relationships between vertical network partners also
facilitates control and allows CDC and grantees to better influence performance. A
representative of a grantee agency explained their success in consistently meeting the
performance measurement standards this way,
I think it’s because we have developed really good relationships with our
contractors [that they have control]. They’re there for us when we need
something, or we need something done differently, or we’ve identified an
issue. And we’re there for them, so we’re reciprocating.

6.2.3 The NBCCEDP network requires that DCPC make significant resource
investments to build a comprehensive performance management system in order to
ensure data quality and the use of performance measurement data at multiple
levels.
NBCCEDP’s network structure requires that DCPC maintain a performance
management system that supports data quality and the use of the data for accountability,
program improvement, and budgeting. DCPC has committed extensive resources to this
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effort. The provision of resources (e.g., MDE data users manual, data management
software), technical assistance (e.g., data contractor’s technical consultants, CDC
program consultants), training (e.g., on-site, annual data managers meeting), extensive
quality assurance efforts, and the semi-annual data review process are all part of a
comprehensive NBCCEDP performance management system. These resources represent
millions of federal dollars and underscore the investment needed to support performance
measurement in a network context.
Since the NBCCEDP’s inception, DCPC has nurtured a data-driven culture. MDE
collection and reporting were a requirement of the first eight cooperative agreements in
1991. The emphasis on data has been strengthened over time and serious attention to the
MDE data and performance measures is given by every level of staffing at CDC from
program consultants, Branch management, and Division and Center leadership. One
person said, “I think the bottom line is that the programs had a voice in designing the
MDEs, they grew up with the MDEs, and for the [new] programs that were added on
later, the data were a given. It’s just part of the programmatic requirement that starts on
day one.”
As described in section 6.2.3.1, DCPC hired a data contractor in 1993 to manage
the MDE data submitted by grantees and provide technical support to NBCCEDP
grantees. The data contractor has worked with DCPC over time to develop a data
management software program (that about half the grantees use), the MDE Data Users
Manual, and provide technical assistance to grantees. Each NBCCEDP grantee is
assigned a technical consultant (from the data contractor agency) and a DCPC program
consultant – together this team provides on-going data management and programmatic

262

support through monthly conference calls, site visits, and annual meetings of grantee
program directors and data managers. Semi-annual data reviews, 42 based on each MDE
submission, represent an important component of DCPC’s performance management
system. One person said,
It’s [the data review process] just a cycle that continues forever basically.
We look at a fairly current period of time and look at performance,
identify any problems, [including] trend-type problems, and have the
grantee address it either as a program issue that the CDC program
consultant would deal with or as a data collection/reporting problem that
our data contractors could give advice on.
These efforts along with others also help ensure data quality for all MDEs and,
consequently, for the performance measures. Again, the network implementation
structure of the NBCCEDP demands the inclusion of extensive quality assurance
mechanisms at all levels. Edit checks have been built into data management systems,
grantees perform local level chart reviews, and the data contractor conducts edit checks.
One participant suggested that data quality is enhanced when all levels of the vertical
chain are aware of and understand the NBCCEDP performance measures.
As far as data quality, no matter where the data collection is happening, if
the grantee relays those [performance] indicators that are expected of them
down the chain to the providers, or the regional folks, I think that’s when
we see a good quality data set coming in. Everybody’s on board of what
the expectations are from the CDC. So the local folks know that they need
to get in timely and accurate data to their state so that those indicators are
met. I’ve definitely seen programs that relay that information down,
especially in the same type of feedback reports that the CDC uses, down to
their local levels. I think there tends to be cleaner data and more accurate
data if everybody’s on the same level.

42

The semi-annual data review process is detailed in section 6.2.3.1
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Finally, NBCCEDP’s data-driven culture and DCPC’s investment in its
performance management system contribute to greater utility of the performance data at
all levels. One person said,
I’ve been extraordinarily impressed with how its [data system] become a
very sophisticated MDE system, number one. And I’ve been
extraordinarily impressed with the fact that not only do we collect the data
but we actually use it, which, in a lot of places, even at CDC, either it’s
not collected, or it’s not collected well, or if it’s collected, nobody ever
looks at it or uses it! I think that we [NBCCEDP] have the full spectrum.
Our Division has a lot to be proud in that regard – we manage with data.
Utility has been enhanced by grantees’ use of the data with their local level partners. A
participant remarked,
Some of the states have broken this [performance indicator report] apart
by their units, their districts, or whatever they have, and say ‘Here’s how
we performed as the state, but look at your district, it’s much better or
worse.’ We found that the old saying, ‘what gets measured gets done’
works. And people are becoming more accountable by having these
[performance] reports and being able to see it. That gives them something
to shoot for, an opportunity to improve.
The most important factor influencing the use of the NBCCEDP performance data
may be that DCPC and grantees alike view the measures as fair, meaningful, and relevant
to the program goals. The choice of measures and the types of measures (i.e., process,
short and intermediate-level outcome) assure that they are tied closely enough to the
program’s work so that they are, indeed, actionable. Universally, participants suggested
that the performance measures represented the most important priorities for the program
– primarily, high quality care for women screened through the NBCCEDP. A participant
remarked,
If you did a random survey of the grantees – or asked all of them – I
would not be surprised if all of them would say they do not want to get rid
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of it [performance measures]. This is a security blanket for them. We’re a
program that screens women for cancer and this is a security blanket for
them to know that women are followed up, and they’re not going to find
out 3 to 6 months down the pike that a woman had cancer that they missed
because they screened her and didn’t follow up. So I think it serves a winwin purpose there, and I think the programs clearly see that.

6.3 Summary
The NBCCEDP represents a clinical, service delivery system. Given the
NBCCEDP’s decentralized program structure, DCPC has designed their performance
measurement system in ways that increase grantees’ control over program outcomes and
enhance data utilization. First, rather than assuming a broad population-based
perspective, DCPC identified program goals that are consistent with the program
authorizing language and emphasize accountability for only those women screened
through the program. Second, DCPC selected performance measures that are closely tied
to the work of providers, network partners in the vertical chain over which DCPC and
grantees have some degree of control given the existence of funding mechanisms and
management practices. Third, DCPC has made revisions to the way it calculates some
measures to reduce grantees’ dependence on factors outside the control of providers.
Finally, DPCP has made a significant investment in structuring a comprehensive data
management system that has aided the adoption of the performance measures and
enhanced utilization of data. In the end, the NBCCEDP performance measures are
overwhelmingly viewed as meaningful, valuable, and fair by both DCPC staff and
grantees. This may account for the ability of DCPC to use the measures for strengthening
accountability, program improvement, and budgeting. One person said, “No matter what
the programs say, their data basically speak for them. I think it just brings this common
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denominator to every program. Despite how they would describe themselves, it’s like,
well, your data describe you.”
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CHAPTER 7
NATIONAL TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAM (NTCP)
7.1 NTCP Case Description
7.1.1 The Program
7.1.1.1 CDC Organizational Context
In the 1990s, federally-funded tobacco control efforts were supported through two
different initiatives: The National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) American Stop Smoking
Intervention Study for Cancer Prevention (ASSIST) Program, a demonstration program,
and CDC’s Initiatives to Mobilize for the Prevention and Control of Tobacco Use
(IMPACT). In 1999, these two efforts were combined to form the NTCP, and, under
CDC’s management, all 50 U.S. states were funded. The purpose of the NTCP is to
reduce tobacco-related disease, disability, and death. The program is administered by
CDC’s Office on Smoking and Health (OSH) in the National Center for Chronic Disease
Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP).
Today the NTCP represents OSH’s largest program. In fiscal year 2007, CDC
awarded a total of $66.1 million to 58 grantees (all 50 states, D.C., and 7 U.S. territories).
Individual awards ranged from $172,516 to $2,059,294 with an average award of
$1,140,588 (median award $1,253,543). The current five-year cooperative agreement (PA
03-022) has been in place since 2003. The agreement was extended for one year in 2008,
and a new competitive funding announcement (DP09-901) was issued in November 2008
with an expected award date of March 2009. While some staff in OSH have worked there
for many years, there has also been turnover in key management positions. The Division
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Director position was vacant for several years, and the leader of the Evaluation Team
within the Epidemiology Branch has had four acting branch chiefs over the course of the
last 2 to 3 years – the position was permanently filled during the summer of 2008.
7.1.1.2 Program Goals
According to the American Cancer Society (ACS), 43 lung cancer is the leading
cause of cancer-related death for both men and women; over 215,000 new cases and
nearly 162,000 deaths from lung cancer were estimated for 2008. Smoking tobacco is the
cause of over 80% of lung cancer cases. Tobacco control and prevention is complex –
multiple factors at the individual, community, and environmental level contribute to
tobacco use and the consequent risks posed by secondhand smoke.
OSH established the NTCP to encourage coordinated, nationwide tobacco control
activities. From the NTCP’s start, the program has articulated four program goals:
1. Prevent the initiation of tobacco use among young people.
2. Eliminate nonsmokers’ exposure to secondhand smoke.
3. Promote quitting among adults and young people.
4. Identify and eliminate tobacco-related disparities.
Given the complexity of tobacco control, OSH and its partners encourage a
comprehensive approach to tobacco control. In a 2007 report, CDC states, “A
comprehensive approach one that optimizes synergy from applying a mix of educational,
clinical, regulatory, economic, and social strategies- has been established as the guiding
principle for eliminating the health and economic burden of tobacco use.” 44 And

43
44

http://www.cancer.org/downloads/PRO/LungCancer.pdf, accessed January 21, 2009.

CDC, HHS. Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, 2007.
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recognizing that a comprehensive approach cannot be accomplished by any single agency
or organization, OSH also emphasizes that tobacco control “requires coordination and
collaboration across the federal government, across the nation, and within each state.” 45
OSH encourages the achievement of the four national goals through community
interventions and mobilization; counter-marketing; policy development and
implementation; and surveillance. The NTCP cooperative agreement supports the
following activities: program and fiscal management, strategic planning, collaboration
and communication with partners, surveillance and evaluation, training and technical
assistance, information exchange, and local grants programs to support community based
coalition building, planning, policy development and implementation, and local-level
surveillance and evaluation. With the exception of the Quitlines, OSH funds may not be
used for research or to provide direct services such as individual and group cessation
services, patient care, personal health services medications, patient rehabilitation, or other
costs associated with the treatment of diseases caused by tobacco use.
7.1.1.3 Stage of Program Development
The NTCP can be described as a mature program – it has been in place in one
form or another since the mid-1990s and its goals are clear and well articulated. In fact,
partners at all levels have adopted the four goal areas that comprise the NTCP framework
and also promote them. Over time, the NTCP has developed logic models for three of the
four goal areas to model the causal linkages that lead to reductions in tobacco-related

45

CDC, HHS. Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, 2007.
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morbidity and mortality 46 (see figures 1-3 in section 7.1.3.1). The tobacco control field
benefits from a strong science base, the result of many years of well-funded research
efforts. Robust evidence supports a number of effective interventions. Consequently,
OSH has constructed evidence-based logic models that highlight, from left to right, the
inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes at three levels – short-term, intermediate, and
long-term.
The linkage between behavioral outcomes, such as reductions in tobacco
consumption, and the distal outcomes (i.e., morbidity and mortality) is well established.
Various reports including those from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) along with CDC’s
Guide to Community Preventive Services: Systematic Review and Evidence-based
Recommendations, provide a valuable synthesis of evidence related to tobacco control
activities. In 1999, OSH published a guide titled, Best Practices for Comprehensive
Tobacco Control Programs, to encourage evidence-based practice in the field. 47 The
guide describes evidence-based, best practices for each of five components of a
comprehensive tobacco control program – state and community interventions, health
communication interventions, cessation interventions, surveillance and evaluation, and
administration and management. The guide also provides recommended program
intervention budgets for each state based on population, prevalence of tobacco use,
infrastructure costs, the number of local health units, the proportion of the population that
is uninsured, and other factors. For instance, OSH recommends an annual investment of
$254.3 million for tobacco control intervention budgets in New York.

46

There is not a strong science-base related to the health disparity goal, therefore, a
related logic model has not been developed.
47
The guide was updated in 2007.
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As a condition of their cooperative agreement awards, NTCP grantees report on
their progress semi-annually through a web-based system managed by OSH called the
Chronicle. The system captures both narrative and quantitative data. The Chronicle was
under a significant redesign effort at the time this study was conducted. Grantees are only
required to report on activities funded through OSH dollars, not those reflecting the
totality of their tobacco control funds.
7.1.1.4 Budget Stability
Like other programs at CDC, the NTCP has been relatively flat-funded for the
past six to seven years. The total anticipated award for the fiscal year 2009 program is
estimated at $63 million 48 . While the NTCP awards from OSH may reflect the sole
resources for some grantees, many others receive additional sources of funds, sometimes
many times the size of their CDC award. Individual settlements with the tobacco industry
and the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the tobacco industry provided an
influx of funding to states in the late 1990s and beyond. Today, roughly 90% of funds for
tobacco control efforts are provided by state legislatures through excise tax revenues and
settlement funds 49 . Consequently, grantees often integrate multiple funding streams to
support the implementation of their comprehensive tobacco control programs.
Unfortunately, in many states, tax and settlement fund resources have been diverted to
address other priorities as the country’s economic situation has worsened. Massachusetts
lost 92% of their state funding in 2002 when the state experienced an economic crisis.

48
49

Fiscal year 2009 federal budget had not been finalized at the time of this writing.
CDC, HHS. Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, 2007.
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7.1.1.5 Stakeholders
The goals of the NTCP can only be achieved in concert with its many
stakeholders. Externally these include CDC’s sister agencies such as the NCI and the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). National
foundations are also critical partners and include the Robert Woods Johnson Foundation,
the American Legacy Foundation, ACS, American Lung Association, American Heart
Association, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (CTFK), and Americans for NonSmokers’ Rights, among others. The National Association of Chronic Disease Directors
(NACDD) is an organization comprised of state and territorial chronic disease directors
and represents another important stakeholder group. Overall, NTCP enjoys a strong
commitment across partner agencies to work together in order to achieve the four goals
highlighted earlier.
7.1.1.6 Political Context
The broader political climate around tobacco control extends to the NTCP. OSH
representatives work closely with Health and Human Services (HHS) offices in
Washington D.C. to coordinate tobacco control efforts across federal agencies. CDC also
provides staffing to the U.S. Surgeon General’s office, meeting with the Surgeon General
several times throughout the year and providing support in developing Congressional
testimony and other presentations. Over time, the NTCP has benefited from political
victories related to tobacco control that have resulted in periods of high visibility and
legislative opportunity. During late 1990s, the first states resolved legal battles with the
tobacco industry and the MSA with other states was completed. Of course, the tobacco
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industry presents a powerful and well-funded political opponent to the entire tobacco
control community, including the NTCP. Participants spoke about how the political
context within an individual state may influence the areas of focus for a NTCP grantee
program. For instance, a particular state may have a strong restaurant and bar lobby that
makes it difficult to pursue policy related to second-hand smoke.
7.1.2 The Implementation Network
7.1.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships
NTCP’s vertical chain begins in Washington D.C. with Congress, HHS, and
others. Federal funds are appropriated to CDC, and staff in OSH’s Program Services
Branch oversee the 58 NTCP cooperative agreements. As mentioned, these dollars are
often complimented by other, more significant resources at the state level, although some
grantees have experienced reductions in state contributions over the past several years.
For most grantees, a large portion of their NTCP funds are retained by the grantee (state
or territory) to support staff and other infrastructure costs that allow them to manage a
comprehensive tobacco control program. Some grantees also use a portion of their NTCP
funds to support Quitlines 50 and grants to local-level partners. Typically, non-CDC
resources (state and private contributions) are used to fund local-level agencies, mass
media campaigns, universities, and others. Regardless of how CDC funds are used,
however, OSH encourages grantees to involve local-level partners.
In summary, the comprehensive tobacco control approach endorsed by the NTCP
involves an extensive vertical network of relationships with between CDC, its grantees,
50

Quitline services are available in every state. The program provides telephone
counseling and support for tobacco cessation.
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and their partners at the local level, often city or county health agencies or community
based organizations (CBOs). Therefore, the vertical chain is not strictly
intergovernmental. In addition, the vertical structure within individual states and
territories varies – for instance, as a home rule state, Massachusetts must collaborate with
351 towns, each with its own government, while California works with 61 different local
lead agencies.
7.1.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships
Extensive horizontal partner involvement is a prerequisite in achieving a
comprehensive tobacco control strategy targeting four different goals (i.e., smoking
initiation, cessation, second-hand smoke, and disparities) through a complement of
interventions (e.g., educational, clinical, regulatory, economic, and social strategies). The
NTCP network includes horizontal relationships at all levels of government, including
federal, state, and local. OSH collaborates externally with federal partners such as NCI,
IOM, SAMHSA, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality as well as with
nongovernmental partners including ACS, CTFK, American Lung Association, American
Heart Association, American Legacy Foundation, Robert Woods Johnson Foundation,
Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights, and others. OSH policy staff meet quarterly with
many of these partners to ensure coordination of efforts. OSH also works closely with
national organizations that represent the interests of state and local-level public health
groups such as the National Association of City and County Health Officials
(NACCHO), the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO), and the
NACCD. Given that tobacco-use is an important risk factor for other chronic diseases
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(e.g., cancer, heart disease, diabetes), OSH staff work with other CDC divisions within
the NCCDPHP.
At the state level, extensive collaboration occurs in support of comprehensive
tobacco control. CDC requires that grantees participate in state-wide tobacco control
planning and coalition building. States typically collaborate with others in state
government (e.g., education, environmental health, other public health programs), state or
regionally-based advocacy organizations (e.g., ACS, CTFK), universities, and
foundations (e.g., American Legacy Foundation). As a member of these coalitions, the
state health department is typically viewed as an influential partner, and depending on
resources, may play the leading role in state tobacco-control efforts. The planning efforts
help prioritize intervention efforts and coordinate funding support. For instance, the state
health department may offer a number of local-level grants for second-hand smoke
reduction, American Legacy Foundation funds may support an intervention for youth,
and ACS may commit resources to work on state legislative policy initiatives.
At the local level, horizontal partners are also engaged. Local-level coalition
building is encouraged and often funded by NTCP grantees to bring together varied
partners from public health, education, health care, business, and local advocacy groups
to plan for coordinated tobacco control efforts.
7.1.2.3 Network Function: Authority and Control within the Network
As noted, OSH uses a cooperative agreement as the funding mechanism to
support its NTCP grantees. Participants viewed cooperative agreements as facilitating
“shared ownership,” but not providing them much control or authority over grantees.
Requirements specified in the program announcement (e.g., reporting requirements) are
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relatively minimal and, as already noted, OSH can only require reporting on CDC-funded
activities. In contrast, grantees more often use contracts to fund local-level partners or
memoranda of agreement with other partner agencies.
7.1.2.4 Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities within the
Network
Network partners, both vertical and horizontal, share a strong commitment to the
four program goals discussed earlier. At the same time, however, each organization
involved in the tobacco control community has their unique agenda and philosophy
which sometimes introduces relationship challenges. In addition, states and territories
must contend with the tobacco industry which represents views diametrically opposed to
their cause. CDC’s endorsement of strategic planning, coalition building, and
sustainability reflect pointed attempts to bring partners together to build a shared vision
and priorities.
7.1.2.5 Network Function: Variability in Context, Resources, and Capacity
The NTCP grantees vary tremendously in their context, resources, and capacity.
The individual context of a state or territory may be an important factor driving the
emphasis of program efforts; one state may focus on second-hand smoke while another
gives priority to youth access. Resources also vary and often limit the ability of grantees
to address all four program goals. Across the NTCP grantees, program budgets may
reflect extreme differentials when all funding sources are considered. And the funding
context can change quickly and radically as indicated by the Massachusetts experience
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when 92% of their state funding was eliminated in a single year. Capacity varies across
grantees as well, influenced by factors such as staff resources and expertise.
7.1.3 Performance Measurement System
7.1.3.1 Process to Develop the Performance Measurement System
In 2005, OSH published an evaluation guide titled, Key Outcome Indicators for
Evaluating Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs intended for planners, managers,
and evaluators of state and territorial tobacco control programs and for CDC’s national
partners. Over a four-year process, an evaluation team led by OSH’s Epidemiology
Branch developed 120 evidence-based key outcome indicators (KOIs) that are included
in the guide. Using the three logic models developed for the NTCP program goals as a
framework, the CDC evaluation team worked to refine the logic models and identify
relevant short-term, intermediate, and long-term outcomes. The guide does not address
the “left half” of the logic models, that is, the process measures related to inputs,
activities, or outputs. Crafted in a “Consumer Reports” format, each of the 120 indicators
is rated on a number of criteria. Reporting on the KOIs is not required of NTCP grantees,
but they are encouraged to use the guide and indicators for program planning and
evaluation and to report measures of their choice. Nearly all grantees report on some
measures as part of their semi-annual progress reporting through OSH’s Chronicle.
Soon after the key outcome indicators (KOIs) guide was published in 2005, OSH
embarked on two other related efforts – to develop process-level indicators and to
identify a subset of the KOIs called “core indicators” in order to provide a “national
snapshot” of the program. The 32 core indicators (and the data sources for each
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indicator 51 ) are summarized in table 23 and are organized according to the goal area and
indicator type as defined by the key outcome indicator guide 52 . Three of the four logic
models for NTCP goals are included as figures 1-3. The indicator number in the table
below corresponds to the numbered box in the logic model. For instance, two of the core
indicators (1.6.3 and 1.6.5) correspond to outcome #6 in the logic model for goal one
(i.e., figure 1, outcome #6 – “increased knowledge of, improved anti-tobacco attitudes
toward, and increased support for policies to reduce youth initiation”). Likewise, core
indicator 1.14.1 corresponds to outcome #14 in the goal one logic model (i.e., figure 1,
outcome #14, “reduced tobacco-use prevalence among young people”).

51

Addressing Tobacco in Managed Care (ATMC), Survey of Health Plans 1997-1998;
National Adult Tobacco Survey (NATS); Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS); California Adult Tobacco Survey (CATS); Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
(CTFK); CDC Health Profiles (Profiles); CDC State Tobacco Activities Tracking System
(STATE); CDC Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS); Current Population
Survey: Tobacco Use Supplement (CPS TUS); Youth Tobacco Survey (YTS)
52
Two of the 32 indicators are included in two goal areas, therefore, there are a total of
30 unique core indicators.
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Table 23. NTCP Core Outcome Indicators
Goal Area

Goal One:
Preventing
Initiation of
Tobacco Use
Among
Young
People

Core Indicator and Data Source(s)

Indicator
Type

1.6.3 Proportion of students who would ever wear or use
something with a tobacco company name or picture (YTS)

Short-term
outcome

1.6.5 Level of support for increasing excise tax on
tobacco products (NATS)

Short-term
outcome

1.7.1 Proportion of schools or school districts reporting
the implementation of 100% tobacco-free policies
(Profiles)

Short-term
outcome

1.8.2 Proportion of jurisdictions (State and Local) with
policies that require retail licenses to sell tobacco products
(measurement protocol under development)

Short-term
outcome

1.8.7 Changes in state tobacco control laws that preempt
stronger local tobacco control laws (STATE)

Short-term
outcome

1.9.1 Extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and
promotions (measurement protocol under development)

Short-term
outcome

1.9.10 Number and type of Master Settlement Agreement
violations by tobacco companies (measurement protocol
under development)

Short-term
outcome

1.10.5 Proportion of young people who are susceptible
never-smokers (YTS)

Intermediate
outcome

1.11.1 Proportion of successful attempts to purchase
tobacco products by young people (YTS, YRBSS)

Intermediate
outcome

1.12.1 Amount of tobacco product excise tax (STATE,
CTFK, State departments of revenue)

Intermediate
outcome

1.13.2 Proportion of young people who report never
having tried a cigarette (YTS, YRBSS)

Long-term
outcome

1.14.1 Prevalence of tobacco use among young people
(YTS, YRBSS)

Long-term
outcome

2.3.7 Level of support for creating tobacco-free policies
in public places and workplaces (NATS, BRFSS)

Short-term
outcome
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Goal Area

Goal Two:
Eliminating
Exposure to
Secondhand
Smoke

Goal Three:
Promoting
Quitting
Among
Adults and
Young
People

Core Indicator and Data Source(s)

Indicator
Type

2.4.1 Proportion of jurisdictions [State and Local] with
public policies for tobacco-free workplaces and other
indoor and outdoor places (measurement protocol under
development)

Short- term
outcome

2.4.3 Proportion of the population that works in
environments with tobacco-free policies (NATS, CPS
TUS)

Short-term
outcome

2.4.4 Proportion of the population reporting voluntary
tobacco-free home or vehicle policies (NATS)

Short-term
outcome

2.4.6 Changes in state tobacco control laws that preempt
stronger local tobacco control [clean indoor air] laws
(STATE)

Short-term
outcome

2.6.1 Perceived compliance with tobacco-free policies in
workplaces (NATS)

Intermediate
outcome

2.7.1 Proportion of the population reporting exposure to
secondhand smoke in the workplace (CATS)

Long-term
outcome

2.7.3 Proportion of the population reporting exposure to
secondhand smoke at home or in vehicles (NATS, YTS)

Long-term
outcome

2.7.5 Proportion of nonsmokers reporting overall
exposure to secondhand smoke (YTS; California
Independent Evaluation)

Long-term
outcome

2.8.1 Per capita consumption of tobacco products
(STATE, State departments of revenue)

Long-term
outcome

3.7.1 Number of callers to telephone Quitlines (Quitline
call monitoring)

Short-term
outcome

3.8.5 Level of support for increasing excise tax on tobacco
products (NATS)

Short-term
outcome

3.10.1 Proportion of insurance purchasers and payers that
reimburse for tobacco cessation services (measurement
protocol under development)

Short-term
outcome
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Goal Area

Core Indicator and Data Source(s)

Indicator
Type

3.11.1 Proportion of adult smokers who have made a quit
attempt (NATS, BRFSS, CPS TUS)

Intermediate
outcome

3.11.2 Proportion of young smokers who have made a quit
attempt (YTS, YRBSS)

Intermediate
outcome

3.11.3 Proportion of adult and young smokers who have
made a quit attempt using proven cessation methods
[measure adults only] (NATS)

Intermediate
outcome

3.12.1 Amount of tobacco product excise tax (STATE,
CTK, State departments of revenue)

Intermediate
outcome

3.13.1 Proportion of smokers who have sustained
abstinence from tobacco use (NATS, BRFSS, YTS)

Long-term
outcome

3.14.1 Smoking prevalence [same as 2.8.3] (NATS,
BRFSS, YTS, YRBSS)

Long-term
outcome

3.14.4 Per capita consumption of tobacco products
(STATE, State departments of revenue)

Long-term
outcome
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Figure 1. NTCP Goal One Logic Model: Preventing Initiation of Tobacco Use Among Young People
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Figure 2. NTCP Goal Two Logic Model: Eliminating Exposure to Secondhand Smoke
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Figure 3. NTCP Goal Three Logic Model: Promoting Quitting Among Adults and Young People

284

The selection of the core indicators was dependent on the development of the
KOIs. Consequently, the overall effort can be viewed as one development process and is
described below. Table 24 summarizes some of the key developmental milestones.

Table 24. NTCP Indicator Development, 1999 2008
Fiscal Year

System Development

2001

Initiated effort to develop key outcome indicators

2002

Convened expert panel to assist in KOI development

2003

KOIs disseminated to grantees and entered into Chronicle

2005

KOI guide published and disseminated to grantees

2006

Core indicator project launched

2009

Estimated completion of core indicators

The development of the KOIs was led by an evaluation team within OSH’s
Epidemiology Branch. The team, working with contractors, began the project in 2001
initially thinking they would identify a set of 10-20 outcomes. In brief, the evaluation
team worked across the three NTCP goal-area logic models, developing potential
indicators to populate the boxes for short-term, intermediate, and long-term outcomes.
Although the team had aimed to develop a small number of indicators, the range of the
three goals areas and the variation in activities implemented by the grantees resulted in
the development of a much larger pool of KOIs. Once the evaluation team identified
potential indicators, they conducted a literature review to determine whether an
association existed between the proposed indicator and the outcome component in the
logic model. Next, potential data sources for each indicator were identified; if a data
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source did not exist, the group developed example questions that could be added to
existing surveys to collect the data.
OSH then convened a panel of 16 experts who represented state tobacco control
programs, universities, cancer or research institutes, and national partners. The panel met
in Atlanta and reviewed a total of 164 candidate performance measures, rating each on
the following criteria: strength of evaluation evidence, resources needed for data
collection and analysis, utility, face validity, conformity with accepted practice,
uniqueness, and overall quality. After all measures were rated by the panel, the evaluation
team made a number of revisions, merging some indicators, eliminating others. Next,
based on advice from the panel, the evaluation team hired an independent contractor to
conduct a literature review to more thoroughly assess the strength of the evidence for
each indicator. The contractor reviewed nearly 850 published and unpublished articles as
part of the comprehensive review process.
In 2003, OSH distributed a total of 120 KOIs to grantees, inviting them to begin
using the KOIs and also to provide CDC relevant feedback on the indicators. Staff in the
Program Services Branch entered all indicators into the Chronicle system. As discussed,
reporting on the KOIs is not a stipulation of the NTCP funding award, but grantees are
encouraged to include relevant measures as part of their semi-annual progress reporting
requirement. The OSH evaluation team continued to develop the KOI guide – it was
eventually published in May 2005 and includes the 120 key outcome indicators. The
Guide is organized according to the three goal areas and provides a detailed profile for
each indicator including an indicator rating table with assessments of the overall quality,
resources needed, strength of evaluation evidence, utility, face validity, and accepted
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practice – all in a “Consumers Report” format mentioned earlier. The profile for each
measure also includes more detailed information such as a rationale for the measure,
examples of data sources, other comments, and references.
Even before the KOI guide was published, the evaluation team had recognized the
need for a set of core indicators that could be assessed and monitored at the national
level. OSH staff realized that given the range of KOIs (120 unique indicators) and
differences in resource levels and areas of programmatic emphasis across grantees,
reporting on particular KOIs via the Chronicle would likely vary. Using the logic models
as a guiding framework and the KOIs as the primary pool of indicators, the evaluation
team initiated an effort to identify a set of core indicators. During the process, new
indicators that were not part of the KOIs were also introduced for consideration. Several
criteria informed the selection process. First, the group wanted to select indicators for
each of the three goal areas and ones that represented each level of outcome (short-term,
intermediate, long-term) in order to emphasize the causal linkages. Second, the team
aimed to choose indicators that were most closely aligned with OSH priorities in order to
convey national priorities and influence practice. Next, the team looked to identify
indicators associated with outcomes viewed as the strongest levers of change. And fourth,
selection was influenced, to some degree, by what data were available easily and quickly.
The first set of 32 core indicators was approved by Division leadership in October
2005. Since that time, the evaluation group has suffered from staff absences and some
turnover. More recently, the evaluation team has focused considerable effort to finalize
the core set. As reflected in table 23, most of the final 30 core indicators can be assessed
using national-level survey data. Grantees can use those same data at a state-level. At the
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time of data collection for this study, the evaluation team was collaborating with others in
OSH to finalize a new National Adult Tobacco Survey (NATS) that will be conducted in
2010 during the second year of the new 5-year NTCP funding cycle. OSH evaluators
were working to ensure that the NATS include survey questions relevant to several of the
core indicators. At the same time, the team has been working to develop data collection
protocols for five core measures that otherwise lack a data source (i.e., 1.8.2; 1.9.1;
1.9.10; 2.4.1; 3.10.1). Some of these indicators are particularly challenging, such as
measuring the extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and promotion (1.9.1) and the
number and type of MSA violations (1.9.10).
Of interest, indicators selected as core are fairly consistent with the most frequent
KOIs voluntarily reported by grantees in the Chronicle. Although such a correlation was
not a criterion for selecting the core indicators, OSH staff are relieved that the core
indicators will not represent a major departure from what grantees are already reporting.
7.1.3.2 Performance Measurement System Design
In this section, the design of the NTCP performance measurement system is
described highlighting the following: purpose of system; level of measurement; types of
measures; use of targets or standards; and quality assurance efforts. Table 25 summarizes
these design features.
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Table 25. Design Features of the NTCP Core Outcome Indicator System
Design Feature

NTCP Core Indicators

Purpose of system

Accountability

Level of measurement

Primarily state but some local level

Type(s) of performance measures

Short, Intermediate, and Long-term Outcomes

Use of targets

Set by grantees

Quality assurance efforts

Use of national survey data, provision of data
collection protocols for some measures

Use of performance data

Core indicators not yet implemented

7.1.3.2.1 Purpose
With the increase in tobacco control resources in the late 1990s and the resulting
influx of settlement funds, OSH evaluators recognized the importance of developing
outcome measures to address accountability demands at both the federal and state levels.
More recent cuts in state tobacco control resources have underscored the importance of
outcome measurement as a means to effectively defend resource allocations. At the
federal level, OSH wants to provide a “national picture” of the NTCP for HHS, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and others “above” CDC. Participants also
suggested that the core indicators will be used for monitoring purposes to assess the
NTCP at both the state level and national level.
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7.1.3.2.2 Level of Measurement
Most of the core indicators reflect state-level measures and are derived from
survey data including CDC’s youth tobacco survey, CDC’s behavioral risk factor
surveillance survey, the current population survey, and the forthcoming NATS. National
monitoring systems such as one maintained by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids and
CDC’s State Tobacco Activities Tracking System also serve as data sources for the core
indicators. As discussed, a small subset of measures reflects more complex requirements
for local-level data collection (e.g., extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and
promotions).
7.1.3.2.3 Types of Measures
The choice by OSH evaluators to focus on outcomes was influenced, in large part,
by political demands for accountability that emphasized outcomes rather than processlevel measures. The core indicators reflect three levels of outcomes: short-term,
intermediate, and long-term. In particular, the evaluators wanted to identify outcomes
where change could be detected within five years or less, rather than longer-term
outcomes that might take ten or more years to achieve. Given the focus on outcomes,
OSH recognizes that results reflect the combined work and resources of many agencies
and organizations involved in the comprehensive tobacco control effort. In other words,
the outcomes reflect effects of the overall comprehensive tobacco control programs, not
simply the CDC-funded efforts.
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7.1.3.2.4 Use of Targets or Standards
The variability in grantee resources and capacity make it difficult to establish
national targets. In addition, national targets for specific measures such as smoking
prevalence are challenged by variable prevalence rates across states. Currently, grantees
specify the goal area, the objective, a baseline, proposed target, and target date when
reporting on a KOI in the Chronicle. Evaluation team members anticipate that grantees
will do the same for the core indicators once the measures are finalized, although
revisions to the Chronicle may have implications for reporting.
7.1.3.2.5 Quality Assurance Efforts
A majority of the core indicators will be calculated based on national survey data
(or, for grantees, calculated based on state survey data). Consequently, the validity and
reliability of those data are well established. Appropriate sample sizes are determined for
both national and state-level assessments ensuring a representative sample size. But while
there is confidence in the quality of the data, problems have persisted in its reporting, at
least as it pertains to the KOIs. In particular, OSH has been challenged by grantees’ use
of “customized” measures rather than the KOIs as defined in the guide. The Chronicle
allows for grantees to submit customized measures, but the feature has been misused to
an extent. Grantees have tended to create custom indicators that are similar but slightly
different from the KOI as defined in the guide. OSH conducted an assessment of the
KOIs reported in the Chronicle for the period 2007-2008 and found that 38% of the
indicators reported were categorized as “customized,” and, of these, 56% were similar or
identical to the evidence-based indicator defined in the guide. Consequently, OSH has
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been limited in its use of the KOI indicator data that has been reported through the
Chronicle, especially in aggregating data across states.
As discussed, the evaluation team is working to define data collection and
measurement specifications for five of the core indicators that are more challenging to
measure (e.g., extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and promotions). The team is
developing strict data collection and reporting protocols for grantees to follow (e.g.,
sampling guidelines, observation instructions). But these measures are likely to be
especially vulnerable to data quality issues given that the data will be collected at the
local level by staff or volunteers of varied expertise.
7.1.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data
The KOIs have been used by the grantees, even if in a “customized” fashion. The
assessment recently conducted found that all 50 states and D.C. reported on at least one
KOI and most (n=44) are using at least one KOI in all three goal areas. Of the 120 total
indicators, 106 had been used by at least one state since they were introduced. Other than
the reporting of the KOIs to CDC, grantees’ use of the indicators is not known. At the
time of data collection for this study, the evaluation team was planning a qualitative
assessment of the use of the KOIs with a sample of nine states. Many participants spoke
of the value of the KOI guide and its use by grantees for program planning, in particular.
Program consultants are especially enthusiastic about the guide’s value and promote it
extensively among their grantees. In particular, the logic models are viewed as useful in
helping grantees understand the causal pathways necessary to achieving longer-term
outcomes. Dog-eared copies of the guide were evident in several offices.
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In regard to the core indicators, CDC anticipates using these to characterize the
national program and help defend resource allocations for the national program. Beyond
this, participants expressed differing views about their use. Some interviewed suggested
the core indicators are better defined as part of an evaluation system while others
suggested they were part of a performance monitoring system. Reporting the core
indicators will remain voluntary under the forthcoming five-year program announcement.
The infrequency of data collection inherent in many of the surveys challenges the core
indicators’ use for on-going data monitoring, and OSH has not developed a performance
management system (other than functions within the Chronicle) to support data use for
on-going performance measurement. At the state level, grantees may not have the
resources to participate in some of the surveys that provide needed indicator data.

7.2 Findings
7.2.1 Network consensus on goals, a strong evidence base, and extensive survey data
facilitate identification of outcome measures for comprehensive tobacco control.
Tobacco control efforts in the U.S. involve a network of agencies and
organizations that implement a mix of educational, clinical, regulatory, economic, and
social strategies. These efforts are supported by diverse sources of funding from federal
and state government as well as business and private foundations. State excise taxes on
tobacco products and settlement funds from legal victories over the tobacco industry
represent a significant investment in tobacco control efforts in some states, dwarfing
federal funds provided by CDC.
The NTCP was established to encourage coordinated, nationwide tobacco control
activities, and, as noted in the case description, CDC funds are primarily used by grantees
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to support program infrastructure costs, coalition building, statewide planning, and
surveillance and evaluation activities. One person said,
For most states, we’re [CDC] the backbone of their tobacco program and
we’re okay with the fact that the whole program is funded by much more
than us. I mean we’re just that much [indicating a small amount with her
fingers] of a lot of states in dollars, but they couldn’t get those other funds
without ours.
CDC funds are often used by the NTCP grantees to leverage other resources that are
sometimes more restricted in their use (e.g., required to be distributed to local levels).
Consequently, resources for tobacco control are frequently integrated at the state health
department to support a range of activities and often complimented by initiatives
supported by other organizations.
In 2001, OSH embarked on their effort to develop program performance measures
so that they could better characterize the NTCP nationally for accountability purposes.
The political climate and influx of funding in the late 1990s proved an incentive for OSH
to identify indicators of performance that would help defend resource allocations at both
the federal and state levels. Given the emphasis on accountability for results, OSH
wanted to identify outcome measures in particular. One person said about the focus on
outcomes,
That was a conscientious decision and we recognized, because
accountability was driving it, because outcomes are what people want
from an accountability standpoint, that that was the most important area.
So we focused on the outcomes piece and we did not focus on the process
piece initially.
Another participant commented,
The rationale [to focus on outcomes] was a very deliberate decision.
…And the reason the focus was on outcomes was because OSH felt that
states needed to demonstrate progress. They needed to, for political
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purposes, for using MSA dollars and other tax dollars – we really wanted
to invest in keeping an eye on the outcomes.
The process to develop outcome measures for the NTCP, led by evaluators in
OSH, has been facilitated by three factors: network consensus around program goals; a
strong evidence base; and the availability of extensive survey data.
As noted above and detailed in the case description, a network of agencies and
organizations are involved in planning, developing, and implementing tobacco control
efforts at the federal, state, and local levels. Leaders in the field of tobacco control at all
levels have adopted four program goals to direct tobacco control efforts: prevent the
initiation of tobacco use among young people, eliminate nonsmokers’ exposure to
secondhand smoke, promote quitting among adults and young people, and identify and
eliminate tobacco-related disparities. The four goals provide an organizing framework
from which to structure coordinated and complimentary interventions by varied network
members in individual states and territories. The network consensus around these four
goals has aided OSH in identifying program outcomes for which all network members
are committed and has supported the development of related performance measures.
Building on the four goals for tobacco control, OSH evaluators, in collaboration
with network stakeholders, have developed detailed logic models for three of the four
program goals that explicate relationships between program inputs, activities, and
outcomes (short-term, intermediate, and long-term). Construction of the logic models has
been aided by a strong science base, the result of a significant investment in research and
evaluation efforts over the past decades. In particular, OSH has developed causal
pathways for each goal and identified 120 key outcome indicators along those pathways
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that can be measured to help assess progress in ultimately achieving population-level
affects on tobacco-related morbidity and mortality. One participant said,
We know what works in tobacco control, and that’s where the key
outcome indicators are so helpful. It [the KOI guide] focuses on what data
sources you need and which of the key outcomes are a little bit more
effective. So states can look through [the guide] and decide which
outcomes best meet their needs for what they’re doing. But then it
provides, like I said, some consistency and some congruency with what
folks are doing.
Lastly, the development of outcome indicators for the NTCP has been supported
by the availability of extensive survey data. In many ways, OSH is “data rich” compared
to other public health programs. As indicated in table 23, survey data is used to calculate
most of the proposed core indicators at both the state and national levels (e.g., YTS,
YRBSS, BRFSS, NATS, and STATE). Consequently, OSH can calculate many of these
measures at the national level independent of grantees’ reporting of data. Not all grantees
have the resources to support state-level data collection for every survey. One person
working on the core indicators said,
In fact, we created a table that took the core indicators and allocated them
to states and to OSH [in regard to data collection and analysis]. There’s a
bunch of indicators that OSH can gather, even at the state-specific level,
without asking the states to do anything. And with the measurement
surveillance systems that are in existence, even more so now that NATS is
coming down, the National Adult Tobacco Survey. They’ve asked me to
cross check NATS drafts with the core indicators specifically. And there’s
a large percentage of them that will be captured by NATS that will be a
method to capture a large percentage of core indicators.
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7.2.2 The network implementation structure of the NTCP leads to a joint production
of outcomes and shared accountability.
As described, tobacco control is implemented by a network of agencies at
multiple levels. Vertical relationships, primarily supported by funding arrangements,
assure the involvement of federal, state, and local health agencies as well as other locallevel organizations. Populating each level are horizontal partnerships representing
government, nonprofits, academic institutions, health care, and commerce. Working with
a wide range of these partners, NTCP grantees frequently lead or participate in coalition
efforts to develop statewide plans for tobacco control that are implemented by a host of
agencies. For instance, in addressing the goal related to the prevention of tobacco use
among youth, the National Legacy Foundation might contract with a marketing firm to
develop a large scale, state-wide, counter marketing campaign. The state department of
education might endorse an anti-smoking school-based curricula or tobacco-free policies
for schools. The state health department might fund CBOs at local levels across the state
to implement anti-smoking interventions for youth. And advocacy groups might
introduce legislation to strengthen tobacco control laws in ways that protect young
people. One participant provided this example,
TFL [Tobacco Free Living] has the money for paid media – the state
doesn’t, because basically their only funding is from CDC. So in the
implementation of the smoke free air law education campaign, TFL took
the lead. They had the money. They had the expertise on site. The state
would compliment that by looking at activating local mini-grants to get
earned media at the local level to support the paid media that was going
on. So again, that’s leveraging, you’re linking.
This comprehensive approach is intended to optimize synergies across network
contributors in order to maximize program effects. Ultimately, program outcomes reflect

297

the contributions of the many. In other words, program outcomes are jointly produced by
network partners. This poses a potential concern for OSH’s venture to develop a set of
core outcome indicators. Specifically, accountability is less easily appropriated to one
agency or another – instead, accountability for outcomes in comprehensive tobacco
control efforts may best be characterized as “shared accountability.” One participant
described earlier attempts to try and disentangle each funder’s contributions,
We tried that back in the early ‘90s when there weren’t as many players in
the game and you still couldn’t do it. I mean, you had NCI who was doing
the $17 million dollars with the ASSIST program, you had our $5 million,
and Robert Wood Johnson’s smokeless states that were probably in there
for about $3 or $4 million. Even with that small amount of resources, you
still couldn’t ferret out the who’s who, and what money did what, and it
started driving the states crazy. And it’s like, we can play this game or we
can actually do public health and have something happen. So we all just
said look, we’re going to step back and evaluate these things in terms of
‘what are effective interventions in the direction we have to go as a
tobacco control community’. All the major funders came to that
agreement, because we were driving ourselves crazy, our grantees crazy,
and we were detracting time from actually doing the real work.
Therefore, for their measurement system, OSH has accepted what some view as a
limitation and others recognize as an unavoidable consequence of the networked
environment. That is, the inherent difficulty of assigning accountability for results when
outcomes follow from multiple and diverse interventions funded and implemented by a
network of collaborating institutions and agencies. OSH’s answer to this dilemma of
outcomes, accountability, and networks is to openly acknowledge that the NTCP core
outcome indicators more accurately represent outcomes for comprehensive tobacco
control, not simply the CDC-funded program.
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7.2.3 Network variability limits types and choice of NTCP core measures and their
use.
NTCP’s extensive network implementation structure has important implications
for the design of the core indicators. In particular, grantee variability in terms of state or
territorial context, tobacco control priorities, implementation activities, resources, and
capacity limits the types, choice, and use of core measures. One person described the
diversity across grantees as follows,
You have California that was already allocating $100 million [of state
funds] back in the ‘90s, so you have that wide range [of resources across
grantees]. And there’s a level of sophistication in the programs – you have
some programs that, as I like to put it, are really just doing the basics.
They’re trying to change social norms, they’re really trying to get the
word out about why tobacco is harmful, about how the [tobacco] industry
manipulates you, trying to get local ordinances passed, and that’s where
they are. Every few years or so, when there’s a perfect storm of
opportunity that brews up, they’ll try to get an increase in their excise tax
on tobacco products. But for the most part, they’re just chugging along
trying to get all their school districts to be tobacco-free, trying to get local
communities to have secondhand smoke ordinances, and those types of
things. Then you go and you find other states that are really progressive
and they’re out there working with the tobacco advocates, beginning to
work with the Medicaid folks, and are really zeroing in on which
[segment] of the low income population is still using tobacco during
pregnancy and developing special interventions and programs for them. So
you have other states that are really cutting edge and looking at how they
can use internet blogging and those types of communication avenues for
cessation programs. So it runs the gambit.
That kind of variability, as well as the breadth of four NTCP goal areas, is what
led to the initial development of 164 proposed key outcome indicators. Although OSH
evaluators had originally intended to identify a small set of outcome indicators for
accountability purposes, the number of indicators quickly expanded as reflected in the
statement below.
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It was [person’s name] that had actually come up with the idea of ‘let’s
come up with a list of 20 or 30 indicators that we think are important for
states to measure.’ And that grew into, like 200 indicators, because they’re
all important, depending on what the state is doing. And that’s where you
get into, you have 50 different states and 50 different programs, and
depending on what the state’s working on, they’re going to want to
measure different things.
“What the state’s working on” often depends on resources and the
selection of priorities consistent with the organizational and political context of a
given grantee. While one grantee may prioritize policy efforts to increase smoking
bans in bars and restaurants, another grantee may face a powerful and well-funded
lobby that dissuades it from addressing the issue.
It was also variability that tabled the effort to develop a similar set of
process measures to accompany the KOIs. OSH evaluators found it impossible to
develop a common set of process measures given that grantees conducted
activities in so many different ways. One participant said,
I went in and told them [Division and Center leadership] that basically, if
you want indicators I’ll give you indicators. But if you want useful
indicators, I can’t give you useful indicators even after 3 years [of trying
to develop process measures]…I mean you’ve got Best Practices, you’ve
got the Community Guide, 53 but you’ve got all that stuff being
implemented 14 thousand different ways. And so to try to come up with
useful [process] indicators that would actually contribute to program
improvement, or give a better understanding of what contributed to the
outcomes, we just basically said ‘no, we can’t do that.’
Therefore, the type of measures to include in the core indicators was limited to
outcome indicators, although, as discussed earlier, OSH evaluators wanted to identify
outcomes to address accountability. The paradox is, however, that outcome-level
53

Best Practices and the Community Guide both provide listings and descriptions of
evidence-based interventions.
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measures typically represent the work of many, not simply CDC. In other words,
accountability becomes fragmented in the network context and outcomes represent results
of multiple network partners.
The choice of measures was also affected by network variability. While
variability in program activity is what led to developing 120 key outcome indicators, the
evaluation team has the difficult task of narrowing these to a smaller set of core measures
appropriate for 58 grantees. As one person said, “We’ve come full circle back to the core
indicator idea!” Evaluators also considered data availability in their choice of core
measures. Resource constraints limit some grantees from participating in some surveys –
especially those that require funds to support specific tobacco-related modules. One
person said,
I think in large part it’s about resources. You’re at the state and you can
collect data, and you know you need your prevalence data – you need it
for youth, you need it for adults, you need this, and you need that. All
these things cost money. How much of your budget can go into collecting
these data and how many of these data? You have to kind of pick and
choose. It’s a resource issue – you have to hire people who are doing the
data collection, analyzing the data, and how many people can you hire?
Consequently, data availability was a consideration in selecting core measures. A
participant described it like this,
Even if you just take the low hanging fruit, the ‘what’s available’
approach. We at CDC are already going to have data on a number of them
(indicators). So we can think, ‘okay well, there’s a core set’ – just low
hanging fruit, what’s available.
With so many grantees, OSH evaluators also considered the effects that
the core measures might have across the national programs and their acceptability
for implementation.
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With the exception of the kind of whacky core indicators, the ones that
we’re having measurement issues with and that we have to define, it’s not
as if they’re [grantees] going to have a big program shift and do anything
differently than they’re already doing. For the most part, they just have to
keep doing what they’re doing. Which is great because we were worried
about that – we thought ‘we don’t want to do anything radically different,
and say okay, we’re going to do this in tobacco control now instead of
this’ We’re adding a couple of new things like Master Settlement
violations and the retail observations that are going to be new and different
for most states, but other than adding those couple of things, everything
else is pretty standard.
Finally, the selection of outcome-level indicators that are primarily derived from
periodic survey data may limit their utility as part of a performance measurement system.
Much of the needed survey data to support the core measures are collected once every
two to three years – at this time, the NATS is funded for only one year of data collection.
Consequently, the core indicators may better be used for program evaluation than as part
of a performance management system that supports on-going program monitoring.

7.3 Summary
At the time of data collection for this study, OSH was finalizing its development
of a set of core outcome indicators for its NTCP. Consequently, findings for this case
focus on OSH’s development process rather than implementation of the measures.
Despite the NTCP’s vast network that includes extensive variation across grantees in
their level of resources, goal priorities, and specific intervention efforts, OSH has been
able to identify a set of core outcome indicators for NTCP. The consensus on and
commitment to four program goals by the broad group of stakeholders within the network
has facilitated this effort as has the availability of a rich evidence-base and extensive
survey data. And while the network structure leads to the joint production of many
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program outcomes, OSH has determined that it would be too costly and burdensome to
conduct the level of evaluation needed to decipher the unique contribution of individual
network members in 58 different grantee states and territories. Consequently, OSH and
its partners have accepted that outcome-based performance measures will typically reflect
the overall efforts of the tobacco control community as well as other factors.
In addition, the variability across grantees in context, priorities, intervention
activities, resources, and capacity has important design consequences for selecting
NTCP’s core indicators. Type of measure was limited to outcomes given that process
measures proved impossible to identify at a national level. Choice of measures was
impacted by resources, data availability, and an interest to ensure their acceptability
across grantees. And use of core indicator data may more accurately support program
evaluation efforts than a performance measurement system.
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CHAPTER 8
CROSS-CASE RESULTS
8.1 Introduction
While the previous four chapters summarized findings from the within-case
analysis for each program, this chapter presents results from the cross-case analysis. As
detailed in chapter 3, this study applies an instrumental case study approach. In contrast
to intrinsic case study that strives to understand a particular case, instrumental case study
is meant to achieve greater comprehension of a particular phenomenon – the case is used
to gain broader insight (Stake 2006). By including multiple cases in an instrumental case
study, the phenomenon is examined in several contexts to achieve a more nuanced
understanding. For the present study, the researcher has examined four unique cases to
investigate the implications of networked public management on the design,
implementation, and utilization of federal-level performance measurement systems. Both
the unique situational analysis of each case presented in chapters 4-7, and the cross-case
analysis presented here contribute to a deeper understanding of performance
measurement as applied in public health programs implemented in networked contexts. In
particular, greater insight is achieved by studying the similarities and differences
observed across the four cases in how networks affect the use, design, and impact of
performance measurement.
This chapter begins with a descriptive summary of the four cases using the
typology that was applied for the case descriptions in the individual case chapters (i.e.,
the program, network, and performance measurement system). Next, the cross-case
results are presented, organized around the three research questions. As detailed in
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Chapter 1, Jennings and Haist (2004) propose a set of 25 hypotheses intended to explicate
assumptions related to the impact of performance measurement (appendix A). More
specifically, Jennings and Haist organize their hypotheses according to five unique
groups including incentives and accountability (nine hypotheses), organizational
characteristics (eight hypotheses), political context (three hypotheses), agency type (three
hypotheses), and leadership (two hypotheses).
The three research questions guiding this study were derived from two of the
three hypotheses related to agency type. Jennings and Haist built these hypotheses from
James Q. Wilson’s (1989) typology of four agency types: production, procedural, craft,
and coping agencies. Wilson’s typology incorporates two dimensions, one related to
whether outputs are observable and another to whether outcomes are observable.
Jennings and Haist define observability in two ways that relate to performance
measurement – the ability to measure outputs and outcomes and the ability to attribute
outcomes to the program of interest (see Chapter 1, section 1.4). The two hypotheses of
Jennings and Haist and the related research questions for this study are summarized in
table 26 below.
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Table 26. Study Research Questions Related to Jennings and Haist’s Hypotheses of
Agency Type
Jennings and Haist Hypothesis

Study Research Questions

Hypothesis #13

Research Question #1.

“The extent to which performance
measures are used and the types of
measures used will depend on the degree to
which outputs and outcomes can be
observed.” (p.185)

How does networked public management
affect the observability of CDC program
outputs and outcomes?
Research Question #2.
How does networked public management
influence CDC’s use of performance
measurement and the types of performance
measures used?

Hypothesis #14

Research Question #3.

“Measurement will be more common and
will have greater impact when agencies
have greater control over outcomes.”
(p.185)

How does networked public management
affect CDC’s control over outcomes and
the subsequent design and perceived
impact of performance measurement?

As detailed in Chapter 3, section 3.8.5, the researcher has used various data
displays to facilitate analysis and the development of individual case findings and crosscase findings. First, a set of matrices was created summarizing the descriptive
characteristics of each case using a standard typology that was devised based on the
literature review and inductive case analysis. These matrices include one for program
characteristics (appendix I), network characteristics (appendix J), and the performance
measurement systems (appendix K). Next, tentative findings were developed for each
case based on the individual research questions (appendix L). From these tentative, casespecific results, findings were constructed for each case – these are summarized in
appendix M.
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Finally, to aid the development of cross-case results, a matrix was developed to
relate the hypotheses of Jennings and Haist with relevant research questions and
individual case findings. This matrix includes information about the effect of each
finding on the performance measurement system for the specific program, the broader
implications of each finding for performance measurement, evidence for each finding
from the specific case, information about the case context that is relevant to the finding,
and details from the other cases that support or counter the finding. This matrix is
included in appendix N.
To aid the reader, acronyms are only used when referring to CDC and
GPRA/PART. Given that all four cases are discussed in this chapter, Division and other
organization names, laws and policies, and other terms previously referenced with
abbreviations are spelled out in full to limit any confusion. The exception to this is in
table 27 where a list of stakeholders for each case is detailed – for these, please refer to
the list of acronyms provided at the beginning of the dissertation before the start of
chapter 1. In table 27, below, a key is provided clarifying how the four cases will be
identified throughout chapters 8 and 9. Finally, the terms “program” and “case” are used
interchangeably and represent the national programs included in the study.
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Table 27. Key to Case Names Used in Chapters 8 & 9
Full Case Name

CDC Division and
Office/Center

Acronyms Used
in Chapters 4-7

Public Health
Emergency
Preparedness

Division of State and Local
Readiness, Coordinating
Office for Terrorism
Preparedness and
Emergency Response

PHEP

Preparedness
Program

Comprehensive
STD Prevention
Services

Division of STD
Prevention, National
Center for HIV/AIDS,
Viral Hepatitis, STD, and
TB Prevention

CSPS

STD Program

National Breast
and Cervical
Cancer Early
Detection Program

Division of Cancer
Prevention and Control,
National Center for
Chronic Disease
Prevention and Health
Promotion

National Tobacco
Control Program

Office on Smoking and
Health, National Center for
Chronic Disease
Prevention and Health
Promotion

NBCCEDP

NTCP

Abbreviated
Name for
Chapters 8 & 9

Cancer Detection
Program

Tobacco
Program

8.2 Descriptive Summary of Four Cases
8.2.1 Program Characteristics
Several program characteristics were identified from inductive analysis that
describe the four cases including their organizational context, program goals, stage of
program development, budget, stakeholders, and political context. Table 28 summarizes
each of these characteristics; appendix I provides a more detailed synthesis.
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Table 28. Summary of Key Program Characteristics by Case
Preparedness
Program

STD Program

Cancer Detection
Program

Tobacco Control
Program

Organizational Context
62 grantees –
states, cities,
territories

65 grantees – states, 68 grantees – states,
cities, territories
D.C., tribes,
territories

58 grantees – states,
D.C., territories

Politically-driven
culture

Change difficult

Science-based

Data-driven culture

Program Goals
Evolving goals
over time;
developing
program
framework

Lacking clear goals
from CDC

Goal consensus
among CDC and
grantees

Goal consensus
among CDC and
grantees

Outcomes difficult
to define
(“preparing,”
“preventing”)

Focus on 3 of 25
STDs: syphilis,
gonorrhea, and
chlamydia

Focus on clinical
outcomes for women
screened

Focus on evidencebased outcomes for
three of four goal
areas

Stage of Program Development
New

Mature

Mature

Mature

FY 2008 Budget
$700 million

$104 million

$157 million

$66 million

Median
award/grantee:
$8.9 million

Median
award/grantee: $1.1
million

Median
award/grantee: $2.1
million

Median
award/grantee: $1.2
million

Stakeholders
DHS, HHS, ASPR,
FEMA, ASTHO’s
Directors of Public
Health
Preparedness,
NACCHO, CSTE,
APHL, grantees,

NCSD, grantees,
other CDC
programs, OMB,
Congress

National
organizations and
advocates, NACDD,
NACCHO,
NBCCEDP Council,
grantees, other CDC
programs, OMB,
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NCI, SAMHSA,
NIH, National
organizations (ACS,
CTFK), NACDD,
grantees, other CDC
programs

CDC Director,
OMB, Congress

Congress
Political Context

Politically visible
and volatile

Stable

Politically visible
given strong
advocacy community

Politically visible
given strong
advocacy
community and
adversary

8.2.1.1 Organizational Context
Each case has a unique organizational context that affects the character of the
program. The Preparedness Program is situated in a highly politicized context influenced
by public concern about terrorist threats and a steady influx of policy initiatives and
directives from federal partners in Washington D.C. – Health and Human Services,
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, Department of Defense, Department
of Homeland Security, and others. Since its inception in the late 1999, the program has
expanded in scope from a focus on terrorism to “all hazards,” responsible for the public
health in the case of events as diverse as hurricanes and anthrax attacks. The program
exploded in size after September 11th and the 2001 anthrax attacks from a $45 million
dollar program in fiscal year 2001 to almost $1 billion in fiscal year 2002. The
Preparedness Program remains the largest funded single program at CDC. Several
participants referred to Preparedness Program’s organizational culture as the “wild, wild
west” reflecting its chaotic, dynamic nature, but also recognizing that preparedness is an
emerging field in public health that is blazing new paths.
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In stark contrast to the Preparedness Program, the STD Program is largely defined
by its status as one of the longest-standing programs at CDC dating back to 1957. CDC
staff working with the STD Program often initiated their careers as federal assignees to
state-based programs conducting disease investigation work. Over time, these staff
typically advanced from front-line positions to state-based management positions and
eventually to CDC headquarters in Atlanta. Consequently, many of the CDC staff
working with the STD Program have decades of experience with the program. While the
program benefits from well-tenured and experienced staff, the organizational culture is
viewed as somewhat entrenched and hard to change, making the adoption of new ideas
difficult.
The Cancer Detection Program was established by law in 1991 and is unique in
the fact that it is a service delivery program. The organizational context for the Cancer
Detection Program can best be described as data-driven. The program benefits from a
long-standing data management system that supports a large set of clinical and data
quality variables. Data are used extensively to manage the Cancer Detection Program and
ensure that women receive quality care.
The Tobacco Control Program was also initiated in the early 1990s, although
under a different name. The program benefits from a robust evidence-base reflecting
years of well-supported research efforts. The organizational culture for the Tobacco
Control Program can be characterized both by its strong science-base and also its
collaborative nature – Tobacco Control Program staff at CDC work closely with many
other national partners on comprehensive tobacco control efforts.
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Each of the four cases included in the study support a large number of grantees,
typically representing government health agencies in states, cities, territories, and tribes.
The Tobacco Control Program has the smallest number of grantees with 58 while the
Cancer Detection Program supports the largest with 68; all represent broadly
decentralized programs managed by CDC, a point discussed further in section 8.2.2
below.
8.2.1.2 Program Goals
Preparedness, STD prevention, breast and cervical cancer screening, and tobacco
control – four very different programs representing unique sub-fields in public health:
public health preparedness, infectious diseases, and chronic diseases. As noted above,
public health preparedness represents a complex area addressing hazards as diverse as
hurricanes, bioterrorist attacks, and pandemic influenza. States vary in their risk for a
given event and in the potential scale of an event. As detailed in chapter 4, the Division
of State and Local Readiness has struggled to define what “preparedness” means and how
it can be represented in terms of public health outcomes for the Preparedness Program
given the infancy of the field, the science base for public health preparedness is thin. In
collaboration with experts from across the country, the Division of State and Local
Readiness is working to develop a programmatic framework for the Preparedness
Program based on five key capabilities (i.e., incident management, risk communications,
biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, isolation and quarantine/community
containment). Program goals for the Preparedness Program are further shaped by its
dominant political context. Top-down policy initiatives from the Assistant Secretary for
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Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, and others dictate
requirements that may not be consistent with expert opinion or programmatic realities.
The Division of STD Prevention has struggled to define and communicate
national-level goals for the STD Program even though it is one of the oldest programs at
CDC. There are over 25 different sexually transmitted diseases – the Division of STD
Prevention focuses on three of them: gonorrhea, chlamydia, and syphilis. In 2004, the
Division of STD Prevention began promoting a broader “community perspective” for the
STD Program that emphasizes the need to engage and influence community-level
partners in order to expand the program’s reach, leverage resources, and extend program
effects. In part, this transformation has been in response to stagnant resource levels,
changes in health care access and delivery, and a desire to more effectively leverage
population-level impact. The “community perspective” requires a paradigm shift from a
more narrow focus on the sexually transmitted diseases clinics, traditionally funded
through the STD Program, to one that assumes broader responsibility for sexually
transmitted disease control and prevention in a community or state. The change in
perspective represents an adjustment in program scope that has implications for program
priorities and goals. However, as noted above, the organizational culture is somewhat
resistant to change and the STD Program currently suffers from a lack of consensus about
the program’s national priorities.
The Cancer Detection Program is guided by its authorizing legislation. At a
patient-level, clinical outcomes are straight-forward and can be easily assessed given an
adequate data collection and reporting system. These outcomes (e.g., timely diagnostic
follow-up, timely initiation of cancer treatment) are consistent with the overall program
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goals which are widely accepted across CDC, the grantees, and individual providers
within the implementation network.
As described in chapter 7, the Tobacco Control Program is strongly rooted around
its four national goals (e.g., prevent the initiation of tobacco use among young people,
eliminate nonsmokers’ exposure to secondhand smoke). These goals are broad in scope
and intended to direct efforts of the larger community of stakeholders involved in
comprehensive tobacco control. The Office on Smoking and Health emphasizes that
achieving the four Tobacco Control Program goals requires collaboration “across the
federal government, across the nation, and within each state.” Consensus around program
goals and the strong science base has enabled the development of detailed logic models
for three of its four goals specifying outcomes at multiple levels.
8.2.1.3 Stage of Program Development and Budget
Three of the four programs can be characterized as relatively mature; the
Preparedness Program, however, has rapidly expanded in scope since its inception in
1999 and can therefore be considered less established. For fiscal year 2008, program
budgets ranged from roughly $66 million for the Tobacco Control Program to over $700
million for the Preparedness Program whose budget is several times the size of the other
three cases. Similarly, median grantee awards range from $1.1 million for the STD
Program to $8.9 million for the Preparedness Program. All four programs have faced
relatively flat or decreasing program funding over the past several years, and CDC staff
uniformly expressed concern about the need to defend current allocations given the
challenging economic climate. Many interviewed described a political climate that
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stresses accountability, and they view performance measurement as an important means
to provide data needed to justify their programs.
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8.2.1.4 Stakeholders and Political Context
All four cases involve an extended network of stakeholders at the federal, state,
and local-levels. Stakeholders typically include other federal agencies (e.g., Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Health Resources and Services
Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency), national-level coalitions
representing state or local health agencies (e.g., National Association of Chronic Disease
Directors, National Association of City and County Health Officials, National Coalition
of STD Directors), national non-profit organizations (e.g., American Cancer Society,
Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids), other programs at CDC, the program grantees, and
local-level agencies primarily responsible for program implementation. These
stakeholders, especially some of the national organizations and grantees, leverage their
political power to influence CDC decision making, particularly around issues of program
policy. Of note is the large number of stakeholders involved in each of these four cases –
important federal level partners, 58-68 grantees, and hundreds to thousands of local-level
partners.
Aside from the political influence of stakeholders, some programs confront a
more intensive political climate than others. Of the four cases, the Preparedness Program
clearly contends with the fiercest political climate that imposes significant demands on
the program. The Cancer Detection Program and Tobacco Control Program also reside in
a political context. Breast cancer, in particular, has a strong advocacy community with
whom the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control must collaborate. In contrast, the
Tobacco Control Program faces a unique political “adversary” in the tobacco industry.
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8.2.2 Network Characteristics
This section summarizes the network characteristics of the four cases including
aspects of network structure and function. Table 29 summarizes some of the network
characteristics according to each of the four cases; appendix J offers a more detailed
listing.
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Table 29. Summary of Network Characteristics by Case
Preparedness
Program

STD Program

Cancer Detection
Program

Tobacco Control
Program

Network Structure: Vertical Relationships
62 grantees;
thousands of locallevel partners

65 grantees;
hundreds of locallevel partners

68 grantees; 22,000 58 grantees; some
local-level providers local-level partners

Most vertical
relationships
formalized via
funding

Most vertical
relationships
formalized via
funding; dominant
dimension

Most vertical
relationships
formalized via
funding; dominant
dimension

Most vertical
relationships
formalized via
funding

Vertical structure
varies within state,
tribe, territory

Vertical structure
varies within state,
tribe, territory

Vertical structure
varies within state,
tribe, territory

Vertical structure
varies within state,
tribe, territory

Primarily
intergovernmental
throughout vertical
chain

Local-level partners
include: local public
health agencies,
CBOs, family
planning clinics

Regional and locallevel partners
include: public
health agencies,
CBOs, private
providers,
community health
centers, family
planning clinics

Local-level partners
include local health
agencies, CBOs
(usually funded with
non-CDC funds)

Service delivery at
local level

Program activities at
state and local levels

Program activities at Most program
state and local levels activities at local
level

Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships
Horizontal partners
at all levels –
federal, CDC, state,
local

Horizontal partners
at all levels –
federal, CDC, state,
local

Horizontal partners
at all levels –
federal, CDC, state,
local

Typically informal
and unfunded

Typically informal
and unfunded

Some funded, others Typically informal
informal and
and unfunded
unfunded
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Horizontal partners
at all levels –
federal, CDC, state,
local

Preparedness
Program

STD Program

Essential to
achieving program
goals – program
outcomes dependent
on network efforts

Increasing
importance of
partnering with
horizontal partners
to access priority
populations

Cancer Detection
Program

Tobacco Control
Program

Support referral of
priority populations
to program services;
program integration;
provide advocacy

Essential to
achieving program
goals – program
outcomes dependent
on network efforts

Network Function: Control and Authority Within the Network
Control and
authority
compromised in
decentralized
implementation

Control and
authority
compromised in
decentralized
implementation

Control and
authority
compromised in
decentralized
implementation

Control and
authority
compromised in
decentralized
implementation

No authority over
unfunded,
horizontal partners
on which grantees
are dependent

No authority over
unfunded,
horizontal partners

In vertical chain,
control and
authority facilitated
by funding and
mgmt tools, network
relations

No authority over
unfunded,
horizontal partners
on which grantees
are dependent

Cooperative
agreement provides
some authority over
grantees

Grant offered
minimal authority
over grantees;
recent shift to
cooperative
agreement

Cooperative
agreement provides
some authority over
grantees

Cooperative
agreement provides
some authority over
grantees, but not
exercised

Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities Within the Network
Differing priorities
across grantees;
goal and mission
conflicts with some
horizontal partners

Differing priorities
across grantees;
goal and mission
conflicts with some
horizontal partners

Shared goals among
network partners

Shared goals among
network partners

Network Function: Context, Capacity, and Resources
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Preparedness
Program

STD Program

Cancer Detection
Program

Tobacco Control
Program

Extensive variability
across grantees in
capacity and
resources

Extensive variability
across grantees in
capacity and
resources

Extensive variability
across grantees in
capacity and
resources

Extensive variability
across grantees in
capacity and
resources

Variability in level
of risk for and type
of “hazard”

Variability in STD
epidemiology

Variability in
demographic profile
of priority
population; cultural
barriers

Variability in
emphasis around
goal areas

8.2.2.1 Network Structure: Vertical Relationships
The network implementation structure for the four cases is comprised of both
vertical and horizontal dimensions. As indicated, all four programs support a large
number of grantees representing states, cities, territories, and tribal organizations. Those
grantees, in turn, support hundreds and up to thousands of local-level partners primarily
responsible for program implementation, although the grantee agency may also conduct
some program activities (e.g., state-wide planning, surveillance). The Cancer Detection
Program’s vertical network is the largest with 68 grantees and over 22,000 local-level
screening and diagnostic service providers. As depicted in figure 1, the vertical network
structure of the Cancer Detection Program can include up to four levels.
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CDC Division of Cancer Prevention and Control

State A

68 Grantees of the NBCCEDP

State B

Regional Health Agencies

Local Level Screening Providers

Local Level Screening Providers

Figure 4. Vertical Network Structure for the National Breast and Cervical Cancer
Early Detection Program [Cancer Detection Program]

For all cases, the vertical relationships typically extend from Health and Human
Services to CDC to the grantee to local level partners. These vertical relationships within
the implementation networks are almost always formalized through funding relationships.
CDC funds its grantees through cooperative agreements and grantees use varied funding
mechanisms (e.g., grants, contracts, memorandum of understanding) to support locallevel partners. State, city, territorial, and tribal infrastructure differs and their individual
policies or laws may specify required relationships between, for instance, state and local
government. The vertical network should not be assumed to be entirely
intergovernmental – three of the four cases (i.e., STD Program, Cancer Detection
Program, Tobacco Control Program) fund local-level, non-governmental agencies such as
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community-based organizations, family planning clinics, private health care providers,
and community health centers.
8.2.2.2 Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships
All four cases involve lateral partners at the federal, grantee, and local levels. For
instance, the Office on Smoking and Health collaborates with the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration, National Cancer Institute, American Cancer
Society, and others at the federal level; Tobacco Control Program grantees typically work
with other divisions within their department of health, advocacy organizations (e.g.,
Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids), and non-profits (e.g., American Cancer Society); and
local-level agencies interact with partners for coalition building and the implementation
of program activities. Similarly, the Division of STD Prevention works with Health
Resources and Services Administration, other Divisions within CDC, and the National
Coalition of STD Directors. STD Program grantees collaborate with other health-related
departments (e.g., HIV/AIDS) and state peers. And agencies funded at the local-level as
part of the STD Program work closely with jails, juvenile detention facilities, family
planning clinics, and private health care providers. While the vertical relationships within
the implementation structure are, for the most part, formalized through funding
mechanisms, the horizontal relationships across the four cases are most often informal
and un-funded. Consequently, while grantees have some level of authority over their
vertical partners, formal authority over horizontal partners is absent.
Horizontal relationships serve different purposes for the four cases. For the
Preparedness Program and the Tobacco Control Program, these relationships are essential
to achieving program goals and are an integral part of overall program implementation.
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For instance, an effective response to pandemic flu will require not only the leadership of
the official health agency in a state, city, or territory, but also necessitates the
involvement of other departments and sectors to ensure a coordinated, integrated, and
effective response. Schools may need to be closed, requiring the involvement of the
Department of Education and local school boards; hospitals will have a critical role in
caring for the sick; personal mobility may be restricted demanding the participation of the
Department of Transportation and even the Police Department; and commerce may be
enlisted to assist with mass dissemination of medication. Similarly, the four program
goals established for effective tobacco control cannot be achieved by CDC or Tobacco
Control Program grantee institutions alone. A compliment of coordinated strategies
involving community interventions and mobilization; counter-marketing; policy
development and implementation; and surveillance are all needed to affect relevant
outcomes.
In contrast, horizontal relationships within the STD Program and the Cancer
Detection Program primarily support improved access to priority populations for sexually
transmitted disease testing and treatment and for breast and cervical cancer screening,
respectively, as well as service integration. For example, STD Program grantees
encourage their local-level partners to establish relationships with jails and juvenile
detention facilities in order to provide screening for syphilis, gonorrhea, and chlamydia
among inmates. As the Division of STD Prevention continues to promote a broader
“community perspective” for the STD Program and introduces population-based goals,
horizontal partners will play an increasingly important role in achieving those goals. At
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present, however, the STD Program is best characterized as leveraging its horizontal
relationships to extend access to priority populations.
In the Cancer Detection Program, horizontal partners provide important public
education messages and help identify and refer program-eligible women for screening. In
addition, these partners assure greater integration of service delivery. For instance,
Cancer Detection Program grantees may work closely with sister programs such as
WISEWOMAN,™ 54 comprehensive cancer control programs, and newer state or
federally-funded colorectal cancer screening programs to facilitate integration of service
delivery. A program-eligible woman coming to a health clinic for a Cancer Detection
Program-funded mammogram ideally would also be offered cardiovascular health
screening funded by the WISEWOMAN™ program and be assessed for colorectal cancer
screening.
8.2.2.3 Network Function: Control and Authority within the Network
In all four cases, CDC’s control and authority over program implementation is
compromised given the decentralized, networked structure. As indicated by the
descriptions above, program activities are typically conducted two to three steps removed
from CDC and one to two steps removed from the grantees. The Preparedness Program,
Cancer Detection Program, and Tobacco Control Program all use cooperative agreements
as the funding tool with their awardees; the STD Program moved from a grant to
cooperative agreement in January 2009. While this particular mechanism supports CDC
involvement with its grantees in terms of program-related decision making, grantees also
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have a fair degree of discretion in program implementation. In addition, the level of
authority exercised by CDC through the cooperative agreement and grant varies across
cases. Program requirements (as articulated in the funding announcement and funding
award) differ for each program as does the political will to impose sanctions on grantees
perceived to be out of compliance. With the absence of a direct funding relationship,
CDC control weakens considerably at the local level. CDC is dependent on its grantees to
exercise authority over local level partners through their funding tools or other
management practices.
Of the four cases, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control was observed to
exert the greatest control over its Cancer Detection Program grantees within the vertical
chain based on the funding awards’ requirements and other management systems in
place. For instance, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control has established an
extensive data monitoring system that allows staff to identify potential implementation
problems and intervene as needed. In addition, Division of Cancer Prevention and
Control management imposes sanctions on grantees viewed as out of compliance with
program requirements, particularly if there are concerns about the care of women served
through the program. The authority relationships between grantees and their local-level
partners are less understood given that few representatives from grantee agencies were
included in the study. However, control and authority between grantees and their funded
partners is also likely influenced, in part, by the funding tool used. Several interviewees
with the Cancer Detection Program described grantees’ use of performance-base
contracting and other reimbursement policies that afford them greater control over locallevel providers and, consequently, service delivery.
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In all four cases, the CDC, grantees, and local-level funded agencies typically
lack formal authority over informal, horizontal partners involved in program
implementation. For the Preparedness Program and the Tobacco Control Program that
rely on horizontal partners to achieve program goals, significant dependencies on partner
cooperation are created. For instance, the 2006 legislation titled the Pandemic and AllHazards Preparedness Act of 2007 requires that Preparedness Program grantees develop
pandemic flu plans, and a 2007 initiative issued by the White House (Homeland Security
Presidential Directive, #21) requires that grantees ensure local capacity to distribute
countermeasures (i.e., prophylaxis treatment) to all citizens within 48 hours of an incident
(e.g., anthrax attack). Both initiatives demand extensive cooperation of horizontal
partners at the grantee-level and local-level, but neither grantees nor local-level vertical
partners have formal authority to demand the participation of their horizontal network
partners.
8.2.2.4 Network Function: Shared Goals and Priorities within the Network
The four cases differ in the degree to which they share goals and priorities within
their individual networks. As noted earlier, the Cancer Detection Program and Tobacco
Control Program enjoy strong consensus among both vertical and horizontal network
partners in regard to their program goals and objectives. For the Office on Smoking and
Health, the broader community of organizations involved in comprehensive tobacco
control has embraced the Tobacco Control Program’s four goals related to adult
cessation, youth prevention, second-hand smoke, and reduced disparities. These goals
drive comprehensive tobacco control efforts nationally, not just for the Tobacco Control
Program grantees funded by CDC. Similarly, the Cancer Detection Program’s goal to
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screen low-income, under-insured women and detect cancer early when it is more
effectively treated is embraced widely by network partners.
Conversely, the Preparedness Program and the STD Program experience priority
and goal differences that may affect program implementation. For instance, the
Preparedness Program grantees have struggled to engage some horizontal partners with
differing priorities in efforts to develop pandemic influenza plans. Data suggest these
partners, often representing other sectors (e.g., emergency response, transportation,
education), may not yet understand the public health role in preparedness or may,
themselves, face competing demands that preclude participation. Likewise, STD Program
grantees have been challenged to involve jails and juvenile detention centers that have
starkly different missions (i.e., public safety) than sexually transmitted disease
prevention. Within the network context of these four cases, shared goals and priorities
seems to facilitate the cooperation of both vertical and horizontal partners in program
implementation while conflicts in mission, goals, and priorities serve as a barrier to
coordinated implementation efforts.
8.2.2.5 Network Function: Context, Capacity, and Resources
Common across all four cases is the extensive variability among grantees in terms
of their context, capacity, and resources. First, the extent and nature of the public health
problem varies across individual grantees – the incidence and prevalence of specific
sexually transmitted diseases in Florida differ dramatically from those in New Hampshire
or South Dakota. The risk for a bioterrorist attack is likely greater in New York than in
Iowa. And the demographic characteristics and cultural norms of women eligible for the
Cancer Detection Program in West Virginia are quite different from those in Texas. Other
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contextual factors reflect variability across grantees in the four programs as well –
differing geography (e.g., rural, urban, size in square miles), state laws and regulations,
and the strength and influence of particular industries (e.g., tobacco industry).
Capacity, which is influenced by resource levels, also varies from grantee to
grantee. Capacity is often reflected in the number of staff assigned to the program, the
expertise available to the program, and infrastructure (e.g., data management systems).
The structure and capacity of the larger network within a state or territory also varies;
local-level capacity and overall network infrastructure have important implications for
program implementation.
And, as reflected in chapters 4-7, the range of the funding award size is significant
across all cases resulting in variable resource levels for grantees. For instance, the award
size for STD Program grantees ranges from $43,609 $6,711,083. In addition, state
contributions to individual programs will vary as well. In the past, the state legislature of
California provided over $100 million to augment the Cancer Detection Program funding
from CDC while other states did not contribute any additional resources.
Together, all three of these factors – context, capacity, and resources – influence
each grantee’s program priorities, activities, and ability to achieve goals. Study
participants for all four cases emphasize that grantee performance should be interpreted
based on the individual program context. Comparing grantees on measures of
performance was viewed as futile given their differences. Across cases, each grantee
program is considered unique.
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8.2.3 The Performance Measurement Systems
The four performance measurement systems studied represent ones in different
stages of development. All were initiated after the passage of GPRA suggesting the
importance of that particular policy in advancing performance measurement as a
management tool for government programs. This section summarizes the process of
developing performance measurement systems for the four cases, their design features,
and each case’s current use of performance data.
8.2.3.1 Development Process
Although all four programs introduced their first set of performance measures
between 2003 and 2004, the cases represent systems at different levels of development.
The Cancer Detection Program performance measurement system is the most mature;
minimum data elements providing the basis for the measures have been collected since
the program’s inception in 1991 and the data quality indicator guide, that includes most
of the current 11 performance measures, was introduced nearly fifteen years ago in 1993.
The 11 Cancer Detection Program performance measures were formally implemented by
the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control in 2004 as “core program performance
indicators.” Overall, the Cancer Detection Program has the most sophisticated
performance management system of the four cases and utilizes its performance data for a
range of purposes including accountability, program improvement, and budgeting. The
minimum data elements and performance measures are considered vital to program
management and are widely accepted and viewed favorably by Division management and
grantees.
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The other three cases are more similar in the time line of their development
process, but still vary in regard to their developmental progress. The Division of State
and Local Readiness launched its first set of over 120 performance measures for the
Preparedness Program in 2003, but the program has experienced a significant expansion
in scope and extensive staff turnover since that time. A revised set of 47 measures was
put forth in 2004, followed by 35 measures in 2005, and the current set of 6 measures in
2007. Currently, staff in the Division’s monitoring and evaluation branch are working
with programmatic and scientific experts, internal and external to CDC, to develop a
conceptual framework built around five areas of preparedness-related capability (e.g.,
incident management, biosurveillance). The framework is intended to better define the
Preparedness Program and provide a foundation from which to identify future
performance measures. As in the Division of STD Prevention, the Division of State and
Local Readiness faces issues of organizational support, particularly among program
consultants, and resistance from grantees. Data validity has been a perennial problem
since the Preparedness Program first launched indicators.
The Division of STD Prevention initiated efforts to develop performance
measures in 1999, piloting over 60 measures in seven states over a two-year period
beginning in 2001. Based on the pilot, twelve measures were included in the 2004 STD
Program five-year grant agreement as a reporting requirement for grantees. Revisions to
the measures were made in 2007. Development efforts have continued, and the five-year
STD Program cooperative agreement funded in January 2009 includes a set of 17
measures, some from previous years and others newly introduced. Although the STD
Program performance measures have evolved over time, organizational support for the
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system remains inconsistent, data validity is problematic, and use of the performance data
is limited.
Finally, the Office on Smoking and Health started their development process in
2001. In 2005, the Key Outcome Indicator Guide, inclusive of 120 measures for the
Tobacco Control Program was published. Grantees currently report on measures most
relevant to their programs, although reporting on the key outcome indicators is not a
requirement of their funding award. In 2006, the Office on Smoking and Health began
working on a set of core indicators. A list of 30 approved indicators is being finalized in
2009, and staff hope that these will provide a “national snapshot” of the program for
stakeholders “up” the vertical chain (e.g., Health and Human Services, Office on
Management and Budget). The Tobacco Control Program is considered the least
developed among the four cases because the Office on Smoking and Health has not
completed and implemented the core set of performance measures.
The process to develop performance measures for these four cases can be
characterized as negotiated and evolving. Adoption of the systems and data use seems to
occur slowly and incrementally over time. First, given the network structure of the four
cases, the development of measures becomes a negotiated process between the CDC
program and those who are accountable for performance and responsible for the relevant
data collection, reporting, and management – primarily the grantees. Consequently,
stakeholder involvement is recognized by all four cases as essential to the development
process. In developing their performance measurement systems, staff in all four cases
have included representatives from associations representing grantee programs (e.g.,
Directors of Public Health Preparedness, National Coalition of STD Directors, National
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Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program Council of Program Directors) and
grantee staff. These stakeholders and others have been included in performance
measurement workgroups (i.e., STD Program, Cancer Detection Program), expert panels
(i.e., Preparedness Program, Tobacco Control Program), pilot efforts (i.e., STD Program),
and vetting processes (i.e., STD Program, Cancer Detection Program, Tobacco Control
Program). Participants in all four cases emphasized the importance of including
stakeholders to ensure that program performance measures are feasible, meaningful for
practice, and valid – a unique challenge with 58 or more grantees. In addition to the
expertise stakeholders contribute to the development process, study participants stressed
the importance of stakeholder involvement to building the necessary buy-in needed to
assure serious participation and data quality. As noted above (section 8.2.1.4),
stakeholders also possess a level of political power and influence – consequently, the
development of performance measures becomes a negotiated process between
stakeholders and CDC.
In addition, for these four cases, the development of performance measures has
been evolving. In general, performance measurement systems are expected to be
dynamic. Periodic revisions to measures based on changes in program priorities,
improved measurement, increased availability of data, and, for public health,
advancements in scientific understanding, are expected. The incremental and evolving
nature of these four performance measurement systems, however, may best be attributed
to the fact that these systems are in their early development and because the measures are
meant to apply to broadly decentralized, networked programs. The evolution has often
been dramatic: the Preparedness Program moved from 120 measures in 2003 to 6
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measures in 2007; the STD Program from 60 measures in 2001 to 12 in 2004 and 17 in
2009; the Cancer Detection Program evolved from a large monitoring dataset with over
100 variables to the data quality indicator guide in 1993 and 11 core measures in 2004;
and the Office on Smoking and Health is transitioning from 120 key outcome indicators
for the Tobacco Control Program in 2005 to 30 core indicators in 2009.
For the Preparedness Program, the dramatic change in measure composition has
largely been a factor of its political environment and turnover among evaluation staff. For
the STD Program, the evolution reflects the development process itself. The program
started by piloting a large set of potential indicators with a subset of grantees. The
Division of STD Prevention and Control has gradually refined these over time based on
field testing and grantee feedback. The Cancer Detection Program implemented its large
monitoring data set at the time the program was initiated in 1991; that monitoring system
is still maintained. Core performance measures for the program were introduced later as a
means to communicate program priorities to the Cancer Detection Program grantees and
begin performance-based budgeting. In the Office on Smoking and Health the 120 key
outcome indicators remain intact for the Tobacco Control Program, but given program
variability, not all 120 measures are relevant or available for all grantees. Consequently,
the smaller set of 30 core indicators currently under development is intended to provide a
common set of data that can be assessed across all grantees and used to provide a national
summary of the program.
Finally, the adoption of performance data seems slow and somewhat incremental.
Performance measurement becomes more challenging in the networked environment
where 58 to 68 grantees must embrace the effort and communicate measures to hundreds
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or thousands of local-level partners involved in implementation. For these programs, the
implementation and adoption of performance measurement systems seems to advance in
a slow, step-wise fashion that must encompass three to four levels in the vertical chain –
measures are introduced, data management systems developed for 50 plus grantees, data
collected and reported, and data quality addressed and improved over time. Data use
seems to follow as CDC staff begin to use and promote data, grantees take up use of the
data, and local-level agencies become aware of the importance of the data.
8.2.3.2 Design Characteristics
A summary of characteristics for the four performance measurement systems is
provided in table 30; a more detailed synthesis is included in appendix K.
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Table 30. Design Characteristics of Performance Measurement Systems by Case
Preparedness
Program

STD Program

Cancer
Detection
Program

Tobacco
Control
Program

Purpose

Accountability

Accountability
and program
improvement

Accountability,
program
improvement,
budgeting

Accountability

Level of
Measurement

Grantee-level

Local and
grantee-level

Local-level
(patient-level
clinical data)

Primarily
grantee but
some locallevel

Types of
Measures

Process
measures that
reflect program
capabilities

Process and
immediate
outcome
measures

Process, shortterm and
intermediate
outcome
measures

Short,
intermediate,
and long-term
outcome
measures

Use of Targets

Time-based
Baseline and 3targets for some year targets set
measures set by by grantees
CDC

Common
standards set by
CDC

Baseline and
targets set by
grantees

Quality
Assurance

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

8.2.3.2.1 Purpose
All four cases identify accountability as an important purpose for their
performance measurement systems. Given the current fiscal crisis, participants across the
cases described the importance of collecting performance data to help preserve funding
levels and defend against potential budgetary cuts. The priority for the Preparedness
Program and Tobacco Control Program is to address accountability concerns from
“above” – that is, for the Division of State and Local Readiness and the Office on
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Smoking and Health to provide performance measurement data to stakeholders at Health
and Human Services, the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response, and other federal-level stakeholders in order to demonstrate
accountability for the national program and its management. The Preparedness Program
and Tobacco Control Program grantees may also use the performance data to demonstrate
accountability with their own state-based (city-based, territorial-based) stakeholders to
defend state or local contributions to the programs if they receive such funds.
While the Division of STD Prevention and the Division of Cancer Prevention and
Control also recognize the importance of accountability to federal-level stakeholders,
CDC staff are more focused on using the performance measurement systems to hold their
STD Program and Cancer Detection Program grantees accountable for their performance.
These two programs emphasize the purpose of program improvement, along with
accountability, as an important driver of their performance measurement systems.
In regard to purpose, the most interesting dichotomy across the four cases is that
between the Preparedness Program and the Cancer Detection Program. The Division of
State and Local Readiness is working to develop unique sets of performance measures to
serve individual purposes – the six existing performance measures for accountability
“up,” a new set of measures to meet the performance-based budgeting requirements
imposed by the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2007, and a larger data
set of capacity measures to support program monitoring and improvement. The Division
of State and Local Readiness’ need to develop unique set of measures is influenced, in
part, by the nascent stage of its overall program development, the nature of the program
and complexity of the problem, and the political context around the Preparedness
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Program. In contrast, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control uses its one set of
eleven Cancer Detection Program measures for all three purposes – accountability,
program improvement, and budgeting. As noted above, the Division of Cancer
Prevention and Control also has its large set of monitoring data (minimum data elements)
for the Cancer Detection Program.
8.2.3.2.2 Level of Measurement
For all cases, much of program implementation occurs at the local-level –
preparedness exercises, STD case finding, breast cancer screening, and school-based
tobacco control programs. Performance measures for the STD Program and Cancer
Detection Program – data are collected at the local-level and the performance measures
typically represent individuals served through the program (e.g., among clients of
sexually transmitted disease clinics, the proportion of women with positive gonorrhea
tests that are treated within 14 and 30 days of the date of specimen collection; percentage
of women screened through the Cancer Detection Program diagnosed with invasive
carcinoma with time from date of diagnosis to treatment started less than 60 days). Data
are aggregated at the grantee-level for submission to CDC.
In contrast, state- or territorial-level survey data will primarily be used to support
the core Tobacco Control Program performance measures, although a few measures will
rely on locally-collected data (e.g., extent and type of retail tobacco advertising and
promotions). For the Preparedness Program, challenges related to data availability, locallevel capacity, and measurement have all contributed to the reliance on grantee-level
measurement for now. A common sentiment across three of the four cases (Preparedness
Program, STD Program, and Tobacco Control Program) has been to select “low hanging
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fruit” – measures for which data are available and the capacity to collect and report data
exists.
8.2.3.2.3 Types of Performance Measures
Aside from the Tobacco Control Program performance measures, process and
short-term outcomes reflect the dominant measure type used for the three other cases. For
example, the Cancer Detection Program includes process, short-term, and intermediatelevel measures reflecting service delivery (i.e., screening and diagnostic services) in its
set of 11 indicators. All are consistent with the program’s focus on the women served
through the program (rather than population-level measures). For all three programs
Preparedness Program, STD Program, Cancer Detection Program CDC has been sensitive
to introduce measures and targets that are viewed by grantees as feasible and achievable.
Participants working with the Preparedness Program and STD Program described an
intention to introduce more challenging, intermediate-level outcome measures over time
as grantees become more comfortable with the measurement process. Again, this
demonstrates the evolving and incremental development process of these systems
discussed above in section 8.2.3.1.
In addition, grantees have successfully argued for measures that they can “fairly”
be held accountable for, that is, measures that are largely under their control. This
inclusion criterion, whether explicit (Preparedness Program) or not (STD Program,
Cancer Detection Program), has effectively dismissed longer-term outcomes that are
often influenced by multiple factors and even some short-term outcomes that are
dependent on partners over which grantees have little authority. In contrast, the Tobacco
Control Program key outcome indicators and proposed core measures only include
338

outcome measures (short-term, intermediate, and long-term). Two factors influenced this
choice. First, from the outset, the development team aimed to identify outcome-level
measures given the emphasis by federal-level partners in addressing accountability.
Second, with 58 grantees implementing “best practices” in different ways, the Office on
Smoking and Health found it impossible to identify a common set of process measures.
In focusing on outcome-level measures, the Office on Smoking and Health recognizes
that the measures represent the results of comprehensive tobacco control efforts, not
simply the activities supported with CDC funds. In other words, Tobacco Control
Program grantees are not expected to influence performance on these measures alone.
The Office on Smoking and Health recognizes that the outcomes will only be achieved by
the joint efforts of network partners in the tobacco control community. Of note, the
acceptance of the outcome-based core measures by Tobacco Control Program grantees is
untested given that the measures have not been introduced. In addition, the planned use
for the performance data seems limited to federal-level accountability purposes for now.
Distal measures, typically representing population-level changes in morbidity and
mortality, have largely been rejected by all cases for inclusion in their performance
measurement systems. For public health programs, this level of change typically takes
years to achieve and requires resources beyond those allocated for any of these four
cases. GPRA/PART measures for the STD Program, Cancer Detection Program, and
Tobacco Control Program include population-level, distal measures 55 which participants
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For example, one GPRA/PART measure for Division of STD Prevention is as follows,
“Reduce pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) in the United States.” Interviewees explained
that there is not even consensus on how to define PID epidemiologically. One of the
GPRA/PART measures for DCPC is the “age-adjusted annual rate of breast cancer
mortality per 100,000 female population.” As noted in Chapter 6, resources for the
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in this study generally viewed as unrealistic to achieve based on program funding levels.
Given that preparedness is not disease-specific and, therefore, lacks incidence and
prevalence data, the Division of State and Local Readiness has successfully negotiated
three GPRA/PART measures with the Office of Management and Budget that are directly
tied to a subset of their six performance measures.
8.2.3.2.4 Use of Targets
Both the Preparedness Program and the Cancer Detection Program have
established standards for their performance measures (e.g., time for primary staff with
public health agency Incident Command System functional responsibilities that the public
health agency’s Emergency Operations Center is being activated – target 60 minutes or
less; percentage of abnormal screening results with time from screening test result to final
diagnosis greater than 60 days – target 25% or less). Neither the STD Program nor the
Tobacco Control Program have set targets for their performance measures due to
variability in disease burden across grantees and the absence of adequate trend data to
help substantiate a standard. The Division of STD Prevention encourages grantees to
document a baseline for their performance measures and set individual targets based on
their epidemiology, resources, and capacity. Similarly, the Office on Smoking and Health
currently requires Tobacco Control Program grantees to set a baseline and three-year
target for any key outcome indicator that grantees report through CDC’s web-based
reporting system.

Cancer Detection Program support screening for approximately 1% of women in the
United States. Consequently, interviewees for this study argued that the Division of STD
Prevention cannot fairly be held accountable for achieving the related benchmark for this
measure.
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8.2.3.2.4 Quality Assurance Efforts
All programs with performance measurement systems in place (Preparedness
Program, STD Program, Cancer Detection Program) require their grantees to submit data
twice annually to CDC. Web-based systems are used by all three programs to report data
or submit a data file. The Tobacco Control Program uses a web-based system for
voluntary reporting of the key outcome indicators already in place. Data quality (e.g.,
complete data, valid data) emerges as a predominant concern for all four cases given their
extensive decentralization. For programs that rely on local-level data collection and
reporting like the STD Program and Cancer Detection Program, data quality is
particularly challenging. And even for the Preparedness Program and Tobacco Control
Program that involve grantee-level data collection, CDC has experienced data quality
problems. Recognizing that the data will be relatively meaningless if quality is poor, staff
in all four programs are making efforts to address quality assurance.
Data quality problems may largely reflect the developmental stage of the
performance measurement systems. For instance, the Cancer Detection Program seems to
have the strongest data quality systems instituted of the four cases – cooperative
agreement funds support a data manager for each grantee, a standard data management
software is available to all grantees, on-going technical assistance for data management is
provided by a data contractor, regular edit checks are conducted at the grantee level and
by the Cancer Detection Program’s data contractor, edit reports are produced, and data
quality is closely examined as part of semi-annual data reviews for each grantee. In
addition, a national data validation study of the minimum data elements was conducted
from 2003-2007 and results reflected high quality data for the national program.
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In contrast, the Preparedness Program and STD Program have both faced
significant data quality problems which the Division of State and Local Readiness and
the Division of STD Prevention are working to address. Participants in the Division of
STD Prevention suggested that data quality is improving with time and increased
technical assistance efforts. Both the Preparedness Program and STD Program provide
grantees performance measurement guides with detailed information about each
measure’s intent, operational definition, data sources, numerator and denominator
specification, and references supporting the measures. However, staff working with the
Preparedness Program and STD Program expressed frustration for grantees’ lack of
compliance with the guidance.
8.2.3.3 Use of the Performance Measurement System and Data
Use of the performance measurement data varies across cases. The Cancer
Detection Program is the most sophisticated user of their performance data employing it
for the multiple purposes of accountability, program improvement, and budgeting. Data
use for the Cancer Detection Program is supported by two key factors. First, the Cancer
Detection Program has established a strong data-driven program culture – as noted, the
minimum data elements have been an integral part of the program since its inception in
1991. As described in chapter 6, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control has longsupported a comprehensive and well-funded performance management system. For
instance, grantees are provided resources through their cooperative agreement award to
support data collection and reporting (e.g., staff salary for a data manager, data system
support). In addition, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control funds a data
contractor to manage the national data set for the Cancer Detection Program. Technical
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consultants working for the data contractor are assigned to work with grantees to provide
on-going data management support. And Cancer Detection Program staff at CDC include
a senior data manager and programmer to work with the data contractor and help manage
the national dataset. Second, the performance measures are overwhelmingly viewed as
meaningful and valid measures that represent program priorities and support program
management. In other words, the perceived value of the performance measures support
and reinforce their use.
Consistent with the Division of State and Local Readiness’ stated purpose for its
performance measures, staff are using Preparedness Program performance measurement
data to respond to accountability demands from the Office of Management and Budget
and other federal-level partners, although data quality problems have limited its utility.
More importantly, however, the Division of State and Local Readiness staff and grantees
interviewed for the study recognize that the current set of six measures is not perceived as
particularly meaningful or useful to grantees. Grantees would prefer performance
measures that better reflect program priorities and that will support program
improvement. Staff with the Preparedness Program recognized that wider adoption and
use of performance measures for the program will be influenced by their ability to
identify more relevant measures as part of the current development process. In addition,
program consultants in the Division have had little to no involvement in the development
efforts; as the primary CDC contact with grantees, their participation and investment in
the effort will be needed to support data quality and data use by grantees.
The use of the STD Program performance measures has been influenced by data
quality concerns, the lack of organizational support within the Division of STD
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Prevention from management and program consultants, and resistance from grantees.
Staff working on the STD Program performance measures have been frustrated by the
lack of buy-in for and support of the effort – while some grantees are using the measures
and even developing their own measures, adoption across the broader network is
perceived to be limited.
Use of the Tobacco Control Program core performance measures is, as yet,
untested given that the indicators are still in development. Grantees voluntarily report key
outcome indicators of their choice as part of regular progress reporting. Of interest, the
Office on Smoking and Health did not mandate reporting of the new core performance
indicators (or key outcome indicators) in the new five-year funding announcement issued
in 2009.
Overall, several factors seem to influence the use of performance measurement
data for the cases included in this study. These include the perceived relevance of the
measures to grantees, how well the measures reflect program goals and priorities, data
quality, the existence of a performance management system supporting data use, and
stakeholder buy-in– especially by CDC program consultants, management, and grantees.
In addition, results suggest that adoption of performance measures in these large
networked contexts takes time and an investment of resources to facilitate their
acceptance and use.

8.3 Cross-Case Results
Findings from the cross-case analysis are presented in this section. Table 31
provides a summary of the cross-case results organized by Jennings and Haist’s
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hypotheses and the research questions for this study. As a reminder, a listing of results
from the with-in case analysis is provided in appendix N.

Table 31. Summary of Cross-Case Findings
Jennings and Haist, hypothesis #13: The extent to which performance measures are
used and the types of measures used will depend on the degree to which outputs and
outcomes can be observed (2004, p.185).
Research Question #1.
How does networked public
management affect CDC’s
observability of program outputs
and outcomes?

Finding 8.3.1.1 Observability (measurement) of
program outputs and outcomes is primarily related to
the complexity of the public health problem, but
network differences in program priorities, activities,
epidemiology, and resource levels do challenge the
ability to observe program outputs and outcomes
across all grantees.
Finding 8.3.1.2 While networked public
management is necessary to achieve program
outcomes, it compromises observability (attribution)
and fragments accountability.

Research Question #2.
How does networked public
management influence CDC’s use
of performance measurement and
the types of performance
measures used?

Finding 8.3.2.1 The use of performance
measurement is an expectation of the political and
administrative context and is not influenced by the
network structure.
Finding 8.3.2.2 The types and choice of
performance measures are affected by network
variability, the political influence of network
stakeholders, and the network structure which
compromises control over outcomes.

Jennings and Haist, hypothesis #14: Measurement will be more common and will have
greater impact when agencies have greater control over outcomes. (2004, p.185)
Finding 8.3.3.1 Dependencies on both vertical and
horizontal network partners diminish CDC and
Does networked public
management affect CDC’s control grantee control over outcomes, restricting the design
over outcomes and the subsequent and impact of performance measurement.
design and perceived impact of
performance measurement?
Research Question #3.
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8.3.1 How does networked public management affect the observability of CDC’s
program outputs and outcomes?
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Jennings and Haist (2004) define
observability as it relates to performance measurement in two ways – the ability to
measure outputs and outcomes and the ability to attribute outcomes to the program of
interest. Two related findings are presented below.
8.3.1.1 Observability (measurement) of program outputs and outcomes is primarily
related to the complexity of the public health problem, but network differences in
program priorities, activities, epidemiology, and resource levels do challenge the ability
to observe program outputs and outcomes across all grantees.
The ability to measure outputs or outcomes for these four cases is primarily
influenced by the complexity of the problem each addresses rather than the network
implementation structure. The nature of the program (e.g., preparedness, infectious
disease control and prevention, health care service delivery, prevention of chronic
diseases), the available evidence base, the complexity of the problem – these are the most
important factors influencing whether the four programs’ outputs and outcomes can be
measured.
As a service delivery program, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control can
easily measure both outputs and short-term and intermediate outcomes for the Cancer
Detection Program. A CDC staff person commented,
This program certainly has advantages in that we’re able to quantify things
in a way that other people can’t. But that’s purely because we are a direct
service delivery program, where you can count the number of women
screened, you can count the number of tests provided, you can count how
many [tests] were abnormal, you can count how long it took to get from an
abnormal screening result to a follow-up test, and from diagnostic
determination of cancer to [cancer] treatment. We have the luxury of
doing that.
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The Preparedness Program, however, represents a much more complicated
problem – preparedness for the public health consequences of disasters as diverse as
flooding and bioterrorist attacks. During a presentation at the national preparedness
conference (2008), a lead evaluator from the Division of State and Local Readiness
suggested that public health emergency preparedness is not an “end state” reflected in
specific outcomes, but rather, an on-going process to build and maintain infrastructure,
partnerships, and plans for demonstrating capability to respond in real emergencies.
Unlike many other public health areas, preparedness lacks disease-specific incidence and
prevalence data. One participant said,
We’re not so sure what it means to be prepared; is emergency
preparedness all about getting everybody trained in incident command and
setting up an emergency op [operations] center and getting everybody
there in 15 minutes from the time that you know there’s an emergency, is
that what emergency preparedness is all about? Well, that might be a little
part of it, but it’s also about how quickly you stand up your points of
distribution following an anthrax event…I would say the biggest challenge
[for performance measurement] is defining what it is we really need to
measure that will have a meaningful interpretation in the world of public
health emergency preparedness.
Even for infectious diseases like sexually transmitted diseases that benefit from
robust surveillance data, some important outcomes for the STD Program are difficult to
measure. For instance, although one of the three GPRA/PART measures for the Division
of STD Prevention is to reduce pelvic inflammatory disease, researchers lack consensus
on how to measure it. Likewise, while the Division of STD Prevention (STD Program),
Division of Cancer Prevention and Control (Cancer Detection Program), and the Office
on Smoking and Health (Tobacco Control Program) all intend to reduce racial and ethnic
disparities in disease impact, an evidence-base supporting how to reduce disparities (and,
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therefore, what to measure) is lacking. From a CDC staff person working with the STD
Program,
Another major Division commitment is to reduce “disparities.” Okay.
What does that mean from a process measure, not from just showing this
is the rate in whites, blacks, and then it happens to come down, but
[measuring] what are you doing [to reduce disparities]? Let’s say you’re
tackling African-Americans – what is it that you want to do that you think
is on the pathway to improving [STD] rates among African-Americans?
We’re way, way far from having any kind of agreement. Is it having a care
home, is it having access to care? Short of being able to find that ‘what’,
there’s no measure.
Likewise, sexually transmitted disease infections prevented or tobacco
consumption prevented is nearly impossible to measure. And in all four cases, even when
outcomes are measurable, population-based outcomes such as morbidity and mortality
may take years to observe making related measures impractical to include in a
performance measurement system.
Although networks do not affect the ability to measure outputs or outcomes,
networks can challenge the capability to observe outputs and outcomes consistently
across the grantees for any given case. That is, outputs and outcomes for the four cases
are not equally observed across the grantee networks due to differences in epidemiology,
program priorities and activities, network capacity, and resources. This variability within
the network has implications for the performance measurement system and is discussed
in 8.3.2 below.
8.3.1.2 While networked public management is necessary to achieve program outcomes,
it compromises observability (attribution) and fragments accountability.
For all four cases included in this study, program outcomes are, to some extent,
jointly produced by both vertical and horizontal partners within the implementation
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network. The complexity of the public health problems addressed by each case demands
networked approaches not only to achieve longer-term goals, but also, for some cases, to
achieve outputs, short-term outcomes, and intermediate-level outcomes.
Dependencies on vertical and horizontal partners are greatest for the Preparedness
Program and Tobacco Control Program given that established goals will only be achieved
through collaboration. For example, moderating the effects from a bioterrorist event
requires an integrated response across levels of government, numerous departments, and
diverse sectors. In such an emergency, a local health department is dependent on an array
of other agencies and organizations at the local level as well as state and federal
government. A representative from a grantee agency funded as part of Preparedness
Program described the networked response in preparedness.
I think in this arena [preparedness] there’s an enormous component that is
relationships, that is coordination. A great deal of what you do is
absolutely not under your control but is critical to any type of success.
You really are mobilizing and enabling others, coordinating across
networks, managing loosely defined networks.
Similarly, eliminating nonsmokers’ exposure to secondhand smoke cannot be achieved
by government alone; other agencies and organizations must bring resources to bear in
order to meet this goal. Educational, clinical, regulatory, economic, and social strategies
are all needed in order to have an impact on secondhand smoke.
As the Division of STD prevention expands its goals for the STD Program to
assume the broader ‘community perspective’ described earlier (rather than a narrow focus
on public STD clinics), the role of partners becomes increasingly important. As noted,
trends of health care access and delivery have shifted; patients are less likely to seek
treatment at publicly-funded sexually transmitted disease clinics than in the past, instead
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turning to private, primary care providers. A participant working with the STD Program
said,
Syphilis used to be ninety percent or more treated in public STD clinics.
Now more than half are treated outside of STD clinics. Particularly men
who have sex with men, a lot of them are HIV infected. They have care
providers and they get treated by those care providers. And so they never
enter the public system. So in order to reach people with syphilis, you’ve
got to reach beyond just the STD clinics.
Consequently, engaging agencies and partners that interface with populations at
higher risk of sexually transmitted diseases such as private health care providers, schools,
departments of corrections, and drug treatment facilities is necessary to effectively
address the problem. Even the Cancer Detection Program, a program that predominantly
relies on partners within the vertical implementation chain (i.e., CDC, grantee, local
health providers) to achieve outcomes, depends on horizontal-level community partners
to conduct public education and support client recruitment efforts. To an extent,
effectively screening women is a product of collaboration across partnering agencies –
some that make the public aware of the importance of screening through educational
efforts, others that help identify program-eligible women and refer them to participating
providers, and the physicians, radiologists, and surgeons who screen and diagnose them.
The statement below, from the most recent funding announcement for the Cancer
Detection Program, reflects the program’s emphasis on partnerships for all of its program
components.
Program components of the NBCCEDP [Cancer Detection Program]
include program management; screening and diagnostic services to
include case management for follow-up of abnormal results; data
management; quality assurance/quality improvement; evaluation;
partnerships; and professional development and recruitment. These
program components are carried out at the local, State and national levels
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through collaborative partnerships with State health agencies, communitybased organizations, tribes and tribal organizations, universities, a variety
of medical care providers and related agencies and institutions, and the
business and voluntary sectors.
For the four cases in this study, collaboration with network partners, whether
intentional, planned, or otherwise, is meant to support the realization of outcomes. All
four programs leverage network partners to achieve synergies, increase resources, and
promote the diverse strategies needed to address these complicated public health
problems that are influenced by multiple factors. At the same time, however, assigning
attribution for specific results to a specific program becomes much more challenging in
these networked environments where outcomes (and even outputs in some cases) are
jointly produced. For instance, even with a strong evidence base supporting causal
pathways, disentangling which outcomes should be attributed to what agency becomes
impossible without employing sophisticated evaluation approaches. Typically,
performance measurement does not entail the methodological rigor to unravel attribution
for outcomes.
In addition, when multiple network partners are all contributing to improved
outcomes, accountability becomes fragmented. For example, which agency is ultimately
accountable for achieving the Tobacco Control Program’s short-term outcome measure
#2.3.7, the “level of support for creating tobacco-free policies in public places and
workplaces?” As discussed in chapter 7 (section 7.3), the Office on Smoking and Health
has made a conscious decision to only include outcome-level measures in its set of
Tobacco Control Program core indicators. Recognizing that the outcomes are jointly
produced by many network partners involved in comprehensive tobacco control efforts,
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assigning accountability for these outcomes to a single agency is impossible. In many
ways, this example best represents one of the conundrums of performance measurement
as applied in networked contexts – that is, while these four cases all state accountability
as a primary purpose for their performance measurement systems, it is often difficult to
assign accountability for jointly produced outputs and outcomes. This issue is discussed
in more depth in 8.3.3 below.
Although not the focus of this study, per se, accountability for GPRA/PART
measures was often discussed by study participants. In theory, CDC programs are held
accountable for these measures and program results are used to inform federal-level
budget decisions. For the cases of the STD Program, the Cancer Detection Program, and
the Tobacco Control Program that all have population-level, distal outcome indicators as
part of their GPRA/PART measures, participants were adamant that CDC alone should
not be held accountable for achieving them given several factors including limited
resources, the network structure that diminishes control over implementation, and the fact
that longer-term program outcomes are typically influenced by multiple factors. A
participant from Tobacco Control Program said,
At CDC we’re the translation agency so we’re not, at least in chronic,
we’re not doing the bench science that’s really easy to measure your
outcome. We’re about setting up programs. We give money [to grantees],
we give program guidance, and we kind of hope that things happen, and
we think we know what the outcomes should be if the guidance is
implemented. But we don’t have any direct control over it…You don’t
have direct control like you do over your checkbook, and so you say, well
I can do this and if good things happen I think I was a part of it but I can’t
claim credit.
And from the STD Program,
Accountability is awfully hard to measure. These are very broad – this is
population-based national stuff, and activities that impact on whether
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people are being screened, whether they’re being treated, whether their
partner’s being screened and treated – that’s all happening three steps
removed from us [CDC] with money that comes to us, to send down there
[to grantees] that is completely inadequate. And getting more inadequate
by the day when we have this pathology of flat funding when flat funding
means less every year.

8.3.2 How does networked public management influence CDC’s use of performance
measurement and the types of performance measures used?
8.3.2.1 The use of performance measurement is an expectation of the political and
administrative context and is not influenced by the network structure.
The networked public management context did not influence the decision for staff
in any of the four cases to use performance measurement. Instead, data suggest that
program staff and stakeholders assume that performance measurement is the best means
to address demands for accountability. The study provides no evidence that
representatives from these cases assess the appropriateness of performance measurement
for their particular program or context. In part, this finding is based more on what was not
said by participants than what they discussed. Results suggest that measurement has
become an expectation for programs, one widely accepted and unquestioned. The
assumption that performance measurement should be employed is probably influenced by
GPRA, PART, and other performance-based initiatives established at CDC. One person
said, “HHS wants it, the top at CDC wants performance measures.” Reflecting a common
sentiment among participants, one person from the Preparedness Program remarked,
I believe in performance measures. You know, ‘what gets measured gets
done.’ I’ve always believed that. And I’ve always believed in looking at
things that measure whether or not your program is meeting what you
want your program to do. I’m not sure we’re there yet. And we still have a
long way to go [in developing measures].
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A participant from the Division of STD Prevention discussed how GPRA and
PART, while not particularly useful to their program, are used to justify the importance
of accountability and the use of performance measurement with grantees.
It’s very useful politically for us to say, ‘There’s an era of greater
accountability, and we need to be documenting and demonstrating,’ which
is not untrue. GPRA is not coming and going, they were smart – it passed
Congress and so it’s a law. The actual [GPRA] measures for us are a little
less useful and we don’t really manage around it, so it has not really
directed what happens out there. But as a concept, as something that isn’t
going to be going away, as part and parcel of this greater era of
accountability – that is quite useful for us.
Overwhelmingly, study participants in all cases suggested the budget crisis in
government has further intensified the need for performance measurement as a means to
demonstrate measurable progress so that programs can defend resource allocations. A
representative from a Tobacco Control Program grantee program said,
I was able to convey to the staff the idea that we always have to be able to
say what we do. And we always have to be able to measure stuff, because
the program has been cut so badly. And part of that [having their budget
cut] was because we were not able to articulate what we did and what the
numbers were and how the program and the state and the citizenry would
be harmed by cuts to the program.
And from someone with the Preparedness Program,
We’ve got to have information to defend this program, that’s the bottom
line. And, and maintain it. We’re faced with funding cuts on a yearly basis
and although it is highly funded as a program, its intent is to build the
public health infrastructure so that we’re in a much better position to
respond to emergencies. And I think if we can demonstrate that [being
prepared] through our measurement system, this program is going to be
much stronger going forward.
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8.3.2.2 The types and choice of performance measures are affected by network
variability, the political influence of network stakeholders, and the network structure
which compromises control over outcomes.
In these four cases, the networked implementation influences the types and choice
of performance measures in three different ways. First, as evident in the description
provided in section 8.2.2.5, the decentralized program implementation of the four cases
results in extensive variation across the program grantees and their local level partners.
Second, the network structure inherently results in a greater number of stakeholders with
whom the performance measurement system must be planned and negotiated. And third,
the network structure lessens the control that CDC and grantees have over outcomes. All
three, network variability, the political influence of network members, and compromised
control within the network, have implications for the types and choice of measures
included in the performance measurement system. In this section, the first two factors are
addressed; the last is discussed in section 8.3.3 below.
Network variability in all four cases is represented in terms of the extent and
nature of the public health problem (e.g., infectious versus chronic disease, epidemiology,
demographics of those affected); context (e.g., state laws, presence of advocates and/or
adversaries); organizational priorities, resources, and capacity (e.g., grantees’ activities,
budget size, staffing, expertise); and network capacity (e.g., local-level capacity,
infrastructure). Together, these kinds of variability affected the types and choice of
measures included in the four performance measurement systems.
Variability in disease incidence and prevalence challenged CDC’s ability to
identify a common set of performance measures across grantees. As example, the
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epidemiology of sexually transmitted disease varies across states – syphilis is much more
prevalent in Texas than Vermont. A representative of STD Program said,
Absolutely there are different disease burdens. I think our challenge has
been to identify a set of measures that is useful for the majority of project
areas, both small and large and that’s been an internal debate in the
performance measure work group. There are a number of participants on
the work group who will come out and say that small states don’t matter,
because the real outcome measure is reducing morbidity and reducing
syphilis morbidity. In New England where all together they have 90 cases
of P&S [primary and secondary] syphilis a year compared to Texas that
has 90 in a month, there are advocates for not worrying about the small
states…Some of these are specifically for syphilis high morbidity areas.
There are a couple of measures that we’ve created so that the non-syphilis
morbidity areas have something else to do. If you don’t have syphilis, then
you should be concentrating on gonorrhea and here’s a measure to take a
look at that.
Likewise, in regard to preparedness, New York is more vulnerable to an anthrax
attack than New Mexico. A participant with the Preparedness Program said,
There’s a lot of concern from grantees about, you know, that West
Virginia doesn’t need to be as prepared for a hurricane as Florida does. Or,
Idaho doesn’t need to be as prepared for a biochemical attack as New
York City does. So what should our measures truly try to address? And is
it as critical that certain states be able to do stuff as quickly or whatever as
others?
For the three cases that confront variability in disease incidence and prevalence
(STD Program, Cancer Detection Program, and Tobacco Control Program), programs
have been forced to incorporate a degree of flexibility into their performance
measurement systems. For instance, in the STD Program, a grantee does not have to
provide data for performance measures that may not be relevant for their state, city, or
territory as long as they provide a rational justification. For the Cancer Detection
Program, if a grantee has a sample size less than ten for a specific performance measure
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(e.g., percentage of women diagnosed with breast cancer with treatment started, target –
90% or greater), the indicator is not calculated given that the small numbers skew the
measurement. And in the cases of both the Tobacco Control Program and STD Program,
grantees will establish their own targets based on baseline data specific to their own state
or territory. From a participant with the Tobacco Control Program,
See that’s [setting targets] the challenge, especially when you fund 50
states [laughing]. I don’t know how those would be set. The target would
have to be different for each program because every state has different
resources, and different goals, and different activities, so I’m not quite
sure [about setting a national target].
And from a staff person with the STD Program,
We’ve opted against things like benchmarking or setting goals. We’re
going to have to revisit that because I think there’s value in that. But
because there’s such variability between programs we didn’t set a national
goal [grantees set their own]. And to get people used to the idea of setting
their own goals, realizing, OK, you know better than we do what your
resources are, what your limitations are. So don’t focus on how you
compare to Texas or how you compare to Washington State. Focus on
where you are now compared to where you could be and then set your
goals accordingly. What we’ve [CDC] learned is that we need to do some
training on how to set goals. They’re all over the place.
Variability in context as well as organizational priorities, resources, and capacity
also had implications for the selection of performance measures. The unique needs of a
given grantee’s population along with its resources and capacity will inform the program
goals it establishes and program activities it implements. As example, CDC has
established four national goals for the Tobacco Control Program, but grantees prioritize
them differently based on need, resource levels (e.g., CDC award size, state
contributions), or capacity (e.g., the network relationships needed to address a particular
goal area). Consequently, program activities implemented within a given state or territory
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will vary as one grantee focuses on secondhand smoke and another on preventing the
initiation of tobacco use among young people. The Office on Smoking and Health has
found that even for the Tobacco Control Program that benefits from a strong science-base
and identified best practices, implementation of program activities differs tremendously,
even within a state (i.e., different communities within a state implement different
activities). In part, this led to the initial development of 120 key outcome indicators
which CDC is struggling to narrow down to a core set of national outcome indicators.
Also, given the extensive variability in implementation efforts, the Office on Smoking
and Health found it impossible to identify a limited and common set of process and
output measures. One person representing the Tobacco Control Program said,
They [Office on Smoking and Health] really wanted to identify process
indicators that mapped onto short-term outcomes. But when we started
going out and interviewing states and talking to them, we realized that
every one of them was doing it so differently that coming up with one or
two or three process indicators that all the states were using was going to
be just a huge task – almost impossible.
This kind of variability in regard to processes and outputs was observed in three
of the four cases, the Preparedness Program, STD Program, and the Tobacco Control
Program. In contrast, however, the Cancer Detection Program is a service delivery
program which is an anomaly among programs supported by CDC. For the Cancer
Detection Program, grantees are responsible for the delivery of the same activities
screening and diagnostic tests for breast and cervical cancer. Because the performance
measures are almost entirely tied to the delivery of these services, the network’s
variability has had less affect on the types and choice of performance measures. All 68 of
the Cancer Detection Program grantees work with local health care providers to recruit
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and screen women, conduct follow-up to assure timely diagnostic follow-up, and ensure
that women diagnosed with cancer initiate needed treatment. These activities are easily
measured, regardless of the type of measure (i.e., process, short-term outcomes, and
intermediate-level outcomes).
Next, variability in network capacity also affects the performance measurement
systems for these four cases. Variability in network capacity is represented by differences
in local-level expertise, resources, staffing, and infrastructure that affect the availability
of data, the ability to collect and report valid data, and the adequacy of data management
systems within a given state. Consider the range of funding, alone. For the Preparedness
Program, grantee awards range from $330,000 to over $50 million; for the Cancer
Detection Program, awards range from $75,000 to nearly $9 million. Resource level is a
major factor affecting all aspects of an individual grantee’s program, including staffing
and data management systems, and the amount of resources available for local-level
implementers.
The lack of local-level infrastructure and capacity in the Preparedness Program
led to the Division of State and Local Readiness’ decision to include only grantee-level
measures in its current set of performance measures. For the Preparedness Program, STD
Program, and Tobacco Control Program, variability in network capacity led all three
programs to initially select what several participants referred to as “low hanging fruit” or,
in the case of the STD Program, “get right at ‘em” measures. For these programs, the idea
of “low hanging fruit” or “get right at ‘em” measures not only reflects the need to identify
measures that are acceptable to most grantees in order to build buy-in, but also the need
to select measures for which data are available and that are feasible for grantees to collect
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and report given their diversity and capacity. That is, CDC must identify performance
measures for which data are available across the grantee network and measures for which
local-level partners have the capacity to collect and report the needed data. From the
Preparedness Program, a participant talked about their choice of performance measures
that are meant to be manageable, and therefore, acceptable to grantees.
I think it’s a good move for now from the measurement perspective – I
think we considered these six ‘low hanging fruit’ and we thought that they
[grantees] would too, so there were fewer complaints (laughing). But I
think that it was partially to get their buy-in and so that they would agree
that, ‘Yes, these are reasonable measures, and yes, we do these things
anyway, and it’s not out of order for CDC to ask us for data on these [six
measures].’
A representative from the STD Program also commented on the challenges of selecting
measures for which all grantees have the capacity to collect and report.
I guess probably it’s [variability across grantees] the biggest challenge
because even being able to come up with the 12 or 14 measures that
everybody [all grantees] can actually collect data on and do it in a
reasonably [valid] sound way was a major accomplishment.
Finally, for all cases, variability limits the ability to compare performance across
grantees. The unique contextual characteristics of each grantee necessitate careful
interpretation of performance data; CDC staff consistently expressed the importance of
assessing grantees’ performance based on their individual situation. From the STD
Program,
I can’t compare North Carolina and South Dakota. They’re two entirely
different environments, as far as what they’re operating in, what they’re
trying to do. So I don’t look at what one project area is doing versus
another. I can’t see the benefit to that. But I will look at the individual
grantee, knowing what a project area does, and then look at those
performance measures.
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The network also influences the type and choice of performance measures
through the political influence of its members, primarily grantees, but also other
stakeholders in the network. In contrast to a contract, the cooperative agreement funding
tool used by these four cases is premised on a collaborative relationship between CDC
and grantees. In all cases, data suggest that grantees hold and exercise political influence
in regard to performance measurement systems as well as in other areas of programrelated policy and decision making. For instance, an observation of a performance
measurement workgroup meeting revealed that the Division of STD Prevention
management was extremely sensitive to grantee concerns about a proposed set of new
performance measures. As each individual performance measure was discussed,
representatives from the management team inquired about any concerns that grantees had
expressed about that particular measure, giving those concerns significant weight in the
considering whether or not to include the measure. In an interview, one person described
how the Division management sometimes relents to pressure from grantees on issues
related to the performance measures. “Well, they [grantees] didn’t like some measure we
had, and so they put pressure on him, that they don’t want this as a measure. And he does
give in to the field [grantees] a good bit.”
Similarly, the Cancer Detection Program grantees will use political influence
when necessary to affect decision making related to the performance measures. A
representative from a grantee who was interviewed suggested grantees could have
Congressmen calling CDC if some performance measures were introduced that grantees
opposed.
Some of the things that CDC’s talking about now [ideas for future
performance measures] that aren’t performance measures of clinical things
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– you may have Congressmen calling! I mean, it’s different. These
[current measures] are tangible – you can count days, you can count
[screening] results, you can count the number of women who have had
cancer diagnosed and, whether or not they got into treatment.
A staff person with the Cancer Detection Program also remarked about the
potential backlash from grantees if benchmarks for the performance measures
were made more difficult.
[Laughing] I think we’d all get shot if we raised the benchmark because
we’ve been standing behind them so long that they’re adequate the way
they are. Because in the same way we refused to lower them, I think we’d
get in much more trouble with grantees if we tried to raise them for the
same reason.
For the Preparedness Program, federal-level stakeholders have been influential in
shaping the performance measures through the imposition of specific policies that require
related performance measures and even specify the type of measure or measure itself. As
detailed in chapter 4, policies such as the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of
2007 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive #21 have significant implications for
the Preparedness Program’s performance measurement system. Homeland Security
Presidential Directive #21 states,
(a) within 270 days after the date of this directive, (i) publish an initial
template or templates meeting the requirements above, including basic
testing of component distribution mechanisms and modeling of template
systems to predict performance in large-scale implementation, (ii)
establish standards and performance measures for State and local
government countermeasure distribution systems, including demonstration
of specific capabilities in tactical exercises in accordance with the
National Exercise Program, and (iii) establish a process to gather
performance data from State and local participants on a regular basis to
assess readiness; and
(b) within 180 days after the completion of the tasks set forth in (a), and
with appropriate notice, commence collecting and using performance data
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and metrics as conditions for future public health preparedness grant
funding.
A participant remarked,
I think it was in the fall or maybe December [2007] that HSPD-21 was
approved. But it gave us six months to develop measures for
countermeasure distribution. The data, the first report has to be within a
year. I mean, it’s just totally unreasonable.
The Preparedness Program grantees also exert political influence around the
selection and development of performance measures. As observed at both a conference
and a performance measurement workgroup meeting, grantees were forceful in sharing
their views about the performance measurement design and the choice of measures that
would be acceptable to the grantees.
8.3.3 How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement?
8.3.3.1 Dependencies on both vertical and horizontal network partners diminish CDC and
grantee control over outcomes, restricting the design and impact of performance
measurement.
As reflected in section 8.2.2.3, CDC’s control over outcomes weakens as the
network descends both vertically and horizontally. Diminishing control over
implementation and subsequent outcomes due to network structure was observed in all
four cases, albeit to different degrees. First, in regard to vertical network relationships,
CDC and grantee control is exerted based primarily on institutional and funding
relationships. However, a central challenge of the vertical structure is CDC’s diminishing
level of influence on program implementation (and outcomes) with each step down the
chain. While these four CDC programs have some formal authority over grantees based
on the cooperative agreement or grant, programs have no direct relationship with vertical
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partners at the local-level. Instead, CDC is dependent on grantees’ control over locallevel implementation which will be influenced, in part, by grantees’ choice of funding
tool and model of decentralization. From the Cancer Detection Program,
I think it [control over the local level] depends on how they’re [grantee
programs] structured. I know, for instance, that a state that works with
county health departments – maybe where the county health departments
are their own unique entity – they [state grantee] don’t have as much
control over service delivery as a grantee that has individual contracts with
providers where the state could cancel their contract, or decrease their
funding, or something like that.
A representative from the STD Program also discussed how the infrastructure
within a state affects control over the local level.
Their [grantees] administration is different. In some areas the disease
intervention specialists, the DIS, who would be doing the interviewing,
they’re state employees in a central location. And in other areas they’re
[DIS] maybe county employees. And so those kinds of things make it a
little more difficult [to control implementation]…there is so much
variation in staffing and the types of staffing and it just makes it more
difficult.
Of the four cases, the Cancer Detection Program is most adept at using
management tools to enhance control and authority within the vertical network, even
down to the local-level. CDC closely monitors clinical service delivery through its large
monitoring dataset and is able to intervene with grantees as necessary. The Division of
Cancer Prevention and Control has not shied away from imposing sanctions on grantees
(e.g., withholding funds, requiring a corrective action plan) when quality of care issues
are involved. A representative of the Cancer Detection Program noted,
In our case, we have the MDEs [minimum data elements] that we’re
always analyzing. We’re always looking at it [the data]. We’re always
providing feedback to the states and working with them. And we do
impose sanctions, if I could call it that, when a program that we fund gets
too far out of compliance.
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Use of the Cancer Detection Program performance measures as part of the
budgeting formula also serves as an incentive for grantees to enhance their mechanisms
of control over local-level performance. Several participants mentioned grantees’ use of
performance-based contracts and reimbursement policies as means to exert influence over
local-level partners.
In contrast, the Division of STD Prevention has afforded greater latitude to STD
Program grantees over the years leading to a culture of grantee autonomy that has been
difficult for CDC to shift. A participant described the tension between the Division of
STD Prevention and its grantees, “You know, [grantees think] it’s my money, and I get to
do this with it, and I’m running my program. But, aren’t there expectations?” This
institutionalized culture has compromised CDC’s influence over grantees. The Office on
Smoking and Health also provides extensive leeway to its Tobacco Control Program
grantees as reflected in the statement below.
We [CDC] have traditionally been non-prescriptive. We want states to use
our money for what they need our money for. If that [a particular goal
area] is not a priority to the state, then we may not require them to do
anything on it. We want the programs to be as effective as they possibly
can and as specific as they possibly can to the needs of their state.
Dependencies on horizontal partners impose the greatest challenge for control and
authority in these four networks given that the relationships are typically unfunded and
informal – that is, neither CDC nor grantees have any formal authority over their efforts.
Horizontal partnerships serve different purposes in the networks of these four cases. For
the Preparedness Program and Tobacco Control Program, outcomes are jointly produced;
therefore, significant dependencies emerge between grantees and the horizontal partners
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needed to achieve results. As noted earlier, an effective response to an emergency,
whether a hurricane or bioterrorist attack, cannot be addressed by CDC grantees alone –
they are dependent on partners in varied sectors and at multiple levels of government to
contribute to the effort. But without formal authority, Preparedness Program grantees
must rely on their ability to influence horizontal partners, an endeavor that itself can be
made more difficult when priority and goal conflicts exist. The Director of a state grantee
program for the Preparedness Program said,
You’re dependent on all these programs to have the agency be prepared.
You need to have them come to the table for planning, and for
participating in training and exercises. But you’re just another “ask” on
top of the work they already have to do.
Like the Preparedness Program, the Tobacco Control Program operates from a
collaborative, networked model. Tobacco control will only be achieved through the
implementation of multiple, complimentary interventions and community mobilization
that address diverse areas such as policy, public education, and clinical care. Because
CDC funds are primarily retained by the grantees to support infrastructure, data revealed
less about their relationships with network partners, including grantees’ ability to exert
control over either vertical or horizontal partners. However, one can assume that similar
issues of control may exist.
The STD Program and Cancer Detection Program grantees along with their locallevel vertical partners rely on horizontal network members to facilitate access to target
populations and support the integration of service delivery. As in the cases of the
Preparedness Program and Tobacco Control Program, formal control over horizontal
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partners is absent. For STD Program grantees, the ability to influence them is further
challenged by mission and goal conflicts. One interviewee noted,
There’s challenges in working with entities whose mission is not public
health. You know, even those of us who have set up jail screening
programs, or worked with provider visitation, or worked with laboratories,
it’s still a challenge that comes up. Convincing people to do our work for
us without any money is what we’re doing and [helping them] understand
how they fit into the public health equation is difficult. It’s a challenge.
In these cases, the loss of control over implementation and outcomes imposed by
the network structure has implications for their performance measurement systems. In
particular, the Preparedness Program, STD Program, and Cancer Detection Program all
experience grantee resistance to performance measures viewed as “outside their control,”
specifically, those indicators for which grantees (or their local-level implementers) are
dependent on horizontal partners over whom they have no authority. In the statement
below, a representative with the STD Program argues that grantees should not be held
accountable through performance measurement for processes that are not “our work.”
If we are trying to measure our work, the STD Program, it makes more
sense to me to measure from date of assignment rather than specimen
collection. [Grantees can’t control how long it takes laboratories to
process and report a case to the health department]. It [influencing the
laboratories] is potentially a piece that we can help to better, but it isn't
actually our work.
A staff person with the Cancer Detection Program described grantees’ concerns over a
performance measure they viewed as “outside their control.”
If a referral is made [by a network partner] to a woman with an abnormal
PAP to go to the B&C program [an Cancer Detection Program-funded
provider] down the street, they [grantee] don’t have control over how long
it takes that woman to show up, and that delays their follow-up time [a
performance measure]. And we counted the clock [calculated the measure]
from the time that woman was diagnosed with an abnormal result, not
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from the date they entered our program. So programs felt disadvantaged
because they can only control the timeframe from the time the woman
walks in the door, as opposed to when they were originally screened and
diagnosed to have an abnormal test.
Staff in the Preparedness Program and STD Program also expressed concern
about the reliance on horizontal partners for data collection and reporting. For instance,
STD Program grantees are dependent on jails and juvenile detention facilities to screen
new admittees. Given that these partners are typically unfunded by STD Program
grantees, concerns about both data access and data quality arise. One participant
discussed why grantees are opposed to measures that depend on jail personnel.
I think it’s pretty clear why grantees don’t like that – you’re calling it
performance, which is a reflection on them. They may not be performing
well because someone in their community isn’t supporting them or there
are things that are beyond their control. And other people just have the
luck of being in a place where they have a cooperative prison system or
something.
In response to grantee resistance, all three programs the Preparedness Program,
STD Program, and Cancer Detection Program – have altered one or more of their
measures to strengthen grantee control over performance. As discussed in more depth in
the individual case chapters, the Division of State and Local Readiness has added a
criterion of “under public health’s control” for the selection of future performance
measures for the Preparedness Program; STD Program grantees rejected several proposed
measures for 2009 that were viewed as “outside their control;” and the Division of
Cancer Prevention and Control recently revised the calculation of a measure to reflect
performance that is strictly under the control of agencies in the vertical network. In all
cases, the consequence has been a tendency to select measures that are more closely tied
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to the work of the grantee or those in the vertical chain. Typically, these include process,
output, and short-term outcome indicators. A representative from the Preparedness
Program described how CDC has tried to revise measures in ways that maximize control
for the grantee.
There’s a whole lot of things that they [grantees] don’t have control over
because of working with such diverse partners. For example, if they’re
doing an exercise with five other partners at the state, but they’re not
leading it [the exercise], that could cause delays in certain things. It
wouldn’t be their fault. So we had to really play with the language to find
out how we can phrase this measure so that they provide what they’re
responsible for verses depending on somebody else to facilitate something.
I think that’s a good move.
Overall, the network implementation structures represented in these cases lead to
diminished CDC and grantee control over outcomes. Grantees, whose buy-in is needed to
assure data quality and data use, are resistant to the inclusion of performance measures
that rely on unfunded, informal horizontal partners. For the Preparedness Program and
Cancer Detection Program that will use performance data to inform budgeting
decisions 56 , grantees seem to have a “zero-tolerance” for measures viewed as “outside
their control” given the implications of the performance data. As a consequence, the
choice and types of measures included in the performance measurement systems for the
Preparedness Program, STD Program, and Cancer Detection Program have all been
constrained by the need to assure that grantees have “control” over related performance.

56

The Division of Cancer Prevention and Control currently uses seven of its 11
performance measures as part of a broader, funding formula. The Division of State and
Local Readiness will begin using performance measures to inform budgeting in 2010
based on the requirements of some federal policies (e.g., Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act of 2007).
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A representative from the Preparedness Program articulated the important compromise
this limitation presents in a networked context,
In the long term, I don’t know if we can move that way [including
measures over which grantees have less control]. I don’t know if we can
get the buy-in from them [grantees] if their situation at the home front
doesn’t change to where they feel like, ‘Yeah, we can be responsible and
accountable for measures that really test that synergy of working among
different partners. I think that’s important. That’s critical. Because that’s
what makes or breaks a good response in public health or any other area.

8.4 Summary
Cross-case findings suggest that networked public management has important
implications for the design of performance measurement systems in the four cases studied
here. While the involvement of vertical and horizontal partners is essential to effectively
address these complex public health problems, networks impose limitations and force
compromises in the design of performance measurement systems. For these four
programs, networks make the attribution of outcomes to specific agencies or programs
difficult, if not impossible. For the Preparedness Program and the Tobacco Control
Program, where program outcomes are dependent on collaborative network efforts,
accountability becomes fragmented. In addition, networks create dependencies that
challenge grantees’ ability to control performance for important outputs and outcomes,
especially when they are reliant on unfunded, horizontal partners over whom they have
no formal authority.
Variability across the grantee network in regard to the extent or nature of the
public health problem, context, organizational features, and network capacity influenced
the types and choice of measures selected, challenged CDC to define common measures,
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set national targets, and forced programs to incorporate flexibility into their performance
measurement systems. Finally, the political power of network stakeholders, especially the
influence of grantees and federal policy initiatives, has shaped the performance
measurement systems for these four cases. Even for the Cancer Detection Program where
the nature of the program (i.e., service delivery) has facilitated the selection of common
performance measures and primary reliance on vertical partners has limited
dependencies, variability across the network and stakeholders’ influence have affected
the design, choice of measures, and target setting.

371

CHAPTER 9
DISCUSSION
This chapter begins with a brief review of the study purpose, theoretical
framework, research questions, and design. Next a summary of the findings are presented
situated within the broader literature related to networked public management and
performance measurement. Third, implications for theory, practice, and policy are
provided reflecting on the theory building of Jennings and Haist and considering the
relevance of this study for federal-level performance measurement in public health.
Fourth, recommendations for future research are provided. The chapter closes with a
summary of the study’s conclusions. As in chapter 8, shortened program names will be
used for the four cases (see table 27, chapter 8).

9.1 Summary of Study Purpose and Design
The purpose of the study was to investigate the implications of networked public
management on the design, implementation, and utilization of federal performance
measurement systems. My intention was to contribute both to the practice of performance
measurement and to expand early theory building initiated by Jennings and Haist (2004).
While much has been written about the importance of performance measurement for
managing in the public sector, little research has addressed its practice in settings where
implementation is carried out through collaborative networks. In particular, there is a lack
of empirical research exploring how networked contexts affect the design,
implementation, and utilization of performance measurement. Given the limited
understanding of this topic, a qualitative, descriptive study design was utilized.
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Qualitative methods are most suitable when a subject is insufficiently understood and
researchers are exploring “how” and “what” (Creswell 2007).
Although exploratory in nature and not intended to test a particular hypothesis,
the research was informed by a set of 25 hypotheses proposed by Jennings and Haist
(2004) related to the impact of performance measurement (appendix A). Jennings and
Haist offer a set of hypotheses about the potential impact of performance measurement
given varied conditions and factors, with the intent to set a theoretical foundation for
performance measurement and spur empirical study. While none of Jennings and Haist’s
25 hypotheses explicitly addresses decentralized or networked implementation structures,
two related to agency type were selected to guide this study given their emphasis on
organizational context and function:
•

Hypothesis #13: “The extent to which performance measures are used and the
types of measures used will depend on the degree to which outputs and outcomes
can be observed.” (p.185)

•

Hypothesis #14: “Measurement will be more common and will have greater
impact when agencies have greater control over outcomes.” (p.185)
These two hypotheses provided the theoretical focus for the study; from them,

three research questions were developed to further guide the investigation, each centered
on the role of networked public management.
•

How does networked public management affect the observability of CDC
program outputs and outcomes?

•

How does networked public management influence CDC’s use of performance
measurement and the types of performance measures used?
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•

How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement?
Given the exploratory nature of the research, a multiple, instrumental case study

design was used. Four public health programs funded by CDC and implemented
nationally through vertical and horizontal network structures were included as unique
cases. For the four cases, data collection included 50 in-depth interviews with 52
individuals, formal review of 57 documents and websites, and 12 formal observations.
Standard qualitative analysis techniques, including those derived from grounded theory
(Charmaz 2006) were applied. A detailed summary of the research methodology is
provided in chapter 3. Results of individual case analysis are presented in chapters 4
through 7; findings are summarized in appendix N. Cross-case findings, presented in
chapter 8 and organized around each research question, provided greater insight by
studying the similarities and differences across the four cases in how the networks affect
design and implementation of federal-level performance measurement systems.

9.2 Summary of Findings
Cross-case findings suggest that the networked implementation structures for
these four federal-level public health programs have important implications for the design
of the performance measurement systems. Specifically, the performance measurement
systems were affected by four consequences of the implementation networks:
•

the political influence of collaborative stakeholders,

•

network variability,

•

dependencies on voluntary, horizontal network partners to achieve outputs
and outcomes, and
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•

jointly produced outcomes that compromise assigning agency-specific
attribution and accountability.

While these four factors did not deter the use of performance measurement by any
of the programs, all had important consequences for the development and subsequent
design of the performance measurement systems, including limiting the choice and types
of measures, level of measurement, potential uses of the measures (e.g., accountability,
comparing performance across grantees), and resources needed to implement and support
the system. In addition, results suggest that the adoption of these systems across vastly
decentralized implementation structures takes considerable time. After briefly describing
the networks involved in the four cases studied, I will address each of the four factors
listed above in turn. The section closes with a discussion about CDC’s decision to use
performance measurement in these four cases.
9.2.1 Network Description
The networks of these four public health programs involve formal and informal
network partners, some intergovernmental, but others representing different agency types
(e.g., community-based organization) and sectors. Although all four programs involve
networks with both vertical and horizontal dimensions, the Preparedness Program and the
Tobacco Control Program are more reliant on horizontal partners to achieve outcomes
than the STD Program or the Cancer Detection Program. In general, these networks
maintain traditional hierarchical, vertical relations based on funding relationships, but
they also extend horizontally in order to reach high risk populations, integrate service
delivery, and facilitate coordinated prevention strategies more effectively. This finding is
consistent with earlier descriptions on network structure (Heinrich, Hill and Lynn 2004;
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Milward and Provan 2004), although this study identified ways in which programs
benefited from these horizontal relationships that had not been discussed previously (e.g.,
extending program reach to high risk populations, facilitating coordinated prevention
strategies). During the past several years, researchers have proposed various typologies of
network types (Agranoff 2003; Milward and Provan 2006); these cases may best reflect
service implementation networks characterized by Milward and Provan (2006).
While public health has traditionally relied on vertical relationships with state and
local partners to implement programming appropriate to the needs of individual
communities, the involvement of horizontal partners in these four cases may be explained
by the growing recognition about the complexity of the problems faced (e.g.,
preparedness, health care system issues) and the need to bring multiple sectors,
nontraditional partners, diverse strategies, and greater resources to bear. This supports, in
part, O’Toole’s (1997) proposition that awareness of more “wicked” social problems is
contributing to increased networks in public management.
9.2.2 The Political Influence of Collaborative Stakeholders
As detailed in chapters 1 and 2, network governance represents a shift from
traditional, hierarchical government to an approach that recognizes the public sector’s
interdependent relationships with vertical and horizontal partners at multiple levels (Kettl
2002; Stoker 1998). For the four cases in this study, a collaborative relationship between
CDC and its grantees is reinforced through the choice of policy tool for funding, a
cooperative agreement. Although CDC maintains some authority, grantees enjoy a level
of autonomy that allows them to structure program implementation in ways appropriate
to community needs and priorities. In regard to local-level partners, CDC concedes direct
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control entirely. And the extent of grantees’ control and authority over local-level
implementers may be dependent, in part, on the funding tool used, the existing state,
tribal, or territorial infrastructure for implementation, and relevant laws or policy 57 . CDC
and grantees both lack formal authority over voluntary, horizontal partners that may exist
at multiple levels, although dependencies exist as their participation is needed to achieve
program outputs and outcomes. Some suggest that the interdependencies, whether
between vertical partners or vertical and horizontal partners, created in a networked
environment lead to power differentials, rendering networked governance an inherently
political concept (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000; Peters and Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998).
This is the case as it applies to the development of the performance measurement systems
studied here. Findings suggest that grantees and their partners hold substantial political
influence in their relationship with CDC that forces a degree of bargaining and
compromise in the design of the performance measurement systems. For the majority of
cases studied, the development of the performance measurement systems is a negotiated
and collaborative endeavor between CDC, the grantees, and, in some cases, other
stakeholders.
The importance of involving stakeholders has long been recognized by experts of
performance measurement to ensure that systems are feasible and that buy-in, needed to
support data quality and data use, is achieved (Hatry 2007; Poister 2003). But results
from this study also suggest that for these cases, network stakeholders at multiple levels
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The relationship between grantees and their local-level partners was not the focus of
this study. A limited number of stakeholders representing the grantees were included in
the study given limits on the number of non-federal employees that could be included in
the research. Consequently, less is understood about the authority relationships between
grantees and their local-level, funded partners (sub-grantees).
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exercise political influence that shapes aspects of the performance measurement systems
including the choice and types of measures and system design. Grantees are willing to
flex their political muscle to influence CDC decision-making related to the performance
measurement systems, especially if performance data will be used to inform budgeting.
This finding lends support to another of Jennings and Haist’s (2004) hypothesis #12:
“Significant mobilization of interests adverse to the measures will reduce the impact of
performance measurement” (p.182). Findings suggest that in these networked contexts, a
participative process of system design was required. Like Radin (2006) who dismisses
the one-size-fits-all approach for performance measurement, the network context
demands a more nuanced, collaborative, and negotiated strategy to develop systems
appropriate to the needs not only of CDC, but to a variety of stakeholders. This idea of a
collaborative approach to the development of performance measurement systems has
been forwarded by Goddard and Mannion (2004) as more appropriate in a networked,
horizontal environment (see chapter 2, table 6).
9.2.3 Network Variability
In this study, network variability was identified as an important consequence of
network structure and a key factor influencing the performance measurement systems.
Variability within the networks of each program was observed in the extent and nature of
the public health problem; the state, tribe, or territorial context; grantee priorities,
resources, and capacity; and network capacity. This variability challenged programs to
identify common measures, led to the selection of “low hanging fruit” for initial sets of
measures, necessitated that programs incorporate a degree of flexibility in their
measurement systems to accommodate the diversity across grantees, affected the level of
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measurement for one program, required programs to incorporate extensive data quality
systems, and compromised the utility of comparing performance across grantees within a
particular program (e.g., Preparedness Program, STD Program). Variability continues to
challenge programs once performance measures are developed and implemented; in
particular, the sheer number of grantees along with variability in network capacity
contributes to on-going challenges in regard to data quality and validity. Studies of
GPRA by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others have identified
similar issues related to variability for programs implemented through decentralized
intergovernmental structures (GAO 1997a; GAO 1998a; GAO 2004; Mihm 2004).
The extent of variability within each of these four programs should not be
underestimated. Not only does the Cancer Detection Program work with 68 different and
unique grantee programs, but an additional 22,000 local providers are involved in service
delivery and, consequently, with the collection and reporting of data that support the
performance measures. This magnitude of decentralization, the related variability, and the
implications for performance measurement cannot be easily dismissed. As Fossett, Gais,
and Thompson (2001) contend, “Proclaiming the virtues of mission-driven federalism is,
of course, one thing and success in implementing it quite another. Intergovernmental
arrangements complicate virtually all aspects of performance management – agreement
on key goals, the development of indicators, the timely collection of pertinent and valid
performance data, the interpretation of these data, the implementation of an incentive
system (e.g., rewards for strong performers), and more” (p. 208).
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9.2.4 Dependencies on Voluntary, Horizontal Network Partners to Achieve Outputs
and Outcomes
Study results provide empirical support for some of the critical challenges related
to managing in networks that have been described in the literature. In nearly all cases,
grantees struggled to engage voluntary, unfunded network partners needed to achieve
outcomes. Grantees in Preparedness Program found it difficult to bring other partners to
the table for preparedness planning; local-level public health agencies with STD Program
wrestled to make in-roads with jails to allow for STD screening; and grantees with the
Cancer Detection Program were frustrated in attempting to ensure timely referrals from
unfunded, partner agencies for women needing diagnostic services. O’Toole and Meier
(2004) and Agranoff (2003) have dubbed this the joint production problem -- the
challenge of achieving program success in an environment that involves voluntary
collaboration with actors over whom public managers have little formal authority.
Among the four cases studied here, there was also evidence of mission and priority
conflicts that challenged collaboration further.
In this study, the consequence of the joint production problem was grantees’
effective dismissal of performance measures reflecting jointly produced outputs or
outcomes. Such measures were viewed as “outside of the control” of grantees given
inherent dependencies on the compliance of others over whom they had no formal
authority. Such power dependencies created in networked environments have been
described by others (Salamon 2002; Stoker 1998). In several cases, grantees successfully
argued that it was “unfair” to include such measures – the Division of State and Local
Readiness had gone so far as to include an inclusion criteria for measure selection that

380

assured proposed indicators were “within the control of public health.” By effectively
excluding important outputs and outcomes given this lack of control, potential limitations
on the impact of performance measurement are created. In particular, performance
measures will more likely reflect process and short-term outcome measures more closely
tied to the efforts of those funded in the vertical chain.
9.2.5 Jointly Produced Outcomes that Compromise Assigning Agency-Specific
Attribution and Accountability
As discussed in chapter 2, accountability is another major challenge in networked
environments. The dilemma of accountability in a governance framework is well
established in the literature (Kettle 2002; O’Toole 1997; Peters and Pierre 1998; Stoker
1998). In the four cases studied here, the layers of decentralization and joint production
of outcomes both contribute to a fragmentation of accountability structures. While all
four cases prioritized accountability as a primary purpose for their performance
measurement systems, programs either had to re-conceptualize the notion to one of
“shared accountability” as seems to be the case with the Tobacco Control Program, or
select measures more closely tied to the work of the grantees for which agency-based
accountability can be assigned. The latter represents another potential limitation to the
impact of performance measurement; similar to the joint production problem, process and
short-term outcome measures may predominate.
Among the four cases, performance measurement seemed most effective for the
Cancer Detection Program, a service delivery program. For this program, issues of
variability are diminished because grantees provide, for the most part, the same set of
services. In addition, dependencies are limited given primary reliance on vertical, funded
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network partners. And accountability problems are minimized since providers in the
vertical chain, over whom there is some authority, are mainly responsible for producing
program outcomes of interest. Although the case benefits from these attributes, the extent
of decentralization (i.e., over 22,000 local providers) is significant and presents obstacles
for performance measurement. But to its credit, the Division of Cancer Prevention and
Control has been relatively successful in managing these challenges. The Division
effectively uses policy and management tools (e.g., cooperative agreement, a large
monitoring data base) to preserve authority and support accountability within the vertical
chain. Although not the focus of this study, there is some evidence that some grantees of
the Cancer Detection Program use performance-based contracts or reimbursement
strategies that strengthen their authority over local-level providers, thus preserving
vertical authority throughout the implementation chain. In addition, the Division of
Cancer Prevention and Control has made an enormous investment in its performance
management system (e.g., data contractor, available software, extensive monitoring
system, data validation study) that contributes to institutionalized data use and to strong
data quality and validity, perennial challenges in such decentralized structures.
But, as a service delivery program, the Cancer Detection Program is an anomaly
in public health at CDC; most programs are more similar to the other three cases -grantee variability is extensive, outcomes may be more difficult to measure and
dependent on voluntary, network partners to produce, and the ability to hold individual
agencies accountable is difficult. These cases represent more complex situations for
assessing performance than within a hierarchical context where accountability structures
are clear (Frederickson 2003; Goaddard and Mannion 2004).
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9.2.6 Use of Performance Measurement
Interestingly, cross-case analysis suggests the compromises to the potential
impact of performance measurement imposed by the network structure were not a factor
in determining whether or not to use performance measurement. Instead, findings suggest
an expectation of use implicit in the administrative and political climate that drives the
uptake of performance measurement by staff with these programs. This finding supports
others’ view that “performance” has been embraced by public managers, often without
critical deliberation (Behn 2003; Blalock and Barnow 2001; Coplin, Merget, and
Bourdeaux 2002; Grizzle 2002; Radin 2006). Although Jennings and Haist (2004)
hypothesize that the use of performance measurement will be tied to the observability of
outputs and outcomes, the authors also acknowledge that political and social imperatives
can take precedence in demanding performance-based accountability. This seems to be
the situation here. Participants across all four cases reiterated the adage, “what gets
measured, gets done” as endorsement for their commitment to develop and implement
federal-level performance measurement systems to support accountability. At CDC, this
expectation of use may reflect the institutionalization of performance measurement for
assessing public health programs. Similar to the Office of Management and Budget using
GPRA measures to hold federal agencies accountable, CDC is developing programspecific performance measurement systems to hold grantees accountable and improve
programs, although without critical assessment of its potential impact as a monitoring
tool given the complexity of the program or its networked context.
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9.3 Implications for Theory, Practice, and Policy
Although these research findings are not generalizable beyond the four cases
included in the study, results nonetheless offer insights for public health, public
management, and public policy. This exploratory study provides empirical evidence for
potential limitations in the use of performance measurement outside of traditional,
hierarchical contexts where its practice has primarily been described. As the adoption of
networked governance expands and federal-level public health leaders continue calls for
greater integration of program strategies, a better understanding of how performance
measurement works in these settings and its potential limitations as a management tool is
needed. In this section, implications of this study for the theory of performance
measurement, its practice, and related policy are presented. Particular attention is given to
federal-level performance measurement in public health.
9.3.1 Implications for Theory and Research
As summarized in 9.1, two hypotheses from Jennings and Haist (2004) guided
this study.
•

Hypothesis #13: “The extent to which performance measures are used and the
types of measures used will depend on the degree to which outputs and outcomes
can be observed.” (p.185)

•

Hypothesis #14: “Measurement will be more common and will have greater
impact when agencies have greater control over outcomes.” (p.185)
With these two hypotheses, Jennings and Haist theorize that performance

measurement will vary in its impact depending on the type of agency involved. Using
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Wilson’s (1989) typology of agency-type, the authors suggest that performance
measurement used in production agencies, those organizations with observable outputs
and outcomes, will have greater impact than when applied in craft, procedural, or coping
agencies, all of which have either outputs or outcomes (or both) that are not observable.
Jennings and Haist define observability in two ways – the ability to measure outputs and
outcomes and the ability to attribute outcomes to the efforts of a particular agency. As
noted in chapter 1, none of the hypotheses developed by Jennings and Haist, including
the two used to guide this research, explicitly addresses the potential influence of
decentralized program implementation structures characteristic of the four cases included
here. Consequently, this study has provided the opportunity to better understand how
network implementation structures influence the design and implementation of
performance measurement.
For the four cases studied here, findings suggest that network structures invite
extensive political influence of stakeholders, introduce significant variability within the
network, weaken control over outcomes given dependencies on horizontal network
partners, and compromise observability (when defined as attribution) based on jointly
produced outputs and outcomes These aspects of the programs’ networked
implementation structures influenced the design of their performance measurement
systems by limiting the choice and types of measures, level of measurement, potential
uses of the measures (e.g., accountability, comparing performance across grantees), and
resources needed to implement and support the system. Based on results, one may
speculate that the networked structure compromises the impact of performance
measurement.
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Consequently, I propose adding three 58 new hypotheses, expanding upon those
offered by Jennings and Haist (2004), in order to elaborate the implications of networked
environments for performance measurement:
•

Network variability (e.g., extent and nature of the problem, program context,
network capacity) imposes limitations on the design and utilization of
performance measurement.

•

Dependencies on voluntary, horizontal network partners for program
implementation weaken principal and agent control over outputs and
outcomes and, consequently, reduce the impact of performance measurement.

•

Networked implementation structures compromise the degree to which
outputs and outcomes can be observed, limiting the inclusion of outcome
measures and, therefore, lessening the impact of performance measurement.

9.3.2 Implications for Practice and Policy
Results of this research may have implications for the practice of federal-level
performance measurement when applied to decentralized, public health programs
implemented through collaborative networks. Given that this was a small, qualitative
study, individual readers must assess the relevance of these recommendations for their
particular program and setting. Several recommendations for practice are proposed
including:
•

Evaluate the decision to develop a performance measurement system and set
reasonable expectations for what the system can accomplish.

58

A new hypothesis related to the political influence of stakeholders is not proposed
given that Jennings and Haist’s hypothesis #12 discussed in section 9.2.2 above
adequately encompasses this issue.
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•

Involve network stakeholders in the development process.

•

Utilize available management tools to strengthen authority within vertical
network structures.

•

Allocate adequate resources to support the success of the system.

•

Recognize that time is needed for the adoption of performance measurement
systems in vastly decentralized and networked settings.

•

Consider more rigorous evaluation methods if agency-based attribution is
important to determine.

First, my findings suggest that programs may benefit from critically assessing
aspects of the program itself and the implementation network that may influence the
potential impact of performance measurement before endeavoring on the development
process. Not unlike evaluability assessment, described by Wholey (2004), results here
suggest that program staff should consider several factors in weighing the decision to
develop a measurement system and setting expectations for its contribution to program
management. Factors such as the complexity of the program (e.g., the ability to measure
outputs and outcomes); the types of stakeholders with an investment in the program; the
extent of vertical and horizontal decentralization that encompasses program
implementation; the level and kinds of variability across implementation sites;
dependencies on horizontal, voluntary partners needed to achieve outputs and outcomes;
and the available management tools to support authority relationships within the vertical
network dimension should all be considered. In better understanding the extent of
program complexity and networked implementation context, program staff will gain
insights for structuring the development process and set more reasonable expectations
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about the types of measures that can be included in a system, the possible uses for the
performance measurement system (e.g., accountability, program improvement,
budgeting), resources needed to support a system, and the potential impact of the
performance measurement system.
Second, results suggest that characteristics of performance measurement may
differ from what has been traditionally described (i.e., use in two-party, hierarchical
contexts where accountability structures are relatively straightforward) when applied in
networked settings. In particular, conducting a participative and collaborative process to
develop performance measurement is recommended in order to design systems
responsive not only to federal-level interests, but also to the needs of state and local
stakeholders. In addition, flexibility in system design may be needed to accommodate the
diversity of grantees and their contexts. If performance measures are included that reflect
jointly produced outputs or outcomes, developers must be sensitive to how data are used.
For instance, grantees will likely oppose the use of performance data to inform budgeting
decisions if they have minimal control over the performance on the measures. Further,
agency-specific accountability may need to be recast as “shared accountability” for
jointly produced outputs and outcomes.
Next, while participative approaches may be more appropriate for the
development of performance measurement systems in networks, programs should use
available mechanisms to support control and authority. As evident from this study, these
opportunities will primarily rest within the vertical network relationships and involve
funding tools, management practices, and partner relationships. Performance
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measurement in networked contexts may necessitate achieving a balance between where
authority can be exercised and where collaboration is needed.
Fourth, in vastly decentralized and networked programs like the cases studied
here, performance measurement systems require a significant investment of resources to
ensure data validity and data use. The Cancer Detection Program has spent over fifteen
years and millions of dollars to develop its monitoring system that provides the data
needed to calculate their performance measures – this commitment has contributed to a
performance measurement system that supports accountability, program improvement,
and budgeting. As described in chapter 6, the Division of Cancer Prevention and Control
maintains a data contractor who supports data management software available to all
grantees and provides technical consultants who are assigned to individual grantees to
provide on-going data management support. In addition, a systematic, semi-annual data
review process is institutionalized to support program improvement. Finally, training is
routinely provided given staff turnover at both the state and local levels and quality
assurance efforts are on-going. Consequently, leaders of national programs must carefully
consider the resources needed to support an effective performance measurement system
before committing to the effort. However, once in place, the performance measurement
systems can be leveraged to help build capacity in the areas of monitoring and evaluation
among state and local level partners.
Results also hint that, given the vast decentralization reflected in these four cases,
adoption of performance measurement by grantees and local-level partners likely requires
significant time. Although training and technical support may facilitate adoption, the
development and implementation of data management systems, development of data
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collection protocols and related technical assistance materials, provision of training, and
pilot testing will take time. Even when a data management software package is made
available, grantees may choose to develop their own in order to integrate with existing
state-based data systems. More importantly, building grantees’ understanding and
appreciation of the system’s value will take time and depend, in part, on the perceived
success of the system. Particularly challenging is making local-level partners aware of the
system. But as reflected in the following comment from a CDC staff person with the
Cancer Detection Program, this seems an important goal,
I think communicating [the measures] to every level is essential…I’m
talking about the fact that it is decentralized. You have a federal central
level, and then you have a state, and then the state is divided up into a
variety of counties and communities. And each one of those may have
either a centralized provider group or individual providers. So in order to
make this work [performance measurement], the lowest level of function
has to be working on this in order to make it work at all.
Finally, if programs need to assess agency-based accountability – that is, to
confidently attribute specific outcomes to a particular program – other means of
evaluation should be considered. The methodological limits regarding performance
measurement and attribution are well established (Hatry 2001; Poister 2003).
Unfortunately, there remains an inaccurate assumption that performance measurement
assumes causality (Blalock and Barnow 2001; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006;
Radin 2006). This limitation must be more effectively communicated to both policy
makers and federal agency leaders.
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9.4 Recommendations for Research
Although this was a relatively small, qualitative study, it offers insight for areas of
future investigation that will help researchers better understand and define the practice of
performance measurement in networked contexts. First, further qualitative studies that
encompass all levels of the network may help illuminate factors that influence both the
adoption of performance measurement throughout a given network and its impact. A
focused study of state and local level partners involved in a federally-funded grantee
program like the ones studied here, would be useful in expanding understanding about the
design, implementation, and adoption of federal-level performance measurement.
Second, this study involved a particular type of network (i.e., collaborative).
Other network types have been described (Agranoff 2003; Milward and Provan 2006) 59 .
Similar descriptive studies of performance measurement as applied in other network
types may also begin to shed light on these more challenging contexts.
Although not the focus of this study, these results point to two areas of particular
interest adoption time and cost. What factors facilitate adoption of performance
measurement in these networked contexts? What are the long-term costs of developing,
implementing, and maintaining performance measurement systems for federally-funded
grantee programs that are vastly decentralized? Quantitative studies, including cost
analysis, may be most appropriate to address these questions.

59

See chapter 2, section 2.6.3. Agranoff (2003) describes information networks,
developmental networks, outreach networks, and action networks. Milward and Provan
(2006) describe service implementation networks, information diffusion networks,
problems solving networks, and community capacity building networks.
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Finally, this study identified potential factors related to network structures that
compromise the impact of performance measurement. These factors include the extent of
vertical and horizontal decentralization, stakeholder involvement, network variability, the
extent of dependencies on voluntary, horizontal partners to achieve outputs and
outcomes, the extent of jointly produced outputs and outcomes, and funding mechanisms
used within the vertical chain. These factors may contribute to modeling the potential
impact of performance measurement in a variety of network contexts and testing my
proposed hypotheses.

9.5 Conclusions
My interest to conduct this study stems from my experiences at CDC in managing
and evaluating federally-funded public health programs implemented through our state
and local partners. While strongly committed to community-based approaches, I also
know, first-hand, the challenges network structures present for program management. At
CDC, program implementation typically takes place two to three steps removed from the
agency; thousands of local-level public and non-profit agencies may be involved in
carrying out program activities or delivering services of a single national program. In
addition, horizontal, voluntary partners are engaged at every level in order to provide
more integrated service delivery, facilitate coordinated public health program efforts,
extend our reach to vulnerable populations, and contribute resources.
Given the emphasis in government today on performance measurement as a tool
of public management, my study aimed to better understand how networked public
management affects the design, implementation, and utilization of federal-level
performance measurement systems. With pragmatic intentions, but also an interest to
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advance nascent theory building, this exploratory study contributes to a small, but
emerging literature addressing performance measurement in the context of networked
public management. Results suggest that for the national public health programs included
in the study and others like them, networked structures impose important limitations on
the practice of performance measurement and likely compromise its impact.
While further research inclusive of the full network is needed to better
comprehend how these implementation contexts affect performance measurement, results
provide insight for both practice and theory. In particular, in practicing performance
measurement, a balance must be struck between leveraging existing authority
relationships within the vertical chain while also recognizing the limits to performance
measurement introduced by the variability within the network, the political influence
wielded by network partners, the inherent dependencies introduced by network
relationships, and compromises to agency-based attribution and accountability brought by
jointly produced outputs and outcomes. In these contexts, a more collaborative and
negotiated approach to performance measurement is called for -- one that reflects
compromises made among all stakeholders in order to best meet their varied needs and
accommodate this difficult implementation context. In addition, in developing theory that
attempts to explain the impact of performance measurement, this study suggests that
factors related to networked contexts must be considered.

393

APPENDIX A
JENNINGS AND HAIST’S TWENTY-FIVE HYPOTHESES FOR
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
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Twenty-five Proposed Hypotheses for Performance Measurement
(Jennings and Haist 2004)
Code
H1

H2

H3
H4

Incentives and
Accountability

H5
H6

H7

H8

H9

H10
Political
Context

H11
H12

Agency Type

H13

Description
The more widespread the sharing of performance
information, the greater the likelihood of positive effects on
performance (p.176).
The greater the belief of service providers and administrators
that officials and citizens care about and will use
performance information, the greater the likelihood of
positive effects on performance (p.176).
The more extensive the mechanisms of control available to
principals, the more likely it is that agents will react
positively to performance measurement (p.176).
The more an organization’s resources are dependent on
measured performance, the greater the impact of
performance measurement (p.177).
The greater the competition faced by the organization, the
greater the impact of performance measurement (p.177).
Incomplete systems of performance measures are likely to
distort agency behavior and reduce attainment of policy
goals (p.178).
Performance measures have greater impact when principals
give them more attention, have more resources to shape
agent behavior, and use the resources to pursue performance
goals (p.178).
Performance measures have greater impact when service
providers and managers believe they are accurate reflections
of performance (p.179).
Performance measures have greater impact on outcomes
when managers believe that the organization’s performance
on the measures affects their own economic well-being,
career opportunities, power, or professional prestige and the
organization’s access to resources of authority and finance
(p.179).
The greater the agreement among principals with respect to
goals and measures, the greater the effect of measurement
(p.181).
The greater the agreement between principals and agents
with respect to goals and measures, the greater the impact of
performance measurement (p.181).
Significant mobilization of interests adverse to the measures
will reduce the impact of performance measurement (p.182).
The extent to which performance measures are used and the
types of measures used will depend on the degree to which
outputs and outcomes can be observed (p.185).
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H14
H15
H16

H17

H18

Organizational
Compatibility

H19
H20
H21

H22

H23

H24
Agency
Leadership
H25

Measurement will be more common and will have greater
impact when agencies have greater control over outcomes
(p.185).
The impact of performance measurement depends on the
design of a set of measures appropriate to agency task and
goals (p.186).
The closer to the level of service delivery a performance
measure is implemented, the greater the impact on output or
outcomes (p.187).
Performance measures that are compatible with the existing
use and distribution of skills, tasks, and resources will result
in greater and more immediate impact. Conversely,
performance measures that require significant disruption of
skill utilization or task organization may experience delayed
or dysfunctional response in adoption (p.187).
Performance measures will have greater impact in more
homogeneous organizational settings (p.187).
The more consistent performance measures are with an
agency’s culture, the greater the likelihood of a positive
impact (p.188).
Performance measures that enhance the mission of the
organization will have a positive effect on outcomes (p.188).
Agencies with low agreement among members regarding the
organization’s mission (agencies experiencing low policy
consensus) are more likely to experience dysfunctional
responses to performance measurement (p.188).
Agencies staffed by professional whose norms are aligned
with the goals of performance measures are more likely to
experience positive response in adoption of performance
indicators (p.188).
Agencies staffed by professionals with strong norms of
autonomy are more likely to experience delayed or negative
response to adoption of performance measures (p.189).
Leadership that demonstrates high commitment to mission,
effective goal setting ability, and ability to cope with
(external) political and (internal) administrative challenges
specific to performance measures will result in positive
impact of performance measures (p.190).
For organizations staffed largely by professionals,
recognition of professional competence of the leader is
critical to the impact of performance measures (p.191).
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Summary of Empirical Research on Performance Measurement (PM)
Findings
Features of
PM System

Adoption of
PM

Level of Use
of PM

Factors
Affecting

Vertical and horizontal
features of PM systems are
present
Widespread adoption of
performance budgeting among
states based on legislative and
administrative mandates
Widespread adoption of
management for results
systems among all 50 states
Adoption of PM influenced by
technocratic and rational
factors such as goal
orientation, resources, etc.;
Implementation of PM
influenced by political and
cultural factors
68% of respondents said either
all departments or at least half
of their departments use PM
40% or less of cities used PM
in “meaningful ways” to
support management and
decision processes
22% of cities used PM to track
progress in meeting goals and
objectives of strategic plans
33% of counties used PM of
some type; only 20%
demonstrated “high use”
Although the use of
administrative data is
imperfect for the measurement
of results, PM information is
still useful
Technical capacity and

Research
Methods
Systematic
review

Level of
Study
Nationallevel, United
Kingdom

Citation
Goddard and
Mannion
2004

States

Melkers and
Willoughby
1998, 2004

Survey

States

Mohnihan
and Ingraham
2003

Survey

State and
local

Julnes and
Holzer 2001

Survey

State and
local

Melkers and
Willoughby
2005

Survey

City

Poister and
Streib 1999

Survey

City

Poister and
Streib 2005

Survey

Counties

Berman and
Wang 2000

Survey

Federal

Heinrich
1999 2002

Survey

Counties

Berman and

Survey

Findings
of PM; widespread use
increases satisfaction with the
impact of PM
Managerial commitment to the
use of PM, decision making
authority, and training in PM
techniques have a significant
influence on its development
and use

Research
Methods

Survey

Level of
Study

Citation

Federal

Cavalluzzo
and Ittner
2003
Hatry,
Morley,
Rossman, and
Wholey 2004
Melkers and
Willoughby
2005;
Willoughby
and Melkers
2000
Frederickson
2003
Melkers and
Willoughby
2005;
Willoughby
and Melkers
2000;
Frederickson
2003

Lack of authority to make
changes based on performance
information limits use

Interviews

Federal

PM found useful for
communications and
management activities such as
strategic planning

Survey

City/County

PM found useful for
managerial purposes

Interviews

Federal

PM not used for budgeting
and fiscal decision making

Survey`Inte
rviews

City/County/
Federal

Survey

Federal

GAO 2004

Survey

Cities

Poister and
Streib 1999

Federal

Hatry,
Morley,
Rossman, and
Wholey 2004

Types of Use
Mixed results regarding the
use of PM for program
improvement
Desire to use PM for
improved decision making and
accountability, not simply
reporting
PM used to trigger action,
identify and encourage best
practices, motivate, and plan

Interviews

Findings

Outcomes of
PM

Challenges
in
Implementi
ng PM

Federal managers report
having more outcome
measures as required by
GPRA, identified positive
effects of GPRA on
requirements for planning and
reporting, and had more
results-based goals in place
Goal related Challenges:
• Goal conflicts
• Translating long term
goals into annual
performance goals
• Coordinating across
federal programs
• Mission fragmentation
Measurement Challenges:
• Developing outcome
measures
• Identifying useful
outcome measures
• Obtaining valid and
reliable data
• Obtaining timely data
• Old data not useful
• Outcomes can take
years to achieve
• Data not disaggregated
Data Collection Challenges
• Collecting outcome
data
Causal Attribution Challenges:
• Inability to attribute
changes in outcomes to
particular programs

Challenges of Decentralized
Implementation Structures:

Research
Methods

Level of
Study

Citation

Interviews

Federal

GAO 2005

Federal

GAO 2004;
Frederickson
2003; GAO
2000a; GAO
1999; GAO
1997a; GAO
1997b

Interviews
and Case
Studies

Federal

GAO 2004;
GAO 2000a;
Hatry,
Morley,
Rossman, and
Wholey 2004

Interviews
and Case
Studies

Federal

GAO 2004;
GAO 2000a

Federal

GAO 2004;
GAO 2000a;
GAO 1997b;
GAO 1996b

Interviews
and Case
Studies

Interviews
and Case
Studies

Interviews
and Case

Federal

GAO 1998a;
GAO 1998b;

Findings

Research
Methods

Level of
Study

Citation

Federal

Hatry,
Morley,
Rossman, and
Wholey
2004; GAO
2004; GAO
2000a

•

Compromises data
quality and introduces
variability in data
collection across sites
• Difficult to control
data collection
collected by 3rd parties
• Challenges to
aggregate data
nationally
Capacity and Training
Challenges:
• Limited understanding
about how to use
performance
information
• Limited analytic and
methodological
expertise
• Lack of training in PM
techniques

Interviews
and Case
Studies
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Individual Interview Guide
Performance Measurement Study

INTRODUCTION
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. The interview will take about 60
minutes and I will be asking you about different aspects of the performance measurement
system for [Program Name]. Your participation in this interview is voluntary and you can
end the interview at any time. Data collected will be kept confidential. Results will be
presented in aggregate for your program and quotes will not be attributed to any specific
individual. The risks associated with your participation are minimal, however, you will
have the opportunity to review this interview transcript before analysis is conducted and
remove any statement(s) for which you have concern.
I am conducting this interview as part of my dissertation research. The research and
interview have been approved by both the GSU and CDC human subjects review boards
[pending]. Would you please read and sign a copy of the consent form if you are
comfortable with it [provide at interview]. [If the interview is conducted by telephone,
the consent form will be sent electronically in advance and the participant will be asked
to fax a signed copy to the researcher in advance of the interview.] Please keep one copy
for yourself.
Do you have any questions before we get started? May I have your permission to audio
record the session?  Yes  No
1. What are the more immediate program outputs for the program?
a. What factors affect those outputs?
b. How does your program contribute to achieving those outputs?
c. From your perspective, how much influence does your program have on
affecting those outputs?
2. What are the long term goals or outcomes for the program?
a. What factors affect those outcomes?
b. How does your program contribute to achieving those outcomes?
c. From your perspective, how much influence does your program have on
affecting those outcomes?
d. Has a program logic model been developed? [If so, request a copy]
3. Describe the implementation structure for your program.
a. What are the critical activities that the grantee staff must conduct to
achieve program goals?
b. Typically, what types of agencies does the grantee collaborate with at the
state or more local levels, both funded and non-funded, to achieve its goals
and outcomes?
c. How important is collaboration (at the grantee level) in achieving program
goals and outcomes? If it’s important, why is it important?
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4. Describe your performance measurement system.
a. What is the purpose or purposes of the system? [Probe on accountability
purpose]
b. How did you develop and select the measures (e.g., from a logic model,
strategic plan? with stakeholder involvement?)
c. Describe the measures. What types of measures are they (e.g., process,
intermediate outcome)?
d. What factors influenced the selection of measures and/or measure types?
e. How did the implementation structure influence the design of the system?
How did it influence measurement selection?
5. What were the most significant challenges you faced in developing your
performance measurement system?
a. How did you address the challenges?
b. What compromises do you feel you had to make, if any?
6. How does the performance measurement system relate to GPRA or PART
requirements for your program?
a. How does your Division leadership perceive the performance
measurement system as it relates to policy? What purpose do you think the
leadership views the performance measurement system serving?
b. How do you perceive the performance measurement system? What
purpose do you think the performance measurement system serves?
7. How are you (CDC) using the performance data?
a. What factors influence CDC’s use (or non-use) of the data?
b. How are grantees using the data?
c. What factors influence grantees’ use (or non-use) of the data?
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Georgia State University
Department of Public Administration and Urban Studies
Informed Consent for Individual Interviews
Title: Federal-Level Performance Measurement in Networked Public Management
Environments
Principal Investigator: Theodore Poister, Ph.D.
Student Investigator: Amy DeGroff, MPH
Purpose
Georgia State University and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
invite you to participate in a research study. Your participation is entirely voluntary.
Please ask questions if there is anything you do not understand. The purpose of this
research is to better understand the performance measurement systems developed for
some of CDC’s public health programs that are implemented nationally through
decentralized program structures. The information will be used to better understand the
issues related to developing and implementing performance measurement in these
contexts.
Procedures
This research is being conducted by Amy DeGroff, a CDC employee and doctoral
candidate at Georgia State University, as part of her dissertation research. The research
involves approximately 32 individual interviews with staff and key stakeholders who
have been involved in the development, implementation, and / or management of the
performance measurement system. One focus group comprised of a subset of 8
interviewees will also be conducted. Based on your involvement with the [program
name] performance measurement system, you have been selected to participate in a 60
minute interview. The interviews are one-time episodes, although the researcher may
contact participants again for clarification of comments made in the interviews. Again,
your participation is entirely voluntary. Interviews will be conducted at your convenience
in a private office at CDC. If it is not possible to conduct the interview in person, the
interview will be conducted by telephone; the researcher will conduct the interview from
a private office.
Confidentiality
Any information you provide will not be associated with your name and the information
you provide will be kept private to the extent allowed by law. The researcher will not
reveal the names of participants to anyone. The interview will be audio recorded with
your permission; individual names will not be included in any transcriptions, the
dissertation, reports, or manuscripts. However, the larger program (e.g., the National
Diabetes Prevention and Control Program) will be named and identified in transcriptions,
the dissertation, reports, and/or manuscripts. The broad role of a person associated with a
quote, such as CDC staff or CDC stakeholder, may be noted in the dissertation, reports,
and/or manuscripts. The researcher will permanently delete all audio files from
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interviews as written transcriptions of the interviews are completed. Transcriptions will
be maintained in a locked filing cabinet.
Risks
Risks associated with participation are minimal but may involve inferred identity by
colleagues who may have a close understanding of the program and its performance
measurement system. You will have an opportunity to read the interview transcript and
delete any statements for which you have concern. The researcher may contact
participants again for clarification of comments made in the interview.
Benefits
Although you will not benefit personally by participating in this study, your participation
will contribute toward a better understanding of the development of performance
measurement systems at CDC and, optimally, to the improved practice of performance
measurement at CDC.
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. You have the right to refuse to
answer any question. You also have the right to end your participation at any time.
Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Contact Persons
If you have any questions about this study, please contact Theodore Poister at 404-4130129 or Amy DeGroff at adegroff@cdc.gov or 770-488-2415. If you have any questions
about your rights as a study participant, you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of
Research Integrity at Georgia State University at 404-413-3513. You may also contact
CDC’s Acting Deputy Associate Director for Science at 1-800-584-8814 and leave a
message with your name, phone number, and refer to CDC protocol # 2550, and someone
will call you back.
If you are willing to volunteer for this research and be audio recorded, please sign and
date below.
You have been told about the study. You have been allowed to ask questions. You had all
of your questions answered. You would like to be in the study.

____________________________________
Signature of Participant

_______________________
Date

____________________________________
Signature of Principal Investigator

_______________________
Date
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Document Review Form
Performance Measurement Study

Date Reviewed
Document Name
Document Date
Document Author

General Description of Document:

Information about networked structure:

Information about observability of program outputs and outcomes:

Information about CDC’s influence/control over program outcomes:

Information about performance measurement design:

Information on types of performance measures:

Information on use of performance measurement system and resultant data:
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Summary Of Documents Reviewed By Case

Comprehensive
STD Prevention
Systems

Federal Register Announcement, vol. 69, no. 139, Wednesday, July
21, 2004 / Notices. Funding announcement pp. 43595-43595
Performance Measures – Quick Reference Guide (2007)
STD Prevention System Logic Model (2000)
Division of STD Prevention webpage
http://cdc.gov/nchstp/dstd/aboutdiv.htm (accessed Nov 2008)
2007 Performance Measures Companion Guidance; CSPS, IPP, SE
Program Announcement (2006)
STD Performance Measures: 2005-2006 Data Report (2007)
2009 Performance Measures (2008)
Charter of the Performance Measurement Workgroup, January
December 2007 (2007)
PM Evaluation Criteria Definitions (2001)
ExpectMore, Program Assessment, National Center for HIV/AIDS,
Viral Hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases, and Tuberculosis
Prevention (accessed 2008)
Performance Measures Learning Tour Guide (2006)
2009 Performance Measures: Feedback from Grantees (2008)
HHS, CDC, Request for Applications 9S09-902 2008. Five year
funding announcement for CSPS (2008)
Hubley T. Lessons from a project to create performance measures
for public health. Evaluation and Program Planning, Vol. 31
(2008): 410-415
Materials from the Maine state program about their 2007 Regional
Program Performance Measures and Benchmarks (2007)
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Public Health
Emergency
Preparedness

Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (AA154)
Budget Period 08, Continuation Guidance (2007)
Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (AA154),
Budget Period 08, Performance Measures, Definitions and
Guidance (2007)
CDC Connects (CDC Intranet): “States, Localities Better Prepared”
(February 2008)
Key Findings from Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State
by State; A CDC Report on the Public Health Emergency
Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (February 2008)
PHEP Evaluation Workgroup Meeting: January 24-25, 2008,
Arlington, VA – Draft Summary Notes
PHEP Cooperative Agreement: Performance Measures Data
Quality Assurance and Improvement Process – Letter Report,
November 27, 2007
Division of Strategic National Stockpile: Local Technical
Assistance Review – October 2007
Division of Strategic National Stockpile: State Technical Assistance
Review – October 2007
Historical Overview of the Evolution of the Evaluation Focus for
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program –presentation
(2007)
PART Measures for PHEP (2008)
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, December
19, 2006
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, October 2007
US Office of Management and Budget website: ExpectMore.gov
(accessed May 2008)
FY 2009 Congressional Justification – Department of Health and
Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(2008)
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National
Breast
and
Cervical
Cancer
Early
Detection
Program

Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (07-703) Budget Period
08, Continuation Guidance (2007)
Public Health Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (07-703), Budget Period
08, Performance Measures, Definitions and Guidance (2007)
NBCCEDP Data Management Web Conference Series: De-mystifying MDE
Feedback Measurements (presentation hand-out) (2006)
Core Program Performance Indicators (2006)
MDE Data Quality Indicator Guide Template (2006)
DP07-703 NBCCEDP Performance Measures assessment tool (2008)
Program Data Review Worksheet Summary: NBCCEDP October 2007 MDE
Submission (2008)
ExpectMore.gov Detailed Information on the Chronic Disease Prevention
Assessment (accessed April 2008)
Update to the FY 2008 NBCCEDP Funding Process
(presentation handout) (2008)
NBCCEDP Policies and Procedures Manual (not dated)
Funding Announcement for the National Comprehensive Cancer Control
Program, the National Program for Cancer Registries, and the National Breast
and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program; United States HHS, CDC
NCPCP; Billing Code: 4163-18-P (2007)
Summary of MDE Validation Project – Internal CDC Report (2007)
The National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program: 19912002 National Report
(http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/nbccedp/bccpdfs/national_report.pdf) (not dated)

National
Tobacco
Control
Program

Key Outcome Indicators for Evaluating Comprehensive Tobacco Control
Programs (2005)
Introduction to Program Evaluation for Comprehensive Tobacco Control
Programs (2001)
Funding Announcement Program Announcement 03022 – (2003)
OSH Consensus Core Indicators (2008)
Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs (2007)
Introduction to Process Evaluation in Tobacco Use Prevention and Control
(2008)
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Measurement development options for non-standard OSH core indicators
(internal correspondence report, 2007)
Use of Outcome Indicators for Planning and Evaluating NTCP presentation
given by Paul Hunting, MPH, at the National conference on Tobacco or
Health, Minneapolis, MN (2007)
ExpectMore.gov Detailed Information on the Chronic Disease Prevention
Assessment (accessed April 2008)
CDC OSH Website, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco (accessed December 2008)
CDC NTCP Website,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco_control_programs/stateandcommunity/i
ndex.htm (accessed December 2008)
Core Indicator Workgroup meeting notes (July 2007)
Collaborative Chronic Disease, Health Promotion, and Surveillance Program
Announcement: Healthy Communities, Tobacco Control, Diabetes Prevention
and Control, and Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System CDC RFA- DP
09-901 FOA (November 2008)
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Observation Guide
Performance Measurement Study

Date of Observation
Role of Observer
Description of the
Observation Event

Description of Setting/Context:

Description of Participants:

General Observations:

Observed Nonverbal Communications:

Observed Informal Interactions:

Detailed Field Notes (to be completed following observation):
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Dissertation
Codebook
Code Number:

001

Code Name:

Context: Fed level

Brief Description:

Contextual factors at the federal level

Long Description:

Contextual factors at the federal level which are relevant to CDC
programs and the development or use of performance measurement

When to Use:

Apply code to text referencing federal level contextual factors such
as diminishing federal resources, federal level policies and
legislation, health care reform, HHS-related (HP 2010), federal
emphasis on accountability or results.

When NOT to Use:

Do not use this code for GPRA/PART issues.

Coding Rules:

If GPRA/PART related, code one of the two "GPRA/PART"
codes. If related to political factors directly affecting the
development of a particular PM system, double code as "Process:
Political Factors."

Example:

"…but they also understand that in light of these funding
restrictions and/or reductions, they need to start demonstrating
accountability and that this is a very difficult area to do, to do so."

Code Number:

002

Code Name:

Context: CDC

Brief Description:

Contextual factors at the CDC level

Long Description:
Contextual factors at the overall CDC level which are relevant to
CDC programs and the development or use of performance measurement
When to Use: Apply code to text referencing overall CDC level factors such as agency
mission, goals; issues of alignment with agency strategic goal planning; CDC Office of
the Director views on value of performance measurement; issues of overall agency
resources.
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When NOT to Use: Not for CDC program-specific level (e.g., COTPER, NBCCEDP)
unless the program specific issues relate to larger CDC context (e.g., mission, goals). Do
NOT use for political factors at CDC level (e.g., CDC OD/OD – Gerberding)
Coding Rules: Double code text that relates to CDC context and program-specific PM
system (e.g., alignment). If policy/political factors at CDC level, code as “Process:
Policy/Political Factors”
Example:

"they're [the PM] tied to the nine [CDC] preparedness

“If the political system lets us do it. And if CDC lets us do it."
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goals."

Code Number:

003

Code Name:

Culture: Shift to PM

Brief Description:

PM as a shift in organizational mgmt/culture

Long Description:
Descriptions of the adoption of performance measurement as
requiring a shift in organizational management or culture. The shift may be evident in
change in how work is done, shift in how PM is perceived, shift to new view of PM as
institutionalized, PM as new, established culture norm, shift to new view of valuing PM,
diminishing resistance to PM.
When to Use: Apply code to text that describes the adoption of PM as a mgmt or cultural
shift, the need for a culture shift in order to adopt PM, or the lack of acceptance at a
broad organizational level for recognizing value or importance of PM.
When NOT to Use: Do not use when culture shift refers to move toward networked
structures and approaches.
Coding Rules: If relates to culture/organizational shift to networks, code as “Culture:
Shift to Networks”
Example:
“I personally think it’s a really critical piece. I don’t think we do enough
of it in public health. I don’t think we have the skill set, I mean, well we have lots of data
analysis skill sets, I don’t think we have a staff level understanding of it as much as we
should. I think the danger is we tend to develop performance measures without
developing a performance management system.”

Code Number:

004

Code Name:

Culture: Shift to Networks

Brief Description:

Cultural shift to use of network approaches

Long Description:
View of move to network approach as a cultural shift in
perspective. In public health, programs have more traditionally viewed their
responsibility as related to the program activities funded by CDC and the carrying out of
public health work through traditional, vertical, intra-governmental relationships.
When to Use: Apply code when text describes recognition that working through
networks is important, that such a shift may require a change in role for the public health
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worker, the consequences of moving to a network, the need for moving to network
approaches.
When NOT to Use: Do not use this code for reference to characteristics of the
networks themselves (vertical dimensions, variability inherent in networks)
Coding Rules: Code any references to network characteristics as any of the Network
Characteristics code family. If relates to shift in culture/organizational mgmt to adopt
PM, code as “Culture: Shift to PM”
Example:

“You realize that public health does not work in a vacuum”

“It was obvious right from the beginning you know that you needed a broader
perspective.”
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Code Number:
Code Name:

005
Design: Control over Performance on Measures

Brief Description:

Level of control over the performance on PM

Long Description:
Factors may affect the grantees’ level of control over their
performance on a particular measure
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects issues that compromise control over the
performance on performance measures – system-level challenges (e.g., provider capacity
to perform colonoscopies), dependencies on network partners (e.g., labs, jails), level of
outcome (e.g., mortality), other factors affecting outcome (e.g., homelessness, drug use,
poverty). Also apply code when text addresses the intentional development of PM for
which grantees will have extensive control
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: If appropriate, double code to the relevant code in “Network
Characteristics” family of codes. May be instances when it’s appropriate to double code
to “Design: Control within Network” (e.g., text about lack of control over jails for whose
performance you’re dependent).
Example:
“So, at this point, I feel like our, the grantees have a fair amount of control
over this set of six measures.”
“It’s, it’s difficult to understand who owns the performance at the state level or even at
the local level. And what, what we can say about that networking piece is that states
want a lot of credit for that”
Code Number:
Code Name:

006
Design: Control within Network

Brief Description:

Level of control over network partners

Long Description:
Given network structure, CDC and grantees often do not have
direct relationships or command and control authority over local level implementers.
When to Use: Apply code when text references limited control over network partners
[e.g., local implementers, lack of direct relationship with local levels, network partners
over which grantee or CDC has little to no control (e.g., jails), structural challenges that
impede control over partners (e.g., governance structures)].
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When NOT to Use: Do not use when text relates to bargaining, consensus building, or
building networks. Do not use when text relates to control over the performance on a
particular measure.
Coding Rules: Code references to bargaining, etc. within a network as “Network
Characteristics: Bargaining, Consensus Bldg, Bldg Networks”. Code references to control
over performance on measures as “Design: Control over Performance on Measures”
Example:
“I mean we don’t have a direct relationship, with the exception of 4 or 5
cities, you know, any direct relationship with the counties. We can’t ask them to do
anything so, or get really any information from them it all has to go through the state.”
“I think people still think, you know, they’re concerned about the things that they control
in their program and if you go on a statewide or a jurisdiction wide basis, they feel like
they’re being held accountable for things that they don’t really have power over.”

Code Number:

007

Code Name:

Design: Conveying Priorities

Brief Description:

Performance measures reflect program priorities

Long Description:
Performance measures typically reflect key priorities of a given
program and are intended to influence program behavior by providing a focus in key
performance areas. In decentralized contexts, it may be difficult to identify measures that
are priority and meaningful for both the federal and state levels. Some programs may not
have a strong sense of what their priorities should be.
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to whether or not the program’s performance
measures reflect program priorities (or goals) for the national program, act as incentives
for programs to focus on certain areas (“what gets measured gets done”), or if programs
face challenges identifying key priorities.
When NOT to Use:

Do NOT apply “PM: Value”

Coding Rules:
Value”

If text relates to other purposes/uses/value of PM, code as “PM:

Example:
“I’m not so confident in our measures to say that if somebody modeled a
program after them in a sense that they were really trying to focus in on something that
we focused in on, that it would do good and not harm, you know”
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Code Number:

008

Code Name:

Design: Fairness

Brief Description:
PM perceived as “fair” (or not); or applied “fairly” across network;
or used in a “fair” way
Long Description:
PM may or may not be perceived as “fair” – whether they are seen
as fair may influence their acceptability for purposes such as accountability and
budgeting. In networks, the variability inherent among actors challenges the notion that a
“fair” set of indicator can be developed, or that “fair” targets can be set for all. Likewise,
the use PM data may be perceived as unfair (e.g., ranking).
When to Use: Apply code when issues of fairness are implied or explicit in the text.
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: If text also relates to fairness of targets, double code to “Measurement:
Targets” or “Measurement: Target Challenges.”
Example:
“To me as long as the measures are clear, the performance expectation is
clear, the technical assistance to help programs get to the level of performance we expect
is clear, that we apply it fairly across all funded programs is transparent and clear, it
should be fine.”
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Code Number:

009

Code Name:

Design: Flexibility

Brief Description:

Flexibility needed in PM system

Long Description:
In network context, flexibility may be needed in the design or
implementation of the PM system (e.g., choice of measures, choice of targets, data
system, data sources).
When to Use: Apply code when text addresses issues of flexibility (e.g., incorporating
flexibility, not allowing flexibility) in the design and/or implementation of the PM
system.
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use code when text addresses issues focused on
variability of activities, data collection, etc.
Coding Rules: Code issues of variability under appropriate “Network Characteristics”
family of codes. If text relates to flexibility and program priorities, double code to
“Design: Conveying Priorities”
Example:
“So, we’ve tried to steer clear of optional measures or allowing them to,
you know, on the one, on the Chlamydia screening in juvenile detention, we do allow
some flexibility in which sites they pick but we’re, you know, for the big cities with more
than 500 [people in the facility], you’ve got to report on all of them”

Code Number:

010

Code Name:

Design: Frameworks

Brief Description:

Frameworks to structure development of PM system

Long Description:
Frameworks such as logic models, process mapping, evaluation
frameworks, and other unique constructs may be used to guide the PM development
process.
When to Use: Apply code to text that refers to such a framework or rationale that guides
development of the PM system.
When NOT to Use:
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Coding Rules:
Example:
“The second set of information is on capabilities which are what can they
do with those capacities that they just bought. How can they demonstrate that they can do
something with that, that infrastructure?”
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Code Number:

011

Code Name:

Process: Time

Brief Description:

Time is needed to develop PM

Long Description:
Recognition that developing PM is a (learning) process that takes
time, usually a significant amount of time. Process may be incremental in nature, an
iterative process of trial and error, piloting, etc. Recognition that time is needed to build a
worthwhile PM system.
When to Use: Apply code when text addresses the inevitable passing of time involved in
the process of developing PM. Text may mention frustration with amount of time needed,
importance of the process itself, the learning process inherent as time passes, and idea
that PM must be gradually (i.e., incrementally) implemented.
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: Double code text that relates to the idea that it takes time to gain
stakeholder buy-in to the appropriate “Stakeholders” family of codes.
Example:
“We want to improve program, you know, and it’s, it’s been a long haul,
quite frankly.”
“That it’s going to take us time to get to an established set of measures that everybody is
going to feel comfortable in gathering the data in the same way and find that those
measures are useful for program planning and program improvement.”

Code Number:

012

Code Name:

Process: Measures Evolve

Brief Description:

PM / PM system evolves as system is developed

Long Description:
Programs often started with large set of “pilot” measures or
worked to fine tune or improve measures as the PM system was developed and improved
upon. In other cases, programs are trying to develop new, additional measures to capture
more complicated constructs. This approach may relate to the incremental nature of
developing a PM system in a decentralized system – need to start more simply before
moving toward the more complex.
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When to Use: Apply code when text addresses change, adaptation, or evolution in the
measures or when text describes efforts to move toward adding targets, adding more local
measures, or removing measures that were unsuccessful or didn’t work.
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
appropriate.

Double code text to “Stakeholders Buy-in: Strategies” when

Example:
“The, the first set was very, for the most part, very specific. We had a set
of syphilis measures that looked at traditional STD program activities such as
interviewing index patients and interviewing cluster patients and suspects and associates,
looking how quickly programs were able to do that.”
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Code Number:

013

Code Name:

Process: Stakeholder Involvement

Brief Description:

Stakeholder involvement in the development of the PM

Long Description:
Given the network, many different stakeholders may be involved
in the development of the PM system. There may be national groups, state grantees, or
other partners who play some role in the development of the measures (e.g., reviewing
draft measures, participating on PM work groups, piloting measures). This may reflect a
collaborative approach to development of the measures and some give/take between CDC
in the selection of measures.
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects stakeholder involvement in the
development of the PM system (e.g., suggest measures, pilot measures, provide feedback)
or the range of stakeholders that should be engaged in the process.
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when text relates to stakeholders or stakeholder
involvement outside of their participation in the development of the PM system.
Coding Rules: Code other stakeholder-related text using the “Stakeholder” family of
codes.
Example:

“Well, a lot of them [the measures] came from them [grantees].”

“I think we, we’d get in much more trouble with programs if we tried to raise them
[targets] for the same reason.”

Code Number:

014

Code Name:

Process: Resources

Brief Description:

Resources needed to support PM

Long Description:
Resources are needed to support the development, implementation,
and maintenance of PM. Resources may include consultants hired to help develop the
system, staff expertise, funding for data system development and maintenance, funding
for contracts that support data management, funding support for on-going maintenance,
technical assistance, training, etc.
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When to Use: Apply code for text referring to or describing resources used or needed to
support PM (i.e., development, implementation, or maintenance).
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: If appropriate, double code to “Use – Technical Assistance/Tools” if
resources relate to the training and TA.
Example:
“Well, part of it has been not having a budget internally [to pay for TA to
the grantees]. I mean, for us to, to function with it, to never know how much money and,
you know, it’s been good that we’ve been able to have a consultation on an annual basis.”
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Code Number:

015

Code Name:

Process: Policy/Political Factors

Brief Description:

Political factors affecting the development/implementation of PM

Long Description:
Policy and political factors seem to affect the development of the
PM system. These factors could include requirements passed down from other Federal
agencies (e.g., Dept of Defense’ Target Capabilities List), policies (e.g., PAHPA, HSPD
#21), investigations (e.g., GAO, IG), Congressional inquiries or hearings, CDC OD OD
(Gerberding), or political scrutiny and pressures.
When to Use: Apply code to text reflecting policy or political factors that affect the
process of developing or implementing PM.
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for broader political pressures and policies at the
Federal level that do not directly affect the development of the PM. Do NOT use for
GPRA/PART related text.
Coding Rules: Code broader federal level political pressures and policies as “Context:
Federal”. Code GPRA/PART issues as one of the two “GPRA/PART” codes.
Example:
“The challenge is around the political agendas and the fact that
Washington, ASPR, HHS, are completely unreasonable in what they expect from a
measurement perspective. If you look at HSPD 21 that was just released in December I
think…”
Code Number:
Code Name:
Brief Description:
attribution

016
GPRA/PART: Perceived Value, Accountability, Attribution
Perceived value of GPRA/PART – related issues of accountability,

Long Description:
Both GPRA and PART are federal policies that require the use of
performance measurement for federal programs. The implementation of PART for CDC
programs has changed over time – not all of the four cases were directly reviewed for
PART by OMB. Perceptions of the GPRA/PART policies vary from useful to “absurd.”
Both policies aim to increase government accountability for performance. Issue of
attribution are also relevant here if GPRA/PART are used for accountability and for
Federal (Congressional) level funding appropriations.
When to Use: Apply code when text addresses the perceived value of GPRA/PART
(either good or bad); views of the PART/GPRA measures themselves; text about the
experience of being reviewed, text addressing GPRA/PART and issues of accountability,
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attribution, and federal level funding appropriations from Congress; or text re: alignment
of program level PM with GPRA/PART measures
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
Example:
“But it (GPRA) is as a concept, as something that ain’t going to be going
away, as something that’s going to one, stay with us, and is part and parcel of this greater
era of accountability, that is quite useful for us starting the programs, and this is part of it
you know. PART is a huge pain in the rear end.”
“The first thing I do is look at it and I say, you know, ‘this is ridiculous’ [GPRA].
know, these are really bad ways to evaluate this program.”
“A whole other sort of thing about you know, GPRA did a good thing GPRA asked
‘what’s your business’? But whether your business was a lot of what you were
measuring, it wasn’t it went to sort of, not clear what your business was about.”
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You

Code Number:

017

Code Name:

Management: Policy Tools in Networks

Brief Description:

Mechanisms used to assert control in networks

Long Description:
Policy tools used to assert control in network contexts such as
cooperative agreements, CDC field staff, formal agreements/MOUs, funding restrictions,
PM itself, performance-based contracts, etc. Can include limits of those tools, as well
When to Use: Apply code for text referring to any policy tools or other means used to
assert control within network structures.
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when text refers to whether or not a particular agent
has control or not over network partners.
Coding Rules: Code text related to whether a particular agent has control or not over
network partners (e.g., local implementers) as “Design: Control within Network”
Example:
“You know, telling, telling providers, yes, we’ll pay for something when
you should be telling them, no, we don’t pay for that.” [provider reimbursement as a form
of control over network partners]
“And, you know, they’re putting out, like, mutual aid agreement templates and stuff for
grantees to be able to use because it’s so clear that there is so much reliance on different
entities.”

Code Number:

018

Code Name:

Management: Unintended consequences

Brief Description:

Unintended consequences of PM

Long Description:
Both positive and negative consequences / effects that may occur
based on the development and implementation of PM.
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects any type of unexpected or unintended
consequence of the PM system (e.g., improved relationships, more collaboration,
unintentionally encouraging unfavorable practice, unintentionally creating frustration for
grantees because PM don’t reflect everything they do)
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When NOT to Use:

Do not use when text describes efforts of “gaming”

Coding Rules:
Gaming”

Code text describing “gaming” of the PM as “Measurement:

Example:
“It, it has, our challenge with that has more been implementation in terms
of we already kind of put out exercise schedules when that first came in so we didn’t,
like, redo all of our schedules and things and there was also some preliminary that needed
to be done to be able to put the right groups of people in there to do that.”
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Code Number:

019

Code Name:

Measurement: Common Measures

Brief Description:

Identification of a common set of federal-level PM

Long Description:
Federal-level PM typically involves identification of a common set
of PM that can be used to describe the program nationally/in aggregate. Network
structures make this difficult given variability in several key areas, including program
activities.
When to Use: Apply code when text describes issues or challenges related to the
identification of a common set of federal-level PM.
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: When appropriate, double code text to “Network Characteristics” family
of codes (in particular, ones related to variability of activities, data collection, etc.).
Example:
“Listeria. And, but there are a whole host of other. We just chose those
two [infections] because they had enough numbers that everybody [all grantees] would be
reporting on.”
“I think it’s very appropriate for all programs, if you screen a woman and they have an
abnormal Pap, that they get into diagnostic [care], and if they have a diagnosis of cancer
they get into treatment. So these to me are very, I’m not sure the right word is generic,
but these are measures that are relevant to everybody [all grantees].”

Code Number:

020

Code Name:

Measurement: Challenges

Brief Description:

Challenges to measurement

Long Description:
A variety of challenges to measurement confront the development
of a PM system for “wicked problems” in a decentralized context. These may include a
lack of science or scientific standards, undefined programs where outcomes aren’t clear –
don’t know what to measure, sample sizes that are small, analytic challenges, could be
measuring the wrong thing, or finding that a measure doesn’t work well.
When to Use: Apply code to text that reflects challenges to measurement

435

When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when measurement challenge relates to what
programs find hard to measure (e.g., level of catastrophe, prevention, PID)
Coding Rules: If text relates to things that are hard to measure, code as “Measurement:
Hard to Measure”
Example:
“So, can we have, like, the same measure [local-level measure] and then
just roll it up and have it be an aggregate that represents what’s happening at the state
level or are they not really roll-upable? You know, like, how, how is it that you actually
measure what’s happening at the local level and somehow aggregate it to get a sense of
how prepared a state is.”
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Code Number:

021

Code Name:

Measurement: Hard/Impossible to Measure

Brief Description:
PM that are difficult or impossible to measure because they are
complex or data is unavailable
Long Description:
Indicators or constructs that are analytically challenging or
impossible to measure such as indicators that require a proxy, vague constructs like
prevention or collaboration, staff capacity, or indicators for which data are unavailable.
When to Use: Apply code when text implies indicator is difficult or impossible to
measure
When NOT to Use:

Do NOT use for more general measurement challenges

Coding Rules: For measurement challenges that do not meet this definition, code as
“Measurement: Challenges”
Example:
“You know, we have this continued idea or we have a need to figure out
some way to measure syphilis prevention during pregnancy. We just haven’t figured out
how to do that yet because pregnancy is not reportable. We’ve tried various ways to
come at it and nobody’s been happy with the outcome.”

Code Number:

022

Code Name:

Measurement: Criteria

Brief Description:

Criteria used for measurement selection

Long Description:
Criteria are frequently used to select performance measures from a
larger set of candidate measures or to simply rate a set of proposed measures. Criteria
may include face validity, extent of a science-base, consistent with goals/objectives, and
relevancy (whether the measure is “meaningful” from the perspective of various
stakeholders), among others.
When to Use: Apply code when text describes or refers to criteria used to judge potential
performance measures.
When NOT to Use:
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Coding Rules:
Example:
“It’s looking to those people who actually do it to say, does this make
sense? We want these measures to be relevant, we want them to be feasible, we want
them to be reliable and we want them to be valid.”
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Code Number:

023

Code Name:

Measurement: Interpretation/Definitions

Brief Description:

Interpretation of the PM and how it is calculated

Long Description:
Given the network structures, network actors (e.g., grantees, local
level implementers) may interpret or define the performance measures differently – this
refers to both an understanding of the intent of the measure and the calculation of the
measure.
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to grantees interpreting the measure
differently, interpreting the intent of the measure differently, defining data sources
differently, other definitional issues, lack of consistency in how things are measured
When NOT to Use: When text refers to variability factors that are un-related to the
consistent interpretation of the measure itself
Coding Rules: If relevant to the interpretation of the measure, may also double code to
“Network Characteristics: Variability – Data Sources, Collection, Reporting, Systems”
Example:
“And that was one issue. The other issue is, even though we sent out the
guidance, they didn’t read it so they defined things their own way.”

Code Number:

024

Code Name:

Measurement: Gaming

Brief Description:
Grantees’ / or CDC’s manipulation of the PM system or
calculation of a particular measure
Long Description:
“Gaming” can occur when there are incentives that drive programs
to manipulate data or circumstances to improve the level of performance on a particular
measure. Gaming is used to make the data seem better than they actually may be. For
CDC, gaming may involve developing measures to “game” political requirements like
PAHPA.
When to Use: Apply code when text describes examples of gaming.
When NOT to Use:
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Coding Rules:
Example:
“I think that, especially those 75% of women screened [for breast cancer],
I’ve seen programs structure their funding to meet that, they have algorithms that they’ve
developed to make sure that, we’ve seen programs be rated 75.1%. It’s hard to tell
whether programs might hold data that is not complete, like get it complete so that it
doesn’t effect it [the PM], I would not be surprised if that’s happening”
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Code Number:

025

Code Name:

Measurement: Process

Brief Description:

Process-level PM (typically program activities/outputs)

Long Description:
lead to outcomes

Process measures typically reflect the activities and outputs that

When to Use: Apply code when text reflects information about process measures as part
of a PM system
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for reference to proximal or longer-term outcome
measures, unless text relates the two (relates process and outcome measures in some way)
Coding Rules: Reference to outcome measures should be coded as “Measurement:
Outcomes.” Double-code text that refers to both process and outcome measures, to
“Measurement: Outcomes.”
Example:
“…and in some ways, the more typical of CDC, than some other
government kind of programs that for a lot of government programs you have a shit load
of process measures and not a whole lot of outcome measures, you know, and in fact it’s
not even clear what your outcome is or there is less agreement about outcome whereas, it
seems we got turned topsy-turvy, you know we can agree we want to reduce rates of
disease and have measures of rates of disease but we just don’t know what to do here
[black box in between activities and outcomes].”

Code Number:

026

Code Name:

Measurement: Outcomes

Brief Description:
program activities)

Outcome-level PM (typically reflect changes resulting from

Long Description:
Apply code when text reflects information about outcome
measures, regardless as to whether they are immediate, intermediate (proximal), or longterm. In public health outcome measures may be tied to changes in behavior, knowledge,
attitudes, policies, morbidity, mortality, etc.
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When to Use: Apply code when text reflects information about any type of outcome
measure, whether immediate, intermediate (proximal), or long-term
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for reference to process measures, unless text relates
the two (see example below)
Coding Rules: References to process measures should be coded “Measurement: Process.”
Double-code text that refers to both process and outcome measures.
Example:
“Yet the reality is we’re still very much in process monitoring rather than
outcome monitoring. We’re working towards developing those measures but it’s taken
some time because it does take time if you want to do it right.”

442

Code Number:

027

Code Name:

Measurement: Targets

Brief Description:

Established targets or benchmarks for performance measures

Long Description:
Targets may or may not be used as part of a PM system.
Approaches to setting targets vary (e.g., based on science, policy, past performance,
individual grantee).
When to Use: Apply this code when text describes views on targets and approaches to
establishing targets
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use code when text describes challenges related to setting
or using targets with PM.
Coding Rules: References to target-related challenges should be coded “Measurement:
Target Challenges”
Example:
“Right, so that was part of the process. And, you know, and that’s
sometimes the argument I get from some programs is they say, we can’t possibly have all
the women meet that [the target] and I say, well, you only need to have 75% to meet it.
You know?”

Code Number:

028

Code Name:

Measurement: Target Challenges

Brief Description:

Challenges to using/setting targets or benchmarks for PM

Long Description:
Given “wicked problems” and a networked context, challenges
exist in setting or using targets or benchmarks for PM. For instance, variability in
programs may inhibit the ability to set a standard; a lack of science or trend data may
challenge the ability to set a defensible target; variability in context and programs may
compromise the utility of comparing sites based on targets.
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to challenges in using/setting targets and
when text addresses the utility of comparing sites based on their performance.
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use this code when text refers to approaches to setting
targets and views on the use of targets for decentralized public health programs.
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Coding Rules: References to approaches to setting targets or views on the use of targets
should be coded as “Measurement: Targets”
Example:
“I mean, I can’t compare North Carolina and South Dakota. I mean, it’s
two entirely different environments, as far as what they’re operating in, what they’re
trying to do.”
“There’s no factor in our measure that take into consideration scalability and that goes
back to, you know, 48 hours is, is the same for Boise as it is for New York City.”
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Code Number:

029

Code Name:

Measurement: Data Quality / Validity Challenges

Brief Description:

Perceptions of data quality and concerns about data validity

Long Description:
Ensuring the validity of data is important for ultimate
interpretation and confidence in the performance data. In networked contexts, data
validity is challenged by a number of issues including the multitude of different
people/agencies involved in data collection and reporting, the variability in data sources
and data systems, and differentials in staff capacity and resources.
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to perceptions of data quality and issues
of data validity / reliability
When NOT to Use: Do NOT code text that refers to methods of ensuring data quality –
use “QA: Methods”.
Coding Rules: If text refers to methods to ensure data quality, code as “QA – Methods.”
Double code text to others that may be relevant such as those in the Network
Characteristics family (e.g., variability: data collection) or the Measurement
Challenges/Measurement: Hard to Measure.
Example:
“I think part of it is because they have, that, that it’s too difficult to get the
right data and they will sort of estimate. They will give us estimates rather than accurate.
You know, than actual data, they’ll estimate because it’s too difficult to get the correct
data.” [Double code to Measurement: Hard to Measure”]

Code Number:

030

Code Name:

Network Characteristics: Horizontal

Brief Description:

Reference to horizontal or lateral network partners/relationships

Long Description:
Networks are typically comprised of both vertical and horizontal
dimensions. Horizontal relationships may exist at multiple levels (e.g., federal level
agencies – CDC, HHS, NCI; within CDC – DCPC, OSH; and at state, regional, and local
levels).
When to Use: Apply this code when text references or describes horizontal relationships
(or the need for these relationships) as they relate to performance measurement. This can
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be when text names those partners (e.g., fire dept.) or use code for text that references
indicators for which performance relies, to some extent, on horizontal partners.
When NOT to Use:

Do NOT use when text refers to vertical dimensions.

Coding Rules: If text refers to both horizontal and vertical dimensions, double code for
both; If text refers to vertical dimensions only, code as “Network Characteristics:
Vertical”
Example:
“Yeah, and I think a lot of project areas have done this community thing,
and they have established a relationship with the CBOs and the agencies within their
community already. That’s a given, that’s established, that’s not going anywhere because
they understand that relationship and that partnership is beneficial to both. But, I think
we haven’t done as much with the private docs, you know, in even the laboratories as
well.”
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Code Number:

031

Code Name:

Network Characteristics: Vertical

Brief Description:

Reference to vertical network partners/relationships

Long Description:
Networks are typically comprised of both vertical and horizontal
dimensions. Vertical relationships are often inter- or intra-governmental (e.g., CDC –
State – local), but could reflect vertical relationships between other agencies as well (e.g.
National organization, State health department, local advocacy group). The vertical
relationships may also reflect more traditional hierarchical arrangements in government.
When to Use: Apply this code when text references or describes vertical relationships (or
the need for these relationships) or structures as they relate to performance measurement.
When NOT to Use:

Do NOT use when text refers to horizontal dimensions.

Coding Rules: If text refers to both horizontal and vertical dimensions, double code for
both; If text refers to horizontal dimensions only, code as “Network Characteristics:
Horizontal”
Example:
“Not because anybody, again, is doing anything on purpose, but because
when you have layers and then you’re moving vertical and then horizontal and then doing
that, coming back…” [double code with “Network Characteristics: Horizontal”
“I’m not sure how deeply involved with STD history you’ve been but the STD program
had been run top down for a lot of years, very strongly managed, well forcefully
managed.”
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Code Number:

032

Code Name:

Network Characteristics: Value and Goal Conflicts

Brief Description:
Conflicts/issues between network partners around values, goals,
mission, priorities, etc.
Long Description:
Given the network structure, conflicts or issues may arise in
developing performance measurement related to differing agency values, goals, mission,
priorities, areas of responsibility / turf, culture, etc. These conflicts may impede the
development of a common set of measures or the collaboration needed to collect/report
performance related data.
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to or describes tensions between network
partners that is related to fundamental differences in values, goals, etc.
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
Example:
“Human nature, again, I could be part of this myself if I was out there, I
have been out there in the past, but you’ve got your own little kingdoms and queendoms
and fiefdoms and all that and the HIV STD programs are a great example of that.
They’re still not really working together out there and it’s now 2008.”
“You know, I think each State determines who their screening population is going to be,
and in Washington it’s not just Department of Health at the site, we have stakeholders,
and we have a really strong Komen presence in our State” [referring to partners who want
women aged 40-50 screened vs. CDC policy of screening women 50-64]
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Code Number:

033

Code Name: Network Characteristics: Bargaining, Consensus Building, Building
Networks
Brief Description:

Efforts of bargaining and consensus building in networks

Long Description:
Bargaining and consensus building are recognized as important
strategies in a network context – taking the place of traditional command and control
structures/approaches in hierarchical arrangements. Building relationships with network
partners is essential – through consensus, compromise, collaboration, respect, etc.
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects efforts of bargaining or consensus building,
efforts of reciprocity or give/take, negotiation, collaboration, etc. – Or other strategies to
build network relationships (at all levels, including CDC).
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
Example:
“I think so, but I think it’s because we have developed really good
relationships with our prime contractors and, you know, they’re there for us when we,
you know, need something or we need something done differently, or we’ve identified an
issue, and we’re there for them, you know, so we’re reciprocating.”

Code Number:

034

Code Name:

Network Characteristics: Variability Activities

Brief Description:
at each site.

Variability across grantees in the program activities implemented

Long Description:
Public health endorses the use of approaches and strategies suited
to the unique context and needs of particular communities. For a national program
operating through a network structure, this results in extreme variability in program
activities which make identification of common codes difficult.
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to the variability across grantees in their
activities/ in how they do things and/or when text refers to the effects of this variation on
the development of PM
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When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
appropriate

Double code text to “Measurement: Common Measures” if

Example:
“Because they’re so different, every place is so God damn different and it
does not help you very much, sometimes, but this is a big problem I’ve had conceptually
across the states and even in terms of the groups they think they get a lot more having
people come in telling them what to do, looking over your state, looking over the fence.
They would be far more advised to look closely at their own system and understand the
difference.”
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Code Number:

035

Code Name:

Network Characteristics: Variability – Capacity/Resources

Brief Description:
Differences across grantees or other network partners in staff
capacity, agency resources, agency infrastructure
Long Description:
Given the network structure, there is variability in the capacity,
infrastructure, and resources of individual grantees and other network partners. This
variability has implications for performance measurement in terms of collecting and
reporting data, availability of adequate data systems, staff to manage and interpret data,
etc.
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to differences in capacity or resources across
the grantees or network partners – may be both a lack of or a richness of resources,
capacity, infrastructure
When NOT to Use: Do NOT code text that refers to issues of resources needed to
support the development/implementation of the overall PM system (national level).
Coding Rules: If text relates to broader resource issues for the overall PM system, code
as, “Process – Resources”
Example:
“The diversity in the programs is, is a big issue because large programs
have larger staff and, and more opportunity to develop the infrastructure necessary to do
some things sometimes. They also have much more disease and a far more complex
program. Smaller programs don’t have any resources or staff.”

Code Number:

036

Code Name: Network Characteristics: Variability – Data Sources, Collection,
Reporting, Systems
Brief Description:
Variability in grantees’ data systems and data sources, collection,
and reporting processes
Long Description:
Given the network structure, there is variability in grantees’ data
systems and in the data source for the measures, as well as the way the data is collected
and reported. This poses several challenges, including ones of data validity, for the PM
system.
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When to Use: Apply code to text that refers to variability across grantees in data sources,
data systems, data collection, or data reporting.
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: Double code text to others that may be relevant such as “Measurement:
Data Validity”
Example:
“They collect data differently and they, you know, store it differently, and
they can report on it differently. So, that’s something that’s always been, you know, hit
and miss with us, as far as data we’re going to get, and can this, is it going to be, you
know, valid and useable.”
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Code Number:

037

Code Name:

Network Characteristics: Variability – Context (comparing too)

Brief Description:

Contextual variance across network members (e.g., grantees)

Long Description:
In a networked structure, programs may vary extensively in regard
to their overall context (e.g., size, capacity, disease burden, cultural norms, demographic
factors). Given this, the interpretation of PM data may need to account for those
contextual factors – similarly, these contextual differences may compromise the value of
comparing the PM data for state A to state B.
When to Use: Apply code when text reflects issues of variance in grantee context; or
when text references the role of context in the interpretation of data.
When NOT to Use:
grantees do)

Do NOT use when text refers to variability in activities (what

Coding Rules: If text relates to variability in grantee activities, code “Network
Characteristics: Variability – Activities”
Example:
“I think it’s [grantee context] very important, I think Bill eluded to it
before, because some of the indicators you really need to know how the program is
structured and whatever other things are going on, just like with the funding source, so a
program that has a large non-federal grant, or money coming in, has the flexibility to
pinpoint which mammograms they’re paying for with federal funds…”

Code Number:

038

Code Name:

Network Characteristics: Value

Brief Description:
health

Perceived value of networks and networked approach to public

Long Description:
The literature suggests that networks provide a number of
advantages in addressing complex problems – together, network partners can tackle the
varied factors contributing to social problems, networks leverage scarce resources, and
networks extend programs’ reach (among other things).
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When to Use: Apply code when text reflects perceptions of the value of networks and
networked approaches to public health – also the value of particular network partners
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
Example:
“I mean, my understanding is that is, it’s [collaboration] extremely
important because a lot of the, I think a lot of the, the work that STD needs to have done
or things that STD needs to accomplish is, are in areas that are essentially outside their
direct control. Like, for instance, with the jails and the family planning clinics and things
like that. And so to be able to actually work with those people in other, other programs
to, to get them to buy into your goals and, and to participate in your process is, seems to
me to be very critical.”
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Code Number:

039

Code Name:

Performance Measurement: Value

Brief Description:

Perceived value of performance measurement

Long Description:
Performance measurement may be perceived as an invaluable
management tool, a meaningless burden, a defense against funding cuts, etc. Value may
be expressed generally, but also reflected in intended uses or purposes.
When to Use: Apply this code when text reflects the value (or lack of value) of
performance measurement for their program, include text about potential use/users and
purposes.
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
Example:

“[The biggest benefit of PM has been in] defining the program.”

“So, they get that, but they also understand that in light of these funding restrictions
and/or reductions, they need to start demonstrating accountability and that this is a very
difficult area to do, to do so. So they really want, there’s a, there’s a fairly large
constituency of folks who really want to get this right.”

Code Number:

040

Code Name:

Program Characteristics: Developmental Stage of Program

Brief Description:

Program’s maturity or developmental stage

Long Description:
Programs vary in their developmental phase or level of program
maturity. The STD program is one of the oldest at CDC; PHEP is one of the newest. A
program’s developmental stage may be reflected in its articulated goals, program
experience, level of institutionalization, etc..
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to the maturity of a program, their stage of
development, experience – and when text explicitly recognizes a relationship between
developmental stage and the PM system.
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When NOT to Use: Do NOT use code when text refers to the developmental phase of
the performance measurement system – unless a direct correlation is made.
Coding Rules: If text refers to the performance measures or measurement system, code as
“Process: Measures Evolve.” If text makes a direct correlation between developmental
phase of the program and developmental phase of the PM, double code with “Process:
Measures Evolve.”
Example:
“You know, so our STD programs are well entrenched and some of them
have trouble moving with the environment. So, yeah, I think the first set of measures was
our attempt to get them used to the idea that, you know, you really do need to collect data
that gives you information about what you’re doing and how you’re performing. There
were obvious deficiencies with the current set as far as aggregating the data for a national
measure.”
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Code Number:

041

Code Name:

Program Characteristics: Disease Burden

Brief Description:
Variability or changes in disease burden or emergency incidents
across grantees / network
Long Description:
Given the variability in disease burden (e.g., syphilis), emergency
incidents (e.g., anthrax attack in NY vs Nebraska; scale of incidents), and populations to
be served (breast cancer screening in Alaska vs. California), performance measures may
be more or less meaningful to a particular grantee/jurisdiction. Similarly, disease burden
may shift in regard to certain high risk populations, with the potential to affect the utility
of a particular PM.
When to Use: Apply code when text references disease burden, variability in types of
emergency hazards and scale of incidents, etc.
When NOT to Use:
general

Do NOT use code for descriptive text about program context in

Coding Rules: May double-code text that is related to both disease burden and
measurement (e.g., Measurement: Hard to measure); May double code text that is also
related to identifying common measures (e.g., Measurement – Common Measure); If
relates to program context more generally, code “Program Characteristics: Goals &
Scope of Program”
Example:
“We’re, you know, we’re finding gonorrhea and Chlamydia in, in these
settings and, and it’s a worthwhile activity and it’s important. You know, that’s
something that could change if, you know, like syphilis, you know, historically it was a
heterosexual disease and now it’s becoming much more MSM disease.”
“ A couple of big states are a bit concerned because they have overwhelming numbers
and they don’t normally follow up on Chlamydia and gonorrhea because they’ve got so
much syphilis. But we think this is going to be a good measure over time.”
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Code Number:

042

Code Name:
Program

Program Characteristics: Goals, Scope, Context, Culture of CDC

Brief Description:

Information about the goals and scope of the national program

Long Description:
General information about the nature of the program, its goals, and
its scope (e.g., the STD program addresses several diseases, preparedness is really broad,
etc.)
When to Use: Apply this code to text that reflects aspects of the national program’s
scope, its goals, and/or its inherent challenges also characterizations of the program or the
program context / program culture
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
Example:
“I think we’re just in an evolutionary phase of our, of, of this as a public
health discipline and I think of it a little bit loose --, because while it is a new section or
sector within public health, certainly new responsibilities and new scope of activities, you
know, where everyday public health ends and public health preparedness begins is a very
fuzzy line.”

Code Number:

043

Code Name:

Purpose: Accountability Fiscal

Brief Description:

Accountability as stewards of federal funds

Long Description:
As a public agency, CDC has responsibility to act as proper
stewards of federal funds (tax dollars).
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to CDC’s accountability for federal
dollars.
When NOT to Use:
performance.

Do NOT use when accountability is related solely to demonstrating
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Coding Rules: If text relates to accountability for performance, code as “Purpose:
Accountability – Performance”
Double code with “Accountability – Performance”
if text addresses both (see example below).
Example:
“Yeah, I think it, I think it’s tremendously valuable because I think for one
thing just simply to, to, to justify, you know, what the money is being used for and how
the, how the program is actually performing in these core areas and to be able to, you
know, essentially to, to put a number on it or at least to have a formal definition and be
able to monitor people’s progress because we’ve never done that, you know, consistently
in the past.
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Code Number:

044

Code Name:

Purpose: Accountability Performance

Brief Description:

Accountability for performance

Long Description:
Performance measurement is intended to promote accountability
for achieving outputs and outcomes, to demonstrate success.
When to Use: Apply to text referring to issues of accountability or responsibility for
outputs, outcomes, or for performance in general. Also code for text that addresses
challenges around accountability as it relates to performance, issues of responsibility, or
policies (other than GPRA/PART) that dictate accountability (e.g., PAHPA) – and for
instances where text describes grantees avoiding accountability.
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when accountability is related solely to fiscal
accountability. Do not use when addressing GPRA/PART.
Coding Rules: May double code with “Performance Measurement: Value” if appropriate
(e.g., text refers to PM as an incentive for holding people accountable). May double code
with “Purpose: Accountability – Fiscal” if text refers to both. If relates to GPRA/PART,
code as “GPRA/PART: Perceived Value, Accountability, Attribution”
Example:
“You’re responsibility for the whole state in terms of your data, but there
seemed to be no movement within the programs to take responsibility for the activities
that would affect that whole state’s rate.”
“Because all of them, you know, just, they’d just say give me the money and, you know,
let me run my, let me run my program the way I want.”
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Code Number:

045

Code Name:

Purpose: Accountability Beliefs

Brief Description:

Individuals’ beliefs about accountability, attribution

Long Description:
People have differing views about what accountability means, the
importance of accountability
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to the interviewee’s beliefs about
accountability, also when text refers to issues of attribution
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text relates to fiscal accountability, accountability
for performance, or GPRA/PART.
Coding Rules: Code fiscal issues as “Accountability – Fiscal”; code performance issues
as “Accountability – Performance”; code GPRA/PART issues as “GPRA/PART”
Example:
"And then I guess we took credit for what else was going on [laughing].
But we never really, you know, we never really reported it that way, we just knew that,
and we didn’t have to, to Congress or anybody, but we knew that if our dollars weren’t
going to support the infrastructure in Massachusetts or New York, they couldn’t have,
they couldn’t have implemented their program"
“You think about the STD program, Division of STD, has never really collected anything
other than case-based surveillance data. Now all of a sudden they want hard data about
program. Well, it’s a little intimidating for people in the field that never had to report on
what they’re doing. It’s absolutely appropriate and necessary.”
“Well I think program improvement is joined at the hip with accountability.”
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Code Number:

046

Code Number:

046

Code Name:

Purpose: Budgeting

Brief Description:

Performance measurement and its use/relationship to budgeting

Long Description:
Performance measurement may be used to inform budgeting
decisions. Some suggest using PM for budgeting encourages improved performance
while others have concerns it will lead to gaming, misuse, teaching to the test, etc. Fears
that PM may be used (punitively) for budgeting also infuses skepticism into the process
(trust) and may compromise the level of buy-in for PM.
When to Use: Apply this code when text refers to individual perspectives on the use of
PM for budgeting (including its value for budgeting, fears about its use), current use for
budgeting, formulas for budgeting.
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:

Double code if appropriate to “Use – Punitive” or “Use – Misuse”

Example:
“No science base, no consistency of definitions or anything like that, so
you are going to have teaching to the test, I think you see it in our data right now even
though it’s not even, it’s low stakes now, because they can just, some of them just say
we’re not even going to report it you know. So they teach to the test, they say you want
us to convene in an hour? Well we’ll do it, we’ll figure out a way to do it.”
“Everybody was afraid. Oh my God, if they do this, they’re going to take money away
from us if we don’t perform well”
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Code Number:
Code Name:

047
Purpose: Program Improvement

Brief Description:

Performance measures as means for program improvement

Long Description:
Performance measurement is viewed as an important monitoring
tool that can identify problems early, track trends over time, etc. – all of which can
inform the improvement of the program (through program adjustments, new strategies,
etc.)
When to Use: Apply this code when the text refers to issues of program improvement
and the use of PM for program improvement.
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use for other purposes (accountability, budgeting), unless
the text reflects two or more ideas
Coding Rules: Double code with other purposes if text addresses accountability and/or
budgeting as well as program improvement (see example below).
Example:
“It’s, all the other things in between, like accountability, seriously
responding to a measure when you’re not meeting it, looking for alternatives on how to
meet it, how to meet that measure How to keep improving, that’s the nature of the whole
thing.”

Code Number:

048

Code Name:

Quality Assurance Methods

Brief Description:

Methods used for quality assurance of PM data/system

Long Description:
Quality assurance is an important component of a performance
measurement system. Various strategies or methods can be used for quality assurance
such as computer edit programs, periodic audits, peer review, data validation efforts, and
involvement of workgroups, etc.
When to Use: Apply this code when text describes QA methods or strategies or groups
working on QA efforts
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
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Example:
“So the calls actually quickly morphed into not just quality assurance of
the data reported, but technical assistance on the measurement, on what was expected in
terms of measurement as well.”
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Code Number:

049

Code Name:

Quality Assurance Benefits

Brief Description:

Benefits to performance measurement of QA efforts

Long Description:
Quality assurance is an important component of a performance
measurement system. Quality assurance efforts are undertaken to improve the collection
and reporting of data or to identify potential problems/issues in the PM system. Benefits
are typically reflected in improved data quality or PM systems.
When to Use: Apply to text that reflects perceived benefits to the PM data or system
based on QA efforts
When NOT to Use:

Do NOT use for QA Methods

Coding Rules: Use “Quality Assurance – Methods” if text references specific QA
strategies
Example:
“And then from the [QA] calls we revised the measures slightly and put
out the guidance for the following year, you know, for the following budget period.”
“We actually found [from the validation study] that the national data was very, I mean,
very good, for the most part. There are problems with particular variables, and a lot of
that, I think, has to do with, frankly, CDC’s lack of guidance.”

Code Number:

050

Code Name:

Stakeholders Buy-In Importance

Brief Description:

Importance of stakeholder buy-in in developing PM

Long Description:
The literature suggests that the support and involvement of
stakeholders in the development and implementation of PM is critical to its success.
Stakeholders are relevant at every level (CDC management, grantees, local level
implementers)
When to Use: Apply this code when text addresses the value and importance of
stakeholder support, involvement, buy-in to the development and implementation of PM
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When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing examples of good/successful buyin, addressing challenges to buy-in, describing names or types of stakeholders, or
strategies to build support
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition
above
Example:
“It’s about change management, buy in, acceptability. All of those, you
know, important aspects. It’s the softer side of the work we do but it’s the most
important.”
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Code Number:

051

Code Name:

Stakeholder Buy-In Strategies

Brief Description:

Strategies used to nurture buy-in for PM from key stakeholders

Long Description:
The literature suggests that the support and involvement of
stakeholders in the development and implementation of PM is critical to its success.
Various strategies may be employed to nurture or build buy-in from key stakeholders
including engaging them in the development process, providing training on the PM, etc.
Stakeholders are relevant at every level (CDC management, grantees, local level
implementers)
When to Use: Apply this code when text describes approaches to building stakeholder
support for PM
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing examples of good/successful buyin, addressing challenges to buy-in, describing names or types of stakeholders, or the
importance of stakeholders to the development/implementation of PM
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition
above
Example:
“I think we considered these six low hanging fruit and we thought that
they would too, sort of. (Laughing) So, you know, there were fewer complaints but still
some but, you know, I think that it was partially to get their buy in too and to hopefully
see that they, that they would agree that, that, yes, these are reasonable measures”

Code Number:

052

Code Name:

Stakeholders Buy-In Good

Brief Description:

Examples of good/successful buy-in from stakeholders

Long Description:
The literature suggests that the support and involvement of
stakeholders in the development and implementation of PM is critical to its success.
When to Use: Apply this code to text that describes “good” buy-in on the part of
stakeholders. Stakeholders could be at any level, including CDC (e.g., mgmt).
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When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing strategies to achieve buy-in,
addressing challenges to buy-in, describing names or types of stakeholders, or the
importance of stakeholders to the development/implementation of PM
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition
above
Example:
“I mean it was at that point I think, you know, I don’t want to say it was a
sea change but there was something of that, there was something that said it no longer
was ‘our’ thing we’re foisting on the program, but it became something that had real
program ownership”
“Most project areas, when you talk with the STD program directors, are in favor of
performance measures. They just may not like the specifics on the ones [measures] that
we have.”
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Code Number:

053

Code Name:

Stakeholders Buy-In Challenges

Brief Description:

Challenges to achieving buy-in from key stakeholders

Long Description:
The literature suggests that the support and involvement of
stakeholders in the development and implementation of PM is critical to its success.
When to Use: Apply to text reflecting challenges to achieving stakeholder buy-in (all
levels of stakeholders)
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing strategies to achieve buy-in,
addressing examples of successful buy-in, describing names or types of stakeholders, or
the importance of stakeholders to the development/implementation of PM
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition
above
Example:
“One of the things I think we’ve learned here is some of the program
consultants probably shouldn’t go. And we’re dealing with that.”
“Especially in project areas where you have so many different people involved in the
performance measure, and they may not even know there’s a performance measure that
you’re dealing with like IPP. A lot of the IPP clinics may not understand that part of the
data that they’re providing relates back to performance measure.”

Code Number:

054

Code Name:

Stakeholders – Names/Types

Brief Description:

Specific Names/Types of Stakeholders

Long Description:

Identity of relevant stakeholders to a program’s PM system

When to Use: Apply to text that identifies relevant stakeholders (e.g., CDC mgmt, CDC
program consultants, national organizations, Congress, grantees, local level
implementers)
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When NOT to Use: Do NOT use if text is describing strategies to achieve buy-in,
addressing examples of successful buy-in, describing challenges to buy-in, or the
importance of stakeholders to the development/implementation of PM
Coding Rules: Use other ‘Stakeholder” codes for related text that doesn’t meet definition
above
Example:
“Well, you know, there’s a lot of politics around it and, you know, we
have the National Coalition of STD Directors and we have a process where we get input
on those performance measures and then there’s, after we’ve drafted proposed new ones,
there’s a period that we’re in right now for, for commenting and, and feedback.”
“And HHS, ASPR, yeah.”
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Code Number:

055

Code Name:

Use – Technical Assistance/Tools

Brief Description:

Technical assistance and tools meant to support the use of PM

Long Description:
Performance measures should be used in order to achieve their
benefit. The literature suggests technical assistance and training are important to provide
to users of the PM system. Other tools or strategies may also support use (e.g.,
dissemination of data reports to state and local levels)
When to Use: Apply code when text describes TA efforts (e.g., PM guides, TA calls,
training) and other tools to support the use of PM – or the lack thereof
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
Example:
“And I think there’s been a lack of really good technical assistance from
CDC on this project, so there’s a little bit of frustration that”
“We [IMS] have 7 technical consultants, but we actually prefer to have 8.” & “Once the
measure were, were developed, then we could come along behind and say, OK, you’ve
got, like, 12 measures and I can, I can write a report that out of our, our system we can
produce seven of them.”

Code Number:

056

Code Name:

Use Grantees Use (or Non-Use) /Capacity for PM

Brief Description:

Grantees use of PM data and challenges to their use

Long Description:
their variability

Grantees’ capacity or motivation to use PM data may differ given

When to Use: Apply code when text describes grantees’ use of PM, their lack of use,
their capacity to use PM, and challenges to their use
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
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Example:
“They may be something that, you know, find it’s just another data
collection exercise the CDC wants, they’ll collect whatever data, but they may not
actually be using the performance measures to kind of, you know, direct their program
and improve on that -identify weaknesses, or something like that.”
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Code Number:

057

Code Name:

Use – Misuse / Punitive Use

Brief Description:

Punitive use of PM or other misuse of PM data

Long Description:
Concerns about punitive use of PM or other misuse may inhibit
buy-in for the PM system.
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to concerns or experiences of punitive use or
misuse of PM data; when text describes a lack of trust on the part of grantees or others on
how the PM data will be used
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: Double code to “Purpose – Budgeting” if appropriate
Example:
“And, and, you know, and again, I mean, just getting back to this whole,
whole idea that we’re trying to be punitive to them, that we’re looking for every reason to
ding them rather than to help them.”

Code Number:

058

Code Name:

Use – Program Consultant Role

Brief Description:

Program consultant’s role in PM

Long Description:
Program consultants have an on-going working relationship with
grantees and may be critical ‘change agents” in the adoption and use of PM
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to the role of Program Consultants in the PM
system – whether positive or negative – Their role could involve promoting adoption,
supporting use, providing technical assistance, etc.
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: Double code with the “Buy-In” family of codes if relevant
Example:
“So, I mean, maybe they’re [program consultants] put in, well, they are
put in a, a delicate position where they kind of have to be the enforcer.”
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“A lot of that performance measure kind of implementation lands on us as program
[consultants], because we have to go out and implement it to the grantees.”
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Code Number:

059

Code Name:

Use Political

Brief Description:

Use of PM for political purposes

Long Description:
PM may be used for political purposes – to argue for more
funding, to defend against funding cuts, to support policy changes, to back up
GPRA/PART, for inclusion in reports that are used as political tools, etc.
When to Use: Apply to text that reflects political use of PM
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: Double code to “Use – Misuse” if appropriate
Example:
“Well, [use PM for] bragging rights, first and foremost [laughing]. I think,
you know, we use it as a way, in my grant applications, whether it’s to CDC or outside
entities, that, you know, in order to be a quality program this is what, this is your
documentation that supports you, you have a quality program.”
“And then, you know, state and federal legislatures are going to have to make a decision
about what’s important, but right now we don’t have any sort of national data to say, you
know, we need more resources.”

Code Number:

060

Code Name:

Great Quote

Brief Description:

Really great quote, regardless of topic

Long Description:
When to Use: Use for any text identified as a terrific quote that may be particularly
illustrative of an issue/idea
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules: Double code with relevant code
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Example:
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Code Number:

061

Code Name:

Design: Data Sources, Collection, Reporting, & Management

Brief Description:
Issues of data sources, collection, reporting, or data management
related to the design of the PM system
Long Description:
Data sources, collection, reporting, and management systems are
central to the design of a PM system. In networked context, issues of capacity and
potential burden must be considered in developing these systems. In public health, the
collection of data may involve extensive data lags which may affect the utility of the data.
When to Use: Apply code when text refers to issues of the data system as it relates to the
overall design of the PM system (e.g., concerns about data lags, burden of data collection
requirements, use of existing data mgmt systems).
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use when text refers to issues of data quality, data
validity, or QA methods and benefits.
Coding Rules: If text refers to issues of data quality and validity, code as “Measurement:
Data Quality / Validity Problems”.
Example:
“So I don’t know if we’re going to be requiring measurement at the local
level in the near future.”
“So, I mean, she can tell you a lot of, you know, the frustrations, the good, the bad, and
ugly about the Chronicle.”
“… the data is fairly old by the time the program uses it to award money. It’s at least two
or three years old. Because you always have to give enough time for everything to have
happened. And then for the reports to come from IMS and so forth. So, there are times
when we know that things are really turned around but they’re being punished for
behavior from three years ago.”
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Code Number:

062

Code Name:

Program Characteristics: Wicked / Complex Problems

Brief Description:
public health

Descriptions or references to “wicked problems” confronting

Long Description:
The literature has coined the term “wicked problems” to refer to
complex social problems that are typically influenced by multiple factors and require
multidisciplinary/multi-sector approaches to effectively address them.
When to Use: Apply code when text describes the public health problem being addressed
by the program (OSH, COTPER) – When text may refer to the lack of or existence of a
strong science base for the problem.
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use this code when text is addressing issues of
MEASUREMENT for complex issues
Coding Rules: If text addresses issues of Measurement – look to “Measurement:
Challenges” or “Measurement: Hard/ Impossible to Measure”
Example:
“And then in terms of another major division commitment is to reduce
“disparities” OK. What does that mean?”
“Joe and I were trying to figure out, what is, how do we measure preparedness?
And, you know, for me, the, the term preparedness sprung up with no real definition
around it. I mean, are we saying that before we coined that term we were unprepared? Or
anything that’s, that we know about that’s preventable that we’re not preventing, does
that mean we’re not prepared?”

Code Number:

063

Code Name:

Use: CDC Use / Non-Use

Brief Description:

Use or Non-Use of PM data by CDC

Long Description:
CDC leads the PM development process but may or may not
effectively use the data collected for management or other purposes.
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When to Use: Apply code when text describes use or non-use of PM data by CDC
When NOT to Use:
Coding Rules:
Example:
“I’ve been extraordinarily impressed with the fact that not only do we
collect the data but we actually use it, which in a lot of places, even at CDC, you know
either is not collected, or is not collected well, or if it’s collected nobody ever looks at it,
or uses it, and I think that we have the full spectrum, so our Division has a lot to be proud
in that regard, we manage with data.”
“Interviewer. OK. OK. And then just, one of the last questions is about how
you’re using the data right now. Interviewee. We’re not [laughing]. Really, to be
honest.”

Code Number:

064

Code Name:
Improvement

Purpose: Tension between Accountability & Program

Brief Description:
Perceived contradictory purposes for PM of accountability and
program improvement
Long Description:
Some suggest that it is difficult or impossible to develop PM
systems that serve both the purpose of accountability and program improvement. The
literature has suggested that systems for each of these would require different types of
measures, etc.
When to Use: Apply code to text describing tension between the two purposes of
accountability and program improvement
When NOT to Use: Do NOT use code if text is just addressing accountability or just
addressing program improvement…or if it’s addressing both but not insinuating any
tension between the two
Coding Rules: If text is addressing accountability: “Purpose: Accountability (fiscal,
performance)”; If text is addressing program improvement: “Purpose: Program
Improvement.”
Example:
“Ideally, see, that’s, this is the constant battle we have internally between
accountability and program improvement for measure, for measures and I think, you
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know, because of the legislation that we have in place, our number one requirement right
now is to provide measures of accountability.”
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APPENDIX I
SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE DATA BY CASEPROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS
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PHEP

CSPS

NBCCEDP

NTCP

PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS
Organizational Context
Originally funded in
1999; PHEP established
in 2002

Program established in
1957; one of oldest at
CDC

Program established by
law in 1990

Initial efforts in early
1990s; NTCP
implemented in 1999

62 grantees representing
states, cities, and
territories

65 grantees representing
states, cities, and
territories

68 grantees representing
states, tribes, and
territories (and D.C.)

58 grantees
representing states and
territories (and D.C.)

Largest grantee program
at CDC

Largest program within
DSTDP

Largest program within
DCPC

Largest program within
OSH

Extensive staff turnover
in all parts of DSLR

Staff often start as CDC
field staff working in
states; long-term tenure

Turnover frequent among
program consultants

More recent turnover
throughout OSH

Context of constant
change and political
volatility

Institutionalized culture
where change can be
difficult

Data-driven program
culture

Science-based program
culture

Politics compromises
science

Grantees have had
extensive autonomy and
have grown resistant to
CDC oversight

Legislated program
requirements

Faces political
opponent in the tobacco
industry

Program Goals
Evolving goals and
expanding scope over
time to “all hazards”

Lacking clear goals and
direction from CDC

Consensus on program
goals among CDC and
grantees

Consensus on four
program goals among
CDC, grantees, and
other national partners

No consensus on
defining public health
“preparedness”; limited
science base

Focus on syphilis,
gonorrhea, and
Chlamydia

Narrow focus on women
screened through the
NBCCEDP only

Focus on smoking
initiation, smoking
cessation, second-hand
smoke, and reducing
disparities

Complexity: Program
outcomes for
“preparing” and
“preventing” difficult to
define

Complexity: 25
different STDs, shifting
disease burden and
epidemiology,
prevalence differences
across grantees,
changing health care
delivery patterns

Program outcomes reflect
clinical outcomes for
women served through
the NBCCEDP

Program outcomes
reflect a comprehensive
tobacco control effort
inclusive of
educational, clinical,
regulatory, economic,
and social strategies
implemented by
multiple agencies and
supported by diverse
funding sources

Outcomes dependent on
integrated and seamless
emergency response at
the local, state, and
federal levels;
collaboration essential

Grantees support a
range of program
activities implemented
at the local level by
diverse agencies

Service delivery occurs
primarily at the local
level

Service delivery occurs
at local and grantee
level; collaboration and
coalition building
emphasized
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Stage of Program Development
New; blazing new
paths, in development

Mature

Mature

Mature

CDC recognizes that it
must meet states “where
they are” given stage of
program development

Programs must stay
responsive to changes in
the health care
environment and in
epidemiology

State grantees have been
funded for 11 or more
years

Strong tobacco control
community

OMEB working to
develop a conceptual
framework for PHEP

Institutionalized culture
difficult to shift

Well established service
delivery infrastructure
with local providers

Evidence-based logic
models developed for 3
of 4 program goals

Program Budget
$700 million FY 2008

$104 million FY 2008

$157 million in FY 2008

$63 million in FY 2008

Median award $8.9
million

Median award $1.1
million

Median award $2.1
million

Median award $XX
million

Declining federal
funding

Flat funding

Flat funding

Flat funding

PAHPA (2006) requires
performance based
budgeting beginning in
FY 2009

HIV/AIDS gets greater
percentage of resources

State legislatures
contribute resources in
some states; advocates
are a source for resources
as well

State contributions
from excise taxes and
settlement funds
dropping or
disappearing
completely given state
budget crisis

Multiple sources of
preparedness funds to
states from federal
government (CDC,
DHS, ASPR)

STD not viewed as high
priority

Focus on achieving
efficiencies given flat
funding

90% of funding for
tobacco control are
from excise taxes and
settlement funds rather
than CDC

Stakeholders
Congress, GAO, OMB,
President

Congress, OMB

High powered national
stakeholders – DHS,
HHS, ASPR, FEMA

Congress, OMB, GAO

Congress, OMB

National advocates –
Susan B. Komen for the
Cure, ACS

National advocates –
ACS, ALA, AHA,
CTFK, Legacy
Foundation)

ASTHO’s Directors of
Public Health
Preparedness,
NACCHO, CSTE,
APHL

NCSD

NACDD, NACCHO,
NBCCEDP Council of
Program Directors

NACDD

CDC Office of the
Director; other CDC
Centers

Division of HIV/AIDS
Prevention, CDC,
Division of Cancer
Prevention and Control,
Division of

CDC’s WISEWOMAN™
and CCC programs

Other CDC programs,
especially in the
NCCDPHP, that share
tobacco use as a risk
factor (e.g., heart

483

PHEP

Grantees

CSPS
Reproductive Health
Grantees

NBCCEDP

Grantees

NTCP
disease, diabetes,
cancer)
Grantees

Political Environment
Dominant theme –
public visibility,
perceived threat of
hazards, pressures to
“get states prepared”

Stable

Political influences of
other federal agencies
(DoD, FEMA, HHS,
ASPR). Top-down,
compliance orientation
– PAHPA, HSPD-21

Politically visible
program given attention
to breast cancer – CDC
Director reports on
related GPRA measure at
quarterly HHS briefing

OSH active in CDC
D.C. office

Policy differences exist
across states, especially in
regard to mammography
screening for younger
women aged 40-49

Political context in
individual states can
have important
programmatic
implications for
individual NTCP
grantee programs

Interferes with CDC’s
control over program
implementation
Grantees have political
influence

Adversary represented
by the tobacco industry
Grantees have political
influence

Grantees have political
influence
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Grantees have political
influence

APPENDIX J
SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE DATA BY CASE
NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS
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NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS
Network Structure: Vertical Relationships
62 grantees; thousands of
local-level partners

65 grantees; hundreds
of local-level partners

68 grantees; 22,000 locallevel providers

58 grantees; some
local-level partners

Congress – HHS – CDC
– grantees, local-level

Congress – HHS –
CDC – grantees,
regional (sometimes),
local

Congress – HHS – CDC
– grantees, regional
(sometimes), local

Congress – HHS –
CDC – grantees, local
(if resources permit)

Most vertical
relationships formalized
via funding

Most vertical
relationships formalized
via funding; dominant
dimension

Most vertical
relationships formalized
via funding; dominant
dimension

Most vertical
relationships formalized
via funding

Vertical structure varies
within state, tribe,
territory

Vertical structure varies
within state, tribe,
territory

Vertical structure varies
within state, tribe,
territory

Vertical structure varies
within state, tribe,
territory

Primarily
intergovernmental
throughout vertical chain

Regional and locallevel partners include:
local public health
agencies, CBOs, family
planning clinics

Regional and local-level
partners include: public
health agencies, CBOs,
private providers,
community health
centers, family planning
clinics

Local-level partners
include local health
agencies, CBOs
(usually funded with
non-CDC funds)

Program activities at state
and local levels

Most program activities
at local level

Service delivery at local
level

CDC funds primarily
support grantee
infrastructure; program
activities at state and
local-level

CDC accountable for
performance of network
partners 1-2 steps
removed

CDC accountable for
performance of network
partners 2-3 steps
removed

CDC accountable for
performance of network
partners 2-3 steps
removed

CDC accountable for
performance of network
partners steps removed

Network Structure: Horizontal Relationships
Horizontal partners at all
levels – federal, CDC,
state, local

Horizontal partners at
all levels – federal,
CDC, state, local

Horizontal partners at all
levels – federal, CDC,
state, local

Horizontal partners at
all levels – federal,
CDC, state, local

Typically informal and
unfunded (e.g., at statelevel Departments of
education, transportation,
emergency response; at
local-level schools, first
responders, commerce,
transportation)

Typically informal and
unfunded (e.g., jails,
private providers,
juvenile detention
facilities)

Some funded (e.g., CBOs
to conduct outreach and
recruitment), others
informal and unfunded
(e.g., community health
agency to assist with
referral)

Typically informal and
unfunded (e.g., at statelevel – Department of
education, other public
health departments,
advocacy organizations;
at local-level – health
care systems, schools)
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Essential to achieving
program goals – program
outcomes are dependent
on network efforts

Increasing importance
of partnering with
horizontal partners to
access priority
populations that do not
seek STD services at
public health clinics or
are incarcerated

Support referral of
priority populations to
program services; provide
advocacy

Horizontal partners are
essential to achieving
NTCP program goals –
program outcomes are
dependent on network
efforts

Some horizontal partners
are funded for
preparedness efforts by
other federal and state
sources, but not for the
public health component

Horizontal partners
typically facilitate
program integration and
improved access to
populations at risk for
STDs

Horizontal partners
typically extend program
reach, increase access to
priority populations,
support program
integration (e.g.,
WISEWOMAN™, and
contribute to broader
public education efforts
that benefit all U.S.
women

Horizontal partners are
integral to any emergency
response

“Community paradigm”
recognizes horizontal
partners as means to
expand influence and
contribute to
population-based
effects

Network Function: Authority and Control Within the Network
Control and authority
compromised in
decentralized
implementation

Control and authority
compromised in
decentralized
implementation

Control and authority
compromised in
decentralized
implementation

Control and authority
compromised in
decentralized
implementation

As vertical
decentralization
increases, CDC’s
authority and control
decreases

As vertical
decentralization
increases, CDC’s
authority and control
decreases

As vertical
decentralization
increases, CDC’s
authority and control
decreases

As vertical
decentralization
increases, CDC’s
authority and control
decreases

No authority over
unfunded, horizontal
partners on which
grantees are dependent

No authority over
unfunded, horizontal
partners – some of
which grantees are
dependent

In vertical chain, control
and authority are
facilitated by funding and
management tools (e.g.,
MDEs), network relations

No authority over
unfunded, horizontal
partners on which
grantees are dependent

Cooperative agreement
provides some authority
over grantees

Grant offered minimal
authority over grantees;
recent shift to
cooperative agreement
beginning in January
2009

Cooperative agreement
provides some authority
over grantees

Cooperative agreement
provides some authority
over grantees, but not
exercised
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Limited control over
local-level within vertical
chain; grantees models of
decentralization may
hinder authority by
grantee over local-level

CDC has not exercised
much authority over
grantees during the past
15 years

Dominance of vertical
network in NBCCEDP
facilitates authority and
control over performance
at all levels

Grantees are given
extensive autonomy
and have minimal
reporting requirements

Building relationships to
facilitate coordination is
essential in preparedness;
Developing relationships
with horizontal partners
at state and local-level is
a critical part of a public
health manager’s role

Skills to negotiate
partner relationships
important, but viewed
as weak among
grantees and local-level
staff

Network Function: Shared Organizational Goals and Priorities Within the Network
Differing priorities across
grantees; goal and
mission conflicts with
some horizontal partners

Differing priorities
across grantees; goal
and mission conflicts
with some horizontal
partners

Shared goals among
network partners

Shared goals among
network partners

Goal conflicts with
vertical partners;
Priorities of upstream
partners (ASPR, HHS,
DoD) privileged

Vertical network
partners often have
their own priorities

Some policy differences
within vertical chain (e.g.,
screening ages for
mammography)

Each organization
involved in
comprehensive tobacco
control has their own
agenda and perspective
depending on the
constituency they
represent

Public health is new to
the “emergency
preparedness” arena and
is challenged to “earn a
place at the table”

Different disease
burden (epidemiology)
likely an influence on
goal and priority
differences

Some policy differences
between CDC and
national advocates

Risk for different hazards
(and the potential scale of
a hazard) likely an
influence on goal and
priority differences
Network Function: Context, Capacity, and Resources
Extensive variability
across grantees in
capacity and resources

Extensive variability
across grantees in
capacity and resources

Extensive variability
across grantees in
capacity and resources

Extensive variability
across grantees in
capacity and resources

Variability in level of risk
for and type of “hazard”

Variability in STD
epidemiology (disease
burden, populations
affected)

Variability in
demographic profile of
priority population;
cultural barriers

Variability in emphasis
around goal areas;
Political climate within
states often influence
program priorities
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Program performance
must be interpreted based
on the unique context,
capacity, and resources of
the individual grantee

Program performance
must be interpreted
based on the unique
context, capacity, and
resources of the
individual grantee

Program performance
must be interpreted based
on the unique context,
capacity, and resources of
the individual grantee

Program performance
must be interpreted
based on the unique
context, capacity, and
resources of the
individual grantee

Variability in level of
state contributions

Laws and regulations
vary by state – affects
authority relationships

Variability in level of
state contributions

If include all resource
contributions for
tobacco control within a
state or territory, there
is huge variability
across grantees
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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
Purpose
Accountability “up” to
OMB, Congress, and
others “above” CDC

Accountability for
performance and
program improvement

Accountability to the
women served,
Congress, OMB, and
the public

Accountability “up” to
OMB, Congress, and
others “above” CDC,
and to state legislatures

Pressured to demonstrate
that the nation is
“prepared”

Adamant that
performance measures
will not be used for
budgeting

Program improvement
at all levels; a subset of
the performance
measures are part of a
budgeting formula

Important to
demonstrate
accountability for CDC
and other funding (e.g.,
excise tax revenues,
MSA settlement funds)

Other sets of measures
will be used for
monitoring, program
improvement, and
budgeting

Performance measures
intended to communicate
program priorities

Performance measures
intended to
communicate program
priorities

Performance measures
intended to provide a
“national picture” of
comprehensive tobacco
control efforts

The 3 GPRA/PART
measures relate closely
to six PHEP performance
measures

Performance measures
are aligned with
GPRA/PART measures,
although all but 1 of the
GPRA/PART measures
are population-based

Of the 3 GPRA/PART
measures, 1 is specific
to women served in the
NBCCEDP and the
other two are
population based

Of the 3 GPRA/PART
measures, one is a core
indicator – all our
population-level
measures

Level of Measurement
Grantee-level

Primarily local-level
with a couple that are
grantee-level related to
timely and complete data
submissions to CDC

Local-level

Primarily grantee but
some local-level

Six measures considered
“low hanging fruit” –
that is, what most
grantees can address and
those measures for which
data are available for
most grantees

First group of
performance measures
were “GRAM” (“get
right at ‘em”) measures,
that is, what most
grantees can address and
those measures for which
data are available for
most grantees

Patient-level, clinical
measures

A consideration in
selecting core measures
were those “low
hanging fruit” –
measures for which data
are available for most
grantees

Types of Performance Measures
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The current six measures
are process measures
reflecting “programmatic
capabilities”

Process measures (e.g.,
proportion of females
admittees to large
juvenile detention
facilities tested for
chlamydia)

Process measures (e.g.,
percentage of screening
mammograms provided
to women aged 50 and
older)

Program found that
common process
measures were
impossible to identify
given variation in
program priorities and
activities across
grantees

Intention to develop
intermediate measures in
the future

Short-term outcome
measures (e.g., among
clients of STD clinics,
the proportion of women
with positive chlamydia
tests that are treated
within 14 and 30 days of
the date of specimen
collection)

Short-term outcome
measures (e.g.,
percentage of abnormal
screening results with
time from screening
test to final diagnosis
less than 60 days)
and
Intermediate-outcome
measures (e.g.,
percentage of women
diagnosed with breast
cancer with treatment
started)

Core measures reflect
outcomes at the
immediate,
intermediate, and longterm levels

Distal measures are
unlikely to be included in
future performance
measures given that
multiple factors
contribute to them

Distal, population-level
measures (e.g., changes
in morbidity and
mortality) viewed as not
helpful for performance
measures given that
multiple factors
contribute to them, they
can take years to achieve,
and CSPS resources
cannot support a
population-level impact

Distal, population-level
measures (e.g.,
changes in morbidity
and mortality) viewed
as not helpful for
performance measures
given that multiple
factors contribute to
them, they can take
years to achieve, and
CSPS resources cannot
support a populationlevel impact

Concerns about data
availability for core
indicators across all
grantees given cost to
participate in various
surveys from which
most data are derived

3 GPRA/PART measures
reflect 3 of the 6
performance measures
aggregated at the
national level

Population-based
GPRA/PART measures
viewed as unrealistic and
not useful

Population-based
GPRA/PART measures
viewed as unrealistic
and not useful

Population-based
GPRA/PART measures
viewed as unrealistic

Use of Targets
National standards set by
CDC for 4 of the 6
measures

Grantees set their own 3year targets given their
individual baseline.
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National standards set
by CDC for all 11
measures

Grantees set their own
targets given their
individual baseline.

PHEP

CSPS

NBCCEDP

DSTDP does not believe
there is enough trend
data to consider national
indicators

Targets based on trend
data for national
program and policy
decisions

NTCP
Variability across
grantees in terms of
baseline data for the
measures makes
establishing national
standards difficult.

Quality Assurance Efforts
OMEB staff conducted
individual telephone
calls with grantees to
address data quality
issues for the first two
data submissions

Different people with
different skill levels enter
data from local and state
levels.

Different data systems
across grantees used
although CDC provides
an optional software
system for data
management to
grantees

Not reporting on core
measures yet – still in
development

Validation assessment
conducted in 2007
identified major quality
assurance issues (e.g.,
misunderstanding about
the intent of the
measures, uncertainty
regarding the definition
of the measures and how
each is calculated, poor
adherence to
measurement protocols)

Data quality problems
have been identified and
documented including
misunderstanding the
measures, capacity issues
affecting data collection
and reporting from locallevel, and differences in
data management
systems across grantees.
Challenging for DSTDP
to assess quality across
so many grantees.

National validation
study of MDE data was
conducted and
supported strong data
quality for program.
Some individual
grantees conduct chart
reviews and use other
quality assurance
practices to assess data
quality.

In regard to broader set
of key outcome
indicators, data
concerns relate to
frequent
“customization” of the
measures rather than
following measurement
protocol and definition.

OMEB has provided
guidance to grantees on
the performance
measures including a
document with detailed
definitions, measurement
specifications, and data
collection methods.

DSTDP has developed
technical assistance
materials and strategies:
A guidance document on
the performance
measures with detailed
information about the
intent of each measure,
definitions, measurement
specifications, data
sources; Performance
measurement “Learning
Tours” involving on-site
review of data quality
and provision of
technical assistance

Extensive data quality
system in place
including standard edit
programs to assess data
quality, technical
consultants who work
for the NBCCEDP data
contractor that work
individually with
grantees on datarelated issues, semiannual review of data
quality as part of MDE
data assessment. DCPC
provides grantees a
detailed MDE data
dictionary CDC
requires that grantees
include a staff position
for a data manager.

Much of the data
supporting the core
indicators will come
from survey data and
should be of high
quality. A few of the
core indicators require
local-level data
collection using data
sampling and collection
protocols that may be
difficult for some
grantees or may not be
implemented
consistently across
grantees.
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Research Question 1: How does networked public management affect the observability of program
outputs and outcomes?
Case

PHEP

Findings

Notes

Variability of “hazards” across network
and rarity of hazards affects observability
of specific outcomes. Risk of hazard varies
(e.g., hurricanes not likely to be observed in
some parts of network). Common
“observable” measures may be difficult to
define in a network. Also feasibility of
accomplishing some possible outcomes varies
given grantee context (48-hr prophylactic
distribution). Together, the complexity of
preparedness and network structure leads to
challenges in observing outcomes.

Relates to challenge of
identifying common
measures that are
meaningful to all network
partners. “Low hanging
fruit” selected early on.

H

Network fragments accountability for
outcomes. Complexity of problem
necessitates network response (at multiple –
vertical – levels AND from multiple –
horizontal – sectors). Outcomes can’t be
attributed to grantee alone.

Based on observability as
perspective of attribution
and accountability

H

Political environment (top level federal
partners in network) contradicts science-based
approach to identifying or defining observable
program outcomes.

PAHPA, HSPD-21

Unique to
PHEP

Complexity of preparedness is an
important factor in challenging
observability of program outcomes.
Complexity is reflected in the lack of a
conceptual framework for PHEP which means
OMEB cannot identify outcomes; lack of
science base; expanding scope; need for
multi-sector response at all levels of
government; and difficulties to measure
“prevention” “synergy” “collaboration.”.
PHEP measures represent process measures
more than outcomes since outcomes are
difficult to identify at this stage of the
program’s development.

What is it to “be
prepared”? Unique
political context which
has contributed to an
expansion of program
scope and demands, “Are
we prepared?” Important
to discussion of interplay
of program complexity
and networks

M
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Importance of
Case to RQ-1

Research Question 2: How does networked public management influence the use of performance
measurement and the types of performance measures used?
Case

PHEP

Findings

Notes

Importance of
Case to RQ2

Need to “meet states where they are.”
Broad network led to choice of “low hanging
fruit” to accommodate varied capacity,
resources, data availability, and to respond
to accountability demands from above.

Complexity, political
context, and stage of
program development also
relevant

H

Political influence of network members
affects types of measures selected. Pushback from grantees if types of PM do not
seem realistic, feasible, meaningful, or if
grantees do not feel they have control over
affecting performance for the measures. The
network (especially grantees) requires a
negotiation over types of measures selected.
Policy requirements (political context)
require use of performance measures and
even specifies use of some measures (topdown network influence) by PHEP. Political
pressure for accountability “up”

Policy tool may be a factor
here given “cooperative”
nature; HSPD-21, PAHPA
– Unique to PHEP

H

Network influences level of measures
selected. For PHEP, difficult to include
local-level outputs and outcomes because of
network structure – local level network
partners lack capacity to collect and report
data at local level in network. Using statelevel measures for now.

Newness (stage of
development) of program
may contribute to lack of
data collection/reporting
infrastructure

M

Network blurs who is responsible for
what. Hard to know WHO (which network
member) is responsible for WHAT
indicators given that outputs/outcomes often
reflect work of many.

Fuzzy boundary and joint
production problems

M

Different network partners want PM to serve
unique purposes (CDC wants PM for
accountability; grantees want PM for
program improvement) – Purpose affects
types of measures selected

Tension between
accountability and program
improvement unique to
PHEP

H
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Research Question 3: How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement?
Case

PHEP

Findings

Notes

As vertical and horizontal decentralization
increase, DSLR’s ability to influence
performance on outcomes decreases. CDC
has little to no control over local level network
partners; vertical structures vary within states;
preparedness demands reliance on horizontal
partners. Goal conflicts between vertical and
horizontal partners further reduces control over
outcomes.

Preparedness is achieved
through joint production
– contributions from
varied levels of
government and from
various sectors

H

H

Grantees demand measures that reflect
outputs and outcomes for which they have
control – leads to process measures. Expert
groups added criteria related to “control” for
measure selection. Grantees argue it is not fair
to make them accountable for performance on
measures for which they don’t have control.
Network may lead to choice of measures
“closer to the work” of grantees (that they have
control of and can affect and can be
accountable for). May support selection of
process measures.
Institutional and funding arrangements
facilitate authority and control within
vertical network. For PHEP, virtually no
control over horizontal partners – but PHEP
dependent on them.

Importance of
Case to RQ 3

Joint production of
outcomes by vertical and
horizontal partners

M

Data validity problems to
date

M

Network demands extensive stakeholder
involvement in development of PM system –
collaborative effort rather than a CDC
effort alone. Network partners influence
design. Need extensive QA to assure data
validity in network. Adoption incremental
given number of grantees.
Network demands sophisticated performance
mgmt system to facilitate use
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Research Question 1: How does networked public management affect the observability of program
outputs and outcomes?
Case

CSPS

Findings

Notes

Variability across network in STD
epidemiology challenges observability of
outcomes. Outcomes may be observed in
some parts of network and not in others (e.g.,
outcomes related to syphilis may not likely to
be observed in some parts of network).
Common “observable” and meaningful
measures may be difficult to define in a
network.

STD identified alternative
measures for low
morbidity areas, but some
thought they were not
priority measures

H

Complexity issue Some longer-term effects
may take years to detect, especially given
minimal resources to affect them. Science
base lacking for some measures and don’t
know how to measure some outcomes (PID).
25 different STDs, differing and shifting
disease burden.

Important to discussion of
interplay of program
complexity and networks

M

Network structure fragments
accountability. Complexity of problem
necessitates network response (at multiple –
vertical – levels AND from multiple –
horizontal – sectors). Outcomes can’t be
attributed to grantee alone. DSTDPs move to
a ‘community approach’ shifts public health
role to influencing partners (jails, private
providers).

Based on observability as
perspective of attribution
and accountability.
Important to discussion of
interplay of program
complexity and networks

H

Differences of opinion across networks of
what outcomes should be observed.
Extensive network has led to differences in
ideas about what key outputs and outcomes
should be prioritized – There is a lack of
consensus about priority outputs and
outcomes needed to reduce long term
morbidity and mortality related to STDs.

Participants suggest lack
of leadership at CDC to
define clear goals and
priorities – Unique to
DSTDP

L

Capacity and resource differentials across
network limit ability collect and report
data outcomes. Outputs and outcomes will
be observed several levels below CDC (local
level) and across 100’s of network partners.
While the outputs and outcomes may be
observable, there may be challenges related to
data availability across network and/or ability
to collect/report output and outcome data to
grantee.
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Importance of
Case to RQ 1

M

Research Question 2: How does networked public management influence the use of performance
measurement and the types of performance measures used?
Case

CSPS

Findings

Notes

Importance of
Case to RQ 2

Choose “get right at ‘em” measures. Broad
network led to choice of GRAM (“get right at
‘em) measures to accommodate varied
capacity, resources, data availability of
grantees and to support grantee buy-in –
DSTDP hopes for more sophisticated
measures in future

Complexity and political
context also relevant

H

Network influences level of measures
selected. Local level measures used given that
most program activities occur at this level (23 steps below CDC)

Level of measurement

H

Political influence of network members
affects types of measures selected. Network
members have political influence and resist if
types of PM do not seem realistic, feasible,
meaningful or consistent with their priorities

Types of measures –
Some proposed 2009
measures rejected

H

Changes in context and network structure
effects types of measures included.
Complexity: Changing patterns in health care
seeking behavior (shift from pubic STD
clinics to private providers) results in changes
in network structure and need to move to
broader, population-level PM

Complexity of public
health problem interacting
with network structure

Variability in network. Large network
introduces data quality issues that affect use
of PM data; use of PM to make comparisons
across grantees not helpful given their unique
context, resource differentials, etc. With broad
network that includes 100s of local level
partners, the adoption of PM and the use of
PM data has been slow.

L

Research Question 3: How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement?
Case

CSPS

Findings

Notes

Authority and control over outcomes
compromised given network structure.
Control weakens with greater vertical
decentralization (local level partners) and out
(no authority over horizontal, unfunded

Control over jails, juvenile
centers, some family
planning clinics difficult
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Importance of
Case to RQ 3
H

partners); varied state structures affect level of
control; funding tools vary between grantees
and local partners; laws and regulations differ
in states.
Mission and goal conflicts lessen control
and authority with local and horizontal
partners.

Jails have mission of
public safety vs. public
health

H

Pushback from grantees for PM where
performance is reliant on partners over
which they have little control. More
process/short-term outcomes (venue-specific)
selected vs. population level outcomes.

Guidance acknowledges
measures outside their
control.

H

PM help communicate program priorities
within a broad network. Cooperative
agreement as means to strengthen
authority in requiring reporting of PM.
Network demands extensive stakeholder
involvement in development of PM system
– collaborative or negotiated effort rather
than a CDC effort alone.

Network partner
influences PM design

Network requires that flexibility needed in
PM system. Grantees set their own targets
given variability in terms of disease burden,
but also in resources, capacity, and context.

Also, some choice in
measure selection for low
morbidity areas (syphilis)

Incremental approach needed given
extensive network. Time for adoption and
buy-in to occur at all levels – even CDC.
Champions in DSTDP. GRAM measures
first selected.

Organizational culture
resistant to PM
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Research Question 1: How does networked public management affect the observability of program
outputs and outcomes?
Case

Findings

Notes

NBCCEDP

Nature of the program (service delivery)
and decision to focus on outcomes only
for women served through the program
facilitates observability of program
outputs and outcomes. HOWEVER, some
outcomes less observable in parts of
network given community size (tribes and
territories have smaller numbers of cervical
cancer cases)

Unique to NBCCEDP

H

Nature of program, dominance of
vertical dimension, and use of specific
polity tools facilitate attribution of
outcomes to program.

Based on observability as
perspective of attribution
and accountability.
Important to discussion of
interplay of program
complexity and networks

H

Some longer-term effects may take years
to detect, especially given minimal
resources to affect them (NBCCEDP
serves 1% of population). Science base
lacking for some measures (re-screening
rates) and don’t know how to measure some
outcomes (disparities).

Important to discussion of
interplay of program
complexity and networks

M

Outputs and outcomes will be observed
several levels below CDC (local level) and
across 1000’s of network partners.
Outputs and outcomes are observable, in
part, given large investment in data
management system and staff capacity to
collect/report data.

Offers contrast to CSPS
and PHEP

M

Observability of treatment initiation
(outcome) obscured by policy factors within
network (HIPAA) that require use of proxy
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Importance of
Case to RQ 1

L

Research Question 2: How does networked public management influence the use of performance
measurement and the types of performance measures used?
Case

Findings

Notes

NBCCEDP

Purpose of PM, nature of program, and
network all influence type of measures
selected. Types of measures influenced more
by program goals/priorities and the nature of
the NBCCEDP as a service delivery program
– led to selection of PM related to clinical
services. Selected types of measures for
which programs can be held accountable and
are actionable.

Recognition that
population-level
measures would not
provide useful
information in network
context.

H

Political influence of network members
affects types of measures selected. Network
members (grantees) push-back if types of PM
do not seem realistic, feasible, meaningful or
consistent with their priorities (issues with
cervical measure). DCPC has revised
measures based on their feedback.

Types of measures

H

Extent of network and its variability has
effects on PM lends comparisons across
grantees not helpful given unique context,
resource differentials; adoption of PM has
taken time given size of network (time to
create a data-driven program culture at all
levels that supports submission of quality data
and use of PM data); requires incremental
implementation/use of PM over time. Large
network introduces data quality issues that
require extensive QA and TA system.
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Importance of
Case to RQ 2

L

Research Question 3: How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement?
Case

NBCCEDP

Findings

Notes

Importance of
Case to RQ 3

Service delivery occurs 2-3 steps below
CDC and some authority and control is
compromised given network structure.

CDC has little influence
on local level providers

H

Funding relationships strengthen
authority and control down vertical chain
within NBCCEDP. Cooperative
agreement used by DCPC to improve
authority in requiring PM Focus on
program-funded screenings also facilitates
authority and control. Dependence largely
on vertical chain increases authority and
control.

Funding tools important
– partner relationships
important

H

PM communicate program priorities
within a broad network. Strong consensus
across network on program goals and
priorities

M

Network demands extensive stakeholder
involvement in development of PM
system – collaborative and negotiated
effort rather than a CDC effort alone.
Push back on measures seen outside
grantees control (cervical measure); revise
measures seen as problematic.

H

Network variability requires some
flexibility needed in PM system.

PM not calculated if
small numbers

M

Longer term outcomes not viewed as fair
to be held accountable for (GPRA
measures) given network structure and
complexity of problem.

Morbidity and mortality
influenced by other
factors than screening
alone

L

M

Incremental approach to PM
implementation needed given extensive
network – time for adoption and buy-in to
occur at all levels.
PM design involves extensive
performance management system that
supports quality and use.

Significant and sustained
investment by CDC

H

Research Question 1: How does networked public management affect the observability of program
outputs and outcomes?
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Case

NTCP

Findings

Notes

Network structure fragments
accountability. Complexity of problem
necessitates network response (at multiple –
vertical – levels AND from multiple –
horizontal – sectors). Outcomes can’t be
attributed to grantee alone (especially since
CDC primarily supports infrastructure vs.
implementation activities). OSH has
accepted this as a given and aims to observe
effects of comprehensive tobacco control
efforts broadly.

Based on observability as
perspective of attribution
and accountability.
Important to discussion
of interplay of program
complexity and networks

H

Variability across network in smoking
prevalence challenges observability of
outcomes. Variability across grantees in
priorities (which goal area) affects
observability of outputs and outcomes.
Science base strong (logic models) and has
facilitated identification of observable
program outputs and outcomes.
HOWEVER, tobacco burden varies across
grantees making some outcomes more or
less observable across network.

Important to discussion
of interplay of program
complexity and networks

M

Network has adopted four goals which
facilitates identification of program outputs
and outcomes. HOWEVER, the extensive
NTCP network challenges ability to identify
common outputs and outcomes given that
grantees address different goal areas (due to
resource limitations, political context, etc.)
and that grantees implement different
activities.

OSH was unable to
identify common process
measures given
variability in which
activities are
implemented and how
they are implemented

H

Capacity and resource differentials across
network limit ability to collect and report
data (“observe”) outcomes. While outputs
and outcomes may be observable, there are
challenges across network to 1)
collect/report local-level valid data given
resource and capacity issues and 2) data
availability across network (expense of
survey data).
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Importance of
Case to RQ 1

M

Research Question 2: How does networked public management influence the use of performance
measurement and the types of performance measures used?
Case

NTCP

Findings

Notes

Select “low hanging fruit.” OSH selected PM
for which most/all states have data – the
“what’s available” approach.

“Low hanging fruit”
concept also observed in
PHEP and CSPS

M

Consensus across network on broad goals,
purpose of system, and strong science base
facilitate decisions around types of
measures included. Agreement on four goal
areas, outcomes for accountability, science
base supporting outcomes at three levels.

Goal consensus – also
exists in NBCCEDP

M

Variability across network in program
activities influences type of measures used.
Outcomes versus process measures.

Common process
measures possible for
NBCCEDP, PHEP, CSPS

H

H

Variability across grantees in goal area
priorities, program activities, and
implementation approaches, influences
choice of PM used.
Extent of network and variability of network
have led to data quality concerns for KOIS.
Comparisons across grantees not helpful
given unique context, resource differentials,
etc.
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Importance of
Case to RQ 2

Core indicators not
implemented yet

L

Research Question 3: How does networked public management affect CDC’s control over outcomes
and the subsequent design and perceived impact of performance measurement?
Case

NTCP

Findings

Notes

Importance of
Case to RQ 3

Choice of outcome-level measures means
grantees have little control over outcomes.
Integrated funding streams and broad
comprehensive tobacco control approach
leads to outcomes that reflect comprehensive
tobacco control efforts.

Recognition that
outcomes would only be
affected through
integrated, comprehensive
approach. May support
evaluation more than PM.

H

Challenge to identify a small, core set of
indicators. Grantees focus on different goal
areas and implement different activities.

Couldn’t identify common
process measures

M

Decentralization lessens CDC control over
local level activities. CDC dollars typically
support grantee infrastructure and may be a
small part of overall resources in a given state.

Large contributions to
tobacco control efforts
from excise taxes and
MSA funds

M

Flexibility needed in system given grantees
focus on different goals, different political
context, and different activities.

Target setting, choice of
KOIs

L

QA challenges will likely emerge with locallevel core measures in decentralized
context.

Core measures not
implemented yet –
specialized protocols for
data collection under
development.

L
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APPENDIX M
MATRIX TO FACILITATE DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-CASE FINDINGS
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Jennings & Haist (2004) Hypothesis: “The extent
to which performance measures are used and the
types of measures used will depend on the degree
to which outputs and outcomes can be observed”
(p185)

Research Question #1: How does networked
pubic management affect the observability of
program outputs and outcomes?
[Jennings and Haist define observability defined as
ability to measure outputs and outcomes and ability
to attribute outputs and outcomes to the program]

Finding #1: Network pubic management fragments the PHEP program’s accountability for results,
creating challenges for performance measurement.
Effect on performance
measurement system

Process measures selected that are more closely tied to the work of
grantees; Grantee-level measures selected rather than local level
measures that may be jointly produced

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Problematic to include output and outcome measures that are jointly
produced; Impossible to discern accountability or attribution for
jointly produced outputs and outcomes, especially outcomes further
along the results chain; Pragmatic challenges of data collection and
management for jointly produced outputs and outcomes; Challenges to
measure some constructs such as collaboration and synergy.

Case examples

Difficult to get partners to participate in public health-related
preparedness activities (e.g., planning for pandemic flu); Grantees
resistant to performance measures that they feel are unfair to be held
accountable for because performance on the measure is outside their
control.

Issues of case context
(situationality)

Achieving outcomes for preparedness demands a coordinated response
across levels of government and sectors at each level – vertical and
horizontal relationships involved in a response muddy efforts to assign
accountability.

Other supportive case examples

Network also fragments accountability in CSPS and NTCP; NTCP
closest example to jointly produced outcomes.

Negative case example

NBCCEDP processes, short-term and intermediate outcomes are easier
to observe because program involves service delivery and relate only
to women served through the program – accountability is more easily
maintained within the network

Finding #2: Network consensus on goals, a strong evidence base, and extensive survey data facilitate
identification of outcome measures for comprehensive tobacco control.
Effect on performance
measurement system

Network consensus on four goals is part of what facilitates
identification of 120 key outcome measures for NTCP from which
core indicators have been selected. Strong science base allows focus
on outcomes.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Network consensus on goals facilitates identification of common
performance measures even with variation in processes across grantees
– accountability assigned to efforts of entire comprehensive tobacco
control program, not just CDC-funded efforts (conscious decision to
accept limitations related to attribution).

Case examples

Four program goals with three evidence-based logic models facilitated
the identification of 120 KOIs using rigorous, panel process; More
challenging to identify small set of core indicators (that all grantees
will report) from that larger set because grantees focus on different
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program goals and few have resources to address all four.
Issues of case context
(situationality)

National partners in tobacco control and all grantees have adopted four
common goals for tobacco control; Strong evidence base after years of
well-funded research; Extensive survey data available at national level
from several sources; performance measurement needed for
accountability “up” and to defend resources at state and federal levels;
CDC interest to provide a “national snapshot” of tobacco control.

Other supportive case examples

Network consensus on program goals and activities in the NBCCEDP
facilitates identification of common outputs and outcomes.

Negative case example

Lack of consensus on goals (more an issue that the program is not well
understood yet – a developmental issue), weak science base, no survey
or surveillance data challenge PHEP to identify outcome measures;
Weak agreement on program goals (including weak leadership on
goals and priorities at CDC) challenges identification of outcomes for
CSPS, although logic models help.

Finding #3: The network implementation structure of the NTCP leads to a joint production of
outcomes and shared accountability
Effect on performance
measurement system

Decision to focus on outcomes and to openly recognize that outcomes
are jointly produced with shared accountability for outcomes among
all those participating in comprehensive tobacco control work.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Accountability is fragmented in a network structure that involves a
dominant horizontal dimension; Impossible to decipher who is
accountable for what.

Case examples

KOIs and core indicators represent outcomes for "comprehensive
tobacco control" efforts, not CDC-funded NTCP; Explicit examples
available for each program goal.

Issues of case context
(situationality)

OSH funds for NTCP primarily support infrastructure costs for
grantees, not program delivery; CDC funds are often only a fraction of
state funds available (excise taxes and MSA); Strategy of
comprehensive tobacco control recognizes importance of multiple
types and levels of interventions.

Other supportive case examples

PHEP reliant on jointly produced outcomes to ensure “preparedness;”
CSPS increasingly reliant on networked response involving private
physicians, jails, etc. in order to achieve population-level effects
inherent in their “community perspective.”

Negative case example

NBCCEDP outputs, short-, and intermediate outcomes observable
because all programs do the same thing (service delivery) and focus on
same goal; Accountability more easily maintained within vertical
network.
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Jennings & Haist (2004) Hypothesis: “The extent
to which performance measures are used and the
types of measures used will depend on the degree
to which outputs and outcomes can be observed”
(p185)

Research Question #2: How does networked
public management influence the use of
performance measurement and the types of
performance measures used?

Finding #1: In the case of the PHEP program, performance measurement is a “political, social, and
scientific” process.
Effect on performance
measurement system

Performance measurement development process is negotiated and
incremental; Political initiatives shape the performance measurement
system; Lack of science makes system vulnerable to political
influence.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Multiple factors influence the design of performance measurement
system; Network structure implies many levels of stakeholders
involved in development and implementation process; performance
measurement development is incremental and negotiated process
adoption will take time.

Case examples

Multiple performance measurement sets developed for different
purposes for PHEP; Evolving mission and expanding scope reflecting
political influence; Policy initiatives HSPD-21, PAHPA big factors
affecting PHEP performance measurement; Extensive stakeholder
involvement in process via Evaluation Workgroup, expert groups,
meetings with federal stakeholders in D.C.

Issues of case context
(situationality)

PHEP in highly political context; Lack of science base; Extensive
network interested in performance measures and pressure for
performance measures as means to show that “we’re prepared”
grantees, ASPR, Preparedness Directors, HHS, DoD, DHS, etc.

Other supportive case examples

PHEP more or less unique in the extent of political influence;
NBCCEPD has political influences on some measures – i.e., to allow
flexibility in measure on providing mammograms to women ages 4049.

Negative case example

Less political influence in CSPS and NTCP, although grantees as key
stakeholders have political power and influence.

Finding #2: Given the CSPS network context, performance measurement is a negotiated and
incremental process.
Effect on performance
measurement system

Process to develop performance measures has been slow and
negotiated; Adoption has been challenging which has affected use and
data quality (lack of endorsement by DSTDP management and
program consultants; resistance to performance measurement by
grantees).

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Network structure implies many levels of stakeholders involved in
development and implementation process; performance measurement
development is incremental and negotiated process adoption will take
time; For CSPS, adoption is required at hundreds of local-level sites;
To facilitate adoption in a network, extensive management system is
needed to support data quality, use, buy-in.
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Case examples

CSPS is not yet a data-driven culture; Grantees are resistant to
requirements; Program consultants sometimes entering data for
grantees; Process of workgroups negotiating measures, piloting, vetting
processes; Poor data quality at this time, although improving; Grant
has given much autonomy to grantees – move to cooperative
agreement with new five-year award in January 2009.

Issues of case context
(situationality)

Organizational culture issues Much autonomy and few requirements
for grantees over the years; Not particularly a data-driven
organizational culture; Long-standing program with institutionalized
organizational culture that is difficult to shift.

Other supportive case examples

NBCCEDP and PHEP also incremental and negotiated performance
measurement development processes. NBCCEDP has incrementally
expanded the use of their measures – most recently to budgeting.

Negative case example

N/A

Finding #3: The variability across the PHEP program’s vertical network significantly shapes the
design of its performance measurement system. [Variability: risk and scale of potential event/hazard;
Program context; Program priorities and activities: Capacity and resources; Data availability and
sophistication of data collection systems].
Effect on performance
measurement system

DSLR selected "low hanging fruit" at start; Can't compare grantees'
performance; Data quality issues; Selection of grantee-level measures
vs. local-level measures; Difficult to identify common measures.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Network variability in vertical chain – in terms of characteristics of
public health problem (risk/scale of hazard), in grantee organizations
(resources, capacity, context, data availability); Overall, variability
effects all aspects of the performance measurement system – choice of
measures, level of measurement, design of system (data quality
mechanisms, flexibility in system).

Case examples

Capacity and data availability issues led to selection of grantee-level
measures even though “all preparedness is local;” Extensive quality
assurance problems with individual telephone calls to grantees needed;
Selected “low hanging fruit” at start viewed as ones acceptable by
grantees and for which data was available across the grantees; Decision
not to compare grantee performance given their unique contexts.

Issues of case context
(situationality)

Huge variation in resource levels across grantees that affect capacity
for performance measurement, including data collection; Differences
in risk levels, potential hazards, and scale of event lead to different
priorities and activities across grantees; Limited control over locallevel although they get 50% of grantee funds.

Other supportive case examples

Three of four cases selected "low hanging fruit" at start in order to
accommodate variability across grantees, especially in regard to
capacity and data availability; None of the four cases compare
performance across grantees; Quality assurance big issue for all four
cases; Flexibility in performance measurement system is built into 3
cases.

Negative case example

Common set of performance measures possible for NBCCEDP given
that service delivery is same across grantees and program priorities are
tied to those services; Local-level measures possible given outcomes
tied to local-level service delivery; Capacity developed over time for
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data collection/reporting – large commitment of CDC resources to
build that capacity and support data quality.

Finding #4: Extensive variability across grantees influences the design of the CSPS performance
measurement system. [Variability in epidemiology disease burden, populations affected; Geographic
context; Capacity and resources; Program priorities and activities; Data availability and sophistication of
data collection systems].
Effect on performance
measurement system

Difficult to identify common set of measures meaningful to all
grantees; Selected GRAM (easiest) at start; Need for flexibility in
system for grantees; Can't compare grantee performance; Data quality
issues.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Network variability in vertical chain: Variability in terms of
characteristics of problem (STD burden; populations affected);
Variability in terms of grantee organizations (geog context, resources,
capacity; data availability) DO THEY HAVE DIFFERENT
IMPLICATIONS? In total variability effects all aspects of the PM
system choice of measures, level of measurement, design of system
(data quality mechanisms, flexibility in system.

Case examples

Some states with little syphilis, so syphilis-related measures not really
relevant; Added choice of measures for low morbidity areas (but some
staff disagreed with approach); Allow grantees to set their own
baseline and targets; Selected GRAM measures; Decision not to
compare grantees since "apples and oranges."

Issues of case context
(situationality)

25 different STDs and CDC focuses on 3; Epidemiology of these 3
STDs varies by grantee in terms of disease burden and populations
affected; Some states have huge geographic area and part-time staff
given small resources while others have lots of DIS and CDC
assignees.

Other supportive case examples

All four cases are confronted with this issue of variability –
NBCCEDP’s variability seems to have the least affect on their
performance measures given it is a service delivery system. However,
even the NBCCEDP has had to accommodate this variability in their
system by not calculating measures if a small “n,” not comparing
grantees given variable context, etc.

Negative case example

N/A
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Finding #5: The NBCCEDP network requires that DCPC make significant resource investments to
build a comprehensive performance management system in order to ensure data quality and the use
of performance measurement data at multiple levels.
Effect on performance
measurement system

Large financial investment in performance management and data
monitoring system for NBCCEDP; Strong data quality; Data reporting
requirements in cooperative agreement.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Implementing performance measurement in a large network context
requires extensive resources and commitment to build adequate
performance management system to support data quality and data use at
all levels.

Case examples

NBCCEPD has supported a data contractor since the program’s
inception; Requirement of data management staff for all grantees;
Training provided on-going; Extensive technical assistance for data
management efforts; Monitoring cycle instituted to regularly review
and discuss data with grantees; Software provision; Consistent
managing with data.

Issues of case context
(situationality)

DCPC has built a data-driven culture around the NBCCEDP from the
start; DCPC has advantage of a service delivery program with the
NBCCEDP that has made measurement of relevant processes and
outcomes feasible.

Other supportive case examples

PHEP and NTCP do not have mature enough performance
measurement systems to assess this aspect.

Negative case example

Use of performance data and data quality are limited in CSPS because
DSTDP lacks a data-driven CSPS program culture; Lacks sophisticated
performance management system to reinforce data use and data quality.

Finding #6: Network variability limits types and choice of NTCP core measures and their use
[Variability: state political context; tobacco control priorities; program priorities and activities; capacity
and resources].
Effect on performance
measurement system

Could not identify common process measures; Difficult to select
common outcome measures because grantees focus on different goals
"low hanging fruit" a factor for selection since data is not available for
all grantees; Use of performance data may be limited to evaluation
given focus on outcomes; Grantees select KOIs and reporting is
optional (flexibility); Reporting of core indicators is not a requirement
of new 2009 FOA.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Within vertical network, variability in grantee's resources, goal
priorities, and context influences choice and types of performance
measures.

Case examples

Only outcome measures are used because grantees implement activities
(even “best practices) in too many different ways to identify common
process measures; Data availability and grantee capacity a
consideration in selecting "low hanging fruit" (easiest); Data collection
infrequent for surveys (every 2-5 years) which may limit use of
performance data to evaluation rather than performance
management/monitoring.

Issues of case context

Grantees have different focus on the four goal areas sometimes choice
is influenced by political context; Although best practices &
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(situationality)

community guide provide extensive information on evidence-based
program activities for tobacco control, implementation happens in many
different ways; Costly to conduct/participate in all the varied surveys
(tobacco supplements, etc) so not every grantee will have data to
calculate core measures.

Other supportive case examples

All cases support this issue of the effects of network variability on
performance measurement

Negative case example

N/A

514

Jennings & Haist (2004) Hypothesis:
“Measurement will be more common and will
have greater impact when agencies have greater
control over outcomes” (p185)

Research Question #3: How does networked
public management affect CDC’s control over
outcomes and the subsequent design and
perceived impact of performance measurement?

Finding #1: Dependency on the PHEP program’s network partners diminishes CDC and grantee
control over performance.
Effect on performance
measurement system

Process measures selected that are more closely tied to work of
grantees and for which grantees feel they have greater control.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Issue of control effects types and choice of measures.

Case examples

PHEP has applied a criteria for selection of new performance measures
titled, "under control of public health"; Concerns about "fairness";
Grantees reject measures viewed as too far outside their control.

Issues of case context
(situationality)

PHEP outcomes are not yet well defined; Outcomes for preparedness
are jointly produced; Goal conflicts with horizontal partners from other
sectors.

Other supportive case examples

CSPS and NTCP – all involve dependencies on vertical and
HORIZONTAL partners

Negative case example

NBCCEDP has greater dependence on vertical partners with whom
some authority can be exerted through policy tools, network
relationships, etc.

Finding #2: Dependencies and goal conflicts with CSPS local-level, horizontal network partners
compromises grantees’ control over performance.
Effect on performance
measurement system

Selection of process and immediate outcome measures and venuespecific measures that grantees feel they have more control over.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Problematic to include intermediate or long-term outcome measures
that are jointly produced; Data availability and quality problematic
when relying on unfunded, informal partners; Hard to discern
accountability for longer term outcomes.

Case examples

Grantees oppose performance measures viewed as too far outside their
control; Priority and goal conflicts with vertical and horizontal partners
public health vs. public safety (corrections) – makes it difficult to
identify incentives for unfunded, horizontal partners with other
priorities; No formal authority over jails, physicians outside the funded
STD clinics and family planning sites, juvenile detention; Dependent
on jails, physicians, and others to participate in STD screening and
treatment AND to provide data for performance measures; Grantees
reject population-based measures other than for syphilis (2009
proposed measures); DSTDP think GPRA measures at population-level
are unrealistic.
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Issues of case context
(situationality)

DSTDP advocating "community perspective" and greater focus on
population effects, but recognizes that their limited resources are
inadequate to have population effects on their own; Emphasis on
engaging network partners like private providers, jails, juvenile centers
in order to access high risk populations; Changes in broader health care
access affecting program goals; Stubborn institutional culture resistant
to change; Grant as funding mechanism does not support much control
within vertical network and DSTDP has not demanded much
accountability in past; Inadequate resources to have population-level
effects on disease prevalence and incidence.

Other supportive case examples

PHEP, NTCP

Negative case example

NBCEDP has less dependencies given greater reliance on vertical
partners.

Finding #3: Although the NBCCEDP network compromises control over program implementation,
DCPC has designed its performance measurement system in ways that support CDC’s and grantees’
control over performances.
Effect on performance
measurement system

DCPC designed the program in ways that enhance control: Narrow
focus on women served, rather than broader, population-level focus;
Selected performance measures aligned with program priorities and
consistent with service delivery implementation that grantees can
control process, short-term, and intermediate performance measures
related to service delivery; DCPC has made revisions in measures to
strengthen grantee’s control over measured performance; Allows
multiple uses of performance measurement data for accountability,
program improvement, and budgeting.

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Network consensus on program goals facilitates selection of
performance measures; Reliance on vertical network with less
dependence on horizontal increases control over performance and
accountability is less fragmented; Grantees view performance
measurement as meaningful, fair, valid, and relevant to priorities
allowing data to be used for multiple purposes, including budgeting.

Case examples

Revised calculation of measure (cervical measure related to time to
diagnosis) to assure grantee control; Performance measures tied to
work of providers in vertical network; policy tools used strengthen
control within vertical network.

Issues of case context
(situationality)

Narrow focus on women served through NBCCEDP; Service delivery
dependent primarily on vertical network; Strong consensus within
network on program goals; Control over vertical network through
policy tools, management practice, and network relationships; 22,000
local providers in system.

Other supportive case examples

Less grantee resistance to measures for which they have greater control
– in CSPS, more support for measures that are dependent on work of
vertical, funded partners; in PHEP, greater support for measures that
grantees directly affect.

Negative case example

NTCP has made decision to include outcomes that are jointly produced
– performance is dependent on comprehensive activities implemented
by multiple partners and at multiple levels.
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Finding #4: Policy tools, management practice, and network partnerships enhance DCPC and
grantee control over the NBCCEDP performance measures.
Effect on performance
measurement system

DCPC and grantees feel greater control over performance on measures
Reporting of performance measures is a requirement of cooperative
agreement; Performance measures is included as a requirement in
grantee contracts with providers (not clear how many grantee use
performance-based contracts).

Broader implication for
performance measurement

Policy tools, management practices, and partner relationships can
strengthen authority within vertical network to give grantees more
control over performance.

Case examples

CDC's use of MDE monitoring data to enhance control over local level
through on-going monitoring of extensive program data (service
delivery data); Cooperative agreement requirements for MDE
reporting; States use of performance-based contracts or other
reimbursement policies to influence performance; CDC's use of
performance measures for budgeting increases importance of measures
to grantees; Grantees’ relationships with providers supports control as
it facilitates greater influence with these partners.

Issues of case context
(situationality)

Mature program with long-standing relationships with grantees and
with local level providers; Some grantees willing to apply
performance-based contracts using the NBCCEDP performance
measures; Extensive and sophisticated data management/monitoring
system (MDEs); Data-driven organizational culture endorsed at all
levels of CDC management; Grantee buy-in on importance and value
of performance measures for assuring accountability with women
served in program.

Other supportive case examples

Less evidence across other cases in use of policy tools, etc. to
strengthen control.

Negative case example

CSPS and NTCP do not exert much authority through their policy tools
(grant, cooperative agreement).
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Summary of Case Findings

Public Health Preparedness Program (PHEP)
1. Dependency on the PHEP program’s network partners diminishes CDC and
grantee control over performance.
2. Network public management fragments the PHEP program’s accountability for
results, creating challenges for performance measurement.
3. In the case of the PHEP program, performance measurement is a “political, social,
and scientific” process.
4. The variability across the PHEP program’s vertical network significantly shapes
the design of its performance measurement system.

Comprehensive STD Prevention Systems (CSPS)
5. Dependencies and goal conflicts with CSPS’ local-level, horizontal network
partners compromises grantees’ control over performance.
6. Given the CSPS network context, performance measurement is a negotiated and
incremental process.
7. Extensive variability across grantees influences the design of the CSPS’
performance measurement system.

National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program (NBCCEDP)
8. Although the NBCCEDP network compromises control over program
implementation, DCPC has designed its performance measurement system in
ways that support CDC’s and grantees’ control over performances.
9. Policy tools, management practice, and network partnerships enhance CDC and
grantee control over the NBCCEDP performance measures.
10. The NBCCEDP network requires that DCPC make significant resource
investments to build a comprehensive performance management system in order
to ensure data quality and the use of performance measurement data at multiple
levels.
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National Tobacco Control Program (NTCP)
1. Network consensus on goals, a strong evidence base, and extensive survey data
facilitate identification of outcome measures for comprehensive tobacco control.
2. The network implementation structure of the NTCP leads to a joint production of
outcomes and shared accountability.
3. Network variability limits types and choice of NTCP core measures and their use.
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